Wright v. Warden of Eastern Correctional Institution et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
WILLIAM WRIGHT,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN OF EASTERN CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION, and
· THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
STATE OF MARYLAND,
Respondents.
Civil Action No.: BAH-23-111
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Self-represented Petitioner, William Wright, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges the validity of his convictions and sentence
in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Maryland, for home invasion, robbery with a deadly
weapon, and first-degree assault. ECF 1. The Petition is fully briefed. ECFs I, 5, 7. Upon review
of the submitted materials, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. 	Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
2025); Rules l(b) and 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition will be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Convictions and Sentence
On October 6, 2015, Wright was indicted on seventeen charges in the Circuit Court for
Harford County (the "home invasion case"). 1 ECF .5-1, at 8, 39. On May 26, 2016, Wright was
arrested in Nevada on a probation violation due to the new charges and extradited to Maryland.
1 The Appellate Court of Maryland briefly described the facts: "On September 10, 2015, [Wright]
and a woman entered a residence and robbed the .homeowners at gunpoint, stealing cash and
jewelry worth over $40,000. [Wright] pointed a gun at a caregiver in the house." ECF 5-1, at 179.
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ECF 5-8. 	On July 12, 2016, public defender Jerri Peyton, entered an appearance on behalf of
Wright in his probation violation case and intended to also represent him in the home invasion
case, but erroneously entered her appearance under the wrong docket number. Id. at 4, 6-7, 13.
On September 12, 2016, Wright appeared in court for proceedings in his probation violation case
and informed Peyton that his home invasiqn case was not moving forward and that he had not been
served with the indictment. 	Id. at 9. 	Peyton arranged with the prosecutor to schedule a pretrial
conference. Id. at 11-12. She also entered an appearance under the correct docket number. Id. at
11; ECF 5-1, at 42. On October 17, 2016, a scheduling order was entered that set the trial date for
January 19, 2017. Id. at 43.
On December 12, 2016, the public defender's office informed the court they had a conflict
of interest and outside counsel was assigned to represent Wright. 	ECF 5-4. New counsel, Tara
LeCompte, filed a Motion to Dismiss the indictment arguing that the trial date was scheduled·
outside of 180 days, in violation of the "Hicks Rule." See Md. Rule 4-271(a)(l). On January 19,
2017, the day trial was set to begin, over an objection from the defense, the trial court postponed
the trial date. ECF 5-5. The trial court advised the parties that Wright's Motion to Dismiss needed·
to be heard by a judge who was unavailable. Id. 	The trial date was reset to March 15, 2017. Id.
at 7.
When the trial date arrived, the defense asked for a continuance because Peyton, the main.
witness whose testimony was needed to adjudicate the Motion to Dismiss, was unavailable. ECF
5-7, at 2. The trial court reset the hearing on Wright's motion for April 10, 2017, and the trial date
for June 6, 2017. 	Id. 	On April 10, 2017, the trial court heard Wright's Motion to Dismiss,.
including testimony from Peyton and Wright. 	ECF 5-8. 	Wright argued that the Hicks deadline
should be calculated starting on July 12, 2016, because even though Peyton entered the wrong
2
i
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docket number, his original counsel intended to enter her appearance in his home invasion case.
Id. at 35. However, the trial court found that the deadline would be calculated from September 12,
2016, when counsel's appearance was officially entered on the docket. Id. at 42. The trial court
·also found good cause supported the postponement of the original trial date. Id. at 45.
On June·6, 2017, the defense requested a postponement of the trial date. 	ECF 5-9. 	The
state objected, but the Circuit Court granted the postponement because there were no judges
·available to preside over the case. Id. Again, on September 13, 2017, the Circuit Court postponed
the trial date to January 24, 2018, because there were no judges available. ECF 5-10.
