Andrade v. Divris

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
MANUEL ANDRADE, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civ. No. 4:22-cv-12237-MRG
)
MATTHEW DIVRIS, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
)
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF. No. 1]
GUZMAN, J.
In April 2009, Manuel Andrade (“Andrade” or “Petitioner”) was convicted of murder in
the first degree for the death of a bystander who was caught in the crossfire of a March 2007
shootout. The Petitioner was also convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon, assault with intent to kill, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and unlawful
possession of a firearm at trial by a jury of his peers. In July 2018, Petitioner appealed his
conviction and moved for a new trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”)
reviewed Petitioner’s appellate claims and his motion for a new trial, and subsequently affirmed
Petitioner’s 2009 conviction, finding no error. See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 174 N.E.3d 281
(Mass. 2021).
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Before the Court is Manuel Andrade’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 raising seventeen grounds for relief.1 [ECF. No. 1]. For the reasons stated below, the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A federal court must review habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 respecting that the
“‘state court’s factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness that can be rebutted
only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.’” Muller v. Goguen, 385 F.Supp.3d 121,
124 (D. Mass. 2019) (quoting Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2002)). The presumption
of correctness “remains true when those findings are made by a state appellate court as well as
when they are made by a state trial court.” Id. (quoting Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.
2002) (citations omitted)). In the present case, the SJC summarized the Commonwealth’s case as
follows:
A. Relevant Facts
At around 1:30 A.M. on March 24, 2007, after [Chiara] Levin and two
friends left a club in Boston, they spoke with a group of men standing outside the
club, including the defendant, his cousin Tony Andrade, and Samuel Ortiz. The
men, whom Levin and her friends had not met previously, invited them to a party
in a private home; Levin’s group accepted, and Tony drove them to the party.
There were about twenty-five to thirty people at the party. One guest,
Jessica Nunez, saw a man, inferentially the defendant, wearing a black fitted
baseball cap, a black “hoodie,” and glasses approach [Casimiro] Barros and Jason
Barbosa, and say, “Y’all Roxbury n****** are nothing but bitches,” and also refer
to Barbosa as a “bitch ass n*****.”
About an hour after Levin and her two friends first arrived, Tony offered to
take the group home. Tony, Levin, her two friends, Ortiz, and the defendant went
outside, where Ortiz, Levin and her group, got into Tony’s Ford Escalade. Before
the defendant reached the vehicle, he said something to Tony and then turned and
walked back toward the house. Tony got into the driver’s seat.
1 The Court notes that in Petitioner’s Writ for Habeas Corpus, the Petitioner mistakenly repeated
the number 12 in his grounds for relief. The Court treats the claims of relief in the order in which
they appear, correcting the numerical error.
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Nunez, who was still inside, heard arguing. She saw the defendant throw a
plate of food at Barbosa and then pull out a gun. Nunez and other guests reported
that they heard gunshots, and that guests ran from the house after the shots. A man
ran into the kitchen yelling that “they were shooting” and everyone “needed to get
out or we’re going to die”; he added that “Spank was buggin’,” and “They're
shooting in there.” Barbosa was shot in the shoulder and fled through the front door.
Nunez saw the defendant point a gun at Barros and then run through the front door,
with Barros following.
The defendant walked quickly toward Tony’s Escalade, looking behind him
toward the house and smirking. Ortiz heard someone at the front of the house say,
“Pop him,” and screamed at the defendant to “watch his back.”
Barros, who was being restrained, broke free and moved toward the
defendant. By that point, the defendant was near Tony’s vehicle. He got out his
gun, and Barros did so as well. Both men opened fire. A bullet from the defendant’s
gun struck a nearby vehicle. Several of the bullets from Barros’s gun hit Tony’s
vehicle; one of them traveled through the front passenger’s side door as the
defendant tried to flee, and struck him in the buttocks. Another bullet from Barros’s
gun went through the rear passenger’s side window, which shattered, and then hit
Levin in the head.
As Levin’s friends yelled for Tony to drive Levin to the hospital, he sped
away, with the defendant also in the vehicle. After about a minute, the defendant
said that he had to get out. Tony stopped the vehicle, and the defendant and Ortiz
left. Tony drove to a Boston hospital. On arrival, Levin was unconscious and
unresponsive. After approximately two hours of effort, doctors determined that she
was “brain dead” and there was nothing further they could do to assist her, so they
terminated their efforts and she died.
