Davis v. Dean et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:24-cv-02609-TDC Document 37 Filed 02/05/26 Page 1of9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

BRYANT DAVIS a/k/a Bryant Davidson,

Plaintiff,

V.
ROBERT DEAN, Warden, Civil Action No. 24-2609-TDC
JIDE SHAMOYE, Correctional Officer,
KEEFE COMMISSARY NETWORK and
KEEFE GROUP, LLC,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Self-represented Plaintiff Bryant Davis, who is currently incarcerated at the Western
Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland, has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (“§ 1983”) in which he alleges that Defendants interfered with his ability to purchase items
from the prison commissary and delivered one of his orders to the wrong cell, in violation of his
constitutional rights, including the right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants Keefe Commissary Network and Keefe
Group, LLC (collectively, “KCN”) have filed a Motion to Dismiss. Defendants Warden Robert
Dean and Correctional Officer Jide Shamoye (collectively, “the State Defendants’) have filed a
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. Davis has filed a Motion
for Appointment of Counsel. Upon review of the submitted materials, the Court finds that no
hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

Motions will be GRANTED, and Davis’s Motion will be DISMISSED AS MOOT.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

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BACKGROUND

In the Complaint, Davis alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Jessup Correctional
Institution (“JCI”) in Jessup, Maryland, he was denied the ability to purchase any detergents or
Nextel soap through KCN beginning on January 1, 2023. He claims that all other inmates at JCI
were able to buy these items. Davis states that his cousin also attempted to purchase detergent for
him from the KCN website and was unable to do so. Davis asserts that although he can purchase
soaps other than Nextel soap, those soaps cost between $1.00 and $2.25 per bar or bottle, while
Nextel soap costs only $0.55 per bar. Davis contends that he is being prevented from purchasing
the less expensive soap because he has more than $55,000 in his inmate account, and because he
has filed grievances and lawsuits against JCI staff.

Davis asserts that he submitted a complaint under the Administrative Remedy Procedure
(“ARP”) to Warden Dean in which he alleged that Officer Shamoye stated, in response to Davis’s
inquiry about why he could not order soap through a tablet, “Because you like to file fucking
lawsuits instead of shutting the fuck up, that’s why.” Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1. This ARP
complaint, No. JCI-0434-24, was dismissed by Warden Dean because there was no evidence to
substantiate Davis’s claim against Officer Shamoye, and technical software issues on his tablet are
not subject to the ARP process. Davis states that it is “patently absurd” that neither Officer
Shamoye nor Warden Dean could contact KCN to fix the problem. /d. at 4. According to Davis,
he argued in a similar ARP complaint, No. JCI-0389-24, that there was no penological reason for
the denial of Davis’s access to a tablet and its applications unless he had a disciplinary infraction,
and then only after a hearing.

In addition, Davis claims that in September 2023, inmate workers from the prison laundry

service incorrectly delivered items he had ordered, specifically, t-shirts, boxers, and socks worth

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$150, to a different inmate in an adjacent cell. Davis filed an ARP complaint about the incident
but states that Warden Dean did nothing, and that he never received his items. According to Davis,
Warden Dean is using the “Intelligence Unit” to prevent Davis’s access to tablet applications, and
that Officer Coates, the ARP Coordinator, confirmed this in ARP No. JCI-0389-24. Jd. at 7. Davis
claims that this course of conduct violates his federal and state constitutional rights, including his
right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Davis also complained about the denial of access to commissary items to a KCN supervisor
named Cora, who took no action. Because neither Davis nor his family can buy items through the
KCN website, Davis claims that it must be the doing of KCN executives. Davis asserts that
Warden Dean, as a supervisor, should have properly addressed these issues.

Davis filed the Complaint in this case on September 6, 2024. Between January 1, 2023
and September 30, 2024, Davis filed six ARP complaints relating to the allegations in his
Complaint: (1) JCI-0389-24, (2) JCI-0434-24, (3) JCI-0443-24, (4) JCI-0524-24, (5) JCI-0672-
24, and (6) JCI-1202-24. Each of these ARP complaints was dismissed for procedural reasons or
on the merits. Davis did not appeal any of these ARP complaints to the Incarcerated Individual
Grievance Office (“IIGO”).

DISCUSSION

KCN seeks dismissal of the claims against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). The State Defendants also seek dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and alternatively
seek summary judgment in their favor pursuant to Rule 56.

I. Legal Standards
To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts

to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

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plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements
do not suffice. /d. A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations
in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson
Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A self-represented party’s complaint must be construed
liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, “liberal construction does not
mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Bing v.
Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020).

The State Defendants filed their Motion as a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment and attached certain exhibits. Typically, when deciding a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers only the complaint and any attached
documents. Sec’y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir.
2007). Rule 12(d) requires courts to treat such a motion as a motion for summary judgment where
matters outside the pleadings are considered and not excluded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Before
converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, courts must give the nonmoving
party “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Jd.
“Reasonable opportunity” has two requirements: (1) the nonmoving party must have some notice
that the court is treating the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment; and (2) the
nonmoving party must be afforded “a reasonable opportunity for discovery” to obtain information
essential to oppose the motion. Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).

Here, the notice requirement has been satisfied by the title of the State Defendants’ Motion.

To show that a reasonable opportunity for discovery has not been afforded, the nonmoving party

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must file an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), or another filing, explaining why “for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d);
see Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 245 (4th Cir. 2002). In his
memorandum in opposition to the Motion, Davis does not assert that summary judgment is
premature and does not claim that he needs discovery in order to respond to the Motion. Under
these circumstances, the Court will construe the State Defendants’ Motion as a Motion for
Summary Judgment for purposes of the arguments requiring consideration of the attached exhibits.

