Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Gopaul

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHEBA S. GOPAUL,
Defendant, 	pro se.
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Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-02454-LKG
Dated: January 15, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	INTRODUCTION
In this insurance coverage action, the Plaintiff, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
(“MetLife”) asserts a declaratory judgment claim against the Defendant 	pro se, Sheba S. Gopaul,
alleging that Ms. Gopaul made certain fraudulent material misrepresentations, misstatements
and/or omissions regarding her criminal history in her application (the “Application”) for a
disability income insurance policy issued by MetLife (the “Policy) in 2015. ECF No. 1.
MetLife has moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim. ECF No. 113.
The motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 113, 120, 121, 127 and 135. No hearing is necessary to
resolve the motion. L.R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). 	For the reasons that follow, the Court: 	(1)
DENIES 	Ms. Gopaul’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 120) and (2) 	GRANTS-
in-PART and DENIES-in-PART 	the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 113).
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II. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A. 	Factual Background
In this insurance coverage action, MetLife alleges that Ms. Gopaul made certain
fraudulent material misrepresentations, misstatements and/or omissions regarding her criminal
history in her Application for the Policy. 	See generally 	ECF No. 1. MetLife also alleges that it
would not have issued the Policy to Ms. Gopaul had it known about these fraudulent material
misrepresentations, misstatements and/or omissions. 	Id. 	at ¶ 33. And so, MetLife seeks a
declaratory judgment that, among other things: (1) declares that the Policy was procured through
Ms. Gopaul’s false and fraudulent misrepresentations, misstatements and/or omissions in the
Application; (2) declares that Ms. Gopaul’s false and fraudulent misrepresentations,
misstatements and/or omissions in the Application violated the terms and conditions of the
Policy; (3) an adjudication that MetLife is entitled to rescind the Policy; and (4) an adjudication
that MetLife has no legal obligation to pay any benefits to Ms. Gopaul under the Policy. 	Id. 	at
Prayer for Relief.
The Application And The Policy
As background, on June 18, 2015, Ms. Gopaul completed the Application for the
Policy. ECF No. 114-1 at J.R. 362 (the Application). When she signed the Application, Ms.
Gopaul acknowledged and agreed to the following provision:
AGREEMENT
I have read this application and any supplemental application
(collectively “Applications”) and I agree that, to the best of my
knowledge and belief: (a) all statements and answers are true and
complete; and (b) all of the information is correctly recorded in
the Applications. I further agree that such statements and answers
may be relied on by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
(MetLife) in order to determine if a policy may be issued.
Id. 	at J.R. 360.
The Application also includes a provision on “limitation on authority,” which
provides as follows:
1 	The facts recited in this memorandum opinion are taken from the joint record; the complaint; the answer
to the complaint; MetLife’s motion for summary judgment; and Ms. Gopaul’s response in opposition
thereto. ECF Nos. 1, 12, 113 and 120.
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CAUTION: MetLife relies on Your answers to all questions in
the application in accepting payment and issuing this Receipt . .
.
I have read this Receipt and reviewed the answers to all questions
in the application. I represent that the answers to all those
questions are true and complete, to the best of my knowledge and
belief. I understand and agree that, subject to the Time Limit on
Certain Defenses provision of the policy, if the answers to any of
the 	questions 	in 	the 	application 	are 	materially 	untrue 	or
incomplete, or if MetLife does not issue a policy within 60 days
after the date the application was signed, the amount of premium
paid will be refunded and this Receipt will be null and void. I
understand and agree to all of the terms of this Receipt. I have a
copy of this Receipt.
Id. 	at J.R. 362. In addition, the Application provides in Section VII, Question 15, which is
entitled “General Risk Questions,” as follows:
Have you EVER been convicted of, plead guilty to or no contest
to, a felony or misdemeanor other than a traffic violation, or are
any charges pending against you? If YES, give details below.
Id. 	at J.R. 359.
It is undisputed that Ms. Gopaul answered “Yes” to Question 15. 	Id. 	at J.R. 359. It
is also undisputed that Ms. Gopaul provided the following supplemental information in the
Application: “15. 20 years old at the time – unauthorized use of vehicle – over $500.” 	Id. 	at
J.R. at 359.
In October 2015, MetLife issued and delivered the Policy to Ms. Gopaul, with an
effective date of October 1, 2015. ECF No. 114-3 at J.R. 1123-24 (the Policy). Relevant to
the pending motion for summary judgment, the Policy contains the following provision on
“Time Limit on Certain Defenses:”
After 	two 	years 	from 	the 	Effective 	Date 	of 	this 	policy, 	no
misstatements, except for fraudulent misstatements, made by You
on the Application can be used to void this policy, or to deny a claim
under this policy, for a Disability starting after the end of such two
year period.