Nunez drove Barbosa to the same hospital, where he was treated for a
collapsed lung. One of the guests who had been at the party when the shootings
took place called the defendant. He told her, “You didn't see anything, right?” and
said that she should tell the other people with whom she had been there that they
had not seen anything either.
Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at 291–93 (footnotes omitted).
B. Procedural History
Petitioner was convicted by jury trial of first-degree murder, assault and battery by means
of a dangerous weapon, assault with intent to kill, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and
unlawful possession of a firearm in April 2009. [ECF No. 2 at 4]. Petitioner appealed in a timely
manner, then filed a post-verdict motion to reduce the verdict. [ECF No. 2 at 5]. When this motion
was denied, Petitioner filed another notice of appeal. [Id.] In July 2018, Petitioner filed a motion
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for new trial with the SJC. [Id.] The SJC remanded the motion to the trial court, which declined to
act on the motion, sending it back to the SJC. [Id.] The SJC affirmed the convictions in October
2021. [Id.] This Court now reviews Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was
filed on December 30, 2022. [ECF No. 1]. Respondent filed an opposition to the Petition on
September 25, 2023. [ECF No. 24]. Petitioner filed a response to the opposition on January 19,
2024. [ECF No. 29].
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
“The writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that guards only against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Rivera v. Kelly, 763 F.Supp.3d 105, 121 (D.
Mass. 2025) (quoting Watkins v. Medeiros, 36 F. 4th 373, 384 (1st Cir. 2022)). The merits of a
habeas petition must be addressed by the standards outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which place
the burden on Petitioner to prove that the state court’s decisions as to all grounds were “contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States” or were “based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S.
366, 375 (2022) (“To respect our system of dual sovereignty . . . the availability of habeas relief is
narrowly circumscribed.”). For a state court decision to be contrary to Federal law, “it either
applies a test that is inconsistent with one announced by the [Supreme] Court or reaches the
opposite conclusion on materially indistinguishable facts.” Rashad, 300 F.3d at 34–35 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Meanwhile, a decision is unreasonable where “the state court
identifi[ed] the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applie[d] that principle”
when viewed objectively. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365 (2000). Mere error by the state
court is not enough to sustain a petition. McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 2002).
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The Supreme Court has “recognized that federal habeas review cannot serve as a substitute
for ordinary error correction through appeal . . . [Rather,] . . .[t]he writ of habeas corpus is an
extraordinary remedy that guards only against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
systems.” Shinn, 596 U.S. at 377. The state court decision must have “some increment of
incorrectness beyond error” that is “great enough to make the decision unreasonable in the
independent and objective judgment of the federal court” that is reviewing the habeas petition.
McCambridge, 303 F.3d at 36 (quoting Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2nd Cir. 2000)).
Indeed, “[t]he standard for evaluating the state court’s decision is ‘highly deferential,’ with ‘the
presumption that state courts know and follow the law’ and the requirement that the decisions of
the state court ‘be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Simpson v. Spencer, 372 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145
(D. Mass. 2005) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)).
A petitioner cannot obtain relief unless he “has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (stating rule as to those “in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court”). This exhaustion doctrine exists to foster “respectful, harmonious
relations between the state and federal judiciaries.” Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 471 (2012).
To meet the doctrine’s requirement, a “petitioner must demonstrate that he tendered each claim ‘in
such a way as to make it probable that a reasonable jurist would have been alerted to the existence
of the federal question.’” Adelson v. DiPaola, 131 F.3d 259, 262 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Scarpa
v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994)). A habeas petitioner cannot continue to litigate a petition
containing any unexhausted claims. Id. at 261; see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982).
However, “[a]n application for writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding
the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(2) (emphasis added). Where a habeas petitioner’s unexhausted claim is “patently
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without merit, . . . a federal court [may], in the interests of judicial economy, . . . dispose of that
claim once and for all.” Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640 F.3d 478, 483 (1st Cir. 2011).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Asserted Inconsistencies
i. 	Inconsistency of Verdicts
In his first ground for relief, Petitioner complains of inconsistencies between two of his
verdicts: first-degree murder and assault with intent to kill. [ECF No. 1 at 5]. Petitioner argues that
these verdicts cannot coexist since one requires a jury’s finding of malice (first-degree murder)
while the other requires a jury to find no malice (assault with intent to kill). [Id.] Petitioner
exhausted this ground by raising it in his appeal before the SJC. Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at 293.
