Davis v. Smith et al

1:24-cv-02924Mdd24 nov 2025

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
BRYANT DAVIS a/k/a BRYANT
DAVIDSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
SERGEANT SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.: MJM-24-2924
MEMORANDUM
Self-represented plaintiff Bryant Davis a/k/a Bryant Davidson initiated this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sergeants Smith, Awonjah, and Choctedjem
(collectively, “Defendants”), correctional officers at Jessup Correctional Institution (“JCI”). ECF
No. 5 (Amended Complaint). 	Davis brings claims for the denial of medical care while in
segregation housing at JCI. 	On July 30, 2025, Defendants moved for dismissal or, alternatively,
for summary judgment. ECF No. 11. Davis filed a response in opposition to the motion, ECF No.
16, and Defendants replied, ECF No. 17. Defendants also moved to seal two of their exhibits. ECF
No. 13. Upon review of the record, exhibits, and the applicable law, the Court deems a hearing
unnecessary. 	See 	Loc. R. 105.6. (D. Md. 2025). 	For reasons that follow, the Court will grant
Defendants’ motions.
I. BACKGROUND
At all relevant times to the Amended Complaint, Davis was an inmate at JCI, housed in
the B-Building. 	ECF No. 5 at 2. 	Defendants were correctional staff and employees of the
Maryland Division of Corrections who supervised the unit where Davis was housed. Davis states
that he has several medical conditions requiring medications that must be renewed every 90 days
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at a chronic care appointment. 	Id. 	Because Davis was being housed in a segregation unit,
Defendants, the supervisors of his unit, were informed by the medical staff of his chronic care
schedule, which included an appointment prior to his medications expiring on June 6, 2024. 	Id.
at 2–3. Defendants failed to escort Davis to his chronic care appointment, and his medications
were not renewed until October 7, 2024. 	Id. 	at 3. He claims that Defendants were informed on
June 6, 2024, and August 24, 2024, that he needed to attend these appointments. 	Id. 	Davis went
without his pain and psychiatric medications for four months, causing him anxiety, depression,
asthma attacks, nerve pain, and emotional distress. 	Id. 	Davis seeks monetary damages. 	Id.
In response, Defendants submit the declaration of Lt. Trieste Jenkins, the Administrative
Remedy Procedure Coordinator at JCI. 	ECF No. 11-3. 	Lt. Jenkins attests that Davis filed 12
Administrative Remedy Procedure (“ARP”) grievances between June 2024 and October 2024,
when he was transferred to Western Correctional Institution (“WCI”). 	Id. 	at ¶ 5. None of these
ARPs concerned the denial of medical care. 	Id. 	at ¶ 6. 	The Litigation Coordinator for WCI,
Brook Brallier, further attests that none of the eight ARPs Davis filed between October 2024 and
March 2025, while at WCI, concerned the alleged denial of medical care. ECF No. 11-4 at ¶ 6.
II. MOTION TO SEAL
Defendants request that Exhibits A and D to their Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment be sealed. ECF No. 13. Defendants state that both
exhibits contain sensitive medical and behavioral health information. 	Id.
Local Rule 105.11 (D. Md. 2025), which governs the sealing of all documents filed in the
record, states in relevant part: “[a]ny motion seeking the sealing of pleadings, motions, exhibits or
other documents to be filed in the Court record shall include (a) proposed reasons supported by
specific factual representations to justify the sealing and (b) an explanation why alternatives to
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sealing would not provide sufficient protection.” The Local Rule balances the public’s common
law right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents, 	see Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978), with competing interests that sometimes outweigh the public’s
right of access, 	see In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984). The common-law
presumptive right of access “can be rebutted only by showing that ‘countervailing interests heavily
outweigh the public interests in access.’” 	Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265–66 (4th Cir.
