Semenchenko v. Brown (#278) et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KONSTANTIN SEMENCHENKO,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Civil No.: 1:25-cv-01044-JRR
OFFICER GREGORY BROWN, 	et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the court is Defendant Town of Elkton, Maryland’s Partial Motion to
Dismiss with Prejudice, or, in the Alternative, to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery. (ECF No. 15; the
“Motion.”) The court has reviewed all papers; no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.
2025). For the reasons that follow, by accompanying order, the Motion will be granted in part and
denied in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
On January 6, 2023, Plaintiff Konstantin Semenchenko was walking in the neighborhood
in which he resided with his parents. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 14–15.) While on his walk, he “suffered a
medical emergency, most likely a seizure, which significantly incapacitated him and caused him
to fall to the ground on the sidewalk.” 	Id. 	¶ 16. During this time, he was “physically weak and
unable to communicate or move.” 	Id. 	¶ 17. Defendant Officer Gregory Brown of the Elkton Police
Department responded to the scene following a 911 call by a “concerned passerby” who sought to
procure a welfare check for Plaintiff. 	Id. 	¶¶ 18–20. 	When Defendant Officer Brown arrived,
Plaintiff “was lying on the ground, hardly moving and unable to communicate”; any attempted
1 	For purposes of resolving the Motion, the court accepts as true all well-pled facts set forth in the Complaint. (ECF
No. 1.) 	See Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017).
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speech “was noticeably slurred and plainly indicative of a medical emergency.” 	Id. 	¶ 24. Contrary
to the Town of Elkton policies and procedures, Defendant Officer Brown did not notify Plaintiff
that the interaction was being audio and visually recorded by his body-worn camera. 	Id. 	¶ 26. At
no time was Defendant Officer Brown investigating Plaintiff for any potential violation of law. 	Id.
¶ 27.
Upon 	approaching 	Plaintiff, 	Defendant 	Officer 	Brown 	“immediately 	proceeded 	to
antagonize and physically assault Mr. Semenchenko.” 	(ECF No. 1 ¶ 30.) 	He did not identify
himself as a police officer and asked Plaintiff “What’s going on?” and “Are you alright?” 	Id. 	¶
31. “Despite knowing that Mr. Semenchenko was in medical distress and lacking any knowledge
of his actual condition, and despite EMS already being en route to provide aid, Defendant Ofc.
Brown then decided to physically engage with Mr. Semenchenko’s person by pressing his fist into
Mr. Semenchenko’s chest.” 	Id. 	¶ 34. Defendant Officer Brown’s action has no legal or medical
justification. 	Id. 	¶ 36. After doing so, Plaintiff became “agitated.” 	Id. 	¶ 38. Plaintiff remained
unable to communicate or answer Defendant Officer Brown’s questions. 	Id. 	¶ 40. Plaintiff was
similarly unable to comply with Defendant Officer Brown’s command that he “sit upright,” and
thus “repeatedly fell over.” 	Id. 	¶¶ 43–44. 	Defendant Officer Brown then again “forcefully
pressing his balled-up fist into Mr. Semenchenko’s chest, despite having no legal or medical
justification to do so.” 	Id. 	¶ 45. 	He then again “dug his fist into Mr. Semenchenko’s chest and
told him to sit up.” 	Id. 	¶ 47.
Plaintiff attempted to stand numerous times, although Defendant Officer Brown instructed
him to “sit up, but not stand up.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 48–50.) Once he managed to remain standing,
Plaintiff attempted to walk away. 	Id. 	¶ 51. 	Defendant Officer Brown then, with no legal
justification and without identifying himself as a police officer or telling Plaintiff that he was under
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arrest, “grabbed Mr. Semenchenko from behind, unlawfully seizing him.” 	Id. 	¶¶ 54–55. Plaintiff
then turned around and Defendant Officer Brown “immediately tackled him to the ground, forcibly
flipped 	him 	onto 	his 	stomach, 	and 	then 	violently 	and 	illegally 	dug 	his 	knee 	into 	Mr.
Semenchenko’s back and neck,” before ultimately attempting to handcuff him. 	Id. ¶¶ 57–58.
“Despite having Mr. Semenchenko fully subdued and under control, Defendant Ofc. Brown
continued to violently hold Mr. Semenchenko on the ground and apply excessive force by keeping
his knee pressed into Mr. Semenchenko’s back.” 	Id. 	¶ 60.