Id. 	at J.R. 1136.
Ms. Gopaul’s Disability Benefits Claim
On January 9, 2020, Ms. Gopaul submitted an initial claim for disability benefits
form to MetLife. ECF No. 114-1 at J.R. 512 and 514 (initial claim for disability benefits
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form). In the disability claim, Ms. Gopaul claimed total disability from her occupation as
the CEO/CFO of a healthcare company, due to moderate to severe pain in her pelvis, knee
and hip when standing, climbing, walking, bending and lifting, due to a series of falls in
June and August of 2019, along with postpartum depression and anxiety after delivering a
baby in December of 2019. 	Id. 	at J.R. 512-23.
Thereafter, MetLife conducted an investigation of Ms. Gopaul’s claim. 	See 	ECF No. 113 at
4. During the claim investigation, MetLife requested a public records and criminal background
search for Ms. Gopaul. 	See id. 	Through this research, MetLife obtained new information about
Ms. Gopaul’s prior criminal history, including criminal charges and guilty dispositions in Maryland
and Virginia. 	See 	ECF No. 114-1 at J.R. 449-74 (Maryland and Virginia criminal history reports
for “Sheba Shabana Gopaul”). Specifically, MetLife alleges that 	the criminal background
information that it obtained shows that Ms. Gopaul had been convicted of, or entered a guilty plea to, the
following charges in Maryland and Virginia:
Maryland 	Virginia
Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County Date of Offense: April 8, 2002
Charge: Theft Over/Theft Under
(Misdemeanor)
Disposition: Guilty
Fairfax County General District Court
Date of Offense: August 9, 2002
Charge: Grand Larceny-credit cards
(Felony)
Disposition: Guilty
District Court for Montgomery County
Date of Offense: February 15, 2007
Charge: Prostitution (Misdemeanor)
Disposition: Guilty Plea
Fairfax County General District Court
Date of Offense: July 29, 2001
Charge: Obtn. Money False Pretense
(Felony)
Disposition: Guilty
District Court for Montgomery County
Date of Offense: May 2002
Charge: U/U use of livestock MV
(Misdemeanor)
Disposition: Guilty
Fairfax County General District Court
Date of Offense: August 21, 2001
Charge: Auto Theft (Felony)
Disposition: Guilty
See 	id. 	at J.R. 449-74; 	see also 	ECF No. 113 at 4.
MetLife contends that it would not have issued the Policy to Ms. Gopaul had it known about
these three prior felony convictions and the multiple misdemeanor convictions sounding in fraud,
because she would have been deemed an unacceptable insured due to both a medical and financial risk.
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ECF No. 113 at 5. MetLife also contends that its underwriting guidelines provide that more than one
felony conviction is an automatic denial for disability insurance coverage, regardless of when the co
conviction occurred. 	See 	ECF No. 114-5 at J.R. 2463-65 (“IDI Underwriting Medical Manual” for
“Court Records: Lawsuits/ Criminal Activities”); 	see also 	ECF No. 114-2 at J.R. 747-49 (17:24-19:15)
and 933-35 (203:20-205:16) (Kris Anderson deposition).
In this regard, Kris Anderson, MetLife’s claims manager in the Individual Disability Insurance
Claims Department, testified during his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that criminal convictions increase the
risk for a disability income insurer, as they increase the possibility of the applicant’s income being
derived from criminal activity and that a history of crimes of dishonesty, such as theft, increase the risk
of insurance fraud going forward. ECF No. 114-2 at J.R. 747-49 (17:24-19:15) and 933-35 (203:20-
205:16). Notably, Mr. Anderson testified that it is “definitely a material consideration whether or not
there have been convictions in the past when determining if somebody should be issued a disability
insurance policy.” 	Id. 	at J.R. 748 (18:9-11). Mr. Anderson also testified that MetLife’s written
underwriting guidelines specifically address felony convictions and mandate that no policy would have
been issued to Ms. Gopaul if she had truthfully disclosed her complete criminal background on the
Application for the Policy. 	See id. 	at J.R. 747-49 (17:24-19:15) and 933-35 (203:20-205:16).
