USA v. Johnson et al

1:10-cr-00799Mdd26 nov 2025

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
LOXLY JOHNSON, a/k/a
Desmond Williams,
Defendant.
Criminal No.: MJM-10-0799
MEMORANDUM
In December 2011, a jury found Loxly Johnson guilty of one count of Conspiracy to Import
One Kilogram or More of Heroin and 500 Grams or More of Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
960(a)(1) and (b)(1)(2) and 21 U.S.C. § 963. ECF No. 98. Judge Quarles, who presided over
Johnson’s trial and sentencing, sentenced Johnson to 240 months of incarceration followed by ten
years of supervised release. ECF No. 152 (Judgment).1
Johnson remains incarcerated and has filed both a Motion for Compassionate Release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and a Motion for Sentence Reduction under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2). See ECF Nos. 204, 207, 209, 221. Both motions are fully briefed, and the Court finds
that a hearing is unnecessary. See Loc. Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons stated herein,
the Court shall grant the motion for compassionate release in part with a reduction in sentence to
time served as of December 18, 2025, and the motion for sentence reduction shall be denied.2
1 The case was reassigned to other judges in the years to follow. It was reassigned the undersigned
on January 15, 2025.
2 There are also several motions to seal various filings made in connection with the foregoing
motions. ECF Nos. 208, 215, 217, 222. These sealing motions shall be granted. Sealing the materials is a
necessary measure to protect Johnson’s private medical records for public view, which the Court finds to
be a compelling interest that overrides the public’s right of access. Considering the high volume of these
materials, the Court finds redaction to be impracticable.
The government also filed a consent motion for extension of time to respond to Johnson’s Motion
for Compassionate release, ECF No. 213, which shall be granted nunc pro tunc.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On December 17, 2010, federal law enforcement authorities received information that crew
members of an international cruise ship may have been involved in smuggling narcotics on the
ship. The next day, Homeland Security Investigation and Customs and Border Protection inspected
crew members upon their arrival to Baltimore, Maryland. During a search of crew member Gavin
Excell’s person, agents found multiple packages containing a total of about 695 grams of heroin
and about 254 grams of cocaine. Following his arrest, “Excell stated that he had picked up the
drugs in Jamaica or the Dominican Republic with fellow crew members John Swart Garth (Garth)
and an individual he knew as Kishurn, later identified as Kishurn Neptune (Neptune), and he was
to deliver them to someone called ‘Tony’ at a nearby Wal-Mart.” United States v. Graves, 545 F.
App’x 230, 233 (4th Cir. 2013).
While Excell was in custody, his phone received a call from a phone number linked to
Johnson’s daughter. An agent went to the Wal-Mart parking lot and observed occupants of a GMC
Envoy vehicle registered to Johnson’s daughter, who were later identified as Johnson and Shenika
Graves, interacting with Garth and Neptune. At one point, Garth entered the vehicle while Johnson
and Graves were inside. Some of these individuals were observed conducting counter surveillance,
and Neptune was observed looking directly at one of the agents present.
Excell made controlled phone calls to “Tony,” and it was later learned through a traffic
stop and seizure of Johnson’s cell phone and other evidence that “Tony” and Johnson were the
same person. During a call between Excell and “Tony”/Johnson, Excell stated that immigration
authorities had checked his passport upon arrival and that delay prevented him from making the
delivery on time, but he could be at Wal-Mart in 15 minutes. Johnson stated that he was at Wal-
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Mart but would not accept the delivery there because the location was “hot.” ECF No. 1
(Complaint). After Johnson left the Wal-Mart in the Envoy vehicle registered to his daughter, law
enforcement continued surveillance of him and observed him using his cell phone at the same time
Excell received a call. Law enforcement conducted a traffic stop and eventually searched the
vehicle, finding $8,000 in cash in the lining of a child safety seat. Johnson was arrested. A query
of the National Crime Information Center revealed that he had been convicted previously of felony
possession and importation of cocaine in Maryland state court and was sentenced to a five-year
term of incarceration.
