Fuller v. Carrera & Partners, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
JOEL FULLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARRERA & PARTNERS, INC. and
NICK CARRERA,
Defendants.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Civil Action No. 25-cv-11565-ADB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Plaintiff Joel Fuller (“Fuller”) brings this action against his former employers, Carrera &
Partners, Inc. (“Carrera & Partners”) and its president, Nick (Dominic) Carrera (“Nick Carrera”
or “Carrera”) (together, “Defendants”), asserting claims related to the termination of his
employment. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Fuller’s complaint, [ECF No. 1-
1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”) at 5–10], pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for
lack of personal jurisdiction. [ECF No. 9]; see also [ECF No. 10 (“Defs.’ Mem.”)]. For the
reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
The following relevant facts are taken from the Complaint, the factual allegations of
which the Court assumes to be true when considering a motion to dismiss. Ruivo v. Wells Fargo
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 1 of 17

2
Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014). The Court has also considered “documents
incorporated by reference in [the complaint], matters of public record, and other matters
susceptible to judicial notice,” Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008) (alteration in
original) (quoting In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2003)), as well
as “facts put forward by the defendants, to the extent that they are uncontradicted,” for purposes
of resolving the pending jurisdictional issue, Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson &
Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Mass. Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc. v.
A.B.A., 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998)).
Plaintiff Joel Fuller resides in Medway, Massachusetts. [Compl. ¶ 1]. Defendant Carrera
& Partners, an automobile advertising agency, is a Florida corporation with a principal place of
business in Deerfield Beach, Florida. [Id. ¶¶ 2, 9]; [ECF No. 11 (“Carrera Aff.”) ¶¶ 12–13].
Defendant Nick Carrera, a Florida resident, was the company’s president at all relevant times.
[Compl. ¶ 3]; [Carrera Aff. ¶¶ 2, 6]. Fuller maintains that Carrera “personally hired [him] to join
Carrera & Partners.” [ECF No. 15 at 16–17 (“Fuller Aff.”) ¶ 4].
Carrera first spoke with Fuller in October 2024 over the phone, from Florida. [Carrera
Aff. ¶ 25]. In November 2024, again from Florida, Carrera conducted a phone interview with
Fuller for an Account Team Leader position, [id. ¶ 26], and then spoke with Fuller twice more
over the subsequent weeks, with at least one of those calls from Florida, to further discuss the
position, training, and compensation, [id. ¶¶ 27–28]. Carrera negotiated and approved Fuller’s
terms of compensation “primarily through phone, email, and text communications while [Fuller]
was located in Massachusetts.” [Fuller Aff. ¶¶ 4, 8]. In December 2024, Carrera emailed Fuller
an offer letter that provided for a $125,000 base annual salary, four weeks of paid time off per
year, and commission pay. [Compl. ¶¶ 13–15]; [ECF No. 15 at 19–20 (“Offer Letter”)]; [Carrera
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 2 of 17

3
Aff. ¶ 29]. The commission pay included a 3% commission on Carrera & Partners’ net revenues
due to Fuller upon collection (the Agency Gross Profitability Commission) and a 3%
commission on Carrera & Partners’ net revenues on any digital business handled by Fuller (the
CF Digital Commission). [Compl. ¶ 15]; [Offer Letter]. The offer letter, which was addressed to
Fuller’s home in Medway, Massachusetts, further specified that Fuller would be “Full Time
working from home, with visits to Clients and home office,” starting on January 1, 2025. [Offer
Letter at 19]; [Fuller Aff. ¶ 3].
Fuller proffers that he “performed approximately 10 days of work for Carrera &
Partners” during his roughly three months with the company,1 primarily in the areas of client
management, budget planning, and marketing, see [Compl. ¶¶ 11–12, 19]; [Fuller Aff. ¶ 5], and
that his “Massachusetts-based efforts” during those ten days’ worth of work “secured client
accounts generating more than $325,000 in net revenue in January 2025 alone, with additional
revenue in February and March 2025,” [Fuller Aff. ¶ 7]; see also [Compl. ¶¶ 22–23 (listing net
revenue and commissions from client accounts serviced by Fuller)]. Fuller “lived and worked
from [his] home office in Medway during [his] entire tenure,” and “regularly joined company
calls and meetings via videoconference while physically located in Massachusetts.” [Fuller Aff.
¶¶ 2, 5]. Additionally, “[a]t the direction of Carrera & Partners,” Fuller attended a client pitch
meeting in person at a Mitsubishi office in Danvers, Massachusetts. [Id. ¶ 6]; see also [ECF No.
15 (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 2]. Other Carrera & Partners employees joined the Mitsubishi meeting via
Zoom. [Fuller Aff. ¶ 6]. No Carrera & Partners employee, including its president Nick Carrera,2
1 See infra note 3.
2 [Carrera Aff. ¶ 11 (“I have never traveled to Massachusetts on behalf of the Company or to
conduct business for the Company. I have never performed work for the Company in
Massachusetts.”)].
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 3 of 17