Ms. Gopaul counters that MetLife cannot show that her other criminal convictions were material
to its underwriting decision with regards to the Policy, because Mr. Anderson testified that he could not
speak to the specific review process used in this case to issue the Policy. ECF No. 127 at 14. In this
regard, Ms. Gopaul argues that she completed the Application with the assistance of her broker in good
faith. 	Id. 	at 14-15. Ms. Gopaul also argues that MetLife’s failure to conduct a criminal background
check at the time that she submitted the Application “forecloses its ability to prove materiality or
reliance” to support its declaratory judgment claim in this case. 	Id. 	at 20. And so, Ms. Gopaul contends
that MetLife cannot show that her alleged misrepresentations, misstatements and/or omissions about her
criminal history were material, or that MetLife relied upon her statement on the Application regarding
her criminal history in deciding to issue the Policy. 	See generally 	ECF Nos. 120 and 127.
MetLife’s Rescission Of The Policy
On May 8, 2020, MetLife sent a letter to Ms. Gopaul providing a Notice of Rescission that
declared the Policy rescinded, null and void, due to the alleged material and fraudulent
misrepresentations that she made in her 2015 Application. ECF No. 114-2 at J.R. 655-60 	(“Notice
of Rescission,” dated May 8, 2020). 	In the notice, MetLife states that Ms. Gopaul had failed to
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disclose her multiple felony and misdemeanor convictions in Maryland and Virginia. 	See 	id. 	at J.R.
656.
The Notice of Rescission also advises that Ms. Gopaul’s failure to disclose her complete
criminal history constitutes a material and fraudulent misrepresentation/omission in the
Application. 	Id. 	at J.R. 655-56 and 659. And so, MetLife tendered to Ms. Gopaul all the insurance
premiums that she had paid under the Policy from October 2, 2015, to March 2, 2020, together with
interest, totaling $29,120.56. 	Id. 	at J.R. 654-55.2
On or about October 7, 2020, Ms. Gopaul appealed the denial of her claim and the
rescission of the Policy to the Maryland Insurance Administration. 	Id. 	at J.R. 608-615 (“Appeal
for MetLife Claim: Policy No: 6684187AH”). During the appeal, Ms. Gopaul argued that that
the criminal charges that MetLife had uncovered originated from a single criminal case that
resulted in multiple charges and that her insurance broker at the time, Gary Becker, informed her
that disclosing the one misdemeanor charge she listed in response to Question 15 in the
Application would suffice. 	See 	id. 	at J.R. 608-615. Mr. Becker testified during his deposition,
however, that he had no knowledge of any criminal history for Ms. Gopaul beyond the criminal
history provided in the Application. ECF No. 114-5 at J.R. 2582-83 (62:3-64:19) (Gary Becker
deposition); 	see also id. 	at J.R. 2746 (written statement of Gary Becker).
On January 28, 2021, MetLife denied Ms. Gopaul’s appeal of the rescission of the Policy
and denial of her claim, because: (1) MetLife contacted Mr. Becker, who confirmed that he was
not aware of Ms. Gopaul’s extensive criminal history and did not recall asking for any other
information related to the supplemental information she provided to Section VII, Question 15 on
the Application; and (2) Ms. Gopaul’s explanation that the newly discovered criminal charges
originated from only one criminal case was not credible, because the convictions and/or guilty
pleas arose from separate incidents, on separate dates, and in different States. 	Id. 	at J.R. 2770-
78 (“Notice of Rescission,” dated January 28, 2021). And so, MetLife concluded that Ms.
Gopaul’s misrepresentations/omissions were made with the intent to defraud MetLife at the time
the Application was signed. 	See 	id. 	at J.R. 2772.
2 	Ms. Gopaul represents that she has not cashed MetLife’s premium refund check. 	Compare 	ECF No. 1 at ¶
23, 	with 	ECF No. 12 at ¶ 23.
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B. Relevant Procedural Background
MetLife commenced this declaratory judgment action on September 24, 2021. ECF No.
1. On March 19, 2025, MetLife filed a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56. ECF No. 113.
On April 22, 2025, Ms. Gopaul filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and response
in opposition to MetLife’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and a
memorandum in support thereof. 	3 	ECF No. 120. On May 19, 2025, MetLife filed a reply brief.
ECF No. 121.
On June 13, 2025, Ms. Gopaul filed a corrected reply brief. ECF No. 127. On July 3,
2025, MetLife filed a sur-reply. ECF No. 135.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
A motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 will be granted only
if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 	See 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986); 	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). And so, if there
clearly exist factual issues “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,” then summary judgment is inappropriate.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; 	see also Pulliam Inv. Co., Inc. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286
(4th Cir. 1987); 	Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 	See United States v.
Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); 	Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th
Cir. 1985). In this regard, the moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 	See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 	Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. State of S.C., 978 F.2d 1334, 1339 (4th
Cir. 1992), 	cert. denied, 	507 U.S. 972 (1993). But, a party who bears the burden of proof on a
particular claim must also factually support each element of his or her claim. 	See Celotex Corp.,
3 	The Defendant 	pro se 	styles her response in opposition to MetLife’s motion for summary judgment as a
cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to MetLife’s motion for summary judgment. ECF
No. 120. But the Court reads this filing to only oppose MetLife’s motion for summary judgment. 	See id.
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477 U.S. at 322-23. Given this, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . .
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 	Id. 	at 323. And so, on those issues on which the
nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is the nonmoving party’s responsibility to
confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence to show
the existence of a genuine issue for trial. 	See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
In this regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that “[a]
mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant’s position will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” 	Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 536 (4th Cir. 1997). And so,
there must be “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for
that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” 	Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).
B. 	The Declaratory Judgment Act
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a district court, in “a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). “This Act gives federal
courts discretion to decide whether to declare the rights of litigants.” 	Trustguard Ins. Co. v.
Collins, 942 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing 	Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286
(1995)).
C. 	Material And Fraudulent Misrepresentations
In Maryland, the general rule is that “a material misrepresentation in the form of an
incorrect statement in an application” for insurance invalidates an insurance policy “regardless of
whether the material misrepresentation is made intentionally, or through mistake and in good
faith.” 	See Bryant v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 2d 495, 497 (D. Md. 1998)
(quoting 	Fitzgerald v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 527, 534 (D. Md. 1979), 	aff’d, 634
F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1980)); 	Gary v. USAA Life Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 3d 365, 376 (D. Md. 2017)
(“The burden is on the insurer “to establish fraud or misrepresentation by the insured in the
application for insurance,” but “Maryland law still imposes a heavy burden on the applicant to be
responsible for all statements in or omissions from the application submitted by him.” (quoting
Fitzgerald, 465 F. Supp. at 535); 	see also Dominant Invs. 113, LLC v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co., 247 F.
Supp. 3d 696, 701-02 (D. Md. 2017) (“[A] material misrepresentation . . . in an application
invalidates a policy issued on the basis of such application . . . without inquiry into the presence
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of a conscious design to defraud.” (quoting 	Hofmann v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 400 F.
Supp. 827, 829 (D. Md. 1975))). And so, to void an insurance policy, due to a misrepresentation
in the application, an insurer must demonstrate either that: (1) the misrepresentation was
fraudulent or material to the risk assumed by the insurer, or (2) the insurer would not have issued
the policy or issued the policy at the same premium rate had the correct facts been disclosed. 	See
Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 12-207(b) (“A misrepresentation, omission, concealment of facts . . . does
not prevent a recovery under the policy unless: (1) the misrepresentation, omission, concealment
. . . is fraudulent or material to the acceptance of the risk . . . or (2) if the correct facts had been
made known to the insurer . . . the insurer would not have (i) issued, reinstated, or renewed the
policy; (ii) issued the policy in as large amount or at the same premium rate; or (iii) provided
coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss.”).
In this regard, this Court has held that a material misrepresentation is one that may
“reasonably have affected the determination of the acceptability of the risk.” 	N. Am. Specialty
Ins. Co. v. Savage, 977 F. Supp. 725, 728-29 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that as a matter of law the
insured’s response on the insurance application was a material misrepresentation when his
driving record indicated his license was suspended on at least two prior occasions and he
answered “no” to the question of whether his license had been suspended or revoked). If the
insurer would not have issued the policy had it known the true facts, or would have charged a
higher premium, materiality is satisfied. 	Gary, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 376 (citing Md. Code Ann.,
Ins. § 12-207(b)); 	see Claudy v. USAA Life Ins. Co., No. GJH-18-517, 2020 WL 949948, at *7
(D. Md. Feb. 27, 2020) (“The misrepresentation is material if the insurer cannot appreciate the
scope of the risk it is asked to insure.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). And so, the
Court has held that a potential insured’s failure to disclose his/her complete criminal history in
the application is a material misrepresentation. 	See Jackson v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co.,
201 F. Supp. 2d 506, 514 (D. Md. 2002) (“The misrepresentation concerning [the insured’s]
1996 felony conviction, however, is material. From the deposition testimony of the senior
underwriter who processed Jackson’s life insurance application, and from company guidelines
that instruct underwriters on how to treat applicants on probation for felony convictions, it is
clear that the withheld information would reasonably have affected the determination of the
acceptability of the risk.”).