Law enforcement approached Graves in the Wal-Mart after Johnson left the location and
asked to speak with her, and she agreed. During an interview in one officer’s patrol car, “Graves
indicated that she had come to Baltimore from Virginia that morning with Johnson, a drug
trafficker, to meet someone from a cruise ship.” Graves, 545 F. App’x at 235. She further stated
that she and Johnson had come to pick up narcotics. ECF No. 1. “Graves said that an unknown
man had entered the Envoy earlier that day and had given them three packages in return for $4,000
and that the ‘stuff’ was in her purse.” Graves, 545 F. App’x at 235. Agents searched Graves’s
purse and found three packages containing about 642 grams of heroin and about 350 grams of
cocaine. Graves advised that these packages were the drugs she and Johnson received from the
unknown man in the vehicle, which was understood to be Garth.
While in custody, Graves received multiple phone calls, two of which she was asked
answered under observation by law enforcement. “The first call was from a person in Virginia,
stating that he was worried ‘about Johnson's status.’ The second call was from a person apparently
using an overseas phone, asking Graves if she had ‘the stuff.’ She told the caller she had it, but
was stuck at the Wal–Mart.” Id.
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B. Procedural History
In December 2010, a grand jury indicted Johnson along with Graves, Excell, Garth, and
Neptune, charging conspiracy.3 ECF No. 25. Johnson entered a plea of not guilty, ECF No. 34,
and proceeded to a jury trial on the superseding indictment for one count of Conspiracy to Import
One Kilogram or More of Heroin and 500 Grams or More of Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
960(a)(1), (b)(1) and 963. ECF No. 25. A jury found Johnson guilty after a three-day trial in
December 2011. ECF Nos. 33, 34, 76, 79, 80, 98.
The Court determined at sentencing that Johnson had a total offense level of 32 and
criminal history category II, which, the Court noted, would have resulted in an advisory sentencing
guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. ECF No. 152 at 5, 6. However, based on Johnson’s prior
conviction4 for a serious drug felony, the government sought an enhanced sentence under 21
U.S.C. § 851. ECF No. 75. Judge Quarles applied the enhancement and sentenced Johnson to a
mandatory minimum of 240 months in prison, with ten years of supervised release. ECF No. 132
(Judgment). Judge Quarles deemed this sentence to be “sufficient but not greater than necessary
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment and adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct, and to protect the public from further crimes of the Defendant.” ECF No. 152 at
6–7. Johnson timely appealed his conviction, ECF No. 138, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed, ECF No. 155; United States v. Graves, 545 F. App’x 230, 243 (4th Cir.
2013) (per curiam).
3 Only Johnson and co-defendant Shenika Graves proceeded to trial; the other three defendants
entered guilty pleas. See ECF Nos. 52, 53, 56, 57, 71, 72.
4 The government relied upon Johnson’s prior conviction for the importation of a controlled
substance, in violation of Maryland’s Criminal Code, on or about January 25, 1999, for which he was
sentenced to five years of incarceration. ECF No. 75 at 1.
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Johnson then filed a series of pro se post-conviction motions. In July 2015, he filed a
motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 157. The case was
reassigned to Judge Motz, who denied the motion. ECF No. 160. Johnson then timely filed a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or amend the Court’s denial of his motion to
vacate, a motion for summary judgment, and a motion for sanctions against the government. ECF
Nos. 161, 162, 164. Judge Motz denied all three motions in August 2016. ECF Nos. 165, 166, 167.
Johnson appealed the denial of his § 2255 and Rule 59(e) motions. ECF No. 168. The
Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded for full consideration of unaddressed claims
Johnson raised in his § 2255 motion. ECF Nos. 173, 174; United States v. Johnson, 687 F. App’x
267, 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Following full briefing of the outstanding issues, Judge
Blake, replacing Judge Motz as presiding judge, denied and dismissed all outstanding claims. ECF
Nos. 183, 184. Johnson sought a certificate of appealability, ECF No. 185, which was denied and
dismissed, ECF Nos. 188, 189; United States v. Johnson, 738 F. App’x 214, 215 (4th Cir. 2018)
(per curiam). Johnson subsequently filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief
from the final judgment or order of this Court’s denial of his § 2255 motion, ECF No. 190, which
was denied, ECF No. 202.5
In September 2021, Johnson, acting pro se, filed a motion for compassionate release
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as modified by the First Step Act of 2018. ECF No. 204.