Other officers later appeared at the scene, including Defendant Corporal Jeremy Fuller,
whereupon Defendant Officer Brown falsely stated that the “Motherfucker swung at me.” (ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 62–63.) Defendant Corporal Fuller then “placed his knee into Mr. Semenchenko’s lower
back area, continuing Mr. Semenchenko’s illegal detention, assault, false arrest, and attempted
handcuffing,” while Defendant Officer Brown “was shoving Mr. Semenchenko’s face into the
ground, applying downward pressure on Mr. Semenchenko’s neck and throat, further exacerbating
his pain and distress.” 	Id. 	¶¶ 64–65. As a result of Defendant Corporal Fuller and Defendant
Officer Brown’s actions, Plaintiff suffered “an acute burst fracture at T3, with prolapsed
fragments.” 	Id. 	¶ 72. Plaintiff experienced extreme pain and screamed out in distress, but the
officers at the scene continued to hold him, and Defendant Corporal Fuller told him to “Stop
squirming and you wouldn’t be in so much fucking pain.” 	Id. 	¶¶ 74–77. According to Plaintiff,
and contrary to Defendant Officer Brown’s alleged statement made at the scene to Defendant
Corporal Fuller:
Defendant Ofc. Brown’s body-worn camera footage conclusively
establishes that Mr. Semenchenko never once attempted to assault
him, let alone make physical contact with him, and that Defendant
Ofc. 	Brown’s 	actions 	and 	use 	of 	force 	were 	unlawful,
unconstitutional, excessive, undertaken with malice, and in direct
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contradiction to both his training and official duties, and Mr.
Semenchenko’s constitutional protections and rights.
Id. 	¶ 80. 	Plaintiff was eventually transported via ambulance to Union Hospital before being
transferred to Christiana Care Hospital. 	Id. 	¶¶ 83–84.
Despite not having committed any criminal act, Plaintiff was charged with one count of
Assault in the Second Degree and one count of Resisting Arrest. 	(ECF No. 1 ¶ 91.) 	He was
acquitted of both charges on March 20, 2024. 	Id. 	¶ 92.
As to Town of Elkton, Plaintiff alleges:
86. Defendant Town of Elkton failed to properly train Defendant
Ofc. Brown on how to respond to medical emergencies or Defendant
Ofc. Brown neglected to follow his training.
87. Defendant Town of Elkton failed to properly train Defendant
Ofc. Brown in necessary de-escalation techniques, or Defendant
Ofc. Brown neglected to follow his training.
88. Defendant Ofc. Brown did not follow proper protocols and
procedures for handling such an incident, demonstrating either a
lack of training by Defendant Town of Elkton or a willful disregard
for departmental protocols and procedures.
. 	. 	.
94. Despite Defendant Ofc. Brown’s misconduct, the Town of
Elkton and the Elkton Police Department refused to discipline him
and, instead, promoted him.
. 	. 	.
98. Defendant Town of Elkton is vicariously liable for the tortious
acts and omissions of Defendant Ofc. Brown, Defendant Cpl. Fuller,
and all other responding officers, via the doctrine of respondeat
superior, as all of them were under the employ of Defendant Town
of Elkton at all times relevant to this action
. 	. 	.
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108. Defendant Town of Elkton, through its policies, customs, and
practices, permitted and condoned unconstitutional conduct, leading
directly to the violations suffered by Plaintiff.
. 	. 	.
120. 	The 	unjustified 	and 	unlawful 	behavior 	and 	conduct 	of
Defendant Ofc. Brown, Cpl. Fuller, and the other unknown Officers,
both 	during 	the 	incident 	and 	in 	its 	aftermath—including 	the
preparation 	of 	a criminal 	charging 	document 	containing 	false
testimony sworn out under oath—are a direct result of the customs,
policies, patterns and practices within the Town of Elkton.”
. 	. 	.
133. The Town of Elkton and the Elkton Police Department directly
caused these constitutional violations by enacting, endorsing, or
perpetuating policies, practices, or customs that encouraged or
permitted Officers to unlawfully seize and arrest the Plaintiff
without probable cause, thereby depriving him of his constitutional
rights.
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 86–88, 94, 98, 108, 120, 133.)
Plaintiff initiated this action on March 31, 2025, asserting the following counts:
Count I: Unlawful Search and Seizure, Excessive Use of Force, and
Improper Use of Police Powers in Violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth 	Amendments 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	against 	all
Defendants;
Count II: Unlawful Search and Seizure, Excessive Use of Force, and
Improper Use of Police Powers in Violation of Articles 24 and 26
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against all Defendants;
Count III: Battery against all Defendants;
Count IV: False Arrest against all Defendants;
Count V: False Imprisonment against all Defendants;
Count 	VI: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against
Defendants Officer Brown and Town of Elkton;
Count VII: Negligent Hiring, Training, Retention, and Supervision
against Defendant Town of Elkton;
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Count VIII: Negligence against all Defendants;
Count IX: Gross Negligence against all Defendants;
Count X: Malicious Prosecution against Defendants Officer Brown
and Town of Elkton;
Count XI: Civil Conspiracy against all Defendants; and
Count XII: Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of the Eighth
Amendment and Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
against all Defendants.
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 123–279.) Thereafter, on June 24, 2025, Defendant Town of Elkton filed the instant
Motion seeking partial dismissal of the claims against it, specifically Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X, and XI.2 	(ECF No. 15.) It also seeks bifurcation of any remaining claims against it,
and a stay of related discovery, until disposition of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Officer
Brown and Corporal Fuller. 	Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint.” 	In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017), 	as amended
(Jan. 20, 2017) (quoting 	Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986)). 	To survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting 	Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“A court decides whether
this standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the
truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court
2 	Defendants Officer Brown and Corporal Fuller filed their Answers to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF Nos. 11, 16.)