Lastly, Section 15-208 of Title 15 of the Maryland Insurance Statutes provides that:
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[E]ach policy of health insurance shall contain the following provision:
Time limit on certain defenses: (1) After two years from the date of
issue 	of 	this 	policy 	no 	misstatements, 	except 	fraudulent
misstatements, made by the applicant in the application for such
policy shall be used to void the policy or to deny a claim for loss
incurred or disability (as defined in the policy) commencing after
the expiration of such two-year period.
Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 15-208(a) (emphasis added). Given this, the misstatement of the
applicant must be fraudulent to void an insurance policy, or to deny a claim for loss incurred or
disability, more than two years after the date of issue. 	See id. 	The elements of fraudulent
misrepresentation under Maryland law are that: (1) the defendant made a false representation to
the plaintiff; (2) its falsity was either known to the defendant or that the representation was made
with reckless indifference as to its truth; (3) the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of
defrauding the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and had the right to rely
on it; and (5) the plaintiff suffered compensable injury resulting from the misrepresentation.
Chubb & Son v. C & C Complete Servs., 919 F. Supp. 2d 666, 673 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting 	Nails
v. S & R, Inc., 639 A.2d 660, 668 (Md. 1994)). And so, Maryland courts have recognized that
fraudulent intent can be drawn from, and inferred from, the circumstances surrounding the
material misrepresentations, as direct evidence of intent rarely is available. 	First Union Nat’l
Bank v. Steele Software Sys. Corp., 838 A.2d 404, 440 (Md. App. Ct. 2003).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
MetLife has moved for summary judgment on its sole declaratory judgment claim in this
case upon the grounds that the undisputed material facts show that: (1) Ms. Gopaul’s
misrepresentations and/or omissions about her criminal history were material; (2) Ms. Gopaul’s
misrepresentations and/or omissions about her criminal history were fraudulent; and (3) Ms.
Gopaul’s anticipated affirmative defenses do not preclude entry of summary judgment in favor
of MetLife. ECF No. 113 at 11-21. Given this, MetLife argues that the Policy should be
rescinded under Maryland law. 	See id. 	And so, MetLife requests that the Court grant its motion
for summary judgment and enter final judgment in its favor. 	Id. 	at 21.
Ms. Gopaul counters that MetLife is not entitled to summary judgment, because there are
material facts in dispute in this case. ECF No. 120. In this regard, Ms. Gopaul argues, among
other things, that materiality cannot be established in this case, because: (1) MetLife erroneously
classified her disclosed criminal charge as a misdemeanor; (2) MetLife declined to verify her
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disclosed criminal history during the underwriting process; and (3) Kris Anderson lacks personal
knowledge about the underwriting procedures that MetLife used in this case. 	Id. 	at 11-14. In
addition, Ms. Gopaul argues that summary judgment is not warranted, because there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the omissions were fraudulent. 	Id. 	at 13-16. In this regard,
Ms. Gopaul argues that there are material factual disputes, because: (1) MetLife improperly
seeks to show fraudulent intent by citing to another policy that she later obtained that was
rescinded by MassMutual and (2) she relied on the professional advice of her insurance broker
during the application process. 	Id. 	at 18. And so, Ms. Gopaul requests that the Court deny
MetLife’s motion for summary judgment. 	Id. 	at 27.
For the reasons that follow, the undisputed material facts in this case show that Ms.
Gopaul’s misrepresentations and/or omissions about her criminal history were material. But,
there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ms. Gopaul’s misrepresentations and/or
omissions about her criminal history were fraudulent. And so, the Court: 	(1) DENIES Ms.
Gopaul’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 120) and (2) GRANTS-in-PART and
DENIES-in-PART MetLife’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 113).
A. 	Ms. Gopaul Is Not Entitled To Summary Judgment
As an initial matter, the Court observes that Ms. Gopaul is proceeding without the
assistance of counsel in this matter. And so, the Court liberally construes her filings. 	Cf. 	Hughes
v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980). Ms. Gopaul has filed a document entitled “Defendant’s cross-
motion for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.”
ECF No. 120. But a careful reading of this filing shows that Ms. Gopaul has not moved for
summary judgment. Rather, Ms. Gopaul argues in the filing that MetLife is not entitled to
summary judgment, because there are genuine disputes of material fact that should be resolved
by the trier of fact. 	Id. 	at 8-11. In this regard, Ms. Gopaul argues that MetLife is not entitled to
summary judgment, because she has “present[ed] compelling evidence and meticulous legal
analysis that establish genuine disputes of material fact, precluding summary adjudication and
mandating resolution by jury trial.” 	Id. 	at 8.
Given this, the Court construes Ms. Gopaul’s filing to be a response in opposition to
MetLife’s motion for summary judgment. And so, to the extent that Ms. Gopaul intends this
filing to also be a cross-motion for summary judgment, the Court DENIES the motion (ECF No.