4
has ever “traveled to Massachusetts to conduct business, to meet with customers or potential
customers, or to attend any conferences,” [Carrera Aff. ¶ 20], and Fuller is the only
Massachusetts resident ever hired by the company, [id. ¶ 22].
Nick Carrera “made the decision to terminate” Fuller’s employment at or around the end
of Fuller’s ninety-day initial probationary period, and called Fuller to let him know on March 28,
2025 (the “termination date”). [Compl. ¶ 17]; [Carrera Aff. ¶ 33]. Fuller alleges that, as of the
termination date, he had earned, but not been paid, approximately $4,807.69 in salary pay and
$30,750.00 in commissions, and accrued about four weeks of paid time off, the equivalent of
approximately $9,615.38.3 See [Compl. ¶¶ 19–30]. Carrera & Partners did not pay Fuller on his
termination date. [Id. ¶¶ 20, 28, 30]. On April 2, 2025, Fuller asked Carrera & Partners to pay
him his earned salary, [id. ¶ 31], and on April 15, 2025, Carrera & Partners paid Fuller his “final
salary,” [id. ¶ 21]. Fuller alleges that as of April 28, 2025, the date he initially filed the
Complaint, Carrera & Partners owed him approximately $40,365.38, an amount reflecting his
unpaid commissions and accrued paid time off, as well as liquidated damages and interest for his
late-paid salary. [Id. ¶ 32]. In his Complaint, Fuller asserts three claims against Defendants: a
claim for nonpayment of wages in violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 149, § 148, against Carrera & Partners and Nick Carrera (Count I); a breach of contract claim
against Carrera & Partners (Count II); and an unjust enrichment claim against Carrera & Partners
(Count III). [Id. ¶¶ 34–46].
3 Fuller does not explain how he calculated the number of days he worked, why he performed
only approximately ten days of work during his ninety-day initial probationary period, or how he
accrued about four weeks of paid vacation during that same period. Although it is difficult to
make sense of these allegations, which are unaccompanied by supporting documentation, the
Court will credit them for the purposes of resolving the jurisdictional issue.
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 4 of 17

5
B. 	Procedural History
Fuller initially filed the Complaint in Norfolk Superior Court on April 28, 2025. [ECF
No. 1 ¶ 1]. Defendants filed a notice of removal to the United States District Court on May 30,
2025, based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. [ECF No. 1]. On August 6, 2025,
Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), [ECF No. 9], along with a supporting
memorandum, [Defs.’ Mem.], and the affidavit of Nick Carrera, [Carrera Aff.]. Fuller filed a
memorandum of opposition on September 3, 2025, [Pl.’s Opp.], along with a supporting
affidavit, [Fuller Aff.], and a copy of his offer letter from Carrera & Partners, [Offer Letter].
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists over the defendants.
A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing Phillips v. Prairie Eye
Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008)). To determine whether the plaintiff has met this burden,
the district court most commonly applies the prima facie standard in the early stages of litigation.
Id. at 58 & n.5 (first citing Phillips, 530 F.3d at 26 n.2; and then quoting Rodriguez v. Fullerton
Tires Corp., 115 F.3d 81, 83–84 (1st Cir. 1997)); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274
F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001) (“When a district court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing . . . the ‘prima facie’ standard
governs its determination.” (first citing United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of America
(UE) v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 987 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1993); and then citing Boit v. Gar-Tec
Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992))).
Under the prima facie standard, the plaintiff may not “rely on unsupported allegations in
[his] pleadings” and “must put forward ‘evidence of specific facts’ to demonstrate that
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 5 of 17