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to reasonably infer that ‘the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” 	A Soc’y Without A
Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
A plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, thereby nudging its claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 	Vitol,
S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., 708 F.3d 527, 543 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation modified) (quoting
Twombly, 	550 U.S. at 555, 570). 	The plausibility requirement is not “a probability requirement
but rather a mandate that a plaintiff ‘demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” 	In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d at 92 (quoting 	Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d
186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009)). Reliance on “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Town of Elkton seeks partial dismissal of the claims against it, advancing arguments the
court considers here, including: 1) Count XII is not cognizable under the Eight Amendment or
Article 16 because Plaintiff was not subject to such protections as a pre-trial detainee; 2) Count I
fails to plead a plausible 	Monell 	claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 3) it is entitled to governmental
immunity as to Plaintiff’s non-constitutional state law claims (Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX,
X, and XI); and 4) any remaining claims against it should be bifurcated from the claims against
the individual officer Defendants and discovery as to same should be stayed.3 	(ECF No. 15-1 at
p. 3.) The court addresses each in turn.
3 	Town of Elkton also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim (Count XI) because it is not, on its own, an
independent cause of action in Maryland. (ECF No. 15-1 at pp. 10–11.) Citing no legal authority, Plaintiff simply
asserts that Town of Elkton is “incorrect.” (ECF No. 19-1 at p. 12.) Because the court concludes Town of Elkton is
entitled to governmental immunity on this count, it declines to reach its argument as to civil conspiracy.
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A. Count XII: Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of the Eighth Amendment
and Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
The court turns first to Town of Elkton’s argument that Count XII brought under the Eighth
Amendment and Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights should be dismissed with
prejudice because the claim is inapplicable here, where Plaintiff was never found guilty of any
crime.4 	See Seth v. McDonough, 461 F. Supp. 3d 242, 258 (D. Md. 2020) (“Eighth Amendment
protections extend to those detainees already found guilty of a criminal offense, whereas similar
protections apply to pretrial detainees pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”). Plaintiff concedes this point and agrees the count should be dismissed. The court
will therefore grant the Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal with prejudice of Count XII.
B. 	Count I: Unlawful Search and Seizure, Excessive Use of Force, and Improper Use of
Police Powers in Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
Town of Elkton further moves to dismiss Count I, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
for failure to plead a plausible 	Monell 	claim, as Plaintiff’s claim is based on vicarious liability, 	see
ECF No. 1 ¶ 136, and because he fails to allege sufficiently any unconstitutional policy or
widespread practice that resulted in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, as alleged. (ECF
No. 15-1 at pp. 6–7.) 	In response, Plaintiff concedes that Town of Elkton may not be held
vicariously liable under § 1983, but asserts the Complaint sufficiently pleads failure to train,
manage, and supervise its officers.5 	(ECF No. 19-1 at pp. 5–8.)
4 	Article 16 is “construed 	in pari materia 	with the Eighth Amendment.” 	Jordan v. Davis, No. CV ELH-22-1541, 2023
WL 2478862, at *1 n.4 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2023); 	see Harris v. State, 251 Md. App. 612, 649 n.19 (2021), 	aff’d, 	479
Md. 84 (2022) (noting that Article 16 is generally “given the same interpretation as the Eighth Amendment” (citations
omitted)).
5 	In the alternative, Plaintiff requests leave to amend his Complaint to add the requisite level of detail. (ECF No. 19-
1 at p. 8.) Against the backdrop of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)’s instruction that “[t]he court should freely
give leave when justice so requires,” FED. 	R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2), “leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when
the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party,
or the amendment would be futile.” 	Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986). 	Where
Plaintiff does not identify any particular proposed amendments, including by way of a proposed amended pleading as
contemplated by Local Rule 103.6, the court is unable to discern whether such amendment would be futile or
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“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 	Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)
(quoting 	Baker v. McCollan, 	443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979)). Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any 	citizen 	of 	the 	United 	States 	or 	other 	person 	within 	the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under section 1983, a Plaintiff “must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted).
In 	Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress
intended “municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to
whom § 1983 applies.” 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The Court explained that “[l]ocal governing
bodies [] can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief,
where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s
officers.” 	Id. 	It cannot, however, “be held liable . . . under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.” 	Id. 	at 691; 	see Burley v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 422 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1032 (D. Md.
2019) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that
prejudicial in view of this court’s opinion. Accordingly, the court will deny Plaintiff’s request at this time; Plaintiff
of course remains free to file a separate motion to amend his Complaint in accordance with Local Rule 103.6.
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each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution.” (citing 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676)).
“[L]ocal governments are responsible only for ‘their 	own 	illegal acts.’” 	Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–61 (2011) (emphasis in original) (quoting 	Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 	475
U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). 	Accordingly, municipal liability attaches only “when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” 	Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Indeed,
for 	Monell 	liability to attached to a municipality, “a plaintiff must show that the municipality’s
policies were ‘the moving force behind a deprivation of federal rights.’” 	Washington v. Hous.
Auth. of the City of Columbia, 58 F.4th 170, 182 (4th Cir. 2023). 	Thus, a plaintiff seeking to
impose liability on a county under § 1983 “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal
policy’ caused [his] injury.” 	Connick, 475 U.S. at 60 (quoting 	Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
Monell 	claims have three essential elements: (1) identification of a specific “policy or
“custom”; (2) attribution of the policy, and fault for its creation, to the municipality; and (3) an
“affirmative link” between an identified policy or custom and a specific rights violation. 	Spell v.
McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1389 (4th Cir. 1987). 	To assert a 	Monell 	claim, a plaintiff must
“adequately plead . . . the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to the
municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.” 	Jordan by Jordan v.
Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994). A policy or custom that purports to give rise to liability
will 	“not, 	however, ‘be inferred merely from municipal 	inaction 	in 	the face of 	isolated
constitutional deprivations by municipal employees.’” 	Saltz v. City of Frederick, MD, 538 F.
Supp. 3d 510, 554 (D. Md. 2021) (quoting 	Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 230
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(4th Cir. 1984)). The municipality’s alleged conduct must demonstrate “‘deliberate indifference’
to the rights of its inhabitants.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 1997)).
A plaintiff may allege four types of policies, customs, or practices for which a municipality
may be held liable:
(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or
regulation; 	(2) 	through 	the 	decisions 	of 	a 	person 	with 	final
policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure
to properly train officers, that manifest[s] deliberate indifference to
the rights of citizens; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent
and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of
law.6
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting 	Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 217
(4th Cir. 1999)). 	Based on Plaintiff’s Complaint allegations and opposition to the Motion, the
court construes Plaintiff’s 	Monell 	claim to be based on theories of failure to train and failure to
supervise and discipline. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 86–88, 94; ECF No. 19-1 at pp. 5–8.)
“Although prevailing on the merits of a 	Monell 	claim is difficult, simply alleging such a
claim is, by definition, easier.” 	Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attys. Office, 	767 F.3d 379, 403 (4th
Cir. 2014). Still, while it is true that often “a plaintiff lacks specific details regarding the municipal
actor’s internal policies and training procedures before discovery” and that “courts should not
expect the plaintiff to possess a rich set of facts concerning the allegedly unconstitutional policy
and the responsible policymakers,” “boilerplate allegations will not suffice.” 	Saltz, 538 F. Supp.
3d at 556–57.
1. 	Vicarious Liability
Despite asserting that Town of Elkton is vicariously liable to Plaintiff for its employee
officers’ actions that resulted in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Plaintiff
6 	The fourth type is commonly referred to as a “condonation theory” of liability.
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concedes in opposition that Town of Elkton may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 136; ECF No. 19-1 at p. 5.) 	See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (holding that “a municipality
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a 	respondeat superior 	theory”); 	Washington v. Hous. Auth.
of the City of Columbia, 58 F.4th 170, 182 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining “‘[t]he municipality itself,
through one of its policies or customs,’ must ‘cause[] the constitutional violation; municipal
liability cannot be premised on 	respondeat superior 	or vicarious liability’”) (quoting 	Buffington v.
Baltimore Cnty., Md., 913 F.2d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 1990)).
Accordingly, the Motion will be granted to the extent Plaintiff’s § 1983 	Monell 	claim in
Count I is based on vicarious liability.
2. 	Failure to Train
“A municipality can also be liable for an established policy through a failure to train, if it
reflects a deliberate or conscious choice to not do so.” 	Johnson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 452 F. Supp.
3d 283, 309 (D. Md. 2020) (citing 	City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). 	“A
municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on
a failure to train.” 	Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).7 	“Training policy deficiencies
can include (1) ‘express authorizations of unconstitutional conduct,’ (2) ‘tacit authorizations’ of
such unconstitutional conduct, and (3) failures to adequately ‘prohibit or discourage readily
foreseeable conduct in light of known exigencies of police duty.’” 	Johnson, 452 F. Supp. 3d at
309 (quoting 	Spell v. McDaniel, 	824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987)). Ultimately, “[a] failure to
train 	Monell 	theory requires a plausible demonstration that (1) the nature of the training was
insufficient in some particularized manner; (2) the insufficiency of the training was a deliberate or
7 	“Although the procedural posture of this case distinguishes it from 	Connick, 563 U.S. 51 . . . , that case is pertinent,
as it highlights the challenge a plaintiff faces when seeking to prevail on a failure to train claim.” 	Saltz v. City of
Frederick, MD, 538 F. Supp. 3d 510, 559 (D. Md. 2021).
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conscious choice; and (3) a causal relationship existed between the failure-to-train and the injuries
suffered.” 	Palma v. Montgomery Cnty., 598 F. Supp. 3d 288, 298 (D. Md. 2022).
“As to the first element, ‘the plaintiff must point out a specific deficiency in training, rather
than general laxness or ineffectiveness in training.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Washington v. Baltimore Police
Dep’t, 457 F. Supp. 3d 520, 533 (D. Md. 2020)); 	see Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390 (“[A] sufficiently
close causal link must be shown between potentially inculpating training deficiency or deficiencies
and specific violation. This requires first that a specific deficiency rather than general laxness or
ineffectiveness in training be shown.”). 	Conclusory or broad-sweeping allegations of deficient
officer training that was a deliberate or conscious choice by the municipality and which resulted
in unconstitutional officer conduct are insufficient to state a claim. 	See, e.g., 	Corbitt v. Baltimore
City Police Dep’t, No. CV RDB-20-3431, 2022 WL 846209, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 22, 2022); 	Devi
v. Prince George’s Cnty., No. CV DKC 16-3790, 2017 WL 3592452, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 21,
2017); 	Jones v. Chapman, No. CIV.A. ELH-14-2627, 2015 WL 4509871, at *18–20 (D. Md. July
24, 2015); 	Hall v. Fabrizio, No. CIV. JKB-12-754, 2012 WL 2905293, at *2 (D. Md. July 13,
2012).
