Burrell v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Chambers of
Douglas R. Miller
United States Magistrate Judge
101 West Lombard Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
MDD_DRMChambers@mdd.uscourts.gov
(410) 962-7770
March 4, 2026
LETTER TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD
Re: Ronald B. v. Frank Bisignano, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration1
Civil No. 24-3751-DRM
Dear Counsel:
On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff Ronald B. (“Plaintiff”) petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s (“SSA’s” or “Commissioner’s” or “Defendant’s”) final decision
to deny Plaintiff’s claim for Social Security benefits. ECF No. 1. This case was then referred to
me with the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Loc. R. 301. I have considered the record in
this case and the parties’ briefs. ECF Nos. 9, 12, 14. I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc.
R. 105.6. The Court must uphold the decision of the SSA if it is supported by substantial evidence
and if the SSA employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v.
Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will REMAND the
Commissioner’s decision. This letter explains why.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits
on February 6, 2018, alleging a disability onset of September 13, 2015, which was later amended
to January 13, 2019. Tr. 10. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on August 10, 2018 and on
reconsideration on April 18, 2019. Tr. 10. On May 7, 2020, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
held a hearing. Tr. 10. Following the hearing, on July 22, 2020, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. Tr.
7. On November 17, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Tr. 1.
Plaintiff appealed to this Court and the case was remanded for further review. Tr. 453. On August
27, 2024, the ALJ held a second telephone conference and subsequently determined that Plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. Tr.
467. The ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the SSA. Sims v. Apfel, 530
1 Plaintiff filed this case against Carolyn Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on
December 27, 2024. ECF No. 1. Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on
May 7, 2025. Accordingly, Commissioner Bisignano has been substituted as this case’s Defendant
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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Ronald B. v. Frank Bisignano
Civil No. 24-3751-DRM
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U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000); see also 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a). Having exhausted all administrative
remedies, Plaintiff once again appeals to this Court for judicial review.
II. THE ALJ’S DECISION
Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The ALJ is required to evaluate a claimant’s disability determination
using a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. “Under this
process, an ALJ evaluates, in sequence, whether the claimant: ‘(1) worked during the alleged
period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the
requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to [their] past relevant work; and (5) if not,
could perform any other work in the national economy.’” Kiser v. Saul, 821 F. App’x 211, 212
(4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (quoting Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Here, at step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since January 13, 2019, the amended alleged onset date.” Tr. 456. At step two, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine, schizoaffective disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, substance abuse disorder,
anxiety disorder, depressive disorder. Tr. 456. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
“does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. 457.
The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform:
medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except he can frequently climb
ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps and stairs. He can frequently balance, stoop,
crouch, kneel and crawl. He can perform low-stress jobs, defined as those having
only occasional decision making required and only occasion[al] changes in the
work setting. He can occasionally interact with the public and with co-workers.
Tr. 459. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. Tr. 466. The ALJ also
determined that the claimant could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national
economy, such as line service attendant, store laborer, and kitchen helper. Tr. 466-467. Therefore,
the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 467.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The scope of the Court’s review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application
of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). “The
findings of the [ALJ] . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .
. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept
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as sufficient to support a particular conclusion.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.
1966). It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Id. In
conducting the “substantial evidence” inquiry, my review is limited to whether the ALJ analyzed
the relevant evidence and sufficiently explained their findings and rationale in crediting the
evidence. See, e.g., Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439–40 (4th Cir. 1997);
DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Judicial review of an administrative
decision is impossible without an adequate explanation of that decision by the [ALJ].”).
IV. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ concluded he could perform medium work without a proper function-by-function
analysis. ECF No. 5 at 11. Plaintiff emphasizes evidence of lumbar degenerative disc disease,
chronic pain, and mental impairments, along with treating opinions indicating significant
limitations, absenteeism, and off-task behavior, which he says are incompatible with medium
work. Id. at 6. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly rejected or discounted all medical
opinions, particularly Dr. Santosh Raiker’s physical assessment, without adequately addressing
supportability and consistency, requiring remand. Id. at 9.
In response, the Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC
findings. ECF No. 14. According to the Commissioner, the ALJ provided a detailed narrative
discussion tying largely benign and conservative physical findings, normal gait and examinations,
consultative exam results, and daily activities to a limited range of medium work with additional
postural and mental restrictions. Id. at 11. The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ properly
evaluated opinion evidence under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c, reasonably finding the treating opinions
unpersuasive, including Dr. Raiker’s, due to minimal support and inconsistency with the broader
record, while partially crediting Disability Determination Services consultants and incorporating
greater mental limitations than they proposed. Id. at 11. The Commissioner further argues that the
ALJ appropriately considered, but was not bound by, the prior light-work finding given new
evidence. Id. The Commissioner urges the Court to affirm and reject Plaintiff’s request to reweigh
the evidence, emphasizing the deferential substantial-evidence standard. Id. at 14.
When evaluating medical opinions in claims filed on or after March 27, 20172, an ALJ
must, as the Fourth Circuit recently explained:
“evaluate the persuasiveness” of that evidence by applying a five-factor test, 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); see also id. § 404.1520c(b)(2), -(c). The factors are: (1)
supportability, (2) consistency, (3) relationship with the claimant, (4) specialization,
and (5) other factors. Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5).