Upon appointment of counsel, ECF Nos. 205, 206, Johnson supplemented his motion for
compassionate release in March 2022. ECF Nos. 207, 208, 209. This supplemental motion is
supported by four exhibits. ECF No. 209-1 through 209-4.6 The government filed a response in
5 Johnson also sought to appeal the reassignment of his case to a different presiding judge, which
was dismissed. ECF No. 198; United States v. Johnson, 790 F. App’x 557, 557 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
6 I will refer to ECF Nos. 204, 207, 208, and 209 collectively as Johnson’s “Motion for
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opposition to the Motion for Compassionate Release. ECF No. 216, supported by six exhibits, ECF
No. 216-1 through ECF No. 216-6. Johnson filed a reply, reasserting the two bases for
compassionate release previously argued—a sentencing disparity and Johnson’s health conditions.
ECF No. 218. He later filed a supplemental reply. ECF No. 229.
This case was reassigned to the undersigned in January 2025.
In February 2025, Johnson, again pro se, filed a separate Motion for Sentence Reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), citing Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
ECF No. 221.7 The government filed a response in opposition to the Motion for Sentence
Reduction, supported by one exhibit. ECF Nos. 228, 228-1.
Johnson is presently incarcerated in a low-security Federal Correctional Institution in
Oakdale, Louisiana (“FCI-Oakdale II”) and has a projected release date of January 2, 2027. See
Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator, https://perma.cc/RS3L-UVMR. He has served approximately
179 months—roughly 75%—of his 240-month prison sentence. ECF No. 132 at 2.
II. 	MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE UNDER 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A)
A. Legal Standard
Usually, a court may not “modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also United States v. Moody, 115 F.4th 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2024). There are,
however, “a few narrow exceptions” to this “rule of finality.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S.
522, 526 (2011).
A 	provision 	of 	the 	Sentencing 	Reform 	Act 	of 	1984, 	“commonly 	known 	as 	the
Compassionate Release.”
7 I will refer to ECF No. 221 as Johnson’s “Motion for Sentence Reduction.” The Office of the
Federal Public Defender declined to supplement this motion. See ECF No. 222.
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‘compassionate-release exception,’” is one such exception. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see also
Moody, 115 F.4th at 310. Under the compassionate release exception, a court may reduce a
sentence if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” or “the defendant is
at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison . . . ,” and “a determination has been
made . . . that the defendant is not a danger to the safety or any other person or the community.”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 831 (4th Cir. 2022). A
sentence modification must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission” and warranted under the § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A);
see also United States v. Crawley, 140 F.4th 165, 169 (4th Cir. 2025). For a court to consider a
compassionate release motion filed by a defendant,8 the defendant must first “fully exhaust[] all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the
defendant’s behalf” or show that more than thirty days have passed “from the receipt of such a
request by the warden of the defendant’s facility[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United
States v. Ferguson, 55 F.4th 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2022).
Before 2023, no relevant policy statement governed compassionate release motions filed
by prisoners themselves. See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 281 (4th Cir. 2020),
superseded as recognized by United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 654 (4th Cir. 2024). In 2023,
the United States Sentencing Commission amended the policy statement at U.S.S.G § 1B1.13 to
apply to motions filed by defendants, clarifying the “contours of ‘extraordinary and compelling’
reasons” for release in such instances. Davis, 99 F.4th at 654, 658; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b).9
8 In 2018, Congress “broadened” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) relief with the enactment of the First Step
Act. Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which expanded access to
compassionate release by allowing prisoners themselves to file such motions, rather than just the Bureau of
Prisons on behalf of inmates. See United States v. Malone, 57 F.4th 167, 173 (4th Cir. 2023).
