USA v. Lara-Martinez

United States 	District Court
District of Massachusetts
United States 	of America,
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v.
Aldrin Manuel 	Lara-Martinez,
Defendant .
Criminal Action No .
26-10050-NMG
MEMORANDUM 	& ORDER
GORTON, 	J.
Aldrin 	Manuel 	Lara-Martinez 	("Lara - Martinez " 	or
" defendant " ) 	moves 	to 	dismiss 	the 	crimina l 	charges 	against 	him,
alleging 	that 	the 	Speedy 	Trial 	Act 	("STA") 	was 	violated . 	He 	was
arrested 	in 	the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	in 	April , 	2024 	and 	is
charged 	with 	1) 	conspiracy 	to 	kill 	persons 	in 	a 	foreign 	country
in 	vio l ation 	of 	1 8 	U.S . C . 	§§ 	956(a) (1) 	and 	(a) (2) (A) , 	and 	(2)
conspiracy 	to 	murder 	a 	U. S . 	national 	in 	violation 	of 	18 	U. S . C .
§§ 	111 7 	and 	1119. 	Lara - Martinez 	has 	been 	in 	custody 	since 	his
arraignment 	in 	May 	of 	2024 .
On 	February 	24 , 	2026 	Judge 	Silvia 	L . 	Carreno - Coll 	a l lowed
defendant ' s 	motion 	to 	transfer 	the 	criminal 	proceedings 	from 	the
District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	t o 	the 	District 	of 	Massachusetts . 	The
government 	attests 	that 	the 	period 	from 	February 	12 , 	2026 	to
July 	30 , 	2026 	should 	be 	excluded. 	In 	response , 	Lara - Martinez
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contends 	that 	between 	February 	27, 	2026 	and 	July 	30, 	2026, 	more
than 	70 	non-excludable 	days 	elapsed 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	STA.
I . 	Background
A. Facts
In 	determining 	whether 	defendant's 	rights 	protected 	by 	the
STA 	have 	been 	violated, 	the 	Court 	will 	scrutinize 	the 	dockets 	of
both 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	case 	and 	this 	case. 	In 	April, 	2024, 	in 	the
District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	Lara-Martinez 	was 	indicted 	on 	charges
of 	conspiracy 	to 	commit 	murder 	in 	a 	foreign 	country 	in 	violation
of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§956(a) 	and 	possession 	of 	firearms 	in 	furtherance
of 	a 	crime 	of 	violence 	in 	violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§924(c). 	USA
v. 	Lara-Martinez, 	3:24-cr-00154-SCC 	(D.P.R.) 	("Puerto 	Rico
Docket"), 	Docket 	No. 	1 	at 	1-2. 	On 	May 	3, 	2024, 	he 	appeared 	for
an 	arraignment 	and 	release 	hearing 	in 	front 	of 	Judge 	Silvia 	L.
Carreno-Coll 	of 	the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico. 	Puerto 	Rico 	Docket
No. 	16. 	He 	was 	ordered 	detained 	pending 	trial 	and 	has 	remained
in 	custody 	since 	then.
On 	October 	9, 	2025, 	the 	government 	filed 	a 	second
superseding 	indictment 	charging 	Lara-Martinez 	with 	(1)
conspiracy 	to 	kill 	persons 	in 	a 	foreign 	country 	in 	violation 	of
18 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	956(a) (1) 	and 	(a) (2) (A), 	and 	(2) 	conspiracy 	to
murder 	a 	U.S. 	national 	in 	violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1117 	and
1119. 	Puerto 	Rico 	Docket 	No. 	114 	at 	7-9. 	On 	December 	11, 	2025,
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defendant 	filed 	a 	Motion 	Requesting 	an 	Order 	to 	Transfer 	the
criminal 	proceedings 	to 	the 	District 	of 	Massachusetts. 	Puerto
Rico 	Docket 	No. 	121. 	The 	government 	timely 	opposed 	that 	motion
on 	January 	21, 	2026, 	and 	defendant 	replied 	on 	February 	18, 	2026.