2 See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5853
(Jan. 18, 2017).
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Ronald B. v. Frank Bisignano
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Although the Social Security Administration must ultimately “stat[e] the ... reason
or reasons upon which” its final decision “is based,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1), an ALJ
need not explain in detail how he “evaluate[d] the persuasiveness,” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a), of each piece of evidence in the record. The ALJ only needs to say,
for each “medical source” in the record, how each of the first two factors applies—
that is, whether that source’s conclusions are supportable by medical evidence and
consistent with the rest of the record. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(1), -(2). An ALJ must
consider all five factors, but need not discuss any save the first two unless those
other factors are dispositive. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(3); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1).
Drumgold v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 144 F.4th 596, 604-05 (4th Cir. 2025).
The relevant regulation defines supportability as follows:
Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting
explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the
medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1).
“Supportability is the degree to which a provider supports [his or her] opinion with
relevant, objective medical evidence and explanation, and consistency is the degree to which a
provider’s opinion is consistent with the evidence of other medical and non-medical sources in the
record.” Oakes v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 207, 212 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)–
(2)). This Court has noted that supportability must be considered independently
from consistency. See Duane H. v. Kijakazi, No. JMC-20-3673, 2021 WL 8314949, at *3 (D. Md.
Dec. 29, 2021) (recognizing that to consider supportability “in conjunction
with” consistency “would conflate the nuances of those factors.”). The consistency factor is an
outward facing inquiry, looking at whether the medical opinion is consistent with other evidence
in the record. Rosa M. v. Kijakazi, No. 9:22-CV-04494-BHH-MHC, 2023 WL 9101308, at *7 (D.
S. C. Dec. 8, 2023). This Court has made clear that an analysis of the consistency of an opinion
with other opinions from the same provider and the rest of the record is not sufficient to constitute
a supportability analysis. See Carlos F. v. Kijakazi, No. BAH-22-2049, 2023 WL 3293086, at *4–
5 (D. Md. May 5, 2023) (finding that analysis of inconsistency between two opinions of one
medical source was insufficient to assess supportability). The ALJ must assess the relevance of
“the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source” to
the ultimate finding advanced by that medical expert. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1).
The ALJ provided the following analysis of Dr. Raiker’s opinion:
In February 2020, Santosh Raiker, M.D., a medical provider at Jai, opined that
the claimant would not be able to be on his feet for 6 hours or lift objects up to 20
pounds frequently in an 8-hour workday and would need to lay down for 5-6 hours in
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Ronald B. v. Frank Bisignano
Civil No. 24-3751-DRM
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a regular 8-hour day. He also opined that the claimant would be absent from work for
a minimum of 30 days out of a work year, offtask for 20 percent of the workday, and
that symptoms would cause substantial restrictions in his capacity for sustained mental
alertness, concentration, and persistence in carrying out simple job duties in a
competitive work environment over a regular 8-hour workday (B11F). This opinion is
unpersuasive because Dr. Raiker only provided minimal support and the limitations
are inconsistent with other evidence. These restrictive limitations are inconsistent with
Jai records that reflect generally benign and unremarkable physical examinations
(B13F). More recently, physical exam findings noted some lumbar spine issues at
times but were generally unremarkable (see B16F/21, B17F/11-12, 37, 234, 335, 359,
B19F/176, 195, B20F/42, e.g.). The Jai record and the other medical records do not
support these restrictive limitations. The claimant also displayed good memory and
concentration at his consultative exams (B6F, B7F), which is inconsistent with finding
he would be off task or lack the ability to perform simple job duties.
Tr. 464.
Remand is required because the ALJ did not adequately articulate her analysis under the
supportability factor of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Specifically, the ALJ did not analyze the
objective medical findings, clinical observations, or explanations provided by Dr. Raiker in
support of his opinion. Nor did the ALJ adequately discuss whether Dr. Raiker’s own treatment
notes or diagnostic findings supported or undermined the limitations he assessed. The ALJ broadly
summarizes exhibits spanning over 100 pages of Jai records by stating merely that the records
“reflect generally benign and unremarkable physical examinations,” Tr. 464 (citing Ex. B13F); or
“noted some lumbar spine issues at times but were generally unremarkable,” id. (citing Ex. B16F
& Ex. B20F). The analysis does not adequately identify specific elements of the Jai records that
are unsupportive of, or inconsistent with Dr. Raiker’s opinions. This cursory analysis does not
build a logical bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s conclusions and frustrates meaningful
judicial review.
On remand, the ALJ should explicitly assess the supportability of Dr. Raiker’s medical
source statement pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Because the case is being remanded on
the grounds described above, I need not address other arguments that appear in Plaintiff’s brief.
On remand, the ALJ is welcome to consider these arguments and make any required adjustments
to the opinion. Additionally, in remanding for further explanation, the Court expresses no opinion
as to whether the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits is correct.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the SSA’s
judgment is REMANDED.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be docketed as a Memorandum Opinion.
A separate implementing Order follows.
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Ronald B. v. Frank Bisignano
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Sincerely,
/s/
Douglas R. Miller
United States Magistrate Judge
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