In January of 2018, Wright filed two pro se motions to dismiss the indictment, arguing
·again that the trial date violated the Hicks Rule and his speedy trial rights were violated. ECF 5-
1, at 75-84. On the day the trial was set to begin, January 24, 2018, Wright entered anAlford2 plea
to three counts in the indictment. The terms of the plea included a binding sentence on the home
.invasion case of seventy years, with all but twenty years suspended, and permitted Wright, after
five and a half years' incarceration, to file a petition for a substance abuse evaluation and
commitment to a treatment facility pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen.§§ 8-505, 507. ECF
.5-11, at 25-26. 	On the probation violation case, the plea involved a binding sentence of a
consecutive eleven years, with all but five years suspended. 	Id. at 27. 	The probation violation
plea also permitted Wright to file a petition for substance abuse evaluation and commitment after
_five and a half years' incarceration. Id. 	The plea also permitted Wright to maintain his right to
appeal the issues raised in his counseled and pro se motions to dismiss concerning the Hicks Rule
2 "An Alford plea is an arrangement in which a defendant maintains his innocence but pleads guilty
for reasons of self-interest." 	United States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)). 	'
3
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and his speedy trial rights. 	Id. at 4--8. 	The·trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Wright
accordingly. Id. at28-53.
B. Direct Appeal
Wright filed a direct appeal to the Appellate Court ofMaryland, 3 in which he asserted-two
errors: (1) the trial court erred by denying Wright's motions to dismiss pursuant to Md. Rule 4-
271, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-103 and State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 (1979), and (2) the trial
court erred by denying Wright's motion to c:lismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a
speedy trial. ECF 5-1, at 86. On March 22, 2019, the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the
convictions and sentence. 	Id. at 177-192. 	Wright failed to file a timely petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court ofMaryland.4
Instead, Wright filed a state court petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 194--202. At
the hearing, the Circuit Court judge cautioned Wright that the appellate courts may interpret his
writ of habeas corpus as his sole postconviction petition. ECF 5-12, at 16. Wright expressed that
he did not want to compromise his ability to file a postconviction petition, id. at 14, and decided
not to move forward with the habeas corpus petition, id. at 17.
Wright next attempted to file a belated petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme
Court of Maryland challenging the Appellate Court of Maryland's denial of his appeal. ECF 5-1,
at 204--212. His December 2, 2019, petition was rejected as untimely. Id. at 213-219.
C. State Post-Conviction Proceedings
On March 11, 2021, Wright filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to the
Maryland Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. ("CP") §§ 7-101-.
3 Formerly known as the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
4 Formerly known as the Maryland Court of Appeals.
4
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7-204. Id. at 220-246, 251-252. 	Pertinent to this federal habeas petition, Wright raised a claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appearance in the correct case number,
id. at 225-227, and a claim that the prosecutors engaged in misconduct by failing to serve his
'indictment until 79 days after his arrest. 	Id. at 232-235. 	The postconviction court issued a
Statement of Reasons and Order on February 15, 2022, denying Wright's petition. Id. at 261-275.
The Appellate Court of Maryland subsequently denied Wright's motion for leave to appeal. Id. at
·291, 305-306, 312.
On January 13, 2023, Wright filed the present petition for habeas relief, in which he asserts
three claims for relief:
(I) 	Counsel for Wright was ineffective where she entered her appearance under the
wrong case number which kept his case from moving forward and had the effect of
delaying his initial appearance for 81-days which in turn violated his 5th and 14th
Amendment rights to due process, ECF 1, at 5;
(2) 	The state's failure to serve Wright his warrant for 79 days kept Wright's case from
moving forward and had the effect of delaying his initial appearance for 81-days
which in turn violated Wright's 5th and 14th Amendment rights to due process, id. at
6;
(3) 	Wright was denied his Constitutional 6th Amendment right to a speedy trial, id. at 8.
_Respondents filed an answer, arguing that all three grounds for relief are procedurally defaulted.