2014) (quoting 	Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)). 	The
public’s right of access to dispositive motions and the exhibits filed within is protected to an even
higher standard by the First Amendment. 	See Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253. This right also “extends
to a judicial opinion ruling on a summary judgment motion.” 	Doe, 749 F.3d at 267. 	The First
Amendment’s right of access “may be restricted only if closure is ‘necessitated by a compelling
government interest’ and the denial of access is ‘narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’” 	Id. 	at
266 (citation omitted). “[S]ensitive medical or personal identification information may be sealed,”
but not where “the scope of [the] request is too broad.” 	Rock v. McHugh, 819 F. Supp. 2d 456,
475 (D. Md. 2011) (citations omitted).
The Court finds that Defendants’ request to seal these select medical records, which
contain Davis’s personal information and sensitive behavioral health details, is not overly
broad. 	Furthermore, because the Court cannot reach the merits of the Complaint, Davis’s
medical records are not necessary for resolution of this matter. 	Defendants’ Motion will be
granted, and Exhibits A and D will remain under seal.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or alternatively for
summary judgment. 	Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may
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seek dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” 	To survive the
challenge, the non-moving party must have pleaded facts demonstrating “a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” 	Lokhova v. Halper, 995 F.3d 134, 141 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing 	Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 	A plausible claim is more than merely conceivable or
speculative. 	See Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 299 (4th Cir. 2022). The allegations must
show there is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 	Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 961 F.3d 635, 648 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept the allegations as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. 	Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759, 765, 777
(4th Cir. 2022). But the Court does not accept “legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” 	U.S. ex rel. Taylor v. Boyko, 39 F.4th 177,
189 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting 	U.S. ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451,
455 (4th Cir. 2013)). 	Merely reciting a claim’s elements “and supporting them by conclusory
statements does not meet the required standard.” 	Sheppard v. Visitors of Va. State Univ., 993 F.3d
230, 234 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting 	ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 212
(4th Cir. 2019)). The Court “does not resolve contests surrounding facts, the merits of a claim, or
the applicability of defenses.” 	Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting 	Tobey v.
Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013)).
“[P]ro se 	filings are ‘h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.’” 	Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 272 (4th Cir. 2022) (second alteration in original)
(quoting 	Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Accordingly, the Court must construe pro
se pleadings liberally. 	Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020), 	cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 1376 (2021). “[L]iberal construction does not require [the Court] to attempt to ‘discern
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the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff,’ but only to determine the actual meaning of the words used
in the complaint.” 	Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting 	Laber v. Harvey,
438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). 	Thus, a pro se complaint “still must contain
enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Thomas v. The Salvation Army
S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 	King
v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016)).
The Court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion typically is limited to the pleadings,
documents attached to the complaint, and the parties’ briefs. 	See 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 12(d);
see also 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). The Court also may consider judicially noticed facts and documents
“integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint” when their authenticity is not disputed. 	See
Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606–07 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 	Am.
Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004)); Fed. R. Evid.
201(b). When the parties present and the Court considers matters outside the pleadings on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the Court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, and
“[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to
the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
The Court notified Davis that he had the right to respond to Defendants’ motion, that the
motion could be construed as one for summary judgment, and that if Davis did not file a timely
and adequate written response, the Court could dismiss the case or enter judgment against him
without providing him another opportunity to respond. 	ECF No. 14. 	Moreover, Defendants’
motion, which identifies summary judgment as possible relief, provided sufficient notice for Davis
to have a reasonable opportunity to present relevant evidence in support of his position. 	See
Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260–61 (4th Cir. 1998). Davis has
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filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion. 	ECF No. 16. 	Thus, the Court is satisfied
that Davis has been advised that Defendants’ motion could be treated as one for summary judgment
and that he has been given a reasonable opportunity to present materials in response to the motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes that “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To meet its burden, the party must identify “particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” in support of
its position. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Then, “[t]o avoid summary judgment, the opposing party
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 	Perkins v. Int’l Paper
Co., 936 F.3d 196, 205 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)). A dispute of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” 	Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The opposing party must identify
more than a “scintilla of evidence” in support of its position to defeat the motion for summary
judgment. 	Id. 	at 252. 	The Court “should not weigh the evidence.” 	Perkins, 936 F.3d at 205
(quoting 	Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). However, if “the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then summary judgment is appropriate. 	Id.