On 	February 	12, 	2026, 	Judge 	Carreno-Coll 	held 	a 	status
conference 	in 	Puerto 	Rico 	on 	the 	Motion 	to 	Transfer 	Venue 	and
ordered 	that
[the] 	STA 	is 	tolled 	in 	the 	interest 	of 	justice 	until 	the
next 	status 	conference. 	The 	Court 	finds 	that 	the
defendant's 	need 	to 	review 	discovery 	outweighs 	the
defendant's 	and 	the 	community's 	interest 	in 	a 	speedy 	trial,
and 	set 	the 	next 	status 	conference 	for 	March 	26, 	2026. 	On
February 	24, 	2026 	Judge 	Carreno-Coll 	allowed 	the 	Motion 	to
Transfer 	Venue 	and 	the 	case 	was 	docketed 	in 	this 	Court 	on
February 	27, 	2026. 	USA 	v. 	Lara-Martinez, 	1:26-cr-10050-NMG 	(D.
Mass.) 	("D. 	Mass. 	Docket"), 	Docket 	No. 	1. 	The 	government 	filed
a 	Motion 	to 	Reconsider 	the 	venue 	transfer 	with 	the 	Puerto 	Rico
court 	on 	March 	24, 	2026, 	which 	was 	denied 	on 	March 	31, 	2026.
Puerto 	Rico 	Docket 	No. 	143. 	Lara-Martinez 	was 	ordered
transferred 	to 	this 	jurisdiction 	on 	February 	26, 	2026, 	but 	he
did 	not 	arrive 	here 	until 	May 	13, 	2026.
On 	June 	25, 	2026, 	newly-appointed 	counsel 	for 	defendant
filed 	a 	Motion 	to 	Reconsider 	his 	Detention 	order 	and 	to 	set
conditions 	of 	release, 	and 	on 	July 	20, 	2026, 	Magistrate 	Judge
Hedges 	held 	a 	hearing 	on 	that 	motion. 	D. 	Mass. 	Docket 	Nos. 	9,
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18. 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Hedges 	convened 	the 	next 	status 	conference
on 	July 	30, 	2026. 	D. 	Mass. 	Docket 	No. 	25. 	At 	that 	status
conference, 	defendant 	objected 	to 	the 	order 	of 	excludable 	delay
and 	to 	any 	continued 	tolling 	of 	the 	STA, 	claiming 	that 	the
tolling 	ordered 	by 	Judge 	Carreno-Coll 	in 	February 	2026 	was 	no
longer 	applicable. 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Hedges 	subsequently
directed 	the 	government 	to 	file 	an 	order 	to 	exclude 	time 	and, 	in
the 	interest 	of 	justice, 	granted 	the 	government's 	request 	to
exclude 	time 	between 	July 	30, 	2026 	and 	the 	next 	status
conference, 	September 	29, 	2026.
The 	government 	filed 	the 	pending 	Motion 	for 	Excludable
Delay 	in August, 	2026 	to 	exclude 	time 	from 	February 	12, 	2026,
(the 	date 	Judge 	Carreno-Coll 	ordered 	the 	STA 	tolled 	"until 	the
next 	status 	conference"), 	until 	the 	date 	defendant's 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration 	was 	to 	be 	decided, 	which 	turned 	out 	to 	be
September 	9, 	2026. 	D. 	Mass. 	Docket 	No. 	39. 	The 	government
contends 	that 	Judge 	Carreno-Coll's 	order 	to 	toll 	the 	STA 	"until
the 	next 	status 	conference" 	was 	an 	open-ended 	continuance
intended 	to 	expire 	when 	the 	status 	conference 	was 	actually 	held,
not 	the 	initially 	scheduled 	date 	of 	March 	26, 	2026. 	That 	status
conference 	did 	not 	take 	place 	because 	defendant's 	motion 	to
transfer 	venue 	was 	granted 	before 	it 	occurred.
