Wood v. United States of America et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ADAM WOOD, 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Action No. EA-25-1104
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	*
et al.,
*
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Adam Wood, who is self-represented, initiated the above-captioned action on
April 2, 2025, in which he asserts tort, constitutional, and statutory claims against Defendants
United States of America and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents Paul
Garaffo, Jared McCarthy, and John and Jane Does based on law enforcement action taken at Mr.
in 2024 	subsequent request for information from the FBI.1 ECF
No. 1. 	motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 40), which is fully briefed (ECF Nos. 48, 50). No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6
(D. Md. Dec. 1, 2025). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background2
On February 6, 2024, Special Agent Garaffo applied for warrants to search
residence and person, which were authorized by a United States Magistrate Judge of this Court.
1 	Plaintiff Adam Wood subsequently filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 32.
2 	Except where noted, this factual summary is drawn from the allegations in the
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32), which are accepted as true for the purposes of deciding this
motion, as well as documents that are integral to the Amended Complaint and authentic. 	Goines
v. 	Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 164-165 (4th Cir. 2016); 	E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. 	v. 	Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011).
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ECF No. 40-1 at 23 (citing Criminal No. 24-mj-294-CDA-1 (D. Md.) (ECF No. 6); Criminal No.
24-mj-295 (D. Md.) (ECF No. 6)). Issuance of these warrants was based on a finding of
probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.4 On February 7, 2024, federal
authorized search
warrants on 	ECF No. 32 ¶ 15. During the execution of these
warrants
Id. 	at ¶ 16. FBI agents then handcuffed Mr.
Wood and 	confined [him] to his dining room for over two hours, 	while
confined [his] fiancée and children to an FBI van for approximately 30 minutes. 	Id. 	at ¶ 20.
Id. 	at ¶ 11.
been coordinating efforts to support the security of [the] United States Government and its
Id. 	at ¶ 22. Prior to requesting and receiving the search warrants, Special
the necessary investigation. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 22 	30. FBI agents 	fail[ed] to research
company
Id. 	at ¶¶ 25 	27. Any search of 	credentials would have revealed
engag[ement] in sanctioned activities with senior military officials and senior executives within
the intelligence community,
3
Files (CM/ECF) system printed at the top of the cited document.
4 	information, a magistrate judge . . . must issue the
warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize
for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime. 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c), (d)(1).
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Id. 	at ¶¶ 24 	26.
The 	raid was predicated on unfounded speculation, demonstrably false assumptions, and zero
corroboration from FBI Headquarters 	any qualified subject
king. 	Id. 	at ¶ 22.
Further, 	as early as August 2023, 	FBI personnel or affiliates unlawfully disclosed
information regarding [Mr. Wood] to unauthorized civilians, 	which resulted in the cancelation
of business contracts and the withdrawal of potential investors and 	cost [ 	] company
$2 million in capital. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 32 	34. As a result of the 	, Mr. Wood
government agencies abandoned planned contracts and pilots, 	[]
. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 36 	38.
distress, and loss 	Id. 	at ¶ 44.
On March 18, 2025, Mr. Wood submitted a formal request for information to the FBI and
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), seeking records relating to the February 7, 2024
law enforcement action and other matters. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 10, 156.
expired without a lawful determination. 	Id. 	at ¶ 10.
B. 	Procedural History
On October 1, 2024, Mr. Wood submitted a Standard Form 95 Claim for Damage, Injury,
or Death (SF-95 Claim) in which he alleged tortious interference; civil rights violations;
violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 	et seq.; and claimed $33,475,000. ECF No.
40-2 at 3, 7.5 	By letter dated November 20, 2024, the Torts Branch of DOJ 	Civil Division
5 Ordinarily a court may not consider matters outside the pleadings when reviewing a
motion to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. 	United States ex
rel. Oberg 	v. 	Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014);
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advised Mr. Wood that DOJ would forward his SF-95 Claim, which it received on October 4,
2024, to the FBI because the alleged claims involved that agency. ECF No. 40-2 at 6. This letter
further advised 	.
Id. 	By letter dated January 30, 2025, the FBI informed Mr. Wood that it had received his SF-95
Claim. 	Id. 	at 47. Mr. Wood initiated the instant action on April 2, 2025. ECF No. 1.
The Amended Complaint, filed on June 30, 2025, pleads thirteen counts. ECF No. 32.