6
jurisdiction exists.” A Corp., 812 F.3d at 58 (quoting Platten v. HG Berm. Exempted Ltd., 437
F.3d 118, 134 (1st Cir. 2006)). In other words, the plaintiff must “proffer[] evidence which, if
credited, is sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction.”
Id. (quoting Phillips, 530 F.3d at 26). “[T]he district court . . . accepts properly supported
proffers of evidence by a plaintiff as true.” Boit, 967 F.2d at 675 (first citing Dakota Indus., Inc.
v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1389 (8th Cir. 1991); then citing Serras v. First Tenn.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989); and then citing Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey,
Inc., 460 F.2d 661, 663 (1st Cir. 1972)); see also Dakota Indus., 946 F.2d at 1389 (“If the district
court does not hold a hearing and instead relies on pleadings and affidavits [to assess whether the
plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction], the court must look at the facts in the
light most favorable to the [plaintiff], and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of [the plaintiff].”
(citation omitted)). The Court will also consider undisputed facts offered by the defendants. A
Corp., 812 F.3d at 58 (citing Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51).
III. 	DISCUSSION
“To establish personal jurisdiction in a diversity case, a plaintiff must satisfy both the
forum state’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing
Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1994)). The Court begins with the
analysis under the Massachusetts long-arm statute, because its requirements are “not coextensive
with the parameters of due process, and in order to avoid unnecessary consideration of
constitutional questions, a determination under the long-arm statute is to precede consideration
of the constitutional question.” SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 85 N.E.3d 50, 52 (Mass. 2017)
(first citing Morrill v. Tong, 453 N.E.2d 1221, 1229–30 (Mass. 1983); and then citing Beeler v.
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 6 of 17

7
Downey, 442 N.E.2d 19, 21 n.4 (Mass. 1982)); see also Cossart v. United Excel Corp., 804 F.3d
13, 18 (1st Cir. 2015) (“The requirements of the Massachusetts long-arm statute are similar to—
although not necessarily the same as—those imposed by the Due Process Clause.”).
A. 	The Massachusetts long-arm statute
The parties agree that the relevant portion of the Massachusetts long-arm statute is § 3(a),
which provides that “[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person . . . as to a cause
of action in law or equity arising from the person’s . . . transacting any business in this
commonwealth.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3; [Pl.’s Opp. at 4–7]; [Defs.’ Mem. at 11]. To
determine whether Defendants transacted business in Massachusetts under the meaning of § 3(a),
the Court “must ‘construe[] the “transacting any business” language of the statute in a generous
manner’” with a “focus on ‘whether the defendant[s] attempted to participate in the
commonwealth’s economic life.’” Cossart, 804 F.3d at 18 (alterations in original) (quoting
United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d
1080, 1087 (1st Cir. 1987)); see also Hahn v. Vt. L. Sch., 698 F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1983)
(referring to “several indications in the Massachusetts case law that the language ‘transacting any
business’ should be construed broadly”). The Court must also determine whether there is an
“independent basis” under § 3(a) for jurisdiction over Nick Carrera, because “[j]urisdiction over
the individual officers of a corporation under the Massachusetts long arm statute may not be
based on jurisdiction over the corporation.” Levesque v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., Inc., 368
F. Supp. 3d 302, 308 (D. Mass. 2019). Finally, the statute’s “arising from” language permits
jurisdiction only if “the transacted business was a ‘but for’ cause of the harm alleged in the
claim.” Cossart, 804 F.3d at 18 (citing Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 551 (Mass.
1994)).
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 7 of 17

8
The Florida-based Defendants maintain that no Carrera & Partners employee has
“traveled to Massachusetts for business purposes,” and that Carrera & Partners has never
registered with the Commonwealth to do business in Massachusetts. [Defs.’ Mem. at 3].
Section 3(a) does not, however, require a defendant to be physically present to transact business
in Massachusetts, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 960 F.2d at 1087
(citing Bond Leather Co. v. Q.T. Shoe Mfg. Co., 764 F.2d 928, 932 (1st Cir. 1985)), and may be
satisfied by “even somewhat exiguous acts on a defendant’s part,” because the more rigorous
inquiry into the “extent of a nonresident’s involvement is properly relevant to the constitutional,
not the statutory, dimension of the jurisdiction inquiry.” Id. (citation modified) (citing, inter alia,
Bond Leather, 764 F.2d at 932). As relevant to the present context, “Massachusetts courts have
held that frequent communications between a plaintiff employee and an out-of-state employer
defendant may constitute ‘purposeful and continuous’ contacts sufficient to satisfy the
transacting business requirement.” Lawrence v. Next Ins., 774 F. Supp. 3d 237, 259 (D. Mass.
2025) (quoting Hongyu Luo v. Tao Ceramics Corp., No. 13-cv-5280, 2014 WL 3048679, at *2
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2014)). Here, the communications between Fuller and Defendants are
sufficient to satisfy the transacting business requirement, because Fuller’s offer letter
contemplated that he would work for Carrera & Partners full-time from Massachusetts, and
because Fuller then “worked from [his] home office in Medway during [his] entire tenure” with
the company, “regularly join[ing] company calls and meetings via videoconference while
physically located in Massachusetts.” [Fuller Aff. ¶¶ 2, 5]. Further, Fuller’s in-person
participation at the client pitch meeting in Danvers, Massachusetts, which he attended as an
employee of and “[a]t the direction of” Carrera & Partners, [id. ¶ 6], may be sufficient on its own
regardless of the meeting’s result. See Cossart, 804 F.3d at 19 (clarifying that Massachusetts
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 8 of 17