9 Section 1B1.13(b) lists six categories of “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances. Section
1B1.13(b)(5) provides a fifth “catch-all” provision for “any other circumstance or combination of
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Section 1B1.13(b) lists six categories of “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances. Relevant
here, § 1B1.13(b)(6) permits a finding of extraordinary and compelling circumstances where a
defendant has served at least ten years of a sentence that is now grossly disparate to a sentence
likely to be “imposed at the time the motion is filed,” based on an intervening “change in the law
. . .” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6). “Then, after considering any appropriate [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors,
the court must determine whether the requested reduction in sentence is consistent with ‘applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” Davis, 99 F.4th at 654 (citations
omitted). Courts “enjoy the discretion to give additional weight to any one [of the § 3553] factor[s]
so long as they do not confine their analysis to that factor.” Davis, 99 F.4th at 656; see also United
States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 381–82 (4th Cir. 2021). And a court does not have “to decide between
immediate release or no reduction at all.” United States v. Braxton, Crim. No. JKB-09-478, 2020
WL 4748536, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 17, 2020).
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
The Court finds that, based on the circumstances of Johnson’s case and significant changes
to the applicable sentencing framework following the First Step Act, Johnson has presented
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” sufficient to warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).10 The First Step Act amended § 3582 to permit judicial review of a sentence
circumstances that, when described by themselves or together with any of the reasons described in
paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).” Id. §
1B1.13(b)(5); see also United States v. Brown, 706 F. Supp. 3d 516, 519–520 (D. Md. 2023). Finally, §
1B1.13(b)(6) deems it extraordinary and compelling when a defendant has served at least ten years of a
sentence that is now grossly disparate compared to a non-retroactive change that would be “imposed at the
time the motion is filed.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6).
10 The government concedes that Johnson has exhausted his administrative remedies. ECF No. 216 at 11.
Johnson submitted a request for compassionate relief from the Warden of FCI McKean on August 1, 2021,
ECF No. 204-1, which counsel later supplemented on February 7, 2022. ECF No. 209-1. The BOP denied
Johnson’s motion on February 25, 2022. ECF No. 212-1
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“‘upon motion of the defendant’ if the defendant has exhausted all administrative remedies to
appeal the BOP’s failure to bring a motion, or if thirty days have lapsed ‘from the receipt of such
a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier[.]’” United States v.
Legrand, Crim. No. CCB-10-052, 2024 WL 2941282, at *3 (D. Md. June 11, 2024) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Additionally, the First Step Act “reduced the mandatory minimum
penalties triggered by a § 851 notice, applicable to offenders with one or more prior predicate
offenses.” Babb v. United States, Crim. No. ELH-04-0190, 2021 WL 2315459, at *11 (D. Md.
June 4, 2021); see also, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 960(b). Importantly, the enhanced penalty applied at
Johnson’s sentencing based on his prior drug trafficking conviction was reduced from 20 years of
imprisonment to 15 years. Id.
Johnson’s specific circumstances qualify as extraordinary and compelling under U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6).11 The provision permits consideration of a change in law in deciding whether an
extraordinary and compelling reason exists in cases where “a defendant received an unusually long
sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment,” so long as the change in
law is not “an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive” and it
“would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be
imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s
11 At the time defendant filed his Motion for Compassionate Release, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 had not
been amended to apply to defendant-filed motions. Thus, the relevant “extraordinary and compelling”
inquiry at the time of filing was the McCoy framework, under which courts evaluated sentencing disparities
on the basis of four factors: (1) a grossly disproportionate sentence as compared to the sentence that would
be imposed today, making the preexisting sentence “dramatically longer than necessary or fair,” (2) a
“grossly lengthy” sentence compared to similar or more serious offenses, (3) amount of sentence already
served, and (4) the defendant’s characteristics, such as relative youth at sentencing and post-sentencing
rehabilitative efforts. Legrand, 2024 WL 2941282, at *5 (citation omitted). While no longer the relevant
inquiry, Johnson’s circumstances would have qualified as “extraordinary and compelling” under the McCoy
framework as well, given that the five-year disparity in mandatory minimums between sentencing and now
is “grossly disproportionate,” Johnson has served the majority of the sentence, and his disciplinary record
reflects only minor infractions.