Lara-Martinez 	asserts 	that 	when 	Judge 	Carreno-Coll 	set 	the
next 	status 	conference 	for 	March 	26, 	2026, 	he 	meant 	that 	the 	STA
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was 	tolled 	only 	until 	March 	26, 	2026. 	He 	further 	contends 	that
between 	February 	27, 	2026 	and 	July 	30, 	2026, 	there 	are 	153 	total
days, 	more 	than 	70 	of 	which 	are 	non-excludable.
On 	March 	31, 	2026 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	court 	denied 	the
government's 	Motion 	to 	Reconsider 	the 	Order 	to 	Transfer 	Venue
and 	on 	May 	5, 	2026, 	this 	Court 	denied 	as 	moot 	the 	government's
Motion 	to 	Remand 	(Limited) 	back 	to 	Puerto 	Rico. 	Defendant 	avers
that, 	although 	this 	Court 	did 	not 	rule 	on 	the 	Motion 	to 	Remand
until 	May 	5, 	it 	became 	moot 	on 	the 	same 	day 	that 	the 	Motion 	to
Reconsider 	was 	decided 	in 	Puerto 	Rico, 	March 	31, 	2026, 	so 	that
no 	time 	should 	be 	excluded 	after 	March 	31, 	2026. 	Defendant
argues 	that 	there 	are 	102 	non-excludable 	days 	between 	the 	date
after 	which 	the 	Motion 	to 	Transfer 	was 	decided 	in 	Puerto 	Rico,
February 	27, 	2026, 	and 	July 	30, 	2026, 	the 	date 	of 	the 	status
conference 	in 	this 	District, 	which 	constitutes 	a 	violation 	of
the 	STA. 	Defendant's 	claim 	is 	based 	strictly 	upon 	the 	STA 	and
not 	upon 	his 	Sixth Amendment 	right 	to 	a 	speedy 	trial.
B. Procedural 	History
The 	government 	filed 	the 	pending 	Motion 	for 	Excludable
Delay 	in 	which 	it 	seeks 	to 	exclude 	all 	time 	between 	February 	12,
2026 	and 	August 	13, 	2026, 	the 	date 	of 	the 	decision 	on 	the
defendant's 	motion 	to 	reconsider 	his 	detention 	order 	under 	the
Speedy 	Trial 	Act 	("Motion 	for 	Excludable 	Delay"). 	Defendant
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then 	filed 	his 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	for 	Speedy 	Trial 	Act 	Violation
on 	September 	4, 	2026. 	Following 	the 	allowance 	of 	an 	extension,
the 	government 	timely 	opposed 	that 	motion 	on 	September 	25, 	2026.
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	herein, 	the 	Court 	will 	deny 	the
defendant's 	motion 	and 	allow 	the 	government's 	motion.
II. 	Motion
A. Legal 	Standard
The 	STA, 	which 	implements 	the 	right 	to 	a 	speedy 	trial 	under
the 	Sixth Amendment, 	requires 	that 	the 	government 	bring 	a
defendant 	to 	trial 	no 	more 	than 	70 	days 	after 	the 	defendant's
indictment 	or 	initial 	appearance 	in 	the 	charging 	court,
whichever 	is 	later. 	18 	U.S.C. 	§3161(c) (1). 	The 	STA 	sets 	forth
several 	excludable 	periods 	of 	delay, 	either 	automatic 	or
permissive, 	to 	accommodate 	the 	adversarial 	system. 	United
States 	v. 	Scott, 	180 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	88, 	91 	(D. 	Mass. 	2015 ); 	United
States 	v. 	Mahoney, 	No. 	CR.A. 	07-40013-FDS, 	2008 	WL 	2312478, 	at
*2 	(D. 	Mass. 	June 	2, 	2008). 	Under 	the 	STA, 	and 	relevant 	to 	the
present 	motion, 	the 	following 	periods 	will 	be 	automatically
excluded:
D) 	delay 	resulting 	from 	any 	pretrial 	motion, 	from 	the
filing 	of 	the 	motion 	through 	the 	conclusion 	of 	the 	hearing
on, 	or 	other 	prompt 	disposition 	of, 	such 	motion.