(quoting 	Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991)); 	see
also 	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, this Court “view[s] the facts and inferences drawn from the facts in the light most
favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.” 	Perkins, 936 F.3d at 205 (quoting 	Evans v. Techs.
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996)).
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state and its agencies
and departments 	are immune from 	citizen suits 	in 	federal 	court 	absent 	state consent 	or
Congressional action. 	See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
Claims against state employees acting in their official capacities are also subject to Eleventh
Amendment immunity because a suit against the state actor is tantamount to a suit against the state
itself. 	Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1985). The State of Maryland has not waived such
immunity for claims brought pursuant to § 1983. To the extent that Davis sues Defendants in their
official capacities, the claims must be dismissed.
B. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, in pertinent part: “No action shall
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, 	by 	a prisoner 	confined 	in any 	jail, 	prison, or other 	correctional 	facility until 	such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
For purposes of the PLRA, “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained
in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or
diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). The phrase “prison conditions” encompasses “all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes,
and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” 	Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002).
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The doctrine governing exhaustion of administrative remedies has been well established
through administrative law jurisprudence. It provides that a plaintiff is not entitled to judicial relief
until the prescribed administrative remedies have been exhausted. 	Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
88–89 (2006). Therefore, a claim that has not been exhausted may not be considered by this Court.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219–20 (2007). In other words, exhaustion is mandatory, and a
court ordinarily may not excuse a failure to exhaust. 	See 	Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016)
(citing 	Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (explaining that “[t]he mandatory ‘shall’. . .
normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion”) (alteration in original)).
However, administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement
and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner. 	Rather, the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by defendants.
See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215–216; 	Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 682
(4th Cir. 2005).
Ordinarily, an inmate must follow the required procedure to exhaust their administrative
remedies. 	Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725, 729 (4th Cir. 2008); 	see also Langford v. Couch,
50 F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“The . . . PLRA amendment made clear that exhaustion
is now mandatory.”). 	Exhaustion requires completion of “the administrative review process in
accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines . . . .” 	Woodford, 548 U.S. at
88. This requirement is one of “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means using
all steps that the agency holds out and doing so 	properly 	(so that the agency addresses the issues
on the merits).’” 	Id. 	at 90 (quoting 	Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)).
But the Court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in [administrative] exhaustion were not
procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” 	Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d
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1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); 	see also Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding
that “the inmate cannot be required to exhaust [administrative remedies] . . . when prison officials
prevent inmates from using the administrative process”).
The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”) has an
established the “administrative remedy procedure” (“ARP”) for use by Maryland state prisoners
for “inmate complaint resolution.” 	See generally 	Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. (“C.S.”), § 10-201
et seq. 	(2025); Md. Code Regs. (“COMAR”) 12.07.01.01B(1) (defining ARP). 	The grievance
procedure applies to the submission of “a grievance against an official or employee of the Division
of Correction [‘DOC’] . . . .” C.S. § 10-206(a). Regulations promulgated by DPSCS concerning
the ARP process define a “grievance” to include a “complaint of any individual in the custody of
the [DOC] against any officials or employees of the [DOC] arising from the circumstances of
custody or confinement.” COMAR 12.07.01.01B(8). To pursue a grievance, a prisoner confined
in a Maryland prison may file a complaint with the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”) against any
DOC official or employee. 	See 	C.S. § 10-206(a). 	When the ARP process provides a possible
remedy, it must be followed and completed before an inmate may file a grievance with the IGO.
However, if the prison has a grievance procedure that is approved by the IGO, the prisoner must
first follow the institutional ARP process before filing a grievance with the IGO. 	See 	C.S. § 10-
206(b).