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individualized circumstances.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). “It is well established in this Circuit . . .
that a gross disparity between the sentence a defendant actually received pre-First Step Act and
would have received post-First Step Act can be an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason[]’ for
compassionate release.” Legrand, 2024 WL 2941282, at *4 (quoting McCoy, 981 F.3d at 286)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Johnson seeks a sentence modification to time-served because the reduced mandatory
minimum reflected in 21 U.S.C. § 960(b), as amended by the First Step Act, would likely result in
a sentence today shorter than the one he received in 2012, 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancements like the
one he received are mpe “disfavored,” and his guideline sentencing range is now lower than it was
when he was sentenced.12 ECF No. 204 at 4–5; ECF No. 209 at 8–14, 25. He also points to the
disparity between his sentence and those of his co-defendants. Id. at 12–14.13 Johnson finally
asserts that his health conditions—namely, his older age, severe obesity, and high blood pressure—
are also “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for release.14 ECF No. 204 at 1; ECF No. 209 at
4–5, 15–22.
In opposition to Johnson’s compassionate release motion, the government minimizes the
disparity between the present mandatory minimum sentence and the mandatory minimum that was
applicable at the time Johnson was sentenced, stating that the difference “only amount[s] to five
12 Current sentencing guidelines have reduced Johnson’s base offense level, lowering his prior
guidelines range of 135–168 months to 108–135 months. Id. at 2, 11–12.
13 Of the four co-defendants, Graves is the only one who pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.
Following her conviction at trial on the charged conspiracy, Graves received a jail sentence of twelve
months and one day and three years of supervised release. ECF No. 128. Excell, Garth, and Neptune each
pleaded guilty to the charged conspiracy, and each received a sentence of time served plus supervised
release, imposed between December 2011 and February 2012. See ECF Nos. 108, 110, 122. On December
15, 2011, Garth received a sentence of time served and four years of supervised release. ECF No.110.
14 Defendant was born in 1962. ECF No. 209-3 at 1. He was 49 years old at the time of sentencing,
and he is now 63 years old.
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years.” ECF No. 216 at 22 (emphasis added). Courts in this Circuit have found lesser disparities
to be “significant.” See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, Crim. No. MFU-13-0025, 2021 WL 3007266,
at *5 (W.D. Va. July 15, 2021). Additionally, courts in this Circuit have found “that the sentencing
disparity resulting from changes to § 851’s penalty structure constitutes an extraordinary and
compelling reason to grant relief.” Babb v. United States, Crim. No. ELH-04-0190, 2021 WL
2315459, at *12 (D. Md. June 4, 2021) (collecting cases). This Court finds the five-year difference
between the 20-year mandatory minimum imposed when Johnson was sentenced and the 15-year
mandatory minimum that would apply today to be significant enough to justify relief.
Furthermore, Johnson’s 20-year sentence is much longer than the sentences typically
imposed upon similarly situated offenders in this Court over the last decade. Less than 2% of
defendants with criminal history category II sentenced in this District for heroin trafficking over
the past decade received a prison sentence of 15 years or greater, and a majority received a sentence
of less than ten years. See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Interactive Data Analyzer, 2015-2024 Sentencing
Outcomes, https://perma.cc/7S8L-R4F3. Considering this data, the Court finds Johnson’s sentence
to be “unusually long” and notes that Johnson has served more than ten years of that sentence for
purposes of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Given the change in the mandatory minimum prison sentence
applicable to Johnson’s conduct that has occurred since his sentencing, it is very likely that a prison
sentence imposed upon Johnson at the time he filed his motion would be significantly lower than
the sentence he is serving.
Moreover, Johnson’s request for a time-served sentence—now amounting to nearly 180
months—is supported by the likelihood that he would have completed his sentence by now had he
been sentenced after enactment of the First Step Act. Johnson’s good time credits have resulted in
a projected release date of January 2, 2027, approximately 13 months from today—far less than
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the five-year disparity between the mandatory minimum applicable at the time of sentencing and
that in force today.
In consideration of the foregoing, this Court finds the five-year difference between the
mandatory minimum sentence applicable and imposed upon Johnson at the time of his sentencing
and the mandatory minimum applicable today resulted in a significant and gross disparity between
the prison sentence Johnson is serving and the sentence he would have likely received when his
motion was filed.