120). 	See 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (A motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 56 will be granted only if there exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and the
moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
B. The Undisputed Material Facts Show That Ms. Gopaul Made
Material Misrepresentations Regarding Her Criminal History
1. 	Ms. Gopaul Failed To Disclose Several
Prior Criminal Convictions On The Application
Turning to MetLife’s motion for summary judgment, the undisputed material facts in this
case show that Ms. Gopaul misrepresented and/or omitted material facts about her prior criminal
history in the Application. Notably, the undisputed material facts show that Ms. Gopaul
disclosed a single conviction for a misdemeanor in the Application 	on June 18, 2015. 	See 	ECF
No. 114-1 at J.R. 359 (the Application). In this regard, there is no dispute that Ms. Gopaul
answered “Yes” in response to Question 15 of Section VII of the Application, which states
as follows:
Have you EVER been convicted of, plead guilty to or no contest
to, a felony or misdemeanor other than a traffic violation, or are
there any charges pending against you? If YES, give details
below.
Id. 	at J.R. 359. It is also undisputed that Ms. Gopaul provided the following supplemental
information regarding Question 15: “15. 20 years old at the time – unauthorized use of
vehicle – over $500.” 	Id. 	at J.R. 359.
There is also no dispute that Ms. Gopaul’s prior criminal history includes several other
felony and misdemeanor convictions in Maryland and Virginia as shown below:
Maryland 	Virginia
Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County Date of Offense: April 8, 2002
Charge: Theft Over/Theft Under
(Misdemeanor)
Disposition: Guilty
Fairfax County General District Court
Date of Offense: August 9, 2002
Charge: Grand Larceny-credit cards
(Felony)
Disposition: Guilty
District Court for Montgomery County
Date of Offense: February 15, 2007
Charge: Prostitution (Misdemeanor)
Disposition: Guilty Plea
Fairfax County General District Court
Date of Offense: July 29, 2001
Charge: Obtn. Money False Pretense
(Felony)
Disposition: Guilty
District Court for Montgomery County
Date of Offense: May 2002
Fairfax County General District Court
Date of Offense: August 21, 2001
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Charge: U/U use of livestock MV
(Misdemeanor)
Disposition: Guilty
Charge: Auto Theft (Felony)
Disposition: Guilty
See 	id. 	at J.R. 449-74 (Maryland and Virginia criminal history reports for “Sheba Shabana
Gopaul”); 	see also 	ECF No. 113 at 4. While Ms. Gopaul maintains that these convictions
arise from the same case, she does not dispute that she was convicted of these offenses prior
to submitting the Application. 	See 	ECF No. 127 at 19. Nor does Ms. Gopaul dispute that
she failed to disclose these criminal convictions to MetLife in the Application. 	See
generally 	ECF Nos. 120 and 127. 	And so, there can be no genuine dispute that Ms. Gopaul
misrepresented the extent of her criminal history and omitted information about her criminal
history in the Application.
2. 	The Omitted Convictions Are Material
The undisputed material facts also show that the misrepresentations and/or omissions
about Ms. Gopaul’s criminal history were material to MetLife’s decision to issue the Policy.
This Court has held that a material misrepresentation is one that may “reasonably have affected
the determination of the acceptability of the risk.” 	N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Savage, 977 F.
Supp. 725, 728-29 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that as a matter of law the insured’s response on the
insurance application was a material misrepresentation when his driving record indicated his
license was suspended on at least two prior occasions and he answered “no” to the question of
whether his license had been suspended or revoked). Notably, the Court has also held within the
context of insurance cases that a potential insured’s failure to disclose his/her complete criminal
history in the application is a material misrepresentation. 	See Jackson v. Hartford Life &
Annuity Ins. Co., 201 F. Supp. 2d 506, 514 (D. Md. 2002) (“The misrepresentation concerning
[the insured’s] 1996 felony conviction, however, is material. From the deposition testimony of
the senior underwriter who processed Jackson’s life insurance application, and from company
guidelines that instruct underwriters on how to treat applicants on probation for felony
convictions, it is clear that the withheld information would reasonably have affected the
determination of the acceptability of the risk.”).