ECF 5, at 32-41. Respondents alternatively argue that Wright's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim should be denied because it lacks merit. Id. at 35-38.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the
Constitution or laws of the United States. 	28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 	The federal habeas statute sets
forth a highly deferential standar_d for evaluating state court rulings, under which state court
decisions are to "be given the benefit of the doubt." Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005); see
5
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also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997). A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas
corpus unless the state court's adjudication on the merits (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by
the United States Supreme Court; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 	28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). 	A state court adjudication is contrary to clearly established federal law under
§ 2254(d) when the state court (1) "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the
Supreme] Court on a question of law"; or (2) "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court's]."
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (citation omitted). 	"Under the 'unreasonable
application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Jd. at 413.
"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because [it] concludes in its
independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S.
at 411). 	The state court's application of federal law must be "objectively unreasonable." 	Id.
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). 	Furthermore, under § 2254(d)(2), "a state court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance." 	Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (citation
omitted). The fact that "reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding·
in question" is not enough to deem a state court's factual determination unreasonable. Id.
6
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III. 	PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Respondents first argue that all three of Wright's grounds for relief are procedurally
defaulted. ECF 5, at 32-35, 38-41. A petitioner seeking habeas relief in federal court generally
-must first exhaust the remedies available in state court. 	28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l); O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). 	This exhaustion requirement is satisfied by seeking review
of the claim in the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider the claim. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
.2254(c). 	For a person convicted of a criminal offense in Maryland, exhaustion may be
accomplished either on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. 	To exhaust a claim on
direct appeal in non-capital cases, a defendant must assert the claim in an appeal to the Appellate
_Court of Maryland and then to the Maryland Supreme Court by way of a petition for a writ of
certiorari. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 12-201, 12-301. To exhaust a claim through
state post-conviction proceedings, a defendant must assert the claim in a petition for post-
conviction relief filed in the· Circuit Court in which the inmate was convicted within 10 years of
the date of sentencing. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. §§ 7-101-7-103. After a decision on a
post-conviction petition, further review is available through an application for leave to appeal filed
with the Appellate Court. Id. § 7-109. 	If the Appellate Court denies the application, there is no
further review available, and the claim is exhausted. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-202.
Wright asserted his first and second grounds· for relief in his state postconviction petition.
ECF 5-1, at 225-227, 232-235. 	The postconviction court found that both claims were waived
pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. 7-106(b)(l)(i) because Wright failed to raise them in his
direct appeal. 	Id. at 272-274. 	Wright's first and- second grounds for relief are consequently
procedurally defaulted because Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc.§ 7-106(b)(l) is an independent and
adequate state ground sufficient to bar federal habeas review. See Hopkins v. Goins-Johnson, Civ.
7
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No. PWG-13-3336, 2016 WL 5477560, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2016), aff'd sub nom. Hopkins v.
Goins-Johnson, 678 F. App'x 94 (4th Cir. 2017); Nivens v. Morgan, Civ. No. TDC-16-2648, 2019·
WL 6067407, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 15, 2019), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 831 F. App'x
75 (4th Cir. 2020).
Wright asserted his third ground for relief in his appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland,.
ECF 5-1, at 86, but the record reflects that he failed to seek a timely writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court of Maryland when the Appeliate Court of Maryland denied his appeal, id. at 213.
The failure to comply with procedural requirements of state law is also an independent and
adequate ground for dismissal and bars re-litigation of the claim in a habeas petition. See Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991), holding modified by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012);
see also Richmondv. Polk, 375 F.3d 309,322 (4th Cir. 2004); O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847, (where
habeas petitioner failed to seek discretionary review from state appellate court and "the time for
filing such a petition ha[ d] long passed," it "resulted in a procedural default"). 	The dismissal of
Wright's petition for writ of certiorari as untimely constitutes an independent and adequate state
procedural rule which prohibits this Court's review of Wright's third ground for relief.