In Andrade’s appeal, the SJC outlined that “verdicts are factually inconsistent when,
‘considered together [they] suggest inconsistent interpretations of the evidence presented at trial,’”
while “legally inconsistent verdicts are ‘verdicts of guilt involving mutually exclusive crimes,
where it is impossible for the Commonwealth to prove the elements of both offenses.’” Andrade,
174 N.E.3d at 294 (quoting Commonwealth v. Resende, 65 N.E.3d 1148, 1154 (Mass. 2017)). In
this case, the jury evaluated each indictment separately, reaching different factual conclusions with
respect to the different victims. Id. The SJC further specified that “it is ‘not necessary that the
verdicts be consistent on the separate indictments.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 245
N.E.2d 415, 418 (Mass. 1969)). However, “even if the verdicts were inconsistent, the Supreme
Court and [the First Circuit] have clearly stated that inconsistencies are no basis for setting aside
a conviction.” U.S. v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233, 239 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Powell,
469 U.S. 57, 105 (1984)). The SJC’s conclusion aligns with established federal law, therefore the
Court sees no clear error or unreasonable conclusion in the SJC’s analysis. See 28 U.S.C. §
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2254(d); Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at 294–95. Accordingly, Petitioner’s first ground for habeas relief
is DENIED.
ii. 	Inconsistencies Between Petitioner’s Trial and Barros’s Trial
In Petitioner’s third ground for relief, he argues that in violation of his rights to due process,
the Commonwealth relied on differing legal theories between his trial and co-defendant Casimiro
Barros’s trial. [ECF No. 1 at 8]; Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at 295. Specifically, Petitioner contends that
the Commonwealth’s argument at Barros’s trial involved Petitioner firing the first shot inside the
house and Barros beginning the shoot-out outside of the house where Levin was struck At
Petitioner’s trial, the Commonwealth argued that Petitioner fired the first shot inside then lured
Barros outside and shot at him. Id.
In reviewing this argument on appeal, the SJC cited the standard in Commonwealth v. Keo,
which requires an inconsistency at the core of the prosecutor’s case against defendants for the same
crime to amount to a due process violation. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Keo, 3 N.E.3d 55, 64
(Mass. 2014)). In both trials, the Commonwealth’s theory centered on the same events where
Petitioner initiated the shooting inside the house, then both parties shot at each other outside where
Levin was hit. Id. Applying Keo, the SJC reasonably determined that the “alleged inconsistency
was not so ‘core’ to the case as to constitute a violation of due process.” Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at
296.
In Housen v. Gelb, the petitioner asserted a comparable claim, contending that “the
prosecution asserted inconsistent theories of liability at his and his co-defendant’s trial, in violation
of his due process rights.” 2013 WL 1694799, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 17, 2013). The court in Housen
agreed with the SJC that “‘two rational conclusions based on ambiguous evidence will not
constitute a due process violation,’ and that ‘this is especially true with respect to cases against co-
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defendants based on a theory of joint venture . . . , where it cannot be determined which of the
defendants fired the fatal shot.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Housen, 940 N.E.2d 437, 444
(Mass. 2011)). Where such factually similar precedent is available and Petitioner has failed to
present applicable Supreme Court precedent indicating a contrary result, this Court aligns with
Housen and the SJC. Id.; [ECF No. 2 at 35–41]. Petitioner has not demonstrated the SJC’s
determination was unreasonable or contrary to established federal law, therefore, Petitioner’s third
ground for habeas relief is DENIED.
B. Evidentiary Rulings
In grounds five, eight, ten, twelve, thirteen, and fifteen of his Petition, Petitioner contends
that multiple violations of his due process rights occurred through improperly excluded evidence,
improperly admitted evidence, and insufficient evidence. [ECF No. 1 at 21, 23–26]. This Court
reviews the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See McDonough v. City of
Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2006). “A misbegotten evidentiary ruling that results in a
fundamentally unfair trial may violate due process and, thus, ground federal habeas relief.”
Coningford, 640 F.3d at 484 (citing Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996)) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court has “defined the category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental
fairness’ very narrowly.” Gomes v. Silva, 958 F.3d 12, 23 (2020). To amount to a constitutional
violation, “the state evidentiary error must so infuse the trial with inflammatory prejudice that it
renders a fair trial impossible.” Id. at 24.