§3161 (h) (1) (D).
H) 	delay 	reasonably 	attributable 	to 	any 	period, 	not 	to
exceed 	thirty 	days, 	during 	which 	any 	proceeding 	concerning
the 	defendant 	is 	actually 	under 	advisement 	by 	the 	court.
§3161 (h) (1) (H).
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Read 	in 	conjunction , 	when 	a 	pretrial 	motion 	does 	not 	require 	a
hearing , 	the 	court 	shall 	exclude 	time 	from 	the 	date 	on 	which 	the
motion 	is 	filed 	until 	the 	date 	on 	which 	the 	court 	receives 	all
" reasonably 	expected papers , " 	plus 	no 	more 	than 	30 	days 	during
which 	time 	the 	motion 	is 	"under 	advisement" . 	United 	States 	v .
Rodriguez , 	63 	F.3d 	1159, 	1163 	(1st 	Cir. 	1995) ; 	Henderson 	v .
United 	States , 	476 	U. S . 	321 , 	329 , 	331 	(1986); 	United 	States 	v .
Martinez , 	No. 	CR 	14 - 327, 	2015 	WL 	10767368 , 	at 	*3 	(D . P.R. 	Dec.
28, 	2015) . 	The 	exclusion 	period 	includes 	the 	date 	of 	the 	filing
and 	the 	date 	the 	court 	makes 	its 	ruling. 	It 	is 	intended 	to
account 	for 	the 	time 	it 	takes 	for 	parties 	to 	file 	their 	briefs
and 	for 	a 	court 	to 	dispose 	of 	a 	motion . 	Henderson , 	476 	U. S . 	at
331.
Al so 	relevant 	to 	the 	present 	motion , 	a 	period 	of 	delay may
be 	excluded
if 	the 	judge 	granted 	such 	continuance 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	his
findings 	that 	the 	ends 	of 	justice 	served 	by 	taking 	such
action 	outweigh 	the 	best 	interest 	of 	the 	public 	and 	the
defendant 	in 	a 	speedy 	trial .
18 	U. S . C. 	§3161 (h) (7) (A); 	United 	States 	v . 	Huete - Sandoval , 	668
F.3d 	1 , 	3 	(1st 	Cir. 	2011) . 	This 	is 	known 	as 	an 	ends-of-justice
continuance 	and 	the 	Judge's 	findings 	must 	be 	on 	the 	record
before 	the 	district 	court 	decides 	the 	defendant ' s 	motion 	to
dismiss. 	Zedner 	v . 	United 	States, 	547 	U.S . 	489, 	507 	(2006). 	In
evaluating 	an 	ends-of - justice 	continuance, 	courts 	will 	consider
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its 	reasonableness. 	United 	States 	v. 	Barnes, 	251 	F.3d 	251, 	256
(1st 	Cir. 	2001) 	(finding 	that 	"reasonableness 	serves 	as 	the
touchstone 	of 	an 	ends 	of 	justice 	analysis").
In 	the 	District 	of 	Massachusetts, 	the 	local 	rules 	account
for 	excluding 	the 	period 	between 	arraignment 	and 	the 	initial
status 	conference. 	L.R., 	D. 	Mass. 	112.2(a) (1). 	When 	granting
an 	excludable 	delay 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	the 	ends-of-justice, 	courts
should 	identify 	the 	date 	on 	which 	the 	continuance 	will 	end.
