Luna Banegas v. McDonald et al

1:25-cv-13161Mad21 nov 2025

Testo completo

United 	States 	District Court
District 	of Massachusetts
Luis 	Humberto 	Luna 	Banegas ,
Petitioner ,
v .
Joseph D . 	McDonald, 	Jr . , 	et 	al . ,
Respondents .
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Civil 	Action No.
25-13161-NMG
MEMORANDUM 	& ORDER
GORTON, 	J.
I n 	his 	petition 	for 	writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	(Docket 	No . 	1)
petitioner 	Luis 	Humberto 	Luna 	Banegas 	(" petitioner " 	or
" Banegas " ) 	contends 	that 	Joseph 	D. 	McDonald , 	Jr . 	and 	other 	named
respondents 	(" respondents " ) 	have 	violated 	his 	s tatuto r y 	and 	due
process 	rights 	by 	refusing 	to 	gra n t 	h im 	a 	bond 	h earing .
Respondent 	asserts 	that 	petitioner 	is 	detained 	pursuant 	to 	8
U. S . C . 	§1225(b) (1) 	(" §1225(b) " ) , 	while 	petitioner 	insists 	t h a t
he 	is 	elig i ble 	for 	such 	a 	hearing 	under 	8 	U. S . C . 	§1226 (a )
(" §1226 (a ) " ) 	For 	the 	reasons 	that 	f o l low , 	the 	pe t it io n 	will 	b e
denied.
I . 	Background
On 	August 	18 , 	2024 , 	petitioner 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	by
crossing 	the 	southern 	border 	at 	an 	unauthorized 	location . 	Later
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that 	same 	day , 	Uni t ed 	States 	Customs 	and 	Border 	Patrol 	("CBP " )
agents 	encountered 	petitioner 	near 	Rio 	Grande 	City , 	Texas , 	along
the 	southern 	border . 	CBP 	arrested 	and 	detained 	petitioner
pursuant 	to 	§1225(b) (1) 	and 	issued 	to 	him 	a 	Notice 	and 	Order 	of
Expedited 	Removal . 	Several 	days 	later , 	while 	being 	processed
for 	Expedited 	Removal , 	petitioner 	expressed 	a 	fear 	of
persecution 	or 	torture 	if 	he 	were 	to 	be 	returned 	to 	Honduras .
Thereafter , 	United 	States 	Citizenship 	and 	Immigration
Services 	(" USCIS " ) 	found 	that 	petitioner 	had 	presented 	a
credible 	fear 	of 	persecution 	or 	torture 	and 	issued 	to 	him 	a
Notice 	to 	Appear , 	which 	informed 	him 	that 	he 	was 	inadmissible
under 	8 	U. S . C . 	§1182 . 	On 	September 	11 , 	2024 , 	petitioner 	was
released 	from 	custody 	on 	humanitarian 	parole 	under 	8 	U. S . C .
§1182(d) (5) 	but 	remained 	subject 	to 	monitoring 	as 	an 	alternative
to 	detention . 	On 	September 	23 , 	2024 , 	users 	filed 	the 	Notice 	to
Appear 	in 	immigration 	court 	which 	automatically 	vacated 	the
Notice 	and 	Order 	of 	Expedited 	Removal 	and 	placed 	petitioner 	into
full 	removal 	proceedings 	under 	8 	U. S.C . 	§1229(a) .
Petitioner 	violated 	his 	monitoring 	conditions 	on 	at 	least
ten 	different 	occa si ons 	over 	the 	course 	of 	the 	next 	year . 	On
October 	15 , 	2025 , 	during 	a 	scheduled 	check - in 	at 	the 	Immigration
and 	Customs 	Enforcement 	(" ICE " ) 	office 	in 	Burlington ,
Massachus ett s , 	agents 	terminated 	petitioner ' s 	parole 	due 	to 	his
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repeated 	monitoring 	violations 	and 	then 	re - detained 	him 	pursuant
to 	§1225 (b) (1).
II. 	Jurisdiction
The 	government 	argues 	that 	this 	Court 	does 	not 	have
jurisdiction 	because , 	in 	his 	petition , 	petitioner 	does 	not 	name
his 	immediate 	custodian . 	He 	names 	Joseph 	D. 	McDonald , 	Jr ., 	the
Sheriff 	of 	Plymouth 	County 	and 	Facility 	Head 	of 	the 	Plymouth
County 	Correctional 	Center 	but 	not 	Antone 	Moniz , 	the
Superintendent 	of 	the 	Plymouth 	County 	Correctional 	Center , 	where
he 	is 	currently 	incarcerated .