Under this standard, courts in the First Circuit consider whether there is “any ‘clearly
established’ Supreme Court precedent” contrary to the evidentiary ruling below. Perkins v. Alves,
No. 1:21-CV-12037-ADB, 2023 WL 5200192, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2023) (quoting Gomes,
958 F.3d at 25). While Petitioner presents case law establishing the right to present relevant
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evidence, such as Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006), the relevance of that evidence
is still at the trial court’s discretion. [ECF No. 2 at 44, 46–48]; see, e.g. Chimeno v. Pion, 129 F.3d
1252 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Determinations concerning the admissibility as well as the exclusion of
evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court will reverse only if the
district court abused its discretion.”).
In reviewing this claim on appeal, the SJC considered each ground individually, noting the
deference given to trial courts and reiterating the lack of error. Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at 297–302.
Like the SJC, this Court finds no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its evidentiary rulings and
thus no due process violation to warrant habeas relief. Id. Where Petitioner has not otherwise
demonstrated the SJC’s determination was unreasonable or contrary to established federal law,
Petitioner’s fifth, eighth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth, and fifteenth grounds for habeas relief are
collectively DENIED.
C. Jury Instructions
In his fourth ground for relief, Petitioner argues his due process rights were violated when
the trial court judge told jurors that Barros was already tried for his role and provided the jury with
exhibits from that trial. [ECF No. 1 at 10]. In his second and sixth grounds for relief, Petitioner
argues that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on two issues: (1) first-degree murder
regarding liability construction in a “shootout,” and, (2) on the instruction of self-defense, where
the judge specified that self-defense was not at issue in this case. [ECF No. 1 at 7, 22]. “As a
general rule, improper jury instructions will not form the basis for federal habeas relief.” Hardy v.
Maloney, 909 F.3d 494, 499 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282, 290 (1st Cir.
1982)). State law typically governs jury instructions, and an “error under state law is not a basis
for habeas relief.” Id. (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71–72 (1991)).
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To succeed on a due process claim under Petitioner’s circumstances, he must show that the
error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Id. (citations
omitted). In its analysis, the SJC thoroughly considered each ground and held that there was no
error. Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at 302–04. This Court finds the SJC’s conclusion reasonable and not
contrary to the “general rule” established in federal law. See Hardy, 909 F.3d at 499 (“[I]mproper
jury instructions will not form the basis for federal habeas relief.”). Therefore, Petitioner’s second,
fourth, and sixth grounds for habeas relief are collectively DENIED.
D. Courtroom Security
In his eleventh ground for relief, Petitioner contends that the partial courtroom closure
during his trial violated his right to a public courtroom since the court required all spectators to
show identification and sign in. [ECF No. 1 at 24]. The SJC determined that the “security
conditions 	imposed 	were 	minimally 	invasive 	and 	were 	tailored 	to 	the 	issue 	of 	witness
intimidation.” Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at 304.
Federal precedent supports the SJC’s holding that “requiring public spectators to present
identification before entering the courtroom did not violate Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial.” Bucci v. U.S., 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24,
32–35 (1st Cir. 1998)). The SJC’s conclusion that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were not
violated is a reasonable determination of the facts, and not contrary to federal law warranting
habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As a result, Petitioner’s eleventh ground for habeas relief
is DENIED.
E. Improper Remarks by Prosecutor
In his ninth ground for relief, Petitioner alleges that during closing arguments, the
prosecutor’s argument was improper and thus violated his due process rights. [ECF No. 1 at 23].
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The criticized remarks were both a distance comparison of the jury’s placement to where the victim
was standing and a statement that Petitioner “opened fire on the man he had just insulted inside.”
Id. In reviewing the claim on appeal, the SJC held that while some of the prosecutor’s closing
remarks could be considered inflammatory, “they were limited, not repeated, and the judge
properly instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence.” Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at 311.
This Court agrees with SJC’s reasonable conclusion. Further, the few improper comments did not
rise to the requisite federal standard of “infect[ing] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.” Taylor v. Medeiros, 983 F.3d 566, 572 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). Accordingly, Petitioner’s ninth ground for
habeas relief is DENIED.
F. 	Consecutive Sentences
In his seventh ground for relief, Petitioner argues that his consecutive sentences violate his
due process rights and right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. [ECF No. 1 at 22].
Specifically, he contends that where the crimes flowed from one chain of events, his sentence for
first-degree murder should not be followed by “from and after” sentences on the other convictions.
