Tesfay v. Travel Centers of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
AMANUEL TESFAY, 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Action No. CJC-25-1242
TRAVEL CENTERS OF AMERICA, 	*
Defendant. 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court are two motions: Defendant’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (the
“Fee Motion”), ECF No. 25, and Plaintiff’s combined Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice,
Motion to Vacate Judgment, and Motion for Sanctions (the “Omnibus Motion”), ECF No. 30.
For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Fee Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Omnibus
Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court construes Plaintiff’s
“Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice” as a request for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court grants the request for voluntary
dismissal on the specific condition that Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel must pay the judgment
imposed within 30 days of this Order. Failure to do so shall result in dismissal with prejudice.
I. 	RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On November 19, 2025, I granted Defendant’s motion for sanctions against Plaintiff due
to Plaintiff’s failure to cooperate in discovery. See ECF No. 24. Specifically, Plaintiff failed to
comply with this Court’s August 21, 2025, Order requiring Plaintiff to respond to all outstanding
discovery requests by August 29, 2025. ECF No. 24 at 2–3. Plaintiff also twice failed to attend
his own deposition, despite agreeing to the depositions and receiving proper notice of the
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depositions. ECF No. 24 at 3. Relying on the broad discretion afforded to the Court in discovery
matters, I sanctioned Plaintiff by finding that Plaintiff waived any objections to Defendant’s
request for production of documents. ECF No. 24 at 4. I further ordered Plaintiff to pay the costs
assessed to Defendant for Plaintiff’s untimely cancellations of both depositions. ECF No. 24 at 4.
Finally, consistent with Rule 37(b)(2)(C), I ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s attorneys’ fees
caused by Plaintiff’s discovery violations. ECF No. 24 at 4. I directed Defendant to submit a bill
of costs and a supporting affidavit no later than December 15, 2025, justifying a reasonable sum
for attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 24 at 4. Defendant did so on December 11, 2025. ECF No. 25.
Plaintiff did not file a response.
On January 6, 2026, the parties were scheduled to attend a settlement conference before
the Honorable Erin Aslan. ECF No. 19. However, Judge Aslan canceled the settlement
conference after Plaintiff and his counsel both failed to appear. ECF No. 28. Significantly, Judge
Aslan noted that the parties had agreed to the settlement conference date in August 2025, and
that, in addition to failing to appear, Plaintiff’s counsel also failed to comply with the Court
Order requiring all parties to submit an ex parte statement in advance of mediation. ECF No. 28.
Also on January 6, I scheduled a status conference for January 13 at 10:00 a.m. ECF No.
29. That same day, Plaintiff filed his Omnibus Motion seeking dismissal of his own case without
prejudice. ECF No. 30. Plaintiff also asks this Court to vacate any judgments entered and to
impose sanctions against Defendant for Defendant’s alleged discovery violations. ECF No. 30.
I held a status conference on January 13. ECF No. 32. Counsel for Defendant was
present. Plaintiff’s counsel did not appear, nor did he contact the Court to advise of any
scheduling conflict or inability to attend. By a conservative estimate, Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure
to attend the January 13 status conference is the third consecutive Court order that he has
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ignored. See ECF Nos. 19, 28 (Order scheduling settlement conference; Plaintiff’s counsel did
not appear); ECF Nos. 20, 24 (Order requiring Plaintiff to respond to all outstanding discovery;
Plaintiff’s counsel did not fully comply); and ECF No. 29 (Order scheduling status conference;
Plaintiff’s counsel did not appear).1
II. 	ANALYSIS
I turn first to Defendant’s Fee Motion before addressing the myriad issues in Plaintiff’s
Omnibus Motion.
A. 	Defendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs are reasonable.
Defendant seeks $7,900 in attorneys’ fees and $878.89 in costs for a total of $8,778.89.
ECF No. 25-1. “In calculating an award of attorney[s’] fees, the Court must determine the
lodestar amount, defined as a ‘reasonable hourly rate multiplied by hours reasonably expended.’”
Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Niles Indus. Coatings, LLC, Civil Action
No. RDB-20-0619, 2023 WL 6619371, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 2023) (quoting Lopez v. XTEL
Const. Grp., LLC, 838 F. Supp. 2d 346, 348 (D. Md. 2012)). Several factors guide this
reasonableness inquiry:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the
attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee
for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the
time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in
controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of
the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which
1 This estimate is conservative because the docket reflects other times where Plaintiff’s counsel
failed to attend Court proceedings or abide by Court protocol. See ECF No. 8 (reflecting Plaintiff’s
counsel’s failure to jointly submit a status report regarding the initial scheduling order); ECF No.
9 (reflecting Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to attend an initial case management conference call with
the Honorable Matthew J. Maddox); and repeated failures by Plaintiff to respond to Defendant’s
motions and discovery dispute correspondence, ECF Nos. 16, 17, 21, 23, 25.
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the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between
attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.
Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243–44 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Barber v.
Kimbrell’s, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978) (adopting the twelve factors set forth in
Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974))).
Many of the above factors are not relevant to a determination of attorneys’ fees relating
to a discovery dispute. See Burley v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, Civil Action No. SAG-18-1743,
2020 WL 1984906, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2020). Rather, “the most relevant Johnson factors are
the time and labor expended, the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised, the skill required
to properly perform the legal services rendered, and the experience, reputation and ability of the
attorneys.” Id. I discuss the reasonableness of Defendant’s counsel’s hourly rate and hours
expended in connection with these factors.
1. 	Experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys
Andrew Stephenson, counsel for Defendant, has submitted an affidavit describing the
experience and background of Defendant’s legal team to justify their respective hourly rates. As
part of the calculation of a fee award, the Court “must consider all relevant evidence to
determine the prevailing market rates in the relevant community . . . including lawyer affidavits,
fee awards in similar cases, general surveys, fee matrices, and even its own personal
knowledge.” De Paredes v. Zen Nails Studio LLC, 134 F.4th 750, 754 (4th Cir. 2025) (citation
modified). When considering a published fee matrix, like the Fitzpatrick Matrix, Loc. R. App’x
B.3 (D. Md. 2025), the Court cannot “elevate a matrix above all other types of evidence or treat a
matrix as establishing a presumptive answer or range of answers.” De Paredes, 134 F.4th at 754.
Mr. Stephenson’s affidavit describes each team member’s professional credentials,
including their title or role and years spent practicing. Mr. Stephenson is a Principal at the law
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firm of Franklin & Prokopik, P.C. (“Franklin & Prokopik”), which is located in Baltimore. ECF
No. 25-2 ¶ 2. Mr. Stephenson has been practicing law for more than 25 years. ECF No. 25-2 ¶ 2.
As Principal, his hourly rate is $250. ECF No. 25-2 ¶ 5. Pavel Glazunov is an Associate at
Franklin & Prokopik with approximately 4 years of experience. ECF No. 25-2 ¶ 3. Mr.
Glazunov’s hourly rate is $195. ECF No. 25-2 ¶ 5. Amanda Moran is a Paralegal at Franklin &
Prokopik with an hourly rate of $150. ECF No. 25-2 ¶¶ 4–5.
I find these rates reasonable. The affidavit of Mr. Stephenson establishes that the
attorneys and paralegal working on this matter are experienced, and that their rates are
comparable to the fee rates of other Baltimore law firms that provide similar legal services. See
ECF No. 25-2 ¶¶ 6–7. Moreover, I note that the rates fall well below those set forth in the
Fitzpatrick Matrix for attorneys with commensurate experience. See Loc. R. App’x B.3 (D. Md.
2025). While the Fitzpatrick Matrix is not dispositive, it is a relevant data point in the Court’s
analysis and supports the reasonableness of Defendant’s fees.