Here, the undisputed material facts show that Ms. Gopaul’s misrepresentations and/or omissions
about her criminal history were material, because MetLife would not have issued the Policy had it
known about these prior convictions. In this regard, Kris Anderson, MetLife’s claims manager in the
Individual Disability Insurance Claims Department, testified during his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that
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14
criminal convictions are material to MetLife’s decision to issue a policy, because criminal convictions
increase the risk for a disability income insurer, as they increase the possibility of the applicant’s income
being derived from criminal activity and that a history of crimes of dishonesty, such as theft, increase
the risk of insurance fraud going forward. ECF No. 114-2 at J.R. 747-49 (17:24-19:15) and 933-35
(203:20-205:16) (Kris Anderson deposition). Mr. Anderson also testified that it is “definitely a material
consideration whether or not there have been convictions in the past when determining if somebody
should be issued a disability insurance policy.” 	Id. 	at J.R. 748 (18:9-11).
In addition, Mr. Anderson testified that MetLife’s written underwriting guidelines specifically
address felony convictions and mandate that no policy would have been issued to Ms. Gopaul if she had
truthfully disclosed her complete criminal background on the Application. 	Id. 	at J.R. 747-49 (17:24-
19:15) and 933-35 (203:20-205:16). The unrebutted evidence before the Court also shows that
MetLife’s underwriting guidelines provide that more than one felony conviction is an automatic denial
for disability insurance coverage, regardless of when the conviction occurred. ECF No. 114-5 at J.R.
2463-65 (“IDI Underwriting Medical Manual” for “Court Records: Lawsuits/ Criminal Activities”); 	see
also 	ECF No. 114-2 at J.R. 747-49 (17:24-19:15) and 933-35 (203:20-205:16) (Kris Anderson
deposition).4
Given this, the undisputed material facts in this case make clear that MetLife would not have
issued the Policy had it known Ms. Gopaul’s complete criminal history. 	See 	Gary v. USAA Life Ins. Co.,
229 F. Supp. 3d 365, 376 (D. Md. 2017) (citing Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 12-207(b)); 	see Claudy v. USAA
Life Ins. Co., No. GJH-18-517, 2020 WL 949948, at *7 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2020) (“The misrepresentation
4 	Ms. Gopaul argues that her other criminal convictions were not material to MetLife’s decision to issue
the Policy, because MetLife did not conduct a search of her criminal background before issuing the
Policy. 	See 	ECF No. 120 at 12-13 and 16-17. But the plain language of the Application makes clear that
“MetLife relie[d] on [Ms. Gopaul’s] answers to all questions in the application in accepting payment
and issuing this Receipt . . . .” ECF No. 114-1 at J.R. 362 (providing that 	“MetLife relies on Your
answers to all questions in the application in accepting payment and issuing this Receipt”); 	see also
id. 	at J.R. 360 (providing that: “I further agree that such statements and answers may be relied on by
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) in order to determine if a policy may be issued.”).
Ms. Gopaul also provides no legal or factual support for her argument that MetLife had an obligation
to research her criminal history before issuing the Policy, and it is well-established that “Maryland
law does not impose a duty on an insurance agent to investigate or verify the answers to an application’s
questions.” 	See 	Jackson v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 201 F. Supp. 2d 506, 511 n.3 (D. Md.
2002); 	see also 	N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Savage, 977 F. Supp. 725, 731 (D. Md. 1997) 	(“Generally,
insurers do not have a duty to investigate insurance applicants and are entitled to believe what an
applicant claims to be true.”).
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15
is material if the insurer cannot appreciate the scope of the risk it is asked to insure.” (internal quotations
and citations omitted)). And so, the Court agrees with MetLife that the undisputed material facts in this
case show that Ms. Gopaul’s misrepresentations and/or omissions about her criminal history were
material to its decision to issue the Policy. 	See Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
C. The Undisputed Material Facts Do Not Show That Ms. Gopaul Made
Fraudulent Misrepresentations Regarding Her Criminal History
While a close question, the Court is not satisfied that the undisputed material facts
establish that Ms. Gopaul’s material misrepresentations and/or omissions to MetLife about her
criminal history were fraudulent. It is well-established under Maryland law that the elements of
fraudulent misrepresentation are that: (1) the defendant made a false representation to the
plaintiff; (2) its falsity was either known to the defendant or that the representation was made
with reckless indifference as to its truth; (3) the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of
defrauding the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and had the right to rely
on it; and (5) the plaintiff suffered compensable injury resulting from the misrepresentation.
Chubb & Son v. C & C Complete Servs., 919 F. Supp. 2d 666, 673 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting 	Nails
v. S & R, Inc., 639 A.2d 660, 668 (Md. 1994)). And so, fraudulent intent with regards to Ms.
Gopaul’s misrepresentations and/or omissions can be drawn from, and inferred from, the
circumstances surrounding the material misrepresentations, as direct evidence of such intent
rarely is available. 	First Union Nat’l Bank v. Steele Software Sys. Corp., 838 A.2d 404, 440
(Md. App. Ct. 2003).