“Stating ‘in broad, conclusory terms and in a variety of different ways that [an entity] failed
to train and supervise its officers’ will not suffice.” 	Brown v. Maryland, No. CV SAG-25-01331,
2025 WL 2855770, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 8, 2025) (quoting 	Peters v. City of Mount Rainier, No. GJH-
14-00955, 2014 WL 4855032, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2014)); 	see McDowell v. Grimes, No. CV
GLR-17-3200, 2018 WL 3756727, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2018) (discussing same). 	“[T]he
municipality will only be liable if ‘the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the
city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’” 	Johnson, 452 F.
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Supp. 3d at 309 (quoting 	Harris, 489 U.S. at 390). 	Further, “[t]hat a particular officer may be
unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the [municipality], for the
officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program.” 	City
of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1989).
Here, Plaintiff pleads the following allegations in support of his claim based on a failure to
train theory:
86. Defendant Town of Elkton failed to properly train Defendant
Ofc. Brown on how to respond to medical emergencies or Defendant
Ofc. Brown neglected to follow his training.
87. Defendant Town of Elkton failed to properly train Defendant
Ofc. Brown in necessary de-escalation techniques, or Defendant
Ofc. Brown neglected to follow his training.
88. Defendant Ofc. Brown did not follow proper protocols and
procedures for handling such an incident, demonstrating either a
lack of training by Defendant Town of Elkton or a willful disregard
for departmental protocols and procedures.
. 	. 	.
108. Defendant Town of Elkton, through its policies, customs, and
practices, permitted and condoned unconstitutional conduct, leading
directly to the violations suffered by Plaintiff.
. 	. 	.
120. 	The 	unjustified 	and 	unlawful 	behavior 	and 	conduct 	of
Defendant Ofc. Brown, Cpl. Fuller, and the other unknown Officers,
both 	during 	the 	incident 	and 	in 	its 	aftermath—including 	the
preparation 	of 	a criminal 	charging 	document 	containing 	false
testimony sworn out under oath—are a direct result of the customs,
policies, patterns and practices within the Town of Elkton.”
. 	. 	.
133. The Town of Elkton and the Elkton Police Department directly
caused these constitutional violations by enacting, endorsing, or
perpetuating policies, practices, or customs that encouraged or
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permitted Officers to unlawfully seize and arrest the Plaintiff
without probable cause, thereby depriving him of his constitutional
rights.
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 86–88, 108, 120, 133.)
The court agrees with Town of Elkton that these allegations are insufficient to allege a
plausible 	Monell 	claim based on a failure to train. Plaintiff’s allegations are of the type this court
has consistently found insufficient because they rely on “bald assertions that police officers were
not properly trained.” 	McDowell, 2018 WL 3756727, at *4. 	Initially, the court notes that
Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, do not even concretely allege a failure to train on the part
of Town of Elkton; instead, they allow that Defendant Officer Brown “neglected to follow his
training.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 86–87.) These allegations are plainly not sufficient, as they fail even to
allege that Town of Elkton, deliberately or consciously, utilized specific training, with an identified
deficiency, that resulted in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 	See Palma, 598 F.
Supp. 3d at 298, 	supra.
Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officer Brown was not properly trained on “how
to respond to medical emergencies” or on “de-escalation techniques,” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 86–87, these
allegations are nonetheless insufficient. Plaintiff does not identify any specific deficiency; instead,
Plaintiff relies upon conclusory assertions that the medical emergency and de-escalation trainings
were deficient. 	These are precisely the sort of generalized alleged deficiencies this court has
repeatedly rejected. 	See, e.g., 	Jordan v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, No. CV SAG-23-
03413, 2024 WL 2956094, at *8–9 (D. Md. June 12, 2024) (finding plaintiff failed to adequately
identify the nature of the training or specific deficiency where he alleged “a general failure to
effectively instruct officers that they have a duty to prevent and report excessive force”) (record
citation omitted); 	Simmons v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, No. 21-CV-00969-LKG, 2023 WL
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16
8452448, at *14 (D. Md. Dec. 6, 2023) (finding plaintiff’s allegations of general laxness in “the
training on [the municipality’s] vehicle pursuit policy” insufficient); 	Devi v. Prince George’s
Cnty., No. CV DKC 16-3790, 2017 WL 3592452, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2017) (finding plaintiff’s
allegations insufficient where he stated “in conclusory terms that the County failed to adequately
train, supervise, and discipline its officers against the use of excessive force”) (record citation
omitted).