Counts I through VII allege violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671
et seq., based on alleged negligence, trespass, battery, assault, false arrest, false imprisonment,
and abuse of process. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 45 	108. Counts VIII through X allege violations of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments under 	Bivens 	v. 	Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Bivens). 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 109 	136. Count XI alleges a violation of the
Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 137 	144. Count XII
alleges a promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance claim. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 145 	153. Count XIII alleges
a violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. 	Id. 	at ¶¶ 154 	161. Mr.
Wood seeks $54,850,000 in damages and various forms of equitable relief. 	Id. 	at 21.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Court may, however, consider documents attached to the motion to
dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic. 	Goines, 822 F.3d at 166;
Robinson 	v. 	American Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222-223 (4th Cir. 2009). A document is
not the mere information it contains, [it]
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. 	v. 	Severstal Sparrows
Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611 (D. Md. 2011) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Further, as discussed herein, 	see, II.A.1., 	infra, a factual challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction
jurisdiction. 	Kerns 	v. 	United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)
outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for 	Tall 	v.
Maryland Developmental Disabilities Admin., Civil Action No. ELH-15-3811, 2016 WL
3459854, at *4 (D. Md. June 24, 2016) (quoting 	Velasco 	v. 	Government of Indonesia, 370 F.3d
392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004)).
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II. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety, raising several
arguments in support of their motion. ECF No. 40. First, Defendants assert that this Court lacks
subject 	failed to comply with the
administrative prerequisites for filing suit or, in the alternative, that these claims fall within the
. ECF No. 40-1 at 2. Second, Defendants argue that
Mr. Wood fails to state a claim under both 	Bivens 	and the Privacy Act. 	Id. 	Finally, Defendants
contend that 	FOIA claim must be dismissed because he did not file suit against the
proper defendant. 	Id.
arguments are addressed in turn below.6
6 Defendants also contend that the claims against Federal Bureau of Investigation Special
Agents Paul Garaffo and Jared McCarthy must be dismissed because Mr. Wood failed to
properly serve them. ECF No. 40-1 at 2. Specifically, Defendants take issue with the fact that
Mr. Wood mailed the summons and complaint via certified mail, rather than with restricted
delivery. 	Id. 	at 25 	26.
officer or employee sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission occurring in connection
st serve the United States and
also serve the officer or employee under Rule 4(e), (f), or (g). 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(3). Rule 4(e)
summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court
Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Therefore, service of summons on Special Agents Garaffo
and McCarthy must be effectuated in accordance with Maryland law. Maryland Rule 2-
121(a)(3) requires, among other things, that service by mail be effectuated through restricted
delivery. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing valid service. 	Maid to Perfection Glob.,
Inc. 	v. 	Ensor, Civil Action No. RDB-09-0958, 2010 WL 1254194, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 29, 2010).
Nevertheless, where, as here, there is actual notice of the suit, courts will liberally construe Rule
4. 	Armco, Inc. 	v. 	Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys. Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984);
v. 	Waters, 464 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (D. Md. 2006).
actual notice
of this lawsuit, (2) the Defendants have not identified any prejudice stemming from [Mr.
of service
Simmons 	v. 	TransUnion, LLC, 712 F. Supp. 3d 629, 636-
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A. 	Standard of Review
1. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
Kokkonen 	v. 	Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations
omitted); 	see also 	Strawn 	v. 	AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296
with the undergirding principle that federal courts, unlike most state courts, are courts of limited
ot empowered the federal judiciary to hear a matter, then the case
Home Buyers Warranty Corp. 	v. 	Hanna, 750 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2014);
see also 	matter
the burden on the party asserting a claim to allege 	and, when challenged, establish 	the
C 	matter jurisdiction over the pending claim. 	Home Buyers Warranty Corp., 750
F.3d at 432.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a party may move to dismiss a
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. There are two types of subject matter jurisdiction
Mortensen 	v. 	, 549 F.2d 884,
are taken as true, and the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to
Armco, Inc., 733 F.2d
at 1089; 	see also 	Xerox Corp. 	v. 	Inc., Civil Action No. PX-21-1058, 2021
WL 4641558, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 7, 2021) (collecting cases). The undersigned therefore declines
arguments in favor of dismissal.
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Kerns 	v. 	United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Adams 	v. 	Bain, 697 F.2d
allegations of the complaint 	Id.; 	see also 	Evans 	v. 	United States, 105 F.4th 606, 615 (4th Cir.