Andrade, 174 N.E.3d at 305. Additionally, Petitioner contends that since the offenses of murder
and assault with intent to kill arose from the same fired bullet, the fact that he was convicted on
both violates his protections against double jeopardy. Id. In considering this argument on appeal,
the SJC reasoned that “two offenses . . . ‘are not the same within the meaning of the double
jeopardy clause merely because they stem from the same conduct.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth
v. Woods, 607 N.E.2d 1024, 1030 (Mass. 1993)). The SJC also specified that while five of
Petitioner’s offenses were related, they “consisted of distinct elements; no conviction was a lesser
included offense of any other.” Id.
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Federal law also follows this logic. In U.S. v. Talavera, the court held that since each count
clearly required proof of facts that the other did not, “[the] contention that consecutive sentences
imposed under the two different counts violated Double Jeopardy lack[ed] merit.” 668 F.2d 625,
632 (1st Cir. 1982). Accordingly, this Court finds the SJC’s reasoning sound where it determined
that since Petitioner’s convictions have separate elements, no double jeopardy or due process
violation occurred in the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. Therefore, Petitioner’s seventh
ground for habeas relief is DENIED.
G. Remaining Grounds for Relief
i. 	Unexhausted Claim.
In his sixteenth ground for relief, Petitioner argues that the state court violated his due
process rights by declining to act when he raised his motion for new trial. [ECF No. 1 at 26].
Petitioner did not technically present this alleged due process violation to the SJC. See Andrade,
174 N.E.3d. This claim was raised in response to the SJC’s 2021 decision and thus could not have
been presented before the State’s highest court.2 Id. “It is well-established that claims presented
for the first time in a habeas petition . . . are unexhausted.” Monteiro v. Massachusetts, 2024 WL
4008535, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2024). Because this claim is unexhausted, it cannot serve as the
basis for habeas relief. See Meas v. Demoura, 444 F.Supp.3d 291, 298 (D. Mass. 2020) (“A habeas
petitioner seeking relief pursuant to § 2254 must first exhaust all claims by presenting them to a
state court.”). Petitioner’s sixteenth ground for habeas relief is therefore, DENIED.
2 The Court notes that the SJC did address the issue of Andrade’s pending motion for a new trial
and the relevant claims raised in the motion as well as the trial court’s denial, in its final order.
The issue of whether the state court’s denial of the motion constitutes a due process violation
however is presented to this Court without prior consideration from the SJC.
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ii. 	Actual Innocence.
In his fourteenth ground for relief, Petitioner argues his actual innocence. [ECF No. 1 at
11]. Claims of actual innocence, even when based on newly discovered evidence, are not grounds
for habeas relief. See e.g. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416–17. Accordingly, Petitioner’s
fourteenth ground for habeas relief is DENIED.
iii. 	Cumulative Impact.
In his seventeenth ground, Petitioner demands relief based on the cumulative impact of
errors made in his case. [ECF No. 1 at 11]. Where Petitioner’s other grounds for relief were denied
and this Court found no error by the SJC, any cumulative impact argument is moot, and this claim
fails as well. See United States v. Acevedo, 882 F.3d 251 (1st Cir. 2018) (“Our review of the
individual alleged errors reveals that there were either no errors or . . . we found that any error on
the part of the District Court in admitting that evidence was harmless.”); Avila v. Clarke, 938
F.Supp.2d 151, 176 (D. Mass. 2013) (finding that where the SJC determined the trial judge “did
not commit the errors claimed, [the SJC had] no reason to consider the cumulative effect” and the
Petitioner failed to “state a claim for habeas relief on the ground of cumulative error.”).
Accordingly, Petitioner’s seventeenth ground for habeas relief is DENIED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [ECF No. 1], is
DENIED. The case is therefore DISMISSED.
V. 	CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The statute governing appeals of final orders in habeas corpus proceedings provides that
an 	appeal 	is 	not 	permitted 	“[u]nless 	a 	circuit 	justice 	or 	judge 	issues 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the
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applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make a “substantial showing,” a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable
jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To meet the
debatable-among-jurists-of-reason standard the petitioner must prove ‘something more than the
absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.’” United States v. Cintron, 281 F. Supp.
3d 241, 242 (D. Mass. 2017) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003)). In ruling
on an application for a COA, a district court must indicate which specific issues satisfy the
“substantial showing” standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3).
The Court denies the COA with respect to all grounds because the Petitioner cannot
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would debate whether the SJC’s application of Supreme Court
precedent or federal law was objectively unreasonable or was based on unreasonable factual
determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Moreover, Petitioner has not made a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the Court declines to
issue a COA.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 27, 2026
/s/ Margaret R. Guzman
Margaret R. Guzman
United States District Judge
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