If a procedural default has occurred, a federal court may not address the merits of a state
prisoner's habeas claim unless the petitioner can show (1) both cause for the default and prejudice
that would result from failing to consider the claim on the merits; or (2) that the failure to consider
the claim on the merits would result in a misc;arriage of justice, specifically, the conviction of one
who is actually innocent. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Breardv. Pruett,
134 F.3d 615, 629 (4th Cir. 1998). 	"Cause" consists of "some objective factor external to the
defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim in state court at the appropriate time."
Breard, 134 F.3d at 620 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). 	To demonstrate prejudice, the
8
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.petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but
that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of
constitutional dimensions." 	United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see Murray, 477
U.S. at 494. Under the second exception, a petitioner may obtain review of proceduraJiy defaulted
claims if the case "faIIs within the 'narrow class of cases ... implicating a fundamental miscarriage
of justice."' Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995) (quotingMcCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467, 494 (1991)). Such cases are generaJly limited to those for which the petitioner can show that
"a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actuaJly innocent."
Murray, 477 U.S. at 496.
Neither exception to the procedural default doctrine applies here. 	Wright argues that the
first and second claims for relief should not be considered waived because the postconviction court
never addressed his due process argument. ECF 7, at 2. The record does not support this assertion.
Wright's first ground for relief asserts a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. ECF 1, at 5. His second ground for relief complains about the delay the state created
by failing to serve him with the indictment for eighty-one days. 	Id at 6-7. 	The record reflects
that the postconviction court addressed each of these claims. ECF 5-1, at 270-274. Wright appears
to argue that the postconviction court overlooked separate claims under the Due Process Clause,
but when a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, "the claim must
be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of
substantive due process." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,272 n.7 (1997).
Wright also claims that the first and second claims for relief should not be considered
defaulted because he failed to raise them on direct appeal. 	ECF 7, at 4. 	Wright argues that his
'plea agreement limited the claims he could have raised on appeal. Id. 	But Wright agreed to the
9
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terms of the plea deal, ECF 5-11, at 3 7, which only permitted him to appeal his motions to dismiss
based on the Hicks Rule and speedy trial rights, id. (confirming that Wright preserved the "ability·
to raise" arguments on appeal related to "Hicks ... as well as with the constitutional speedy trial
issue"). 5
Next, Wright argues that he made a "mistake" by failing to timely seek a petition for a writ•
of certiorari to the Maryland Supreme Court on his third ground for relief. ECF 7, at 4. Wright's
mistake is insufficient to excuse the procedural default of the third ground for relief. Breard, 134
F.3d at 620 ("Cause" consists of "some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded.
[petitioner's] efforts to raise the claim in state court at the appropriate time.").
Where Wright has provided no basis for excusing his procedural default, all three grounds
for relief are not properly before this Court and will be dismissed. 	In any event, as discussed.
below, even if the claims were not procedurally defaulted, they would be dismissed for lack of
merit.
IV. 	MERITS 6
Wright's first claim for relief contends that his counsel was ineffective for entering her
appearance in the wrong case and contributing to the delay of his proceedings. ECF 1, at. 5. The
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy t\Je right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const.
amend. VI. In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that to prevail on a claim of
5 In Section IV, below, the Court considers the second ground for relief as part of Wright's speedy·
trial claim. 	Arguably, for this reason, it was raised in his appeal. 	However, it would be
procedurally defaulted as part of the third ground for relief because Wright failed to appeal his
speedy trial claim to the Supreme Court of Mary land.
6 Because Wright's three claims for relief are interrelated, the merits of the claims will be addressed
together.
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_ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish two elements: deficient performance
and prejudice. 466 U.S. 668,692 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance
was deficient in that counsel "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Deficiency exists when
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" under "prevailing
professional norms." Id at 688; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). "Judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential" and apply "a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."·
Id.