Additionally, while Johnson’s obesity and hypertension do not by themselves constitute an
extraordinary and compelling circumstance, the fact that he suffered these health issues while in
custody 	during 	the 	height 	of 	the 	COVID-19 	pandemic 	adds 	further 	support 	to 	finding
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a sentence reduction. Some courts have determined
that the combination of an underlying illness with a sentencing disparity can constitute
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release. See, e.g., United States v.
Wright, Crim. No. ELH-08-381, 2022 WL 2104489, at *13–14 (D. Md. June 10, 2022) (concluding
that obesity, hypertension, and prediabetes, particularly when considered with sentencing
disparity, “constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances under the compassionate release
statute”); United States v. Stavrakis, Crim. No. ELH-19-0160, 2025 WL 2897668, at *28 (D. Md.
Oct. 9, 2025) (collecting cases in which district courts “have found extraordinary and compelling
circumstances for defendants with chronic medical conditions such as diabetes and hypertension”).
Further, judges in this District have found that incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic
“sufficiently increased the severity of the sentence beyond what was originally anticipated such
that the purposes of sentencing are met even with . . . [a] proposed reduction.” See, e.g., United
States v. Cunningham, Crim. No. ELH-18-017, 2024 WL 4057004 (D. Md. Sept. 4, 2024);
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Stavrakis, 2025 WL 2897668, at *30. Although Johnson recovered after contracting COVID-19,
he was both hospitalized for three days, ECF No. 209, and spent nine months in the solitary housing
unit (“SHU”) during the pandemic because he felt his life was in danger and that “SHU was the
safest place to be.” ECF No. 209-4 at 1.
This Court finds the disparity between Johnson’s prison sentence and that likely to be
imposed today due to the intervening change in the applicable statutory minimum, combined with
Johnson’s health condition and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on his circumstances in
custody, provide an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction.
C. 18 U.S.C. § 3355(a) Sentencing Factors
Having found “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release, the Court
must consider whether the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) warrant relief. See Bethea, 54
F.4th at 831. Here, the Court finds that the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a sentence reduction.
The § 3553(a) factors include, among others, (1) “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;” (2) the need for the sentence to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment, to afford
adequate deterrence, and to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; (3) “the kinds
of sentences available;” (4) the kinds of sentences and sentencing range established under the
sentencing guidelines; (5) any pertinent policy statement of the U.S. Sentencing Commission; (6)
“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Addressing first “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities[,]” id. § 3553(a)(6),
the Court has recognized that there has been a change in the law that applied to Johnson at the time
of his sentencing and caused a substantial disparity between the prison sentence imposed upon him
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and the much shorter sentences commonly imposed upon defendants who engage in drug
trafficking with comparable criminal history. See Part II.B supra.
Second, 	Johnson’s 	offense 	was 	quite 	serious 	and 	warranted 	a 	lengthy 	term 	of
imprisonment. Johnson conspired with others to smuggle more than a kilogram of heroin and about
600 grams of cocaine into the United States. As the government describes Johnson, he was “the
primary architect and l[i]nchpin” of this international drug-smuggling operation. Although the
sentence Johnson received was substantially greater than those of his co-defendants, his longer
prison term was justified by his more culpable role in the conspiracy; the disparity was not
unwarranted. Heroin and cocaine are both notoriously addictive and dangerous to their abusers. A
lengthy sentence of incarceration was necessary to reflect both the seriousness of the societal harms
and dangers the conspiracy likely inflicted upon the community, and the critical role Johnson
played in the conspiracy. Johnson’s prior criminal history—specifically, his previous incarceration
for another drug trafficking offense—and his recidivism in his late 40s underscore his high
culpability, the high risk of further trafficking in addictive and dangerous drugs that would be
presented by his presence in the community, and the great need for the sentence in his case to
impart respect for the law and to deter him and others from involvement in drug trafficking. A
long prison sentence was justified by the need to deter Johnson specifically, given that the five-
year sentence Johnson had previously received failed to deter him from seriously escalating the
degree of his involvement in drug trafficking in the instant case. See United States v. Thomas,
Crim. No. ELH018-0246, 2025 WL 1504831, at * (D. Md. May 27, 2025) (finding failure of prior
incarceration to deter defendant “troubling”). Johnson’s criminal history was further justification
for a longer sentence than that imposed upon his co-defendants.15
15 Furthermore, three of Johnson’s co-defendants demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for
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15
With the foregoing facts in mind, the Court also recognizes that Johnson is now over the
age of 62. While age alone is not dispositive generally, courts in the Fourth Circuit have determined
that because of evidence of “decreased recidivism as prisoners age,” age can favor compassionate
release. Stavrakis, 2025 WL 2897668, at *28 (citation altered) (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics,
United States Department of Justice, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005:
Patterns from 2005 to 2010 (April 2010), https://perma.cc/ZE9K-QD9U); United States v.
Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 533 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he risk of recidivism is inversely related to an
inmate’s age”). Considering that Johnson was approximately 47 years old when he committed the
instant offense, and advanced age would not necessarily preclude re-involvement in drug
trafficking conspiracies, the Court finds that Johnson’s release even at the age of 62 would present
some risk of recidivism. But the risk of recidivism is not as great as it would have been if Johnson
were younger and not so great as to forbid his release after serving 180 months of incarceration.
The 180 months of imprisonment Johnson is now close to serving greatly exceeds any prior period
of incarceration.
Given his current projected release date16 of January 2, 2027, any reduction of Johnson’s
sentence at this point will, at most, barely exceed one year, an amount of time unlikely to carry
any greater deterrent value than the nearly fifteen years of incarceration Johnson has already
served. See, e.g., United States v. Braxton, Crim. No. JKB-09-478, 2020 WL 4748536, at *4 (D.
Md. Aug 17, 2020) (finding that although defendant’s criminal history called for “a substantial
penalty . . . to dissuade him from future offenses[,]” “for a person of [63 years of age] and ill health,
their crimes by admitting their guilt, which justified reduced sentences for those defendants.
16 At the time he filed his motion for compassionate release, Johnson had earned 540 days of good
time credit and had a projected release date of January 2, 2028. At present, his projected release date is
January 2, 2027. ECF No. 209-3 at 8.
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any sentence of over a decade is bound to have a very substantial deterrent effect, particularly
given [defendant’s] traumatic experience of contracting COVID-19 during his incarceration” and
that “there is little reason to think a sentence of 20 years would deter him more forcefully than a
14-year sentence”); United States v. Downer, Crim. No. SAG-11-0050, 2025 WL 2494321, at *2
(D. Md. Aug. 28, 2025) (referring to an early release by eighteen months as a “relatively modest
reduction in . . . remaining sentence”).
The Court notes the modest evidence of rehabilitation Johnson has submitted for
consideration. See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 492 (2011) (recognizing that evidence
of rehabilitation can provide “the most up-to-date picture” of a defendant’s “‘history and
characteristics[]’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)). Johnson has been employed while in custody,
but several disciplinary infractions stemmed from his failure to report to work. Johnson provides
a plausible explanation for the infractions he incurred while incarcerated,17 but his rehabilitative
efforts beyond employment appear to be minimal. I note, however, that Johnson has not been
disciplined for any violent or otherwise serious infractions during his long period of incarceration.
Furthermore, he has provided evidence of strong familial ties. These familial ties are likely to
provide Johnson a stable home and support system during his period of reentry to the community,
which will assist Johnson in avoiding further criminal involvement. See ECF No. 209-4 at 4 (letters
in support of Johnson’s release stating that he would live in the family home in New York with
his mother, step-father, sister, niece, and cousin, rather than in the state of Virginia where he
resided at the time of commission of the crime). Johnson describes himself as having a “deeply
changed perspective for . . . life which [he] gained through . . . maturation while being
17 Johnson asserts that several of his sanctions, which were for failure to return to the general
population or refusal of a work assignment, were “precipitated by unrest in the prison, Mr. Johnson to feel
unsafe in general population and working a job.” ECF No. 209 at 23.
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incarcerated.” ECF No. 209-4 at 2.