The ARP process consists of multiple steps. For the first step, a prisoner is required to file
his initial ARP request with his facility’s “managing official,” COMAR 12.02.28.05D(1), which
is defined by COMAR 12.02.28.02B(14) as “the warden or other individual responsible for
management of the correctional facility” and defined under C.S. § 1-101(m) as “the administrator,
director, warden, superintendent, sheriff, or other individual responsible for the management of a
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correctional facility.” 	Moreover, the ARP request must be filed within 30 days of the date on
which the incident occurred, or within 30 days of the date the prisoner first gained knowledge of
the incident or injury giving rise to the complaint, whichever is later. COMAR 12.02.28.09B.
The second step in the ARP process occurs if the managing official denies a prisoner’s
initial ARP or fails to respond to the ARP within the established time frame. The prisoner has 30
days to file an appeal to the Commissioner of Correction. COMAR 12.02.28.14B(5).
If the Commissioner of Correction denies an appeal, the prisoner has 30 days to file a
grievance with the IGO. COMAR 12.02.28.18; C.S. § 10-206(a); COMAR 12.07.01.05B.1 	When
filing with the IGO, a prisoner is required to include copies of the following: the initial request for
administrative remedy, the warden’s response to that request, a copy of the ARP appeal filed with
the Commissioner of Correction, and a copy of the Commissioner’s response. 	COMAR
12.07.01.04B(9)(a).
If the grievance is determined to be “wholly lacking in merit on its face,” the IGO may
dismiss it “without a hearing . . . .” 	C.S. § 10-207(b)(1); 	see also 	COMAR 12.07.01.06B. 	An
“order of dismissal constitutes the final decision of the Secretary [of DPSCS] for purposes of
judicial review.” C.S. § 10-207(b)(2)(ii). However, if a hearing is deemed necessary by the IGO,
the 	hearing 	is 	conducted 	by 	an 	administrative 	law 	judge 	with 	the 	Maryland 	Office 	of
Administrative Hearings. 	See 	C.S. § 10-208(a); COMAR 12.07.01.07. 	The conduct of such
hearings is governed by statute. 	See 	C.S. § 10-208; COMAR 12.07.01.07D; Md. Code Ann., State
Gov’t, § 10-206(a)(1).
A decision of the administrative law judge denying all relief to the inmate is considered a
final agency determination. C.S. § 10-209(b)(1)(ii); COMAR 12.07.01.10A(2). However, if the
1 	If the Commissioner fails to respond, the grievant shall file an appeal within 30 days of the date the response was
due. COMAR 12.07.01.05B(2).
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ALJ concludes that the inmate’s complaint is wholly or partly meritorious, the decision constitutes
a recommendation to the Secretary of DPSCS, who must make a final agency determination within
fifteen days after receipt of the proposed decision of the administrative law judge. 	See 	C.S. §§ 10-
209(b)(2), (c); COMAR 12.07.01.10B.
The statute provides for judicial review. C.S. § 10-210. But “[a] court may not consider
an individual’s grievance that is within the jurisdiction of the [Inmate Grievance] Office or the
Office of Administrative Hearings unless the individual has exhausted the remedies provided” in
C.S. §§ 10-201 through 10-210. C.S. § 10-210(a).
Here, it is undisputed that Davis did not initiate the grievance procedure available to him
at JCI or WCI concerning the allegations in his Complaint. 	Davis, who filed numerous ARPs
while incarcerated at both institutions, did not file anything complaining about Defendants’ failure
to escort him to chronic care or otherwise ensure that he received medical care. Davis’s response
in opposition to the Motion does not assert that he made any such attempt to file an ARP nor that
the grievance procedure was unavailable to him. As such, having not filed an ARP nor appealed
through the grievance process, the Court finds that Davis’s claims are unexhausted and therefore
must be dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall grant Defendants’ Motions. 	Davis’s claims
against Defendants are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
A separate Order follows.
___11/24/25 	_____________________________
Date 	Matthew J. Maddox
United States District Judge
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