2024) 	Where a defendant challenges the factual predicate of subject-matter jurisdiction, the
district court need not assume the truth of the allegations, may decide disputed issues of fact, and
may venture outside of the pleadings to resolve the challenge.
2. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss
fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It is fundamental that the 	purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test
the sufficiency of a complaint 	Edwards 	v. 	City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.
1999)
give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests 	Bell Atl. Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw
all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the plaintiff to determine if the plaintiff is
entitled to the legal remedy sought. 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); 	E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. 	v. 	Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). The same does not
hold true for legal conclusions. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. To determine
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conclusions from the factual allegations. 	A Soc 	y Without a Name 	v. 	Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346
(4th. Cir. 2011).
more than labels and conclusions 	formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 	To survive a motion
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. 	Id. 	A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard falls somewhere in between
Id.; 	Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 	Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
B. 	Federal Tort Claims Act Claims (Counts I-VII)
United States 	v. 	Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608
(1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 	Webb 	v. 	United States, 66 F.3d 691, 693
Lane 	v.
Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); 	Welch 	v. 	United States, 409 F.3d 646, 650-651 (4th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, any ambiguities must be construed in favor of immunity and exceptions to the
conditions upon which the United States consents to be sued will not be implied. 	United States
v. 	Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995); 	Lehman 	v. 	Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981).
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the Government while acting within the scope of [their] 	Welch, 409
Hart 	v. 	Casey, Civil Action No. GJH-22-1216, 2022 WL 17989577,
at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 28, 2022).
McNeil 	v. 	United States
Estate of Van Emburgh by & through Van Emburgh 	v. 	United States 	(Van Emburgh), 95 F.4th
795, 801 (4th Cir. 2024). 	First, a plaintiff must 	present [their] claim to the appropriate Federal
agency[.] 	Id. 	(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)) (alterations in original). Importantly, for the
purposes of this first requirement 	whose
activities gave rise to the claim
initially presented to an agency whose actions did not give rise to the claims at issue, that agency
must transfer it to the proper agency. 	Id.
Id.
sum they are seeking for their claim. 	Van Emburgh, 95 F.4th at 801. Subject to limited
shall not be instituted for any sum in
excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency 	28 U.S.C. § 2675(b).
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Van
Emburgh, 95 F.4th at 801 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)) (alteration in original). Failure to
satisfy these three prerequisites to suit deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the
FTCA claim. 	McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111-113; 	Kielwien 	v. 	United States, 540 F.2d 676, 679 (4th
Cir. 1976).
Here, Mr. Wood has not satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to suit
FTCA claims arise from the actions of FBI agents during the February 7, 2024 search warrant
execution. ECF No. 32. Under the governing regulations, the proper agency to adjudicate Mr.
administrative claim was the FBI. Mr. Wood first submitted his SF-95 Claim to DOJ on
October 1, 2024. ECF No. 40-2 at 7 	8. By letter dated November 20, 2024, DOJ advised Mr.
Wood that his claim would be forwarded to the FBI. 	Id. 	at 6. Assuming the claim was
transferred the same day DOJ issued its letter, the FBI had at least until May 20, 2025, to make a
administrative claim before Mr. Wood could file suit.7 Mr.
initiation of this action on April 2, 2025, was premature, and the Court therefore lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over his FTCA claims.
Even if DOJ were the proper agency for purposes of administrative exhaustion, there are
other deficiencies that require dismissal of 	. First, the scope of the
claims asserted and relief sought in this action extend beyond what Mr. Wood identified in his
administrative claim. 	-95 Claim alleges only two of the seven FTCA claims
advanced in his Amended Complaint.8 Lewis 	v. 	United States, Civil Action No. DKC-22-2899,
7 	As noted previously, 	see 	I.B., 	supra, the FBI did not acknowledge receipt of Mr.
-95 Claim until January 30, 2025. ECF No. 40-2 at 47.
8 	This same deficiency bars Count XII of the Amended Complaint, in which 	Mr. Wood
equitable relief in the form of promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance to prevent
injustice arising from government misconduct. 	¶¶ 4, 146-153. The only possible
mention of promissory estoppel in 	administrative claim are his assertions of
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2024 WL 895112, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 29, 2024) (dismissing FTCA claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff failed to identify claims in the administrative claim).