The balance of the relevant § 3553(a) factors support Johnson’s prompt release from
custody after having served approximately 180 months of incarceration. The Court finds 180
months in custody to be “sufficient but not greater than necessary” to satisfy the purposes of
sentencing listed in § 3553(a)(2), considering Johnson’s history and characteristics and the nature
and circumstances of his serious crime. This period of imprisonment adequately reflects the
severity of the conduct underlying Johnson’s conviction and his criminal history while also
accounting for his advanced age and his lack of serious or violent disciplinary infractions while in
custody, while avoiding the severe sentencing disparity that would result if a sentence reduction
were denied. The Court notes, moreover, that the 180 months Johnson will have served by
December 18, 2025, equals the mandatory minimum sentence presently in force for his offense of
conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1). See also Brown, 78 F.4th at 131, 132 (finding that the disparity
between a prior mandatory minimum and a current mandatory minimum as “primarily the result
of Congress’ conclusion that the prior mandatory minimum is “unfair and unnecessary,” reflecting
a “legislative rejection” of the prior mandatory minimum “as well as a legislative declaration of
what level of punishment is adequate”) (internal citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court will grant Johnson’s Motion for Compassionate Release under §
3582(c)(1)(A) in part and reduce his prison sentence to time served as of December 18, 2025. This
sentence reduction is consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
III. 	MOTION FOR SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
A. Legal Standard
As with motions for compassionate release, courts in the Fourth Circuit undertake a two-
step inquiry when evaluating motions for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See
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United States v. Peters, 843 F.3d 572, 574 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
817, 826 (2010)); United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 2015). First, § 3582(c)(2)
allows a court to reduce a sentence where a defendant “has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission,” if the change to the guidelines has been made retroactive, and so long as the
“reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); see also United States v. Barrett, 133 F.4th 280 (4th Cir. 2025); U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10. Second, as with motions for compassionate release, even where an amendment to the
guidelines applies retroactively, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors must favor granting relief.
U.S.S.G. § 3582(c)(2); see also United States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398, 400 (4th Cir. 2022).
B. Amendment 782
Johnson argues in his separate Motion for Sentence Reduction that his sentence should be
reduced under Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which went into effect
on November 14, 2014. Amendment 782, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, https://perma.cc/6HJ3-GGT6.
This amendment changed “how the applicable statutory mandatory minimum penalties are
incorporated into the Drug Quantity Table [of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)] while maintaining consistency
with such penalties.” Id. “Specifically, this amendment reduce[d] by two levels the offense levels
assigned to the [drug] quantities that trigger the statutory mandatory minimum penalties . . . .” Id.
Amendment 782 did not alter U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c), which allows for the imposition of a sentence
“within the applicable guideline range” so long as it “is not less than any statutorily required
minimum sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(2).
In the instant case, Amendment 782 does not warrant a reduction in Johnson’s sentence
because his sentence resulted from a statutory mandatory minimum rather than an application of
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the Sentencing Guidelines. Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 specifically states that “a
reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
and is not consistent with this policy statement if” even an applicable guideline amendment “does
not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation
of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment).” (Emphasis added). While Amendment 782 reduced the “offense levels assigned
to the quantities that trigger the statutory mandatory minimum penalties,” it did not affect statutory
mandatory minimums themselves. U.S.S.G. App. C at p. 66, 68; see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c).
Johnson’s 240-month prison sentence was the minimum sentence mandated by statute
based upon the quantity of drugs involved in his offense of conviction—irrespective of his offense
level under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c) (providing that the sentence
imposed 	shall 	not 	fall 	below 	“any 	statutorily 	required 	minimum 	sentence”). 	Therefore,
Amendment 782 does not provide grounds to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
By separate Order, which follows, Johnson’s Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF
Nos. 204, 207) shall be granted in part. An Amended Judgment shall issue, resentencing Johnson
to time served as of December 18, 2025, to be followed by ten years of supervised release. The
government’s consent motion for an extension of time to file a response to the Motion for
Compassionate release (ECF No. 213) shall be granted nunc pro tunc.
Johnson’s separate Motion for Sentence Reduction (ECF No. 221) shall be denied.
The parties’ motions (ECF Nos. 208, 215, 217, 227) to seal shall be granted.
___11/26/25 __ 	_____________________________
Date 	Matthew J. Maddox
United States District Judge
Case 1:10-cr-00799-MJM Document 232 Filed 11/26/25 Page 19 of 19

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