2. 	Time and labor expended
The fee detail demonstrates that Defendant’s counsel spent a combined 45.5 hours of
legal work dating back to August 1, 2025, through the filing of their request for fees. See ECF
No. 25-3. The fee detail and Mr. Stephenson’s affidavit describe the efforts undertaken by
Defendant’s counsel to obtain discovery from Plaintiff. Those efforts include, but are not limited
to, communicating with Plaintiff’s counsel regarding Plaintiff’s depositions; preparing for
Plaintiff’s depositions; attending the depositions, at which Plaintiff and his attorney failed to
appear; drafting correspondence to the Court regarding Plaintiff’s discovery violations; and
drafting discovery-related motions seeking sanctions and fees. See ECF Nos. 25-2 ¶ 9, 25-3. It is
evident from the fee detail that Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute his own case and participate in
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discovery necessitated the steps that Defendant took to obtain Court intervention. Accordingly, I
find that the time and labor expended from and including August 1, 2025, through December 11,
2025, is reasonable under the circumstances.
3. 	Novelty and difficulty of the questions raised, and skill required to
properly perform the legal services rendered.
These two factors are interrelated. The discovery issues presented in this case were not
novel or substantively complex. Given the straightforward nature of the issues, Mr. Stephenson
appears to have appropriately delegated much of the legal work to Mr. Glazunov, who is an
associate and bills at a lower rate. Defendant’s counsel exercised sound billing judgment by
limiting the fees where possible. Accordingly, these factors support the reasonableness of
Defendant’s attorneys’ fees.
4. 	Defendant’s costs
I ordered Plaintiff to pay the costs assessed to Defendant for Plaintiff’s failure to attend
his two scheduled depositions. Defendant submitted an itemization of costs and supporting
invoices reflecting that Planet Depos, a court reporting company, charged Defendant $528.89 for
the cancellation of the August 8, 2025, deposition of Plaintiff and $350 for the cancellation of the
September 2, 2025, deposition of Plaintiff, for a total of $878.89. See ECF No. 25-1, -4. These
costs are facially valid and will be awarded to Defendant.
B. 	Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel must pay Defendant’s attorneys’ fees and
costs.
The only remaining issue regarding Defendant’s attorneys’ fees is who will pay the fees.
Rule 37(b) permits the Court to impose attorneys’ fees against the disobeying party, the party’s
attorney, or both. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). “In apportioning fees between counsel and client,
the central question is: who is responsible for the misconduct?” Park v. Kim, No. 20 CV 2636
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(PKC)(LB), 2024 WL 5643192, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2024). In the Fourth Circuit, courts
generally apportion fees to the party, the party’s attorney, or both only if there is evidence that
they contributed to a discovery violation. See Doe v. Mast, No. 3:22CV00049, 2025 WL
1787436, at *5 (W.D. Va. June 27, 2025) (“some district courts make the attorney pay only when
it is clear that discovery was unjustifiably opposed principally at his or her instigation.” (citation
modified)); NOA, LLC v. Khoury, No. 5:14-CV-114-FL, 2016 WL 4444770, at *6 (E.D.N.C.
Aug. 23, 2016) (imposing fees solely against attorneys because of their inadequate discovery
responses); see also Vaughn v. Grand Brands, LLC, No. 2:19CV596, 2020 WL 5743215, at *5
(E.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2020) (imposing fees under Rule 37(a)(5)(a) against attorneys alone because
“[t]he Court has been presented no information suggesting that Plaintiff … was the instigating
force behind the decision to refuse to cooperate”).
Here, the evidence supports holding both Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel responsible for
the judgment. Both Plaintiff and his counsel failed to appear for the two scheduled depositions.
For Plaintiff’s counsel’s part, he failed to respond to all of Defendant’s outstanding discovery
requests, in violation of the Court’s express order. See NOA, 2016 WL 4444770, at *6 (finding
responsibility for inadequate discovery responses “usually, and appropriately, falls at the feet of
counsel”). Based on this clear evidence, the Court finds it appropriate to impose costs and fees
jointly and severally.