Open-ended 	continuances, 	for 	example 	ordering 	that 	the 	STA will
toll 	"until 	the 	next 	status 	conference", 	are 	not, 	however,
"prohibited 	per 	se" 	and 	can 	be 	found 	to 	be 	reasonable. 	United
States 	v. 	Santiago-Becerril, 	130 	F.3d 	11 	(1st 	Cir. 	1997); 	United
States 	v. 	Parga-Rivas, 	689 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	25, 	27 	n.1 	(D.D.C. 	2009);
United 	States 	v. 	Mahoney, 	No. 	CR.A. 	07-40013-FDS, 	2008 	WL
2312478, 	at 	*3 	(D. 	Mass. 	June 	2, 	2008) (finding 	that 	the 	STA was
not 	violated 	because 	both 	parties 	agreed 	to 	an 	open-ended
continuance 	due 	to 	complex 	discovery).
Courts 	are 	unwilling 	to 	find 	that 	the 	STA was 	violated 	when
the 	delay 	was 	caused 	by 	or 	benefited 	the 	defendant. 	United
States 	v. 	Scantleberry-Frank, 	158 	F.3d 	612, 	616 	(1st 	Cir. 	1998);
United 	States 	v. 	Agosto-Pacheco, 	432 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	13, 	24 	(D.P.R.
2019) 	(emphasizing 	that 	"[t]he 	STA 	is 	a 	shield 	against 	prolonged
prosecutions, 	not 	a 	sword 	against 	justified 	and 	self-inflicted
delay"). 	Particularly, 	defendants 	cannot 	"sandbag" 	the 	district
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court 	into 	granting 	a 	continuance 	and 	then 	claim 	their 	STA
rights 	have 	been 	violated. 	Scantleberry-Frank, 	158 	F . 3d 	at 	616
(find i ng 	that 	the 	continuance 	granted 	at 	the 	bequest 	of 	defense
counsel 	must 	be 	excluded 	from 	STA 	consideration) .
The 	burden, 	however , 	is 	on 	the 	court 	and 	government, 	not
the 	defendant, 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	STA. 	United 	States 	v .
Winston , 	492 	F . 	Supp. 	2d 	15 , 	19 	(D . 	Mass. 	2007); 	United 	States
v . 	Barnes , 	159 	F.3d 	4 	(1st 	Cir. 	1998) 	(finding 	defendant ' s
failure 	to 	object 	to 	the 	continuance 	of 	trial 	did 	not 	excuse 	the
court ' s 	failure 	to 	make 	explicit 	findings 	for 	the 	ends - of -
justice 	continuance 	thereby 	violating 	the 	STA). 	By 	not 	raising
the 	STA violation 	prior 	to 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	a 	defendant 	does
not 	waive 	his 	rights 	under 	the 	STA. 	Barnes , 	159 	F.3d 	at 	14.
If 	the 	court 	finds 	that 	the 	defendant 	was 	not 	brought 	to
trial 	within 	70 	non-excludable 	days, 	the 	defendant 	can 	move 	to
dismiss 	the 	indictment 	and 	the 	court 	must 	dismiss 	the 	case,
either 	with 	or 	without 	prejudice 	while 	considering :
the 	seriousness 	of 	the 	offense; 	the 	facts 	and 	circumstances
of 	the 	case 	which 	led 	to 	the 	dismissal; 	and 	the 	impact 	of 	a
re - prosecution 	on 	the 	administration 	of 	[the 	Act] 	and 	on
the 	administration 	of 	justice.
Zedner 	v. 	United 	States, 	547 	U.S. 	489, 	499 	(2006). 	In 	the 	First
Circuit , 	courts 	shall 	also 	consider 	a 	fourth 	factor, 	that 	is
whether 	the 	delay 	prejudiced 	the 	defendant . 	United 	States 	v.
Franklin , 	630 	F.3d 	53, 	58 	(1st 	Cir. 	2011) . 	Dismissing 	with
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prejudice 	is, 	however, 	"a 	last 	and 	rare 	resort." 	Id. 	( quoting
United 	States 	v. 	Dessesaure, 	556 	F.3d 	83, 	85 	(1st 	Cir.2009).
