Levy v. Howard County, MD et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MARK R. LEVY, 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Action No. RDB-24-3580
HOWARD COUNTY, MARYLAND 	*
And HOWARD COUNTY FIRE AND
RESCUE SERVICES, 	*
Defendants. 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM ORDER
In this employment discrimination action, Plaintiff Mark R. Levy, a Fire Fighter
Paramedic, alleges that his employers, Defendants Howard County, Maryland (the “County”),
and the Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services (the “Fire and Rescue
Department”) (collectively, “Defendants”), violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act
(“MFEPA”), Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 20-606 et seq., by refusing him reasonable
accommodations for his mental health disability over the span of nearly three years from
February 2022 to October 2024. 	See generally 	(ECF No. 2). Specifically, Levy alleges
discrimination (Count I), harassment and hostile work environment (Count II), and retaliation
(Count III). (Id. at 16, 20, 22) He brings each count under both the ADA and MFEPA. (Id. at
16, 20, 22)
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Presently pending are Levy’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 21; ECF No. 22) and his uncontested Motion for Leave to File a Reply (ECF No. 26).1
Levy seeks leave under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to add a fourth count seeking
declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. (ECF No. 21
at 1) The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions; no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R.
105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the following reasons, Levy’s Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21; ECF No. 22) and Motion for Leave to File a Reply (ECF
No. 26) are GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Levy has been employed as a Fire Fighter Paramedic with the Howard County
Fire and Rescue Department since October 31, 2016. (ECF No. 2 ¶ 12) At the time he filed
this suit, on October 14, 2024, Levy was assigned to Battalion 3, Station 3 in Sykesville,
Maryland. (Id. ¶ 13) Levy alleges that he has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression since
2002. (Id. ¶ 18) He asserts that his assignment to Station 3 is optimal for managing his mental
health because the station has a lower call volume than other stations in Battalion 3. (Id. ¶ 27)
Multiple times in 2022, Levy was reassigned from Station 3 to other stations in the battalion.
(Id. ¶¶ 47, 52) Each time, he requested that the Fire and Rescue Department allow him to stay
at Station 3. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 65) He alleges that the Department denied these requests. (Id. ¶ 68, 71)
He also alleges that the Department retaliated against him by placing him in an administrative
position after he sought the accommodation of staying at Station 3. (Id. ¶ 57)
1 Levy’s Motion for Leave to File a Reply (ECF No. 26) is uncontested and will
therefore be GRANTED.
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After exhausting his administrative remedies as required by Americans with Disabilities
Act, Levy filed this three-count suit in the Circuit Court for Howard County on October 14,
2024. (Id.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, Defendants removed the case to this Court
on December 11, 2024.2 (ECF No. 1) On May 20, 2025, Levy sought, by email, Defendants’
consent to amend the Complaint to add a fourth count of declaratory relief. (ECF No. 21-2)
In a reply email dated June 6, 2025, Defendants declined to join the motion. (Id.) On June 8,
2025, Levy filed the pending Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint to add a
fourth count pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. (ECF No.
21 at 1) Defendants filed a Response to Levy’s Motion on June 24, 2025. (ECF No. 23) Levy
filed an uncontested Motion for Leave to File a Reply (ECF No. 26), which includes a
memorandum of law replying to Defendants’ Response (ECF No. 23). The matter is ripe for
review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a plaintiff may amend her complaint once
“as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served,” “by leave of court,”
or “by written consent of the adverse party.” In general, district courts should “freely” grant
leave to amend “when justice so requires.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Lanford v. Prince
George’s Cnty., 199 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300 (D. Md. 2002) (applying Rule 15(a)). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted that “this liberal rule gives effect to the
2 This Court has original federal question jurisdiction over Levy’s case as his claims
arise under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331; Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“A suit arises
under the law that creates the cause of action.”).
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federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on
technicalities.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citing Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game
of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”)). As
such, a district court has broad discretion to grant leave to amend. See Simmons v. United Mortg.
& Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 769 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Equal Rts. Ctr. v. Niles Bolton
Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010)). The district judge may deny leave to amend “when
the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, the moving party has acted in bad
faith, or the amendment would be futile.” Equal Rts. Ctr., 602 F.3d at 603 (citing Laber, 438
F.3d at 426). As relevant here, an amendment is futile if it would not survive a motion to
dismiss. 	See, e.g., 401 N. Charles, LLC v. Sonabank, No. RDB-17-0872, 2018 WL 6570680, at
*2 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2018) (citing Whitaker v. Ciena Corp., No. RDB-18-0044, 2018 WL
3608777, at *3 (D. Md. July 27, 2018)); Tawaab v. Va. Linen Serv., Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769
(D. Md. 2010) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999)).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The “mere recital of elements of a cause of action,
supported only by conclusory statements, is not sufficient to survive a motion made pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6).” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012). The Court accepts
“all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
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in weighing the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com,
Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
ANALYSIS
In his proposed First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21-4), Levy seeks to add a fourth
claim for declaratory relief pursuant to § 2201 of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Specifically,
Levy seeks declarations that he is a qualified individual with a disability and can perform the
essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation. (Id. at 28) He also seeks
declarations that Defendants have an obligation to engage in the interactive process and
explore reasonable alternatives and to grant Levy a reasonable accommodation. (Id.) In their
Response, Defendants argue that the Motion should be denied as futile. (ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 6–
12) They make boilerplate assertions that Levy’s proposed First Amended Complaint lacks
any facts which would support declaratory relief. (Id. ¶ 8) They also argue that the ADA does
not allow Levy to seek declaratory relief. Of note, Defendants do not argue that they would
be prejudiced by the amendment or that Levy requests leave to amend in bad faith. As such,
the Court only analyzes whether granting leave to amend the Complaint would be futile.
Levy’s First Amended Complaint, which adds a count seeking declaratory relief, would
not be futile for two reasons. First, the ADA plainly allows plaintiffs to seek declaratory relief.
See Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 454 (4th Cir. 2019) (discussing standing
requirements for declaratory relief under the ADA); see also Equal Rts. Ctr. v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 510, 529 (D. Md. 2010) (finding standing for plaintiffs seeking
declaratory relief under the ADA). Second, Levy’s First Amended Complaint would not be
futile because it would survive a motion to dismiss. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides
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that where an “actual controversy within its jurisdiction” exists, “any court of the United
States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). As the Fourth Circuit has noted, if the complaint alleges an
actual controversy between the parties and the district court possesses an independent basis
for jurisdiction, the court has discretion to exercise jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment
claim. See also Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., Inc., 386 F.3d 581, 592 (4th
Cir. 2004); see also Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) (“Since its inception, the
Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and
substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.”); Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952) (explaining that the Declaratory Judgment Act
is “an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right
upon the litigant”).
Here, Defendants do not contest that there is an actual controversy between the parties
and that the Court has original jurisdiction over the claims under the ADA. As such, the Court
has wide discretion to hear the declaratory judgment claim. Defendants’ boilerplate argument
that the claim for declaratory relief fails to state facts entitling Levy to equitable relief is legally
flawed. The only requirements for jurisdiction in the Declaratory Judgment Act are the
existence of an actual controversy and an independent basis for jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2201;
see also Volvo Constr., 386 F.3d at 592. Once met, the decision to hear a claim for declaratory
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relief is firmly within the district court’s discretion.3 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286. Therefore, Levy’s
Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is this 8th day of December, 2025, hereby ORDERED
that Levy’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21; ECF No. 22) is
GRANTED.
Richard D. Bennett
United States Senior District Judge
3 At this stage, the Court does not engage in a full Rule 12(b)(6) analysis of Levy’s claim
for declaratory relief. District courts in this circuit recognize that dismissal of a declaratory
judgment action is rarely appropriate. See, e.g., Brown Thomas v. Hynie, 412 F. Supp. 3d 600, 606
(D.S.C. 2019) (quoting Palmer v. Audi of Am., Inc., No. GJH-14-03189, 2015 WL 222127, at *2
(D. Md. Jan. 13, 2015)). Nevertheless, Defendants may still move for dismissal of Levy’s
Amended Complaint.
/s/
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