Accordingly, judgment will be entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff and
Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $8,778.89.
C. 	Plaintiff’s Omnibus Motion is procedurally and substantively flawed.
Plaintiff’s Omnibus Motion is rife with defects. It is neither procedurally nor
substantively proper. I begin with two initial observations. First, the Plaintiff, Amanuel Tesfay,
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has attempted to unilaterally substitute ETA Trucking as the plaintiff. See ECF No. 30. ETA
Trucking is a not a party to this case. Plaintiff did not amend his Complaint within the time
prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or this Court’s Scheduling Order to add ETA
Trucking as a party, and Plaintiff did not seek leave to do so. Accordingly, the Court disregards
Plaintiff’s attempt at party substitution and construes the Omnibus Motion as filed by Amanuel
Tesfay, the sole Plaintiff in this action.
Second, the Omnibus Motion is an amalgam of requests that Plaintiff should have filed as
standalone motions with a supporting memorandum. See Loc. R. 105.1 (D. Md. 2025) (requiring
a memorandum to accompany any motion). Plaintiff’s requests are inherently contradictory.
Plaintiff requests dismissal of the case because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. ECF
No. 30 at 3. Yet, Plaintiff simultaneously asks the Court to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of
imposing sanctions against Defendant. ECF No. 30 at 4. Even more confusing, Plaintiff also
seeks vacatur of a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which, in
essence, is a request to reopen a case following the district court’s final judgment, order, or
proceeding. ECF No. 30 at 2. At bottom, the Omnibus Motion makes little sense. It spans 5
pages, fails to cite a single case, and lacks clear reasoning. The form and substance of the
Omnibus Motion are flawed, as set out in greater detail below.
1. 	The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to vacate the Court’s judgment.
Plaintiff asks this Court to vacate any judgment under Rule 60(b) “due to excusable
misunderstanding regarding deposition logistics, mischaracterization of discovery conduct, and a
lack of prejudice to the Defendant . . .” ECF No. 30 at 2. Plaintiff’s request is premature and
procedurally improper.
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“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits ‘a party to seek relief from a final
judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances.’” Kemp v.
United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022) (citing Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005)).
Rule 60(b)(1) provides that a party may seek relief based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)). Rule 60(b)(3) allows a party to seek
relief for “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(3). Rule 60(b)(6) provides a catchall for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Id.
Critically, Rule 60(b) provides an avenue for relief only after the district court has
entered a final judgment, order, or proceeding. As the Advisory Committee Notes makes plain,
“[t]he addition of the qualifying word ‘final’ emphasizes the character of the judgments, orders
or proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief; and hence interlocutory judgments are not
brought within the restrictions of the rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) Advisory Committee’s Note to
the 1946 Amendment.
Plaintiff erroneously filed the Omnibus Motion seeking vacatur of “any judgments”
before entry of any final judgment, order, or proceeding on the merits. ECF No. 30 at 5. While
the Court had ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff’s discovery
violations, that Order was hardly “final” within the meaning of Rule 60(b). See Gonzalez v.
Wicked Taco LLC, No. 1:23-CV-09555 (NCM)(JAM), 2025 WL 3755601, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
23, 2025) (“Discovery orders are not final judgments, orders, or proceedings. . . . Consequently,
a party seeking relief from a court’s discovery order may not resort to Rule 60(b)” (citation
modified)).2
2 Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) request is also perplexing because Plaintiff makes this request along with
a request for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 30 at 5. Thus, Plaintiff
seeks both a reopening and a dismissal of his lawsuit at once. Plaintiff cannot have it both ways.
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To the extent that Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) request is intended as a request for
reconsideration of the Court’s order imposing sanctions, that request is denied as untimely.