Further, the monetary damages Mr. Wood seeks in this action are greater than the amount of his
administrative claim, which is impermissible. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b); 	compare 	ECF No. 32 at 21
(seeking $54,850,000 in damages) 	with 	ECF No. 40-2 at 7 (claiming $33,475,000).
Second, Mr. Wood has not carried his burden of plausibly alleging that the discretionary
function exception found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) does not apply to his claims.9 	E.g., 	Wood 	v.
United States, 845 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2017); 	Seaside Farm, Inc. 	v. 	United States, 842 F.3d
853, 857 (4th Cir. 2016). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the
challenged action (1) involved no element of judgment or choice and (2) was not based on public
policy considerations. 	E.g., 	Wood, 845 F.3d at 128; 	Pride 	v. 	,
-2 at 37 	38. Even if this generous reading were enough to satisfy the
administrative exhaustion requirement, the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for claims
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
pro se 	Justus 	v. 	Clarke, 78 F.4th 97,
111 (4th Cir. 2023), 	cert. denied sub nom., 144 S. Ct. 1096 (2024). This liberal construction
Cage 	v. 	NASA Goddard Space
Flight Ctr., Civil Action No. PX-18-3355, 2019 WL 3841928, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2019), but
it does not transform the Court into an advocate, 	Thurman 	v. 	Robinson, 51 F.3d 268 (Table);
pro se 	pleading to state
a claim if possible from the facts available, but it will not rewrite the complaint to include claims
Lewis 	v. 	United States, Civil Action No. DKC-21-2387, 2022 WL
3716544, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And the
Cage, 2019
WL 3841928, at *3; 	see also 	Russell 	v. 	Russel Motor Cars, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 414, 418 (D.
promissory estoppel allegation does not transform it into a potentially meritorious claim, the
Court must dismiss it.
9 	T
28 U.S.C. § 2671 	et seq., does not include 	he exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government. 	28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
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No. 319CV00363RJCDCK, 2021 WL 4261515, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2021). The Amended
Complaint includes no allegations that the actions at issue were somehow compelled or without a
basis in public policy considerations. 	See generally 	ECF No. 32. Accordingly, Counts I through
for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
C. 	Bivens 	Claims (Counts VIII-X)10
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided 	Bivens 	v. 	Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics 	and held that an individual may bring a cause of action for damages against
constitution. 403 U.S. at 389. 	Bivens 	involved a Fourth Amendment violation. 	Id.
decade that followed, the Court recognized what has come to be called an implied cause of
gender discrimination claim and the other involving an Eighth Amendment medical treatment
claim. 	Ziglar 	v. 	Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 131 (2017) (citing 	Carlson 	v. 	Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)
and 	Davis 	v. 	Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)).
Bivens 	remedy is now a
Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 132, 135 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); 	see also Tun-Cos 	v. 	Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514, 521 (4th Cir. 2019) 	In the almost 40
10 	The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to constitutional
torts, so any 	Bivens 	claim must be asserted against government officials in their individual rather
than their official capacities. 	E.g., 	Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 	v. 	Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477
(1994); 	Everett 	v. 	Francis, Civil Action No. 5:07CV135, 2009 WL 2971359, at *3 (N.D. W. Va.
Sept. 16, 2009), 	, 390 Fed. Appx 266 (4th Cir. 2010).
that permitting recovery against a federal agency would undermine the purpose of 	Bivens, which
officer
Goss 	v. 	United States, Civil Action No. EA-24-406, 2024 WL 4135471, at *5 (D.
Md. Sept. 10, 2024) (quoting 	Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485-486 (emphasis in original)). Thus, to the
extent Mr. Wood asserts his 	Bivens 	actions against the United States, those claims must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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years since 	Carlson . . . 	the Court has declined to countenance 	Bivens 	actions in 	any 	additional
context. 	(emphasis in original)) (collecting cases). Analysis of whether a 	Bivens 	remedy is
available against federal officials involves a two-step inquiry. 	First, courts must inquire
whether a given case presents a 	new 	Bivens 	context. 	Tun-Cos, 922 F.3d at 522. If the context
is different from that in any of the three recognized cases, the court must then 	evaluate whether
there are 	special factors 	counseling hesitation 	in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress. 	Id. 	(emphasis in original) (quoting 	Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 136).