Here, 	Defendant 	did 	not 	move 	for 	dismissal 	with 	prejudice, 	so
the 	Court 	need 	not 	consider 	the 	relevant 	factors.
B. Application
At 	issue 	is 	whether 	70 	non-excludable 	days 	elapsed 	between
February 	12, 	2026 	and 	July 	30, 	2026. 	There 	is 	no 	dispute 	that
the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	is 	the 	"charging 	court" 	and 	the 	STA
clock 	began 	when 	defendant 	appeared 	in 	that 	district. 	The 	Court
will 	first 	make 	its 	own 	determination 	as 	to 	which 	days 	are
excludable 	under 	§3161(h) 	and 	then 	address 	the 	issue 	of 	whether
Judge 	Carreno-Coll's 	order 	tolling 	the 	STA was 	an 	open-ended,
ends-of-justice 	continuance. 	Under 	both 	approaches, 	the 	Court
finds 	that 	the 	STA was 	not 	violated.
i. 	STA Excludable Delay Calculation
The 	Court 	finds, 	based 	on 	its 	own 	calculation, 	that 	there
are 	65 	non-excludable 	days 	between 	February 	27, 	20 2 6, 	the 	date
after 	which 	the 	Motion 	to 	Transfer 	was 	decided 	in 	the 	District
of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	and 	July 	30, 	2026, 	the 	date 	of 	the 	status
conference 	in 	the 	District 	of 	Massachusetts.
Dates 	in 	2026 	/ 	Events 	Number 	of Excludable Days
February 	27 	- 	July 	29 	153 	total 	days
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March 	24 	- 	March 	31
Defendant's 	Motion 	to
Reconsider 	pending 	in 	D.P.R
April 	1 	- 	May 	5
Government's 	Motion 	to 	Remand
pending 	in 	D.MA.
Transportation 	of 	defendant
from 	P.R. 	to 	MA.
June 	25 	- 	July 	29
Defendant's 	Motion 	to
Reconsider 	Detention 	pending
in 	D.MA.
- 	8 	days
- 	35 	days
- 	10 	days
- 	35 	days
= 	65 	non-excludable 	days
Defendant 	objects 	to 	the 	35-day 	exclusion 	while 	the 	Motion
to 	Remand 	was 	pending 	in 	the 	District 	of 	Massachusetts. 	He
contends 	that, 	although 	the 	Motion 	to 	Remand 	was 	pending 	in 	this
Court 	until 	May 	5, 	2026, 	time 	should 	not 	be 	excluded 	following
the 	disposition 	of 	the 	Motion 	to 	Reconsider 	in 	the 	District 	of
Puerto 	Rico 	on 	March 	31, 	2026 	because 	the 	Motion 	to 	Remand
became 	moot 	on 	that 	day. 	Defendant 	fails 	to 	acknowledge,
however, 	that 	the 	Motion 	to 	Reconsider 	was 	decided 	in 	a
different 	district 	and 	recorded 	on 	a 	different 	docket 	by 	a
different 	Judge. 	There 	is 	no 	evidence 	that 	the 	Judge 	in 	this
District 	was 	informed 	of or 	had 	reason 	to 	know 	about 	the
decision 	in 	the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico. 	It 	is 	reasonable 	to
apply 	the 	period 	of 	exclusion 	for 	pretrial 	motions 	under 	the 	STA
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to 	the 	Motion 	to 	Remand 	filed 	in 	this 	District. 	§3161 (h) (1) (D).
Therefore, 	this 	District 	had 	30 	days 	from 	the 	date 	on 	which 	it
had 	all 	reasonably 	expected 	papers 	to 	decide 	the 	Motion 	to
Remand 	before 	the 	elapsing 	of 	any 	non-excludable 	days.
§3161 (h) (1) (H).