Under Rule 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts supported in the record, not
simply assertions in the pleadings. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522
(4th Cir. 2003). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party.
Id. at 248-49.
II. KCN’s Motion to Dismiss

KCN seeks dismissal of the claims against it on the ground that it is not a state actor and
therefore is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. Section 1983 creates a cause of action
against any person who, under color of state law, subjects someone within the jurisdiction of the

United States “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

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Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, KCN may be held liable
under § 1983 only if it was a state actor. KCN, a private company, is not a government agency.
A private party may nevertheless be considered a state actor for purposes of a § 1983 claim under
the following circumstances:

(1) when the state has coerced the private actor to commit an act that would be

unconstitutional if done by the state; (2) when the state has sought to evade a clear

constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor; (3) when the state has

delegated a traditionally and exclusively public function to a private actor; or (4)

when the state has committed an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a

right of a private citizen.
DeBauche vy. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 507 (4th Cir. 1999). “If the conduct does not fall into one of
these four categories, then the private conduct is not an action of the state,” and § 1983 is
inapplicable. Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Atlanta, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1993),

KCN, in its role as a provider of goods for purchase to Maryland inmates, does not engage
in state action. See Ryidu-X v. Md. Div. of Corr., No. WDQ-14-1735, 2015 WL 4095522, at *4
(D. Md. July 6, 2015) (dismissing a § 1983 claim against KCN because its contract to provide
commissary items to prisoners does not render it a state actor). In carrying out its role, KCN
executes neither a clear constitutional duty nor a traditionally and exclusively public function. See
DeBauche, 191 F.3d at 507. Federal courts have routinely held that a vendor selling products to
prisoners does not act under color of state law. See, e.g., Bomer v. Access Catalog Co., 75 F.
App’x 382, 383 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, numerous federal courts have concluded that KCN
specifically, in its role as operator of prison commissaries, is not a state actor. See Ahlgrim v.
Keefe Grp., LLC, No. 16-177 JB/GJF, 2016 WL 9819520, at *3 (D.N.M. Oct. 19, 2016) (“This

Court has found no precedent . . . that holds that a private corporation acts under color of law by

contracting with a state prison for the purposes of supplying commissary products to prisoners.”’);

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Leatherwood v. Rios, No. 15-767-C, 2016 WL 7192684, at *4—5 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 13, 2016)
(collecting cases and holding that KCN was not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983); Kyles
v. Keefe Commissary Network, No. 14-cv-11907, 2015 WL 1637466, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 13,
2015) (same). Moreover, there are no allegations that KCN or its employees were coerced by state
employees. Therefore, KCN cannot be found liable pursuant to § 1983, and its Motion to Dismiss
will be granted.

Ill. The State Defendants’ Motion

In their Motion, the State Defendants assert that the Complaint must be dismissed on
several grounds, including that Davis failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before
filing this action. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),
states:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.

Id. Inmates must exhaust administrative remedies before they bring any “suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Exhaustion is mandatory and generally may not be excused unless the administrative
procedure is not available. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (holding that an inmate
“must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones”). “[A]n administrative
remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was

prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). In

Ross, the United States Supreme Court identified three circumstances when an administrative

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remedy is unavailable. An administrative procedure is not available when officers are consistently
unwilling or unable to provide relief to aggrieved inmates, the procedure is so opaque that it is
practically incapable of use, or prison administrators actively thwart inmates from filing
grievances. Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44.

In Maryland prisons, for the type of grievance asserted by Davis, the ARP is the
administrative process that must be exhausted. See generally Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. §§ 10—
201 to 10-210 (LexisNexis 2025); Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.02(B)(1) (2025) (defining the ARP).
First, a prisoner must file an ARP complaint with the warden of the prison within 30 days of the
incident or when the prisoner gains knowledge of the injury giving rise to the complaint. See Md.
Code Regs. 12.02.28.09(B), 12.02.28.05(D). Second, if the ARP is denied, a prisoner must file an
appeal with the Commissioner of Correction within 30 days. Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.14. If the
appeal is denied, the prisoner must appeal within 30 days to the IIGO. See Md. Code Ann., Corr.
Servs. § 10-206; Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.18, 12.07.01.05. Inmates may seek judicial review of
the IIGO’s final determinations in a Maryland circuit court. Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 10-
210.

The State Defendants have submitted a declaration by an IIGO official stating that there is
no record that Davis has filed any appeals with the IIGO, including appeals of any of the six ARP
complaints that he filed in relation to conduct at issue in this case. In his memorandum in
opposition to the Motion, Davis asserts only that his ARP complaints were never investigated, a
claim that is contradicted by the files on these ARP complaints that reflect investigative action.
Regardless, Davis has neither alleged nor established that the ARP process was unavailable to him,
nor has he presented any other reason for failing to appeal his ARP complaints through the entire

administrative process before instituting this action. Thus, pursuant to the PLRA, because Davis

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has not exhausted administrative remedies as to his claims against the State Defendants, the Court
will dismiss those claims without prejudice. See Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 623 n.3 (4th Cir.
2021).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, KCN’s Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED, and the State
Defendants’ Motion, construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, will be GRANTED based on
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Davis’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel will

be DISMISSED AS MOOT. A separate Order shall issue.

Date: February 5, 2026 ——-
THEODORE D. CHUA}
United States Dishes