Further, Plaintiff fails “to identify a specific omission and awareness on the part of the
entity of the omission and the risks it posed; in other words, facts showing deliberation on the part
of [Town of Elkton].” 	Valentine v. PrimeCare Med., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 3d 431, 447 (D. Md. 2023).
Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations rest solely on the conclusory assertions noted above that Defendant
Officer Brown was not properly trained (or failed to follow his training). An individual officer’s
lack of training “will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings
may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program.” 	City of Canton, Ohio v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1989). Plaintiff makes generalized (and vague) allegations about
Town of Elkton’s policies that allegedly resulted in officer unconstitutional conduct, and offers
nothing in the way of Town of Elkton’s officer training program or factual allegations linking a
specific training deficiency to alleged constitutional violations.
In all, Plaintiff fails to allege plausibly a “specific 	deficiency” and that “deficiency’s causal
connection to ‘the 	specific 	violation.’” 	Washington v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Columbia, 58
F.4th 170, 182 (4th Cir. 2023) (emphasis in original) (quoting 	Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218
(4th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, are insufficient to allege a
plausible 	Monell 	claim based on a failure to train theory. The court will therefore grant Town of
Elkton’s Motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s 	Monell 	claim to the extent it is based on failure to train.
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3. 	Failure to Supervise and Discipline
This court has previously recognized what it has referred to as a “failure to supervise and
discipline” theory of 	Monell 	liability. 	Washington v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 457 F. Supp. 3d 520,
536 (D. Md. 2020). “A failure to supervise gives rise to municipal liability ‘only in those situations
in which there is a history of widespread abuse.’” 	Id. 	at 536–37 (quoting 	Wellington v. Daniels,
717 	F.2d 	932, 	936 (4th Cir. 	1983)); 	see 	Thompson 	v. 	Mediko, 	Inc., 	No. 	1:24-CV-1736
(RDA/WBP), 2025 WL 2616966, at *15 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2025) (same).
To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that the supervisor had ‘actual or constructive knowledge’ that a
subordinate was engaged in conduct that ‘posed a pervasive and
unreasonable risk of constitutional injury’; (2) that the supervisor’s
response to that knowledge ‘was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference 	to 	or 	tacit 	authorization 	of 	the 	alleged 	offensive
practices’; 	and 	(3) 	an 	‘affirmative 	causal 	link’ 	between 	the
supervisor’s inaction and the plaintiff'’ alleged constitutional injury.
Cottman v. Baltimore Police Department, et al., No. 21-CV-00837-SAG, 2022 WL 137735, at *9–
10 (D. Md. Jan. 13, 2022) (quoting 	Brown v. Bratton, No. ELH-19-1450, 2020 WL 886142, at *34
(D. Md. Feb. 21, 2020)); 	see Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (same). Importantly,
a plaintiff who fails “to allege widespread conduct by County employees that could support the
inference that County policymakers were aware of and tacitly condoned” the unconstitutional
conduct by failing to supervise or discipline their employees is insufficient to “nudge [a] 	Monell
claim ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” 	Brown, 2020 WL 886142, at *35 (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
As explained above, “a municipal policy or custom giving rise to § 1983 liability will not
be inferred merely from municipal inaction in the face of isolated constitutional deprivations by
municipal employees.” 	Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1984).
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Further, [i]t is not sufficient to state in ‘broad, conclusory terms and in a variety of different ways’
that the police department ‘failed to train and supervise its officers.’” 	Jordan v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, No. CV SAG-23-03413, 2024 WL 2956094, at *9 (D. Md. June 12, 2024)
(quoting 	Peprah v. Williams, Civ. No. GLR-18-990, 2019 WL 224245, at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 15,
2019)).
In support of his claim under such a theory, Plaintiff alleges:
94. Despite Defendant Ofc. Brown’s misconduct, the Town of
Elkton and the Elkton Police Department refused to discipline him
and, instead, promoted him
. 	. 	.
108. Defendant Town of Elkton, through its policies, customs, and
practices, permitted and condoned unconstitutional conduct, leading
directly to the violations suffered by Plaintiff.
. 	. 	.
120. 	The 	unjustified 	and 	unlawful 	behavior 	and 	conduct 	of
Defendant Ofc. Brown, Cpl. Fuller, and the other unknown Officers,
both 	during 	the 	incident 	and 	in 	its 	aftermath—including 	the
preparation 	of 	a criminal 	charging 	document 	containing 	false
testimony sworn out under oath—are a direct result of the customs,
policies, patterns and practices within the Town of Elkton.”
. 	. 	.
133. The Town of Elkton and the Elkton Police Department directly
caused these constitutional violations by enacting, endorsing, or
perpetuating policies, practices, or customs that encouraged or
permitted Officers to unlawfully seize and arrest the Plaintiff
without probable cause, thereby depriving him of his constitutional
rights.
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 94, 108, 120, 133.)