This 	Court 	was 	not 	dilatory 	in 	deciding 	the 	government's
Motion 	to 	Remand 	on 	or 	before 	May 	5, 	2026, 	and 	thus 	finds
excludable 	the 	period 	of 	time 	between 	March 	25, 	2026, 	the 	date
on 	which 	the 	Motion 	to 	Remand 	was 	filed 	and May 	5, 	2026, 	the
date 	on 	which 	it 	was 	denied 	as 	moot. 	As 	a 	result, 	65 	non-
excludable 	days 	have 	elapsed 	during 	the 	relevant 	period.
ii. 	Open-ended Continuance
The 	Court 	also 	concludes 	that 	the 	order 	of 	Judge 	Carreno-
Coll, 	tolling 	time 	at 	the 	February 	12, 	2026 	status 	conference,
was 	an 	open-ended 	continuance 	such 	that 	the 	STA 	has 	not 	been
violated. 	At 	that 	hearing, 	Judge 	Carreno-Coll 	ordered 	that
[the] 	STA 	is 	tolled 	in 	the 	interest 	of 	justice 	until 	the
next 	status 	conference.
Puerto 	Rico 	Docket 	No. 	134. 	At 	that 	same 	hearing, 	the 	Puerto
Rico 	court 	scheduled 	the 	next 	status 	conference 	for 	March 	26,
2026. 	In 	his 	order 	Judge 	Carreno-Coll 	did 	not, 	however, 	require
that 	the 	STA be 	tolled 	until 	March 	26, 	2026; 	he 	merely 	ordered
the 	STA be 	tolled 	"until 	the 	next 	status 	conference." 	The 	March
26, 	2026 	status 	conference 	in 	the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	never
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took 	place 	because 	the 	case 	had 	already 	been 	transferred 	to 	the
District 	of 	Massachusetts. 	The 	next 	status 	conference 	was 	held
in 	this 	District 	on 	July 	30, 	2026.
Notably, 	the 	reason 	for 	the 	delay 	in 	convening 	the 	status
conference 	was 	that 	the 	defendant 	moved 	to 	transfer 	venue 	to
this 	District, 	which 	the 	government 	opposed. 	The 	permitted
transfer, 	which 	benefited 	the 	defendant, 	unsurprisingly 	resulted
in 	a 	delay 	in 	excess 	of 	the 	10 	excludable 	days 	under 	18 	U.S.C.
§3161 (h) (1) (E), 	and 	defendant 	now 	asserts 	that 	his 	rights 	under
the 	STA 	have 	been 	violated. 	Defendant 	did 	not, 	however, 	arrive
in 	Massachusetts 	until 	May 	13, 	2026, 	and 	new 	counsel 	were
appointed 	for 	him 	on 	that 	date. 	While 	it 	was 	not 	his 	burden 	to
raise 	the 	STA 	issue, 	defendant 	did 	not 	request 	a 	status
conference 	or 	any 	other 	accommodation 	before 	registering 	his
objection 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	STA 	at 	the 	status 	conference
before 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	on 	July 	30, 	2026. 	Moreover, 	the
delay 	cannot 	be 	attributed 	to 	the 	government's 	intentional
noncompliance, 	negligence 	or 	even 	unreasonableness. 	Santiago-
Becerril, 	130 	F.3d 	at 	18, 	22; 	United 	States 	v. 	Apicelli, 	839
F.3d 	75, 	83 	(1st 	Cir. 	2016) 	(finding 	that 	delay 	with 	prejudice
may 	be 	warranted 	when 	the 	government 	intentionally does 	not
comply 	with 	the 	STA).