In 	habeas 	cases , 	the 	immediate 	custodian 	and 	pr oper
respondent 	is 	the 	individual 	with 	"day - to - day " 	control 	over 	the
impriso ned 	individual . 	Vasquez 	v . 	Reno , 	233 	F . 3d 	688 , 	691 , 	696
( 1st 	Cir . 	2000). 	The 	so - called 	immediate 	custodian 	rule
prevents 	petitioner 	from 	naming 	the 	Attorney 	General 	or 	some
other 	remote 	supervisory 	official 	and 	from 	filing 	his 	petition
outside 	the 	district 	of 	confinement . 	Rumsfeld 	v . 	Padilla , 	542
U. S . 	426 , 	430 	(2004) . 	This 	rule 	serves 	the 	important 	purpose 	of
preventing 	forum 	shopping 	by 	habeas 	petitioners . 	Id .
For 	the 	purpose 	of 	determining 	jurisdiction 	in 	this 	case ,
it 	appears 	that 	the 	naming 	of 	Sheriff 	McDonald 	does 	satisfy 	the
immediate 	custodian 	rule 	because 	(1) 	other 	courts 	have 	found
Sheriff 	McDonald 	to 	be 	the 	actual 	custodian 	of 	the 	Plymouth
County 	Correctional 	Facility , 	see 	Anim 	v . 	McDonald , 	No. 	11-
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10017 - JLT , 	201 1 	U. S . 	Dist . 	L EXIS 	2 158 , 	a t 	*1 - 2 	(D . 	Mass . 	Jan .
10 , 	2011) 	and 	the 	government 	has 	not 	challenged 	jurisdiction 	in
those 	cases 	in 	which 	he 	has 	been 	the 	named 	respondent ; 	(2)
Sheriff 	McDo na ld 	does 	have 	day - to - day 	control 	over 	the 	facility
based 	on 	the 	description 	on 	its 	webs it e , 	and 	(3) 	petitioner 	does
not 	appear 	to 	this 	Court 	to 	be 	forum 	shopping .
Thus , 	the 	Court 	concludes 	it 	has 	jurisdiction 	in 	this 	case
and 	will 	proceed 	to 	the 	merits 	of 	t he 	petition .
III. 	Legal 	Standard
Section 	1225 	applies 	to 	" applicants 	for 	admission ," 	who 	are
defined 	as 	noncitizens 	" present 	in 	the 	United 	States 	who 	[have]
not 	been 	admitted ." 	§1225 (a) (1) . 	Section 	1 225 (b) (1) 	" applies 	to
aliens 	initially 	determined 	to 	be 	inadmissible 	due 	to 	fraud ,
misrepresentation , 	or 	lack 	of 	valid 	documentation ." 	Jennings 	v .
Rodriguez , 	583 	U. S . 	281 , 	287 	(20 18 ) 	(quoting 	§ 1 225(b) (1)) .
Individuals 	sub ject 	to 	§1225(b) (1) 	are 	normally 	placed 	into
Expedited 	Removal , 	without 	further 	hearing 	or 	review , 	but 	those
who 	indicate 	an 	intention 	to 	apply 	for 	asylum 	or 	express 	a 	fear
of 	persecution 	are 	referred 	for 	an 	asylum 	interview . 	If 	the
interviewer 	finds 	a 	credible 	fear 	of 	persecution , 	the 	alien 	is
detained 	for 	further 	consideration 	of 	that 	app li cation .
§1225 (b) (1) (B) (ii) .
An 	alien 	detained 	under 	§ 1 225(b) 	may 	be 	released 	only 	if 	he
is 	paroled 	for 	significant 	public 	benefit 	or 	urg ent 	humanitar ian
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reasons 	under 	§1182(d) (5) (A) . 	Such 	parole 	is 	not 	regarded 	as 	an
admission 	of 	the 	alien 	and 	may 	be 	terminated
upon 	accomplishment 	of 	the 	purpose 	for 	which 	parole 	was
authorized 	or 	when 	in 	the 	opinion 	of 	one 	of 	[certain
specified 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security] 	officials 	. .. ,
neither 	humanitarian 	reasons 	nor 	public 	benefit 	warrants
the 	continued 	presence 	of 	the 	[noncitizen] 	in 	the 	United
States .
8 	C.F . R. 	§212 . 5(e) (2) (i) 	The 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security
must 	provide 	written 	notice 	to 	the 	noncitizen 	and 	he 	or 	she 	is
then 	restored 	to 	his 	or 	her 	pre - parole 	status . 	Id .
