Dowling v. The People of Department of State et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
ANGELA DAWN DOWLING,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE PEOPLE OF DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-30182-MGM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
March 9, 2026
MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Angela Dawn Dowling, who resides in Arizona and is representing herself, filed a complaint
naming as defendants the People of the Department of State, the People of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the People of the U.S. District Attorney Office, and the People of the State of
Massachusetts. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ I(B)). Dowling checked the box on the complaint to indicate
that the basis for federal court jurisdiction is federal question. (Id. at ¶ II). In response to the question
on the complaint requiring identification of the law at issue in this case, Dowling responded
“unknown.” (Id. at ¶ II(A)). There are 29 pages of exhibits with the complaint. (Dkt. No. 1-3). In
Dowling’s statement of claim, she writes “hater crime” and “take over entity unlawfully, terrorist,
terrorism unlawfully actions @ Aic collage (‘possible” police “collage + security possible intent to hurt
/hater crime.” (Id. at 3). For relief, Dowling writes: “Best of people of courts knowledge Best of courts
knowledge, Best DA knowledge urgent, urgent request of relief contact Defendants urgent,
immediately, immediately.” (Id.).
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Dowling has also filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or
Costs (docketed as a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis). (Dkt. No. 2.) By Electronic Order
dated December 11, 2025, the court denied Dowling’s motion to amend. (Dkt. No. 5).
For the reasons set forth below, the court will DENY the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and DISMISS this action.
II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Under the federal in forma pauperis statute, a court “may authorize the commencement . . . of
any suit . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses [showing] that the person is unable to pay
such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). One does not have to be “absolutely
destitute” to proceed in forma pauperis. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).
Rather, the litigant must show she cannot pay the filing fee “and still be able to provide [her]self and
dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a
right. See, e.g., Young v. Bowser, 843 Fed. App’x 341, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (per curiam); Daker v. Jackson,
942 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Bryant v. United States, 618 Fed. App’x 683, 685
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
In the Application, which was signed under penalty of perjury, Dowling represents that, in the
past year she has received income from self-employment. She does not indicate the amount she
received and what she expects to receive in the future, although the directions to the Application
require the litigant to provide this information. In addition, she does not indicate the amount of money
she has in a checking or savings account (or in cash). Questions five through eight ask about assets,
regular expenses, dependents, and debts; Dowling wrote “unknown” in response to each question. By
failing to clearly answer the questions on the Application, Dowling has failed to provide a complete
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statement of her ability to provide for herself. Without such information, the court cannot determine
whether Dowling can pay the filing fee and still be able to afford the necessities of life for herself and
any dependents. Because of this, the court will deny the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
III. REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
The federal courts possess certain “‘inherent powers,’ not conferred by rule or statute, ‘to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
630-31 (1962)). Those powers include the power to dismiss frivolous or malicious actions, regardless
of the status of the filing fee. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1989); Brockton
Sav. Bank. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11 n.5 (1st Cir. 1985). As used in this context,
“frivolous” does not refer to the subjective intent of a plaintiff. Axcella Building Realty Trust v. Thompson,
No. 23-40151-DHH, 2024 WL 474539, at n. 2 (D. Mass. Jan. 25, 2024). “Rather, in legal parlance, a
complaint is ‘frivolous’ if it ‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.’” Id. (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
In conducting this review, the court liberally construes Dowling’s complaint because she is
proceeding pro se. See Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
A. Analysis
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the complaint contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This statement must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). It must afford the defendants a “[‘]meaningful opportunity to
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mount a defense,’” Díaz-Rivera v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Rodríguez
v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1172 (1st Cir. 1995)).
Dowling’s complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a). The complaint states that the claim is
based in federal law, but Dowling has not identified any federal statute or provision of the Constitution
that provides a basis for her claim, or any other legal basis for relief.
Dowling has also been a frequent litigant in this district, filing unsuccessful lawsuits against
similarly named defendants. See e.g. Dowling v. The People of Dallas Police Department, et al., No. 25-12648-
MRD (dismissed Dec. 2, 2025); Dowling v. The People of the Court, 25-13262-JEK (dismissed Dec. 4,
2025). An on-line search of the federal Judiciary’s Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER) service reveals that Dowling has filed no less than seventy-nine (79) pro se civil actions
spanning nine federal courts. See https://pacer.uscourts.gov (last visited March 6, 2026). In 2024, the
District of Arizona entered an Order finding Dowling to be a vexatious litigant and enjoined her from
filing any new actions in that court without obtaining leave of the court by filing a motion for leave to
file with copies of the pleadings and including an affidavit certifying that the claim or claims presented
are new and have not been raised by Dowling in a federal court and that to the best of Dowling’s
knowledge, the claim or claims presented are neither factually nor legally frivolous and are not taken
in bad faith. Dowling v. Arizona Vehicle Theft Task Force, 2024 WL 4894734, *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 26, 2024).
In light of the nature of the claims asserted, the court finds that amendment would be futile.
Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that sua sponte
dismissal is appropriate only when it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending
the complaint would be futile).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is DENIED.
2. This action is DISMISSED pursuant to the court’s inherent authority.
It is So Ordered.
/s/ Mark G. Mastroianni _
MARK G. MASTROIANNI
United States District Judge
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