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iii. 	Alternative 	Calculation of Excludable 	Time
Although 	not 	dispositive, 	the 	government 	cited 	to 	the 	Court
at 	oral 	argument 	the 	United 	States 	District 	Court 	of
Massachusetts 	Plan 	for 	Prompt 	Disposition 	of 	Criminal 	Cases
("The 	Plan"), 	adopted 	in 	2009. 	Section 	5 (b) (1) (E) (iii) 	of 	that
Plan 	states
If 	on motion 	of 	a 	defendant 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	21 	of 	Federal
Rules 	of 	Criminal 	Procedure 	a 	case 	is 	ordered 	transferred
to 	this 	district 	an 	excludable 	period 	shall 	commence 	on 	the
date 	of 	the 	first 	day 	of 	the 	hearing 	on 	that 	motion 	in 	that
other 	district 	and 	shall 	conclude 	on 	the 	date 	on 	which 	the
defendant 	first 	arrives 	in 	this 	district 	in 	custody 	or 	the
date 	on 	which 	the 	clerk 	receives 	the 	papers 	in 	the 	case,
whichever 	is 	later.
Pub. 	Notice 	Regarding 	Modifications 	to 	the 	Plan 	for 	Prompt
Disposition 	of 	Crim. 	Cases, 	U.S. 	Dist. 	Ct. 	for 	the 	Dist. 	of
Mass., 	§5 (b) (1) (E) (iii) 	(2009). 	The 	government 	contends 	that
the 	alternative 	period 	of 	excludable 	delay 	should 	therefore 	run
from 	December 	11, 	2025, 	the 	date 	on 	which 	defendant's 	Motion 	to
Transfer 	was 	filed 	in 	Puerto 	Rico, 	to 	May 	13, 	2026, 	the 	date 	on
which 	defendant 	was 	physically 	transferred 	into 	the 	District 	of
Massachusetts.
Even 	though 	this 	alternative 	calculation 	of 	excludable 	time
is 	not 	prescribed 	by 	the 	STA, 	it 	lends 	credence 	to 	the 	Court's
conclusion 	that 	it 	is 	reasonable 	to 	exclude 	the 	time 	it 	took 	for
the 	Court 	to 	appoint 	new 	counsel 	for 	defendant 	and 	for 	that
counsel 	to 	get 	up 	to 	speed 	on 	the 	case 	during 	the 	pendency 	of
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the 	government's 	Motion 	to 	Remand. 	If 	such 	time 	is 	excluded
under 	this 	alternative 	calculation, 	the 	elapsed, 	non-excludable
time 	does 	not 	exceed 	70 	days.
The 	government 	argues, 	and 	this 	Court 	agrees, 	that 	Judge
Carreno-Coll's 	order 	in 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	case 	to 	toll 	the 	STA
"until 	the 	next 	status 	conference" 	is 	an 	open-ended 	continuance
that 	serves 	the 	end 	of 	justice 	and, 	more 	particularly, 	resulted
in 	a 	delay 	for 	the 	benefit 	of 	the 	defendant 	who 	had moved 	to
transfer 	venue 	of 	the 	case 	over 	the 	government's 	objection.
Further 	delay 	resulting 	from 	that 	transfer 	was 	inevitable 	and
necessary 	for 	newly-appointed 	counsel 	to 	become 	familiar 	with
the 	case 	and 	is 	considered 	excludable 	time 	in 	the 	Plan 	for 	the
District 	of 	Massachusetts. 	Excluding 	appropriately 	designated
periods 	between 	February 	27, 	2026 	to 	July 	30, 	2026 	is 	reasonable
given 	the 	transfer 	of 	the 	case 	to 	this 	District 	at 	the 	request
of 	the 	defendant. 	Moreover, 	even 	if 	the 	Court 	did 	not 	consider
the 	continuance 	to 	be 	open-ended, 	by 	its 	calculation 	only 	65
non-excludable 	days 	have 	elapsed 	during 	the 	relevant 	period.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	STA 	has 	not 	been 	violated.
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li
III . 	Order
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	defendant's 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss
for 	Speedy 	Trial 	Act 	Violation 	[Docket 	No . 	36] 	is 	DENIED 	and 	the
government ' s 	Motion 	for 	Excludable 	Delay 	[Docket 	No. 	29] 	is
ALLOWED .
So 	ordered .
Senior 	United 	States 	District 	Judge
Dated : 	October /5" , 	2026
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