Second, the petitioner must show prejudice in that the deficient performance by counsel
consisted of errors that "were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial" with a reliable
result. Id. at 687. To establish such prejudice, a petitioner must show that "there is a r.easonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
·been different" Id at 694. A "reasonable probability" is one "sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome." Id. A petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief based on prejudice where
the record establishes that it is "not reasonably likely that [the alleged error] would have made any
·difference in light of all the other evidence of guilt." Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560.U.S. 370,390
(2010).
The postconviction court denied Wright's ineffectiye assistance of counsel claim. ECF 5-
•l, at 270-273. Citing to the Appellate Court of Maryland's opinion on appeal (discussed in detail
11
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below), the postconviction court concluded that Wright failed to show that he was prejudiced by
his counsel's error in entering her appearance. 	Id. at 270-273. 	Specifically, the postconviction
court found that there was no prejudice, and no speedy trial violation based on the delay between
the indictment and the Alford plea, and Wright could not demonstrate that the outcome of his
proceeding would have been different if his counsel had entered her appearance in the correct case·
on an earlier date. Id. at 271.
The postconviction court also found that there was no merit to Wright's contention that his
counsel's error prejudiced his ability to assert a violation of the Hicks Rule. Id. at 272. 	The·
postconviction court found that the record reflected it was unlikely that the trial would have
commenced on January 8, 2017, which is the date Wright contends is 180-days from the day his
counsel should have properly entered her appearance. This finding rested on the fact that after his.
defense counsel was substituted, Wright's second counsel asked for a postponement of the trial
date on June 6,2017 since she was not prepared to commence a jury trial so close in time to her
appointment. 	Id. 	The postconviction court logically reasoned that if defense c_ounsel was.
unprepared in June of2017, she would not have been prepared a few months earlier, either. Id.
The Court cannot say that no reasonable jurist would have reached the same conclusion as
the postconviction court when it found that Wright was not prejudiced by his first counsel entering
her appearance in the wrong case. For this reason, Wright's first ground for relieflacks merit.
Wright's second and third grounds for·relief concern his constitutional speedy trial rights. 7
After entering an Alford plea, Wright appealed the preserved issue of whether his speedy trial
7 Wright's habeas petition does not appear to be seeking relief based on a violation of the Hicks
Rule, which was also a claim raised in his appeal. To the extent the petition could be interpreted
as raising such a claim, it does not implicate the Sixth Amendment and is non-cognizable in federal
habeas relief. See Vance v. Bishop, Civ. No. ELH-18-133, 2020 WL 2732075, at *9 (D. Md. May-
22, 2020), appeal dismissed and remanded, 827 F. App'x 333 (4th Cir. 2020); cf Hicks, 285 Md.
II 12
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rights were violated by the delays in his proceedings. ECF 5-1, at 85-136. The Appellate Court
• of Maryland denied Wright's speedy trial claim:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."
Whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial must
be determined ad hoc by applying a four-factor balancing test, which considers: (1)
length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his
right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 104, 106 (1975).
***
In this case, over twenty-seven months passed between the date the State filed an
indictment, and the date [Wright] entered his Alford plea. This length of delay is of
"constitutional dimension" and warrants analysis. See Ratchfordv. State, 141 Md.
App. 	354, 359 (2001) 	(finding delay 	of. eighteen months of "constitutional
dimension"). But the length of delay alone does not result in a speedy trial violation,
and we must consider it alongside the other Barker factors.
