Patel v. Hyde et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-12518-RGS
JIGNESHKUMAR VISHNUBHAI PATEL
v.
PATRICIA HYDE, Acting Director of Boston
Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; TODD LYONS, Acting Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; ANTONE MONIZ,
Superintendent of Plymouth County Correctional Center;
and PAUL CHONG, City of Boston Registrar
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
November 12, 2025
STEARNS, D.J.
Petitioner Jigneshkumar Vishnubhai Patel, a national of India, filed
this petition for writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of his
detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. For the following
reasons, the court will grant his petition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
U.S. Border Patrol agents encountered Patel in Rio Grande City, Texas,
on January 19, 2011. 	They determined that Patel had entered the country
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without inspection and initiated removal proceedings against him. 	An
Immigration Judge ordered Patel removed in abstentia on January 19, 2012.
On May 5, 2023, Patel filed a Form I-918 Petition for U Nonimmigrant
Status based on having been the victim of a qualifying crime and his
subsequent cooperation with law enforcement in the investigation of that
crime. Roughly a year later, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) issued a Bona Fide Determination Notice and placed Patel in
deferred action status. USCIS has not, to date, revoked the grant of deferred
action.
On September 9, 2025, ICE agents detained Patel in front of his home.
The next day, Patel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court,
arguing that his detention violates the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Jurisdiction
The government first challenges the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that
Patel (in effect if not in name) seeks to stay execution of a removal order in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The court is not convinced. At bottom, Patel
does not challenge the government’s discretionary decision to execute a
removal order; he challenges the government’s refusal to honor USCIS’s
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prior (unrevoked) grant of deferred action. 	See Ayala v. Bondi, 2025 WL
2209708, at *2; cf. Primo v. Mattivelo, 2025 WL 1899115, at *3 (D. Mass.
July 	9, 	2025) 	(finding, 	in 	similar 	circumstances, 	that 	petitioner 	had
challenged 	“the 	Secretary’s 	authority 	to 	detain 	him,” 	and 	not 	any
discretionary decision to commence, adjudicate, or execute a removal order).
Section 1252(g), therefore, does not strip the court of jurisdiction over his
claims.
II. 	Merits
At the outset, the court notes that Patel has not been provided with any
opportunity to challenge or seek review of his detention before a court of
appropriate jurisdiction, as due process would normally require. The court
need not delve further into this issue, however, because it agrees with Patel
that the provision under which the government purports to detain him – 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) – is inapplicable.
Section 1231(a)(6) permits the government to discretionarily detain an
alien who has been ordered removed beyond the mandatory 90-day removal
period. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court read
an implicit limitation into the statutory provision that any post-removal
detention may not exceed the “period reasonably necessary to bring about
that alien’s removal from the United States.” 	Id. at 689. 	Although a
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detention of up to six months is presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas,
Zadvydas does not give the government free reign to confine aliens. 	Id. at
701. Detention is only permissible “until it has been determined that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Id.
Consistent with the weight of precedent, see F.R.P. v. Wamsley, 2025
WL 3037858, at *5-6 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2025) (collecting cases), the court finds
that removal is not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future given Patel’s
unrevoked U-Petition deferred action status. 	His detention thus is not
authorized by § 1231(a)(6), and petitioner must be released. See Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 699 (“Whether a set of particular circumstances amounts to
detention within, or beyond, a period reasonably necessary to secure removal
is determinative of whether the detention is, or is not, pursuant to statutory
authority.”).
ORDER
The court ORDERS that petition be released from custody by 12:00 pm
tomorrow, Thursday, November 13, 2025. 	The government shall file a
certificate of compliance with the court’s order by November 14, 2025.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns____________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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