The court, again, finds Plaintiff’s allegations insufficient to state a claim under a failure to
supervise and discipline theory. 	First, Plaintiff’s complete failure to identify an individual who
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acted in a supervisory capacity is itself “fatal” to Plaintiff’s claim because the court “cannot
ascertain whether the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of any improper conduct if
the supervisor has not been identified.” 	Jordan, 2024 WL 2956094, at *9; 	see also Cottman, 2022
WL 137735, at *9–10 (discussing the elements of a claim), 	supra. 	Similarly, Plaintiff does not
allege a widespread history of abuse necessary to raise a plausible inference that supervisors had
actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. 	See Washington, 457
F. Supp. 3d at 536–37, and 	Thompson, 2025 WL 2616966, at *15, 	supra. Further, where Plaintiff’s
allegations again rely on broad, conclusory allegations that Town of Elkton failed to supervise and
discipline Defendant Officer Brown, the claim is insufficient. 	See, e.g., 	Jordan, 2024 WL
2956094, at *9 and 	Peprah, 2019 WL 224245, at *6, 	supra.
The court will therefore grant the Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Count I on the
basis of a failure to supervise and discipline. 	In view of the court’s foregoing analysis, Count I
will be dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice, as against Town of Elkton.
C. 	Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI: Non-Constitutional State Law Claims
Finally, Town of Elkton argues that Plaintiff’s non-constitutional state law claims—Counts
III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI—should be dismissed with prejudice because, as a local
government entity, it is immune from suit by operation of governmental immunity. (ECF No. 15-
1 at p. 8–10.) 	Plaintiff urges the contrary—that Town of Elkton is not entitled to governmental
immunity, citing 	Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1 (2012), and 	Housing Authority of Baltimore City v.
Bennett, 359 Md. 356 (2000).8
“[T]he doctrine of governmental immunity is alive and 	well 	in Maryland today.”
McCarthy v. Bd. of Comm’rs for Frederick Cnty., 	266 Md. App. 134, 143 (2025) (quoting 	Heffner
8 	Plaintiff further asserts that governmental immunity is not applicable to his state constitutional claims, 	see 	ECF No.
19-1 at pp. 10–11; that is not in dispute here.
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v. Montgomery Cnty., 76 Md. App. 328, 333 (1988)). 	“Under Maryland law, counties enjoy
governmental immunity from tort liability with respect to ‘nonconstitutional torts based on activity
categorized as governmental.’” 	Paulone v. City of Frederick, 787 F. Supp. 2d 360, 378 (D. Md.
2011) (quoting 	Housing Auth. of Balt. City v. Bennett, 	359 Md. 356 (2000)). “[M]unicipalities are
generally immune from common law tort suits when engaged in governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, acts.” 	Devi v. Prince George’s Cnty., No. CV DKC 16-3790, 2017 WL 3592452, at
*2 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2017); 	see DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 47 (1999) (instructing that “[a] local
governmental entity is liable for its torts if the tortious conduct occurs while the entity is acting in
a private or proprietary capacity, but, unless its immunity is legislatively waived, it is immune
from liability for tortious conduct committed while the entity is acting in a governmental
capacity”).
Importantly, enactment of the Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”)
“did not serve to create a cause of action against the local governments or their employees.”
Rounds v. Maryland-Nat. Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 441 Md. 621, 640 (2015). And, it “does
not waive the [municipality’s] common law governmental immunity in any extent more broad than
its duty to indemnify employees.” 	Livesay v. Baltimore Cnty., 384 Md. 1, 20 (2004). Accordingly,
“the only actions which can be brought directly against a local government are those authorized
by law which is separate and distinct from the LGTCA.” 	Rounds, 441 Md. at 640 (citation
modified) (quoting 	Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. 379, 394 (2000)); 	see Nam v. Montgomery
Cnty., 127 Md. App. 172, 184 (1999) (“Nowhere in the Act, however, is there a waiver of immunity
so that the governmental entity is subject to being made a party to an action based upon its
employee’s or agent’s tortious acts.”); 	Hicks v. Anne Arundel Cnty., No. CV JKB-20-0022, 2020
WL 7624773, at *5 (D. Md. Dec. 22, 2020) (“A Maryland statute provides that local governments
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may be vicariously liable for the tortious acts or omissions of their employees, but this statute
contains no specific waiver of governmental immunity when a governmental entity is sued in its
own capacity.” (citations omitted)).
Based on the foregoing, Town of Elkton is entitled to governmental immunity as to
Plaintiff’s non-constitutional state tort claims. There is no dispute that Town of Elkton is a local
government entity. 	See, e.g., 	Myers v. Town of Elkton, Maryland, No. BPG-22-803, 2023 WL
2242870, at *9 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2023). 	It is similarly beyond dispute that a local government
entity’s “operation . . . of its police department is quintessentially governmental.” 	Clark v. Prince
George’s Cnty., 211 Md. App. 548, 558 (2013); 	see, e.g., 	Talley v. Anne Arundel Cnty., Maryland,
No. CV RDB-21-347, 2021 WL 4244759, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 17, 2021) (same); 	Devi, 2017 WL
3592452, at *2 (same); 	Schmidt v. Town of Cheverly, MD., 212 F. Supp. 3d 573, 583 (D. Md.
2016) (same); 	Williams v. Prince George’s Cnty., MD, 157 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (D. Md. 2001)
(same) (quoting 	Hector v. Weglein, 	558 F. Supp. 194, 206 (D. Md. 1982)). Accordingly, because
Plaintiff brings his non-constitutional Maryland tort claims against Town of Elkton, a local
government entity, based on governmental activity, Town of Elkton is protected by governmental
immunity. 	See Paulone, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 378, 	supra.