The second Barker factor is the reason for the delay. In analyzing the reasons for
pre-trial delay, reviewing courts give different weights to different reasons for
delay. The Supreme Court has held as follows: "A deliberate attempt to delay the
trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the
government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts
should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the
ultimately responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government
rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness,
should serve to justify appropriate delay." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
Here, approximately twelve of the twenty-seven months of pre-trial delay weigh
against the State. The State was solely responsible for seventy-seven days of pre-
trial delay when it held [Wright] without serving him with his indictment. These
seventy-seven days weigh heavily against the State. Additionally, the circuit court
postponed the ·trial date four times. Two of the postponements, contributing 189
days of delay, were solely due to court unavailability. [Wright] also requested a
postponement-which the court noted that it would not grant except that there were
no judges available for trial-resulting in ninety-nine days' delay. The 288 days of
delay for court unavailability ultimately weigh against the State. See id (noting that
the "ultimate responsibility" for neutral reasons such as overcrowded courts "must
rest with the government rather than with the defendant"). Delays arising from court
unavailability do not weigh heavily against the State, however, as overcrowded
courts are a "more neutral reason," and do not evince a "deliberate attempt to delay
.310 (providing that Mary land intended to provide additional statutory rights beyond the minimum
threshold established by the Sixth Amendment).·
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the trial in order to hamper the defense." Hallowell v. State, 235 Md. App. 484, 516
(2018) 	(quoting 	Barker, 	407 	U.S. 	at 	531). 	Finally, 	[Wright] 	requested 	a
postponement that resulted in an eighty-two-day delay, which we weigh against
[Wright]. As only seventy-seven days of pre-trial delay are directly attributable to
the State, and an additional 288 days .weigh only minimally against the State, this
factor does not favor dismissal.
The third Barker factor is whether and to what extent [Wright] asserted his speedy
trial right. Although a defendant has "no duty to bring himself to trial," Barker, 407
U.S. at 527; Epps, 216 Md. at 118, his assertion of the right is "entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether [he was] being deprived of the right."
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531- 32; Epps, 276 Md. at 118. This is because "the strength
and timeliness of a defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right indicate whether
the delay has been lengthy and whether the defendant begins to experience
prejudice from tqat delay." Glover, 368 Md. at 228. Courts examining a defendant's
assertion of his speedy trial right can weigh the "frequency and force of the
objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma
objection." Barker, 407 U.S. at 529. But invoking Hicks is not the same as asserting
one's speedy trial right. See Marks v. State, 84 Md. App. 269,281 (1990) (holding
that [Wright] waived his speedy trial right where he only raised the Hicks issue at
trial). "[Failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that
he was denied a speedy trial." Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
[Wright] argues that he asserted his right to a speedy trial at every opportunity.
[Wright's] attorneys both prayed for a speedy trial when they entered appearances
in this case. While these filings may have put the State on notice that [Wright] was
asserting his speedy trial right, they do not bear significant weight in the speedy
trial analysis. See id. at 529; Lloyd v. State, 207 Md. App. 322, 332 (2012)
(characterizing the defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right in an omnibus
motion as "little more than the avoidance of waiver"). Aside from pro forma
language in his counsel's early filings, [Wright] did not mention his constitutional
speedy trial right until he filed a pro se motion to dismiss five days before he ente.red
the plea that resolved his case. [Wright] did object to the postponement of the first
trial date and filed a Hicks motion in January 2017, but that motion did not include
a constitutional speedy trial claim. Thus, the third Barker factor weighs against
dismissal of [Wright's] case.
The fourth and "most important" Barker factor is prejudice to the defendant. Peters
v. State, 224 Md. App. 306,364 (2015). A determination of prejudice must consider
the three interests of defendants that the speedy trial right was designed to protect:
(1) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defonse will be
impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-3J; Epps, 276 Md. at 106-07. The first two of
the factors are "generally afforded only slight weight," Hallowell, 235 Md. App. at
518, and the most important factor in establishing prejudice is the inability to
prepare one's defense. Wilson v. State, 148 Md. App. 601,639 (2002). 	•
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[Wright] was incarcerated for approximately twerity months before his trial, and he
asserted in his pro se motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds that
he suffers from anxiety regarding his case. But a "bald allegation" of anxiety "has
little significance," Howell v. State, 87 Md. App. 57, 86 (1991), and these factors
weigh only slightly in [Wright's] showing of prejudice. [Wright] has pointed to no
witnesses or physical evidence lost because of the delay. In the absence of any
showing of prejudice, this factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal. See Wilson,
148 Md. App. at 639. While the twenty-seven months of pretrial delay in [Wright's]
case warrant constitutional analysis, only around twelve months weigh against the
State, and all but seventy-seven days weigh_ lightly. Most significantly, however,
[Wright] failed to show any prejudice. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion
or err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional
right to a speedy trial.
