S.R.C. v. Miller et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
S.R.C., a minor child, by her next friends, )
JOHN COBBETT-WALDEN and )
JENNIFER LEE LAURENZA )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
) Civil Action No. 25-CV-12676-AK
v. )
)
STAVERNE MILLER, in her official )
capacity as Commissioner of the MA )
Department of Children and Families, )
and DR. KIAME MAHANIAH, )
in his official capacity as Secretary of )
the MA Executive Office of Health & )
Human Services, )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
ANGEL KELLEY, D.J.
Before this Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order turned-
Preliminary Injunction [Dkt. 2], Defendants Staverne Miller and Dr. Kiame Mahaniah’s
(“Defendants”) Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Directing Appointment of a
Guardian Ad Litem [Dkt. 20], and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 52]. For the following
reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction is DENIED; and Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED as moot.
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I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a juvenile court judge’s ruling in a care and protection custody
proceeding in Massachusetts Juvenile Court, resulting in an order of custody to the biological
father, Esvin O. Gregorio Cabrera (“Mr. Cabrera”).1 [Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 2-3]. S.R.C., a minor child, was
removed from her mother’s care on May 2, 2021, and was placed into foster care. [Id. ¶¶ 32, 35;
dkt. 24 ¶¶ 2, 3]. At that time, Mr. Cabrera, a Guatemalan citizen, was living in Guatemala. [Dkt.
24 ¶ 5]. That month, May 2021, Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (“DCF”)
identified Mr. Cabrera as S.R.C.’s father and contacted him in Guatemala. [Id. ¶ 6]. In
September 2021, Mr. Cabrera came to the United States from Guatemala. [Dkt. 1 ¶ 33].
In January 2022, S.R.C.’s permanency goal was changed from reunification with her
family to adoption because her mother was not consistently cooperating with DCF and her father
had limited contact with DCF. [Dkt. 24 ¶ 7]. On January 21, 2022, Mr. Cabrera reached out to
DCF requesting contact with S.R.C. [Id. ¶ 8]. On February 7, 2022, S.R.C. was placed into
foster care with John and Catherine Cobbett-Walden. [Dkt. 1 ¶ 35]. That same month, Mr.
Cabrera began supervised visits with S.R.C. [Id. ¶ 41]. Since that time, Mr. Cabrera has engaged
with DCF and worked towards gaining custody of his daughter. [Id. ¶ 41; dkt. 24 ¶¶ 10-23].
Following Mr. Cabrera’s efforts, DCF changed S.R.C.’s permanency goal from adoption to
reunification with her father on May 24, 2024. [Dkt. 1 ¶ 36].
On January 29, 2024, after S.R.C.’s mother failed to engage in services to remedy the
conditions that brought S.R.C. into DCF’s custody, S.R.C.’s mother’s parental rights were
officially terminated by order of the Lynn Juvenile Court. [Id. ¶ 32; dkt. 24 ¶ 4]. Mr. Cabrera
continued his visits with S.R.C., but later that year, on October 21, 2024, DCF was informed that
1 For any factual disputes, the Court relies upon Plaintiff’s articulation of the facts.
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Mr. Cabrera was taken into custody by Immigration and Custody Enforcement. [Dkt. 1 ¶ 52; dkt.
24 ¶ 24]. In November 2024, Mr. Cabrera was deported to Guatemala. [Dkt. 24 ¶ 26].
Following his deportation, Mr. Cabrera continued to engage with DCF and work towards
obtaining custody of S.R.C. [Dkt. 1 ¶ 59; dkt. 24 ¶¶ 28-35]. On August 26, 2025, DCF was
heard on their Motion for Return of Custody of S.R.C. to her father. [Dkt. 24-1, Ex. E at 2
(“Custody Order”); dkt. 24 ¶ 36]. During the hearing, all parties participated, including the
foster father, one of the Next of Friends, who initiated this action. Custody Order at 2.
On September 8, 2025, the Juvenile Court granted permanent custody of S.R.C. to Mr.
Cabrera. Id. at 7. Because Mr. Cabrera lives in Guatemala, the Juvenile Court stayed its order
until S.R.C. was in Mr. Cabrera’s physical custody, granted DCF temporary custody of S.R.C.,
and directed DCF to transition S.R.C. to Mr. Cabrera’s custody in Guatemala. Id. at 7-8.