Section 	1226(a) 	establishes 	a 	discretionary 	detention
framework 	fo r 	aliens 	arrested 	and 	detained 	pending 	removal
proceedings. 	Under 	that 	provision , 	the 	Attorney 	General 	may
continue 	to 	detain 	the 	alien , 	release 	him 	on 	bond 	or 	releas e 	him
on 	parole . 	§§1226(a) (1)-(2) . 	The 	arresting 	immigration 	officer
makes 	an 	initial 	custody 	determination 	but 	non - citizens 	have 	the
right 	to 	request 	a 	custody 	redetermination 	(i.e ., 	bond ) 	hearing
before 	an 	immigration 	judge . 	See 	8 	C . F . R . 	§§1236 . l(c) (8) ,
(d) (1) . 	This 	Court 	recently 	held 	that 	§1226(a) , 	rather 	than
§1225(b) , 	applies 	to 	aliens 	who 	are 	detained 	while 	residing 	in
this 	country 	while 	§1225(b) 	applies 	to 	those 	detained 	at 	the
border. 	See , 	e . g ., 	Lopez - Monteros 	v . 	Hyde , 	No . 	25 - cv - 12629 - NMG
(D . 	Mass . 	Oct . 	27 , 	2025) .
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IV. 	Analysis
a. Statutory Rights
Petitioner 	contends 	that , 	although 	he 	was 	initial ly
detained 	pursuant 	to 	§ 1 225(b) (1) , 	once 	he 	entered 	full 	removal
proceedings 	under 	§1229a , 	the 	statutory 	authority 	for 	detention
became 	§1226(a) , 	thereby 	entitling 	him 	to 	a 	bond 	hearing 	under
§1226(a) . 	The 	government 	rejoins 	that 	petitioner 	was 	detained
under 	§1225(b) (1) 	under 	which 	detention 	is 	mandatory .
The 	government 	is 	correct . 	Petitioner 	offers 	no 	support
for 	his 	conte nt ion 	that 	the 	statutory 	authority 	shifted 	to
§1226(a) 	and 	nothing 	in 	the 	statutory 	scheme 	indicates 	that 	an
alien 	in 	§1229 	proceedings 	is 	to 	be 	detained 	under 	§1226 .
Indeed , 	another 	session 	of 	this 	Court 	recently 	determined , 	based
on 	indistinguishable 	facts , 	that 	§1225(b) (1) 	is 	the 	applicable
statute 	rather 	than 	§1226(a) . 	Rincon 	v . 	Hyde , 	2025 	WL 	3122784 ,
at 	*7 	(D . 	Mass . 	Nov . 	7 , 	2025) .
To 	the 	extent 	petitioner 	argues 	that 	his 	parole 	after
arrival 	placed 	him 	under 	§1226(a) 	rather 	than 	§1225(b) , 	he 	is
mistaken . 	The 	statute 	under 	which 	he 	was 	paroled 	explicitly
provides 	that 	upon 	termination 	of 	parole , 	the 	alien 	is 	to 	be 	re -
placed 	into 	the 	custody 	from 	which 	he 	was 	paroled . 	Martinez 	v .
Hyde , 	792 	F . 	Supp . 	3d 	211 , 	216 	(D . 	Mass . 	2025) . 	Thus , 	contrary
to 	petitioner ' s 	assertion 	that 	there 	is 	no 	statutory 	support 	for
DHS ' s 	theory 	that 	detention 	is 	to 	be 	restored , 	it 	is 	well -
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established 	that 	the 	humanitarian 	parole 	statute 	does 	just 	that .
See , 	e . g ., 	Matter 	of 	Q. 	Li , 	29 	I . 	& 	N. 	Dec . 	66 , 	70 	(BIA 	2025 )