ECF 5-1, at 188-.192.
Wright contends in his third ground for relief that his speedy trial rights were violated.
ECF 1, at 8. When addressing this claim, the Appellate Court of Maryland correctly identified the
controlling legal precedent, Barker, 407 U.S. 514, and applied it to the facts of Wright's case.
Notably, the Appellate Court of Maryland found that Wright was not prejudiced by the delay, only
77 days of delay were caused by the prosecution, and most of the delay (288 days) was attributed
to the lack of availablejudges, a factor that carries less weight in the Barker analysis. See Barker,
407 U.S. at 531.
Wright has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the Appellate Court
of Maryland's factual conclusions about the delays in his proceedings are incorrect. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(l). He has also failed to identify a United States Supreme Court opinion that supports
a conclusion that the Appellate Court of Maryland's dismissal of his speedy trial claim was
contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).
The same analysis applies to Wright's second claim for relief because he contends that the
state delayed his proceedings by failing to promptly serve him with the indictment. ECF 1, at 6-
·7. This allegation constitutes part of the factual scenario that contributed to the delays in Wright's
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proceedings. 	As discussed above, Wright's second claim for relief is covered by the specific
constitutional provision concerning the right to a speedy trial and does not call for a separate
analysis. 	Lanier, 520 U.S. at 272. 	When assessing Wright's speedy trial claim, the Appellate
Court of Maryland attributed 77 days of delay to the state for holding Wright without serving the
indictment and concluded that those 77 days "weigh heavily against the state." ECF 5-1, at 189.
The Appellate Court of Maryland considered.this 77-day delay when weighing the Barker factors
but ultimately concluded that no speedy trial violation had occurred. 8 ECF 5-1, at 188-192. The
second ground for relief is part of Wright's third claim for relief. Thus, for the same reasons relief
'is denied as to Wright's third ground for relief, the state court's dismissal of Wright's speedy trial
claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 9
Accordingly, all three of Wright's claims for relief would have been dismissed for lack of
merit even if they were not procedurally defaulted.
V. 	CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A petitioner may not appeal the denial of a federal habeas petition without first receiving a·
certificate of appealability. 	28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l). 	The Court may issue a certificate of
appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When, as here, the Court has denied the petition on the merits, a·
8 In his second ground for relief Wright contends that the delay was 81 days. ECF 1, at 6-7. The
Appellate Court of Maryland reached 77 days, calculating the delay from the date Wright was
detained at the Harford County Detention Center on July 3, 2016, and the date he was served with·
the indictment, September 19, 2016. Wright appears to calculate 81-days from July 3, 2016, until
the date ofhis arraignment on September 21, 2016. Id. In any event, the 4-day discrepancy would
have no impact on the Barker analysis.
9 Wright raised the second claim for relief in his.postconviction petition. ECF 5-1, at 232-235.
The postconviction court relied on the Appellate Court of Maryland's speedy trial analysis when.
denying the merits of the claim. Id. at 273-274.
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petitioner must "demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of
.the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." 	Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)
(quoting Slackv. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,484 (2000)). Upon a review of the record, this Court
finds- that Wright has not made the requisite showing. 	The Court therefore declines to issue a
_certificate of appealability. 	Wright may still request that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit issue such a certificate. Fed. R. App. P. 22.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. The Court
will decline to issue a certificate of appealability. A separate Order shall issue.
Isl
Date: January 21. 2026 	Brendan A. Burson
United States District Judge
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