On September 19, 2025, the “next friends” filed this Complaint on behalf of S.R.C. in
federal court alleging that DCF’s international transportation of Plaintiff violated her rights under
the Citizenship and Equal Protection Clauses, and her procedural and substantive due process
rights. [Dkt. 1]. The “next friends” representing S.R.C. are Mr. Cobbett‑Walden, S.R.C.’s prior
foster father, and Jennifer Lee Laurenza, a friend of Mr. and Ms. Cobbett‑Walden and licensed
therapist (collectively, “the Next Friends”). [Id. ¶¶ 15-24]. That same day, the Next Friends also
filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order requesting the Court stop S.R.C.’s
transfer to Guatemala. [Dkt. 2].
On September 19, 2025, the Court ordered that S.R.C. not be moved from her current
residence, the United States, nor the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that a Guardian Ad
Litem be appointed to represent her in the case. [Dkt. 8]. On September 23, 2025, the parties
filed a joint letter to the Court in which DCF agreed that, until the Court issues a decision on the
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Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, S.R.C. would not be moved from the United States or
Massachusetts. [Dkt. 15]. On September 29, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Reconsider the
appointment of the Guardian Ad Litem. [Dkt. 20].
Not initially a party, on October 31, 2025, Mr. Cabrera filed a Motion to Intervene [Dkt.
41], which was granted on November 24, 2025. [Dkt. 57]. On November 20, 2025, Defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
which reasserted the legal arguments in their Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order. [Dkt. 52]. On December 3, 2025, Mr. Cabrera filed his Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, which alleged that the Next Friends lacked
standing. [Dkt. 61].
On December 10, 2025, Mr. Cabrera
filed a Motion to Expedite the ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief. [Dkt. 67].
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must ensure it has the constitutional and statutory authority to
adjudicate. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “The
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction ‘is never presumed,’” Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 410
(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998)), and federal
courts “have a duty to ensure that they are not called upon to adjudicate cases which in fact fall
outside the jurisdiction conferred by Congress.” Esquilín-Mendoza v. Don King Prods., Inc., 638
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F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2011). Courts “must resolve questions pertaining to its subject-matter
jurisdiction before it may address the merits of a case.” Donahue v. City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110,
117 (1st Cir. 2002).
The party asserting federal jurisdiction is responsible for establishing that such
jurisdiction exists. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Review for dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is “similar to that accorded a
dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995). That is, courts construe the complaint
“liberally and treat all well-pleaded facts as true, according the plaintiff the benefit of all
reasonable inferences.” Id.
B. Jurisdiction
1. Younger Abstention
The Court does not have jurisdiction over this case because of the Younger Abstention
Doctrine. Under that doctrine, federal courts are prohibited from interfering with certain pending
state judicial or administrative proceedings. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69,
72 (2013). The First Circuit has established a three-step approach for determining whether
Younger abstention applies. Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Riche, 794 F.3d 185, 192-93 (1st Cir.
2015). First, courts must decide whether the particular state court proceeding is the type of
proceeding to which Younger abstention applies. Id. Then, courts consider whether the
Middlesex factors support abstention. Id. And finally, if based upon the first two steps,
abstention is appropriate, courts determine whether the case falls under an exception. Id.
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a. Type of Proceeding
The Juvenile Court proceeding at issue implicates the Younger Abstention Doctrine.
Younger abstention applies to (i) criminal prosecutions, (ii) “civil proceedings that are akin to
criminal prosecutions,” and (iii) proceedings “that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the
orders and judgments of its courts.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72-73. The Supreme Court identified
“state-initiated proceeding[s] to gain custody of children” as a type of “civil proceedings that are
akin to criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 79 (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1979));
see also Amadi v. McManus, 16-CV-10861-NMG, 2016 WL 3814597, at *4 (D. Mass. July 11,
2016), aff’d, No. 16-1960, 2017 WL 7048503 (1st Cir. Oct. 16, 2017) (declining jurisdiction
over challenge to custody proceedings in Massachusetts Juvenile Court); Liviz v. Supreme Jud.
Ct. of Mass., 17-CV-12345, 2018 WL 1697125, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 6, 2018), aff’d, No. 18-
1340, 2018 WL 4998135 (1st Cir. Oct. 2, 2018) (“[C]hild welfare and custody proceedings are a
qualifying type of proceeding.”); Martinez v. Murillo, 25-CV-11667-JEK, 2025 WL 2108907, at
*2 (D. Mass. Jul. 28, 2025) (“DCF-initiated child welfare and custody proceeding triggers
Younger.”) (citation modified).