Plaintiff appears disagree with the well-settled state of the law as discussed above, but his
asserted challenges are not supported by the authority he cites. 	First, Plaintiff relies on 	Jones v.
State, 425 Md. 1 (2012). 	Jones 	is inapposite because it addressed suit against the state and
application of the Maryland Tort Claims Act, not, as is at issue here, suit against a municipality
and application of governmental immunity, with consideration of the LGTCA. As Town of Elkton
correctly observes, the Appellate Court of Maryland has explicitly rejected Plaintiff’s argument:
“The appellants argue that 	Jones v. State, 	425 Md. 1, 38 A.3d 333 (2012), changed the law of
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immunities regarding common law tort claims for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.
They are incorrect. 	Jones 	did not involve allegations of common law tort liability against a 	local
government. 	It involved allegations of common law tort liability against 	the State of Maryland.”
Clark v. Prince George’s Cnty., 211 Md. App. 548, 559 (2013) (emphasis in original). 	It
continues: “The holding in 	Jones 	is not relevant to the issue of immunity of a local government
against common law tort claims brought against it directly, in its own capacity, for governmental
acts or omissions, including allegations of negligent hiring, training, or entrustment.” 	Id. 	at 561.
Next, citing 	Housing Authority of Baltimore City v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356 (2000), Plaintiff
asserts: “there are a number of instances where local government immunity has not been extended
to the local government entity on tort related actions.” (ECF No. 19-1 at p. 10.) 	Bennett, 	however,
concerned “whether the damages cap provision applies to a judgment against a local government
agency in a tort action which is authorized by another statute enacted by the General Assembly
prior to the LGTCA and reenacted after the LGTCA.” 	Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City v. Bennett,
359 Md. 356, 358 (2000). As Town of Elkton correctly states, the court’s analysis did not turn on
the applicability of governmental immunity, as it recognized an applicable waiver of such
immunity. 	Id. 	at 359–61. No such waiver is present here.9
Plaintiff cites no authority that supports his contention that governmental immunity does
not operate as set forth above. Based on the foregoing, the court will grant the Motion to the extent
it seeks dismissal with prejudice of Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI, as against Town
of Elkton.
9 	Plaintiff also argues that Town of Elkton “fails to acknowledge” his Count VII, which does not rely on a theory of
vicarious liability. 	(ECF No. 19-1 at p. 11.) 	This distinction is immaterial to Town of Elkton’s argument and the
court’s related analysis.
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D. Alternative Request for Bifurcation
Finally, Town of Elkton moves to bifurcate any remaining claims against it (here, Count
II, Plaintiff’s Maryland Declaration of Rights claim), because “any municipal liability is secondary
to a finding against the individual officers.” (ECF No. 15-1 at p. 12.) Plaintiff opposes the request,
arguing that judicial economy would not be served by bifurcation. (ECF No. 19-1 at pp. 13–14.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides: “For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or
to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues,
claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” FED. 	R. 	CIV. 	P. 42(b). “Notably, Rule
42(b) is disjunctive, meaning ‘[o]nly one of these criteria need be met to justify bifurcation.’” 	Saltz
v. City of Frederick, MD, 538 F. Supp. 3d 510, 561 (D. Md. 2021) (quoting 	Saxion v. Titan-C-
Mfg., 86 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1996)). The decision to bifurcate claims for trial is committed to
the court’s “broad discretion.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Beasley v. Kelly, DKC-10-0049, 2010 WL 3221848,
at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 13, 2010)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) further provides:
A party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties
have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding
exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when
authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.
FED. 	R. 	CIV. P. 26(d)(1).
Where Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim against Town of Elkton is Count II, which will
progress on a theory of vicarious liability, the court is not persuaded that bifurcation is warranted
at this time. 	The court discerns no prejudice to be avoided, or economy to be served, by
bifurcation. The cases Town of Elkton cites rely on the unique nature of 	Monell 	liability under §
1983, which is no longer at issue in view of the court’s ruling. The court has repeatedly recognized
that § 1983 	Monell 	claims are good candidates for bifurcation, but Town of Elkton does not
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persuade the court that the same ends would be served by bifurcation in the absence of such a
claim. Instead, it may cause needless delay.
Accordingly, the court will deny the Motion to the extent it seeks bifurcation and a related
stay of discovery as to Plaintiff’s remaining claim against Town of Elkton.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, by separate order, the Motion will be granted in part and
denied in part. It will be granted to the extent it seeks dismissal of Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII against Town of Elkton and denied in all other respects.10
February 6, 2026 	/s/
Julie R. Rubin
United States District Judge
10 	Based on the posture of the case, and the relevant immunity doctrine at issue, the court finds dismissal without
prejudice is warranted as to Count I as against Town of Elkton, and dismissal with prejudice is warranted as to Counts
III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII as against Town of Elkton. 	Adbul-Mumit v. Alexandria Hyundai, LLC,
896 F.3d 278, 292 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that “the nature of dismissal” is left “to the sound discretion of the district
court”).
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