Having 	established 	that 	§1225(b) (1) 	is 	the 	applicable
statute , 	the 	next 	question 	is 	whether 	petitioner 	has 	been
afforded 	the 	statutory 	rights 	to 	which 	he 	is 	entitled . 	It 	is
clear 	that 	he 	has . 	Section 	1225(b) (1) 	provides 	that 	aliens 	must
be 	detained 	for 	" further 	consideration 	of 	the 	application 	for
asylum ," 	which 	in 	petitioner ' s 	case 	will 	occur 	in 	his 	§1229
removal 	proceedings . 	His 	detention 	is 	accordingly 	mandated
under 	§1225(b) 	until 	the 	resolution 	of 	his 	removal 	proceedings
and 	§1225(b) (1) 	does 	not 	provide 	for 	bond 	hearings . 	Jennings ,
583 	U.S . 	at 	297 .
b. Constitutional 	Rights
Petitioner , 	relying 	on 	case 	law , 	also 	claims 	that 	his
detention 	without 	a 	bond 	hearing 	violates 	the 	Due 	Process
Clause . 	Hernandez - Lara 	v . 	Lyons , 	10 	F . 4th 	19 , 	41 	(1st 	Cir . 	2021)
( holding 	that 	the 	Due 	Process 	clause 	entitles 	a 	noncitizen
detained 	pursuant 	to 	§1226(a) 	to 	a 	bond 	hearing) . 	That 	argument
is , 	however , 	premised 	on 	his 	incorrect 	assertion 	that 	he 	is
subject 	to 	§1226. 	As 	explained 	above , 	petitioner ' s 	detention
is 	pursuant 	to 	§1225(b) 	and 	that 	distinction 	is 	dispositive 	of
his 	constitutional 	claim .
An 	alien ' s 	due 	process 	rights 	do 	not 	arise 	from 	any
particular 	statute 	but 	rather 	from 	his 	entry 	into , 	or 	physical
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presence 	in , 	th e 	country . 	Depending 	on 	the 	circumstances ,
eit her 	§1 225(b) 	or 	§1226 	becom es 	applicable . 	Because 	§1226 , 	by
its 	terms , 	applies 	to 	aliens 	who 	are 	alre ady 	present 	in 	the
cou ntry , 	those 	aliens 	are 	entitled 	to 	due 	process 	protections .
In 	co ntrast , 	aliens 	apprehended 	while 	illega l ly 	crossing 	the
border 	ha ve 	not 	entered 	the 	country 	and 	thus 	are 	n ot 	afforded
the 	same 	panoply 	of 	due 	process 	rights . 	That 	is 	true 	even 	if
the 	alien 	has 	remained 	in 	the 	country 	for 	a 	period 	of 	time 	und er
certain 	restricted 	conditions . 	The 	so-called 	" entry 	fiction
doctrine " 	provides 	that 	those 	who 	are 	apprehended 	shortly 	a fter
ille gally 	entering 	the 	country 	are 	nonetheless 	treated 	as 	if
t hey 	were 	stopped 	at 	the 	border 	and 	detained 	pending 	further
cons iderat ion . 	OHS 	v . 	Thuraissigiam , 	591 	U. S . 	103 , 	140 	(2020)
Thi s 	Co ur t 	agrees 	with 	other 	judges 	in 	this 	district 	that
the 	entry 	fiction 	doctrine 	makes 	sense 	in 	a 	world 	of 	uncertain
b o rders , 	see 	Rincon , 	2025 	WL 	3122784 , 	at 	*6 , 	and 	concludes 	that
it 	is 	appropriately 	ap pli ca ble 	in 	this 	and 	similar 	situations
because 	it 	i nu res 	to 	the 	benefit 	of 	the 	petitioner . 	If 	the
doctrine 	were 	not 	applicable , 	Banegas 	would 	have 	had 	to 	be
detaine d 	at 	the 	b orde r 	for 	weeks , 	months 	or 	years 	whil e 	USCIS
consid ered 	his 	appl ica ti on . 	Instead , 	he 	was 	granted 	parole 	in
this 	country 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	his 	application 	under 	the
statutory 	condition 	that , 	if 	he 	became 	ineligible 	for 	asylum 	for
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whatever 	reason , 	he 	would 	revert 	ba ck 	to 	the 	entry 	stage ,
subject 	to 	detention 	under 	§12 25 .
Because 	of 	the 	entry 	fictio n 	doctrine , 	mandatory 	detention
of 	petitioner 	under 	§1225 	does 	not 	deprive 	him 	of 	due 	process 	or
run 	afoul 	of 	the 	Constitution . 	Upon 	revocation 	of 	his
humanitarian 	parole , 	petiti o ner 	was 	p lace d 	in 	custody 	pursuant
to 	§1225(b) (1) 	just 	as 	though 	he 	had 	been 	stopped 	at 	the 	border
and 	his 	due 	process 	rights 	were 	significantly 	curtailed
accordingly . 	Thuraissigiam , 	591 	U. S . 	at 	140 . 	Those 	rights ,
whateve r 	they 	may 	be , 	do 	not 	include 	t h e 	right 	to 	a 	bond
hearing .
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons , 	the 	petition 	for 	writ 	of 	hab eas
cor pus 	(Docket 	No . 	1) 	is 	DENIED.
So 	ordered.
Nathaniel 	M. 	Gorton
Senior 	United 	States 	District 	Judge
Dated : 	November 2/ , 	2025
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