Here, the Next Friends allege that they do not seek to enjoin the Juvenile Court but rather
challenge (1) the use of a United States passport to move S.R.C. from the United States to
Guatemala; (2) the international travel during which DCF personnel would accompany S.R.C. to
Guatemala, “where S.R.C. has no known legal immigration status, has never been, and does not
speak the native language”2; and (3) the lack of federal immigration or removal process prior to
S.R.C.’s move. [Dkt. 64 at 3, 7]. However, in their Complaint, the Next Friends requested the
Court “halt[] all transfer proceedings of the Child, to Guatemala.” [Dkt. 1 at 13]. The Juvenile
2 Concerns pertaining to S.R.C.’s immigration status in Guatemala is a matter that should be raised before the
Juvenile Court judge who issued the order.
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Court judge ordered that S.R.C. “remain in the temporary custody of [DCF] until such time as
her Father, Esvin O. Gregorio Cabrera, has physical possession of [her] in Guatemala,” and that
DCF “submit a written plan of travel to the Court and parties” including “the flight itinerary,
identity of passengers traveling with the child, and any other details related to travel.” Custody
Order at 7. The Juvenile Court judge also ordered that S.R.C. have two months of medications
“to travel with [her] to Guatemala” and that S.R.C.’s medical, educational, and custody records
be translated to Spanish and “accompany [her] to Guatemala.” Id. The request to stop S.R.C.’s
transfer is directly in conflict with these sections of the Juvenile Court judge’s order.
Additionally, the Next Friends raise factual questions regarding the adequacy of S.R.C.’s
legal representation in the Juvenile Court proceeding. [See, e.g., Dkt. 3 ¶ 20; dkt. 4 ¶ 11]. These
allegations further demonstrate that, despite the Next Friends contentions otherwise, the
Complaint challenges the Juvenile Court proceedings. Because the Next Friends are challenging
a state-initiated custody proceeding, they are challenging a proceeding that implicates Younger
abstention.
b. Middlesex Factors
The factors enumerated in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar
Association also favor abstention in this case. 457 U.S. 423 (1982). In Middlesex, the Supreme
Court held that federal courts must abstain when there is an ongoing state proceeding to which
Younger applies, “which implicates important state interest[s] and provides an adequate
opportunity to raise federal defenses.” Sirva Relocation, 794 F.3d at 192 (citing Middlesex, 457
U.S. at 432). These factors are not a stand-alone test for whether Younger abstention applies.
Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81-82. Instead, they are “additional factors appropriately considered by the
federal court before invoking Younger.” Id. at 81.
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The Juvenile Court case is ongoing for three reasons. First, the Next Friends admit that
“the Juvenile Court proceeding is not final, but rather is still ongoing.” [Dkt. 31 at 4]. Second,
the Juvenile Court’s order stayed its own final custody determination until Mr. Cabrera had
physical custody of S.R.C. and granted temporary custody of S.R.C. to DCF. Custody Order at 7.
Mr. Cabrera does not have physical custody of S.R.C. and DCF retains temporary custody of her.
Both the “stay” of its final order and the temporary nature of DCF’s custody indicate that the
Juvenile Court order is not final.
Third, a “proceeding [is] ‘ongoing’ for Younger purposes until the state appellate process
[i]s complete.” Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607-11 (1975)). The Juvenile Court order is appealable,
and S.R.C. can raise federal constitutional issues in a state court appeal. See, e.g., In re Adoption
of Willow, 745 N.E.2d 330 (Mass. 2001) (hearing appeal of a juvenile court case on the
appellant’s claim of a violation of fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
However, the custody determination has not been appealed.
The Next Friends point out that they were not parties to the underlying state court actions
and cannot appeal nor obtain federal constitutional relief there. [Dkt. 64]. That is accurate but
belies the point. The issue in this case is not whether the Next Friends’ constitutional rights are
violated. See Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 198 (1895) (explaining that a next friend is
“neither technically nor substantially the party, but resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem,
by whom a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another”). The issue is whether S.R.C.’s
constitutional rights are violated by the Juvenile Court order. Plaintiff, S.R.C., can appeal
through her legal representative. See Care & Prot. of Jaylen, 231 N.E.3d 302, 311 (Mass. 2024)
(child appealing care and protection decision, in part, on constitutional grounds).