Here, the Court agrees with MetLife that the undisputed material facts show that Ms.
Gopaul falsely represented her criminal history to MetLife, because she omitted several felony
and misdemeanor convictions in the Application. The Court also agrees that the undisputed
material facts show Ms. Gopaul knew that the representations about of her prior criminal history
were false. As discussed above, Ms. Gopaul neither disputes these other convictions, nor denies
that she did not disclose the convictions to MetLife. 	See generally 	ECF Nos. 120 and 127. 	See,
e.g., ECF No. 114-1 at J.R. 264-269 (264:1-269:8) (Ms. Gopaul’s deposition testimony stating
that “I am aware that there were judicial actions that occurred, and I do not recall the details.”).
But there are material facts in dispute in this case about whether Ms. Gopaul’s
misrepresentations and/or omissions about her criminal history were made for the purpose of
defrauding MetLife. As MetLife correctly observes, there is evidence before the Court to show
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16
that Ms. Gopaul intended to defraud MetLife by concealing the extent of her criminal history.
For example, several of Ms. Gopaul’s felony convictions occurred within the same year as the
lesser misdemeanor charge that Ms. Gopaul did disclose. 	See 	ECF No. 114-1 	at J.R. 449-74
(Maryland and Virginia criminal history reports for “Sheba Shabana Gopaul”). In addition,
Ms. Gopaul attempted to expunge certain of her Maryland convictions on August 1, 2019,
prior to submitting the initial claim for disability benefits form to MetLife on January 9,
2020, and she subsequently denied such expungement efforts during discovery in this
matter. 	See 	ECF No. ECF No. 114-1 at J.R. 376 (Court records showing Ms. Gopaul’s
petition for expungement of certain Maryland convictions); 	id. 	at J.R. 496-97 (Ms. Gopaul’s
second supplemental answer to MetLife’s first Interrogatory Question 11); 	id. 	at J.R. 512
(Ms. Gopaul’s initial claim for disability benefits form).
But Ms. Gopaul argues in this case that she did not intend to mislead MetLife about her
criminal history, because she “explicitly relied upon professional guidance from [her] broker
Gary Becker during application preparation, categorically refuting allegations of deceptive
intent.” ECF No. 120 at 25. The Court observes that Ms. Gopaul’s argument is called into doubt
by Mr. Becker’s written statement to MetLife and his deposition testimony showing that he had
no knowledge of any criminal history for Ms. Gopaul beyond what she disclosed on the
Application at the time he helped Ms. Gopaul complete the Application. 	See 	ECF No. 114-5 at
J.R. 2746 (written statement of Gary Becker); 	see also 	id. 	at J.R. 2583 (63:13-16) (“Q. [A]t the
time the application was taken you were not aware of any criminal history . . . . Is that correct?
A. Correct. Hundred percent.”). Mr. Becker also testified that he never told Ms. Gopaul that she
did not have to disclose all her convictions in response to Question 15. 	Id. 	at J.R. 2555 (35:16-
25) (“Q. Did you ever tell Ms. Gopaul that she did not have to disclose all of her convictions in
response to question 15? A. No. I would never do that.”).5
Nonetheless, there is a genuine dispute in this case about whether, and to what extent,
Ms. Gopaul relied upon the advice of Mr. Becker in answering Question 15 of the Application,
and whether Mr. Becker provide any guidance to Ms. Gopaul regarding whether to disclose her
5 	Ms. Gopaul also testified during her deposition that she provided the answers to the Application over the
phone to Mr. Becker’s assistant. 	See 	ECF No. 114-1 at J.R. 39-40 (39:14-40:16) (“Q. Right. [The
Application] was completed over the phone with you giving the information provided and Mr. Becker’s
assistant taking it down; is that correct? A. Yes. Mr. Becker’s assistant completed [the Application] after
a phone conversation that we had.”).
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other criminal convictions. While the evidence before the Court casts doubt on Ms. Gopaul’s
version of these events, this is an issue to be resolved by the trier of fact at trial, after hearing the
evidence and weighing the credibility of the witnesses. And so, summary judgment on this final
issue is not warranted.
Because the Court concludes that there are material facts in dispute regarding whether
Ms. Gopaul intended to defraud MetLife by misrepresenting and/or omitting information about
her criminal history, the Court does not address the remaining elements for fraudulent
misrepresentation, or whether MetLife is entitled to rescind the Policy.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) 	DENIES 	Ms. Gopaul’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 120) and
(2) 	GRANTS-in-PART and DENIES-in-PART 	the Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 113).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge
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