Here, Mr. Wood raises three constitutional claims against Defendants: (1) a violation of
(ECF No. 32 ¶ 111);
(2) a 	l
interrogation without advising him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to consult with
(id. 	at ¶ 121); and (3) a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection by
him] for investigation, raid, and enforcement action based on his professional
association with [] an Israeli[-]Australian 	(id. 	at ¶ 129).
recognized in 	Bivens 	because the searches and seizures Mr. Wood challenges were conducted
pursuant to lawful warrants supported by probable cause. 	Annappareddy 	v. 	Pascale, 996 F.3d
120, 135 (4th Cir. 2021) 	Bivens 	involved was the Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable 	warrantless 	United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
because [it] mean[s] that proving the claim[ ] here would require a different type of showing than
did the claims in 	Bivens, one that would pose a greater risk of intruding on the investigatory and
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prosecutorial functions of the executive branch. 	Id. 	at 136. 	Bivens 	did not
require this type of fact-checking and conscience-probing, . . . which can, as the Supreme Court
has warned, impose substantial costs. 	Id. 	(internal citations omitted).
and equal protection claims also fail. First,
Bivens 	Id. 	at 134 (internal
citation omitted). Second
because of his association with an Israeli-Australian national is far afield of the equal protection
remedy recognized in 	Davis. 	442 U.S. 228 at 234-235. The Fourth Circuit has cautioned that
-the-fact inquiri
on executive-
Annappareddy, 996 F.3d at 134-135 (quoting 	Farah 	v.
Weyker, 926 F.3d 492, 501 (4th Cir. 2019)). Counts VIII through X are therefore dismissed.
D. 	Privacy Act Claim (Count XI)
The Privacy Act 	agency shall disclose any record which is contained
in a system of records . . . to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains,
is permitted by an exception. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Civil
actions under the Privacy Act are properly instituted against federal agencies, not individuals or
the United States, as sovereign. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (authorizing suit against an agency);
Walker 	v. 	Gambrell, 647 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (D. Md. 2009) 	ivil actions under the
[Privacy] Act are properly commenced only against agencies, not individuals. 	Accordingly,
Privacy Act claim fails because he has not filed suit against a federal agency.
Further, Mr. Wood has not plausibly alleged a Privacy Act claim. To state a cause of
action under the Privacy Act, Mr. Wood must plausibly allege that:
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(1) the information at issue is covered by the Privacy Act as a
components: (a) an adverse effect standing requirement and (b) a
causal nexus between the disclosure and the adverse effect); and
(4) the disclosure was willful and intentional.
Doe 	v. 	Herman, No. CIV. A. 297CV00043, 1999 WL 1000212, at *8 (W.D. Va. Oct. 29, 1999),
report and recommendation adopted in part, 2000 WL 34204432 (W.D. Va. July 24, 2000),
, 306 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2002), 	, 540 U.S. 614
(2004).
Here, the facts Mr. Wood alleges to establish a Privacy Act violation are insufficient to
raise his right to relief above the speculative level. 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Amended
Complaint alleges that at some point between August 2023 and the February 7, 2024 law
enforcement action
regarding a sealed national security investigation involving [Mr. Wood] to unauthorized
civilian 	him 	¶¶ 139 	40, 143. The
Amended Complaint does not specifically identify who disclosed the information, to whom it
was disclosed, what the disclosure revealed, or how it caused the harm alleged. The Amended
Complaint even falls short of 	Twombly 	insufficient 	formulaic recitation 	t does
not assert that the disclosed information
and makes no claim that the disclosure was willful or intentional. 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555; 5 U.S.C. § 552a. This claim must therefore be dismissed as well.
E. 	Freedom of Information Act Claim (Count XIII)
enjoin the 	agency
Emesowum 	v. 	National
Security Agency, Civil Action No. BAH-24-0360, 2025 WL 847905, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 18,
Case 1:25-cv-01104-EA Document 51 Filed 02/05/26 Page 15 of 16

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concern[s] the
obligations of agencies as distinct from individual employees in those agencies, 	no cause of
action exists 	Id. 	(quoting 	Martinez 	v. 	Bureau of Prisons, 444
F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Because Mr. Wood has not filed suit against a federal agency,
his FOIA claim must be dismissed, as it cannot be sustained against the United States or the FBI
agents in their individual capacities.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, 	motion to dismiss (ECF No. 40) is granted, and all
of 	claims advanced in the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32) are dismissed. 	A
separate Order follows.
Date: February 5, 2026 	/s/
Erin Aslan
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:25-cv-01104-EA Document 51 Filed 02/05/26 Page 16 of 16