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The Middlesex factors also favor abstention because Massachusetts has a “compelling
state interest” in protecting children, and “[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state
concern.” Moore, 442 U.S. at 435. The Next Friends argue that Massachusetts does not have a
compelling state interest because “[t]he authority to remove individuals from the United States
rests exclusively with the federal government.” [Dkt. 31 at 5]. In support of this argument, the
Next Friends rely upon cases from the immigration context.
However, this is not an immigration case. In the context of custody determinations, state
courts regularly order visitation rights over American children to non-citizen parents who live
internationally. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Stern, No. 13-2087, 2015 WL 568584, at *4 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 11, 2015) (“[T]he district court should not have prohibited visitation in Israel.”);
Abouzahr v. Matera-Abouzahr, 824 A.2d 268, 280-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)
(upholding grant of visitation to father in Lebanon); Markus v. Markus, 427 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626-
27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (granting visitation to Isreal and citing cases). These custody
determinations demonstrate that states retain a strong interest in the welfare of children and
families, even where it requires children move outside of the United States.
c. Exceptions
Finally, the Court must address whether one of the exceptions to Younger abstention
applies. Abstention is inappropriate where a state proceeding is brought “for the purpose of
harassment,” if the state forum “provides inadequate protection of federal rights,” or if a state
statute is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.” Sirva
Relocation, 794 F.3d at 192. The Next Friends appear to allege that this case falls under the
“extraordinary circumstances” exception to Younger. [Dkt. 64 at 8]. In support, the Next Friends
cite a Fourth Circuit case holding the lower court did not abuse its discretion by excepting a case
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from Younger abstention because the state adjudicator demonstrated bias. [Dkt. 64 at 8 (citing
Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. McVey, 37 F.4th 89, 102 (4th Cir. 2022))]. The Next Friends do not allege
or provide any evidence of bias in the underlying Juvenile Court proceeding. Nor do they
provide any other legal basis upon which to conclude that the “extraordinary circumstances”
exception applies.
Upon careful review of the Complaint, and undisputed facts submitted by Defendants,
there is no indication that any of the Younger exceptions apply. Therefore, Younger abstention
applies, and this Court does not have jurisdiction over the case.
2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
If the Juvenile Court case is final – therefore barring Younger abstention – this Court does
not have jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. Under that doctrine, federal district
courts do not have jurisdiction “over a challenge to a state court judgment to which the
challenger was a party.” Miller v. Nichols, 586 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine prevents losing
litigants “from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a
United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself
violates the loser’s federal rights,” as only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the
decision of a state court in civil litigation. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 287. Notably, Rooker-Feldman
abstention “does not depend on what issues were actually litigated in the state court.” Miller, 586
F.3d at 59 (quoting Maymó-Meléndez, 364 F.3d at 33).
Here, the Next Friends are seeking review of a state judgment, alleging violations of
federal rights. As previously noted, although the Next Friends claim they do not challenge the
Juvenile Court’s custody determination, the relief they seek directly conflicts with the Juvenile
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Court order and they challenge the adequacy of S.R.C.’s legal representation in Juvenile Court.
The Next Friends also argue that they were not parties in the Juvenile Court proceedings. Again,
this is beside the point. The Next Friends are not litigating on their own behalf. They are
litigating on behalf of S.R.C., and S.R.C. was a party to the Juvenile Court case. Therefore, this
Court also does not have jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
As this Court does not have jurisdiction under either the Younger Abstention Doctrine or,
in the alternative, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, it will not address the domestic-relations
exception to federal court jurisdiction. Similarly, although the Next Friends appear to lack
standing, based upon the potential conflict with S.R.C.’s best interest and the First Circuit’s
holding in Dev. Disabilities Advoc. Ctr., Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281, 286 (1st Cir. 1982), the
Court will not rule on this basis when it lacks jurisdiction over the case on independent grounds.
Finally, despite Plaintiff’s comment about “punting,” the Court declines to address the merits of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss where it
lacks jurisdiction over the claims. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2010) (“‘[A]
court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its subject matter jurisdiction, and to proceed
no further if such jurisdiction is wanting.’”) (quoting In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000,
1002 (1st Cir. 1988)).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 52] is GRANTED;
Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Dkt. 2] is DENIED; and Defendants’
Motion for Reconsideration [Dkt. 20] is DENIED as moot.
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SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 9, 2026 /s/ Angel Kelley
Hon. Angel Kelley
United States District Judge
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