Plaintiff had several opportunities to challenge Defendant’s request for discovery sanctions and
failed to do so. First, Plaintiff never responded to the three separate letters filed by Defendant, in
which Defendant advised the Court of Plaintiff’s discovery violations. Second, Plaintiff never
filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion seeking sanctions. Third, Plaintiff failed to
file any request for reconsideration of the Court’s November 19, 2025, Order imposing
sanctions. See Loc. R. 105.10 (providing 14 days for a party to file any motion to reconsider any
order issued by the Court). Fourth, Plaintiff did not file any response in opposition to
Defendant’s request and affidavit supporting attorneys’ fees and related bill of costs, despite the
Court’s specific invitation to Plaintiff to file any response within 14 days after the filing of
Defendant’s request. ECF No. 24 at 5. These repeated failures reflect that Plaintiff and his
counsel were content with the record regarding Plaintiff’s discovery failures and the Court’s
orders regarding the same.
2. 	The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for sanctions against Defendant.
As noted above, Plaintiff had many opportunities to develop a record of any purported
discovery violations by Defendant. Plaintiff could have advised the Court of Defendant’s alleged
discovery failures by either responding to Defendant’s discovery-related correspondence and
motions or by filing his own correspondence and motions during the discovery period. Discovery
closed on October 2—more than 90 days before the filing of Plaintiff’s Omnibus Motion.
Plaintiff offers no explanation for the untimely sanctions request. The alleged discovery
violations that Plaintiff describes are precisely the kind of discovery disputes that my discovery
dispute procedure was designed to resolve. See ECF No. 15. Plaintiff should have raised these
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disputes earlier and in conformance with my protocol. Plaintiff chose not to do so, and discovery
is now closed. Plaintiff’s belated request for sanctions is therefore denied.
3. 	The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff seeks dismissal of his lawsuit on the ground that the Court no longer has subject
matter jurisdiction “[b]ecause Plaintiff’s amended ‘amount in controversy’ is no longer more
than $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” ECF No. 30 at 1. In addition, Plaintiff appears to
seek remand of this case back to the Circuit Court for Washington County due to a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See ECF No. 30 at 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
As noted above, Plaintiff did not amend his Complaint. The time to amend as a matter of
course has long expired, and Plaintiff did not file a proper motion seeking leave to amend his
Complaint. Thus, the amount in controversy articulated in the Complaint at the time of
removal—“an amount greater than $75,000, plus costs”—remains the operative factual
allegation for jurisdictional purposes. ECF No. 30 at 3.
Even if the amount in controversy had fallen below the jurisdictional threshold, that
would not deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction at this stage. Courts have repeatedly
found, based on settled Supreme Court precedent, that “a post-removal ‘amendment of
[plaintiff’s] pleadings,’ that ‘reduces the claim below the requisite amount ... does not deprive
the district court of jurisdiction.’” Burgess v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 7:19-CV-235-FL, 2020 WL
1812010, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 9, 2020) (quoting Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
283, 292 (1938)); see also, e.g., Coleman v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Civil Action No. L-
10-2297, 2010 WL 5055788, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2010); Hatcher v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc.,
718 F. Supp. 2d 684, 687 (E.D. Va. 2010); 13E Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 3608 (3d ed. 2025).
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Because Plaintiff did not properly amend his Complaint to reduce the amount in
controversy, and any such reduction would not deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction
in the first instance, Plaintiff’s request for “mandatory” dismissal without prejudice is denied.
D. 	The Court construes Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss as a request for voluntary
dismissal.
