Saia v Boston Children's Hospital

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
THERESA SAIA,
Plaintiff,
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Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-11474-IT	v. 	*
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BOSTON CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL,
Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
October 14, 2026
TALWANI, D.J.
In this action, Plaintiff Theresa Saia (“Saia”) asserts claims against Defendant Boston
Children’s Hospital (“BCH”) for age discrimination, retaliation, and breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Compl. ¶¶ 58–72 [Doc. No. 1-1]. As a basis for these claims, Saia
alleges, inter alia, that BCH denied her conversion into a newly created job code because of her
age, id. ¶¶ 14–36, and then subjected her to “several instances of retaliation at the workplace”
after she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, id. ¶ 55.
In its pending Partial Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11], BCH seeks dismissal under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of Count IV, Saia’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Partial Mot. to Dismiss 1 [Doc. No. 11]. Upon review of the briefings, the court
finds that Count IV fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and the Partial
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11] is GRANTED.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court assumes “the truth
of all well-pleaded facts” and draws “all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Nisselson
v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain
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sufficient factual material to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although “[e]very contract in Massachusetts is subject, to some extent, to an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” this “implied covenant may not be invoked to create
rights and duties not otherwise provided for in the existing contractual relationship.” Ayash v.
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, 443 Mass. 367, 385, 822 N.E.2d 667, 683–84 (2005) (citation
modified). If a duty “does not already exist in the contract,” the implied covenant “cannot create
[it].” Dexter v. Dealogic, LLC, 390 F. Supp. 3d 233, 244 (D. Mass. 2019). Because this covenant
is implied so that a party can “receive the fruits of the contract,” Robert & Ardis James Found. v.
Meyers, 474 Mass. 181, 189, 48 N.E.3d 442, 450 (2016) (citation modified), Massachusetts
courts have only found breaches of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in limited
cases, such as where there is a violation of public policy for which there is not already a remedial
scheme, see Curran v. NSTAR Elec. Co., 833 F. Supp. 3d 15, 22 (D. Mass. 2026), and where
“employers would unjustly benefit financially by depriving the employees of future
compensation earned for past services,” Bergeson v. Franchi, 783 F. Supp. 713, 717 (D. Mass.
1992); see also Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Reg. Co., 373 Mass. 96, 105, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257
(1977).
Saia fails to state a plausible claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. She alleges unfair and discriminatory treatment but does not allege that her employment
agreement creates any duty for BCH to grant her a new job code or that BCH’s actions have
deprived her of the fruits of past service. See Compl. ¶ 71 [Doc. No. 1-1]; Ayash, 443 Mass. at
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385–86, 822 N.E.2d at 684 (“There is no general duty…to act ‘nicely.’ Accordingly, to the
extent that the plaintiff’s claim rests on allegations that [her employer] dealt with her in a manner
that was unfair…the plaintiff did not present a claim on which she could recover”). Nor does she
identify a violation of public policy that is not remedied by a statutory scheme. See Compl.
¶¶ 58–68 [Doc. No. 1-1] (seeking relief for discriminatory acts under federal and state law).
Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11] is thus GRANTED, and Count IV
of the Complaint [Doc. No. 1-1] is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
October 14, 2026 	/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
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