While I will not grant Plaintiff’s request for dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, I will construe Plaintiff’s request as a request for voluntary dismissal pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Rule 41(a)(2) allows the Court to dismiss an action “on
terms that the [C]ourt considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The Court should consider the
following non-exclusive factors when deciding whether to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2): “(1) the opposing party’s effort and expense in preparing for trial; (2) excessive delay
or lack of diligence on the part of the movant; (3) an insufficient explanation of the need for
a dismissal; and (4) the present state of the litigation.” Catlett v. Young & Assocs., P.A., No. CV
0:17-3236-DCN-PJG, 2018 WL 6926607, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-3236 DCN, 2018 WL 6921930 (D.S.C. Oct. 23,
2018) (citing Miller v. Terramite Corp., 114 Fed. App’x 536, 540 (4th Cir. 2004)).
The Court may grant a request for voluntary dismissal either without prejudice or with
prejudice if the plaintiff fails to satisfy particular conditions. “Unless the order states otherwise, a
dismissal” pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) “is without prejudice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). “It is
implicit in this language that the district court may dismiss the plaintiff’s action either without
prejudice or, by so specifying, with prejudice.” Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Goodwin & Boone, 11
F.3d 469, 471 (4th Cir. 1993). “Rule 41(a)(2) ‘permits the district court to impose conditions on
voluntary dismissal to obviate any prejudice to the defendants which may otherwise result from
dismissal without prejudice.’” Sadler v. Dimensions Health Corp., 178 F.R.D. 56, 60 (D. Md.
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1998) (quoting Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.1987)). The Court “may
require that the dismissal will become prejudicial if certain conditions are not met, so long as
considerations of due process and fundamental fairness are taken into account and the party
requesting dismissal is given ‘explicit and clear’ warning of the harsh consequences of failing to
comply with the court’s conditions.” Id. (quoting Choice Hotels, 11 F.3d at 471).
Here, application of the factors supports dismissal of this lawsuit. With respect to
Defendant’s effort and expense in preparing for trial, Defendant’s fee detail provides remarkable
clarity. The fee detail shows that Defendant has been attempting to obtain discovery from
Plaintiff for at least the past four months. See ECF No. 25-3. Defendant’s discovery gains have
been limited and only after considerable effort. Plaintiff partially responded to Defendant’s
discovery requests only after the Court ordered compliance, and Plaintiff never sat for a
deposition. Indeed, it is Defendant, not Plaintiff, that has been actively litigating this case.
For these same reasons, the second factor—excessive delay or lack of diligence on the
part of the movant—also supports dismissal. As described above, Plaintiff has displayed a
troubling pattern of failing to cooperate in discovery and failing to appear for Court proceedings.
The third factor—an insufficient explanation of the need for dismissal—also weighs in
favor of dismissal. Plaintiff has not moved to amend his Complaint and has offered no
explanation for the abrupt attempt to substitute ETA Trucking as the plaintiff and reduce the
amount in controversy. Rather, it appears that the request for dismissal is Plaintiff’s attempt to
evade the Court’s Order imposing sanctions.
Finally, the present state of the litigation warrants dismissal. Discovery closed on October
2 and the deadline for dispositive motions was November 3. If this case were to proceed, the
Court’s next task would be to hold a pretrial scheduling conference. However, given the myriad
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discovery issues, including Defendant’s inability to depose Plaintiff and obtain complete
discovery, trial seems inconceivable. The lack of progress in this case due to Plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute, and the fact that the Court has not yet set any dates in connection with trial, militate in
favor of dismissal.
I further find that this is a case in which it is necessary to specify that the voluntary
dismissal shall be with prejudice if the judgment ordered in this case is not paid within 30 days
of this Order.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Fee Motion is GRANTED. Judgment is
entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of
$8,778.89.
Plaintiff’s Omnibus Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s request to vacate any judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions against Defendant is
DENIED. The Court construes Plaintiff’s “Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice” as a request
for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court grants the request for voluntary dismissal and hereby dismisses this action.
The dismissal shall be with prejudice if Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel fail to pay the judgment
imposed within 30 days of the date of this Order.
A separate order consistent with this Opinion follows.
Date: January 22, 2026 	/s/
Chelsea J. Crawford
United States Magistrate Judge
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