9
precedent does not require defendants to have successfully solicited business in Massachusetts);
see also Haddad v. Taylor, 588 N.E.2d 1375, 1377–78 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (finding § 3(a)
satisfied when out-of-state defendant negotiated a Massachusetts land sale via telephone and
mail with the plaintiff and a real estate broker in Massachusetts, even though no binding contract
was created). Although Defendants employed Fuller for only a few months, it cannot be said
that Defendants merely engaged in an “isolated or incidental transaction with a Massachusetts
resident,” which may be insufficient to satisfy § 3(a). Hongyu Luo, 2014 WL 3048679, at *2
(finding defendant’s contacts with plaintiff, who worked for defendant’s Texas ceramics
business from a Massachusetts office, to be “clearly” sufficient to satisfy § 3(a)’s transacting
business requirement when, “[o]ver the course of 15 months, [defendant] allegedly contacted
[plaintiff] on a weekly basis regarding his progress on securing sales” in Massachusetts); see also
Tatro, 625 N.E.2d at 552 (finding it “obvious” that a defendant hotel, a Delaware corporation
doing business in California, transacted business in Massachusetts when the hotel “solicited and
obtained meeting and convention business from at least ten Massachusetts businesses, and
maintained telephone and mail contact with them”).
The transacting business requirement of § 3(a) is also satisfied as to Nick Carrera, the
individual defendant in this action. “[P]recedent supports subjecting corporate officers to
jurisdiction under the long-arm statute at least where they are ‘primary participants’ in corporate
action.” Cossart, 804 F.3d at 19. Here, Carrera acted as a “primary participant” in the relevant
corporate action when he, as president of Carrera & Partners, personally interviewed Fuller,
discussed terms of employment with Fuller over multiple phone calls, sent Fuller his offer letter,
and called Fuller to terminate his employment after making the decision to do so, see [Compl. ¶¶
5, 10]; [Fuller Aff. ¶¶ 4, 8]; [Carrera Aff. ¶¶ 25–29, 33]. He is therefore subject to the reach of
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 9 of 17

10
§ 3(a). Cf. Cossart, 804 F.3d at 18–19 (finding president of Kansas company subject to personal
jurisdiction as a “primary participant” in corporate activity where the president “personally
negotiated” an employment contract contemplating that plaintiff would work from Massachusetts
and signed a certificate of registration establishing a Massachusetts sales office for the
company); see also Post v. Mark Edward Partners LLC, No. 22-cv-10148, 2022 WL 5118214, at
*2 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2022) (noting that “individual defendants acted as ‘primary participants’ in
their decision to cease payment of Plaintiff's wages”).
Finally, the long-arm statute’s “arising from” language is clearly satisfied here, as
Fuller’s claims for unpaid wages “arise directly from the work [Fuller] performed for Carrera &
Partners from [his] Massachusetts home office and the client meetings [he] conducted in
Massachusetts,” [Fuller Aff. ¶ 11], such that the alleged harm would not have happened but for
Defendants’ transacting business in the commonwealth—namely, their hiring Fuller to work for
Carrera & Partners. Cf. Cossart, 804 F.3d at 19 (finding the “arising from” requirement to be
“easily met . . . where [plaintiff’s] claim arose from . . . work he performed in Massachusetts
under his employment contract with [defendant]”). The Court thus proceeds to the constitutional
analysis.
B. 	Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Under the Due Process Clause, courts may exercise either general or specific personal
jurisdiction. Fuller does not argue that general jurisdiction, which “requires affiliations ‘so
continuous and systematic as to render the foreign corporation essentially at home in the forum
State,’” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 133 n.11 (2014) (citation modified) (quoting
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)), applies to either
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 10 of 17

11
Carrera & Partners, a Florida corporation, or Nick Carrera, a Florida resident. The Court must
therefore determine only whether it may exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendants.
“Specific jurisdiction exists when there is a demonstrable nexus between a plaintiff's
claims and a defendant’s forum-based activities.” Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 618 (quoting
Mass. Sch. of L., 142 F.3d at 34). Specifically, the defendant must “have certain minimum
contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose
Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In the First Circuit, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
all three requirements of the minimum contacts analysis are met:
First, the claim underlying the litigation must directly arise out of, or relate to, the
defendant’s forum-state activities. Second, the defendant’s in-state contacts must
represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the
forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and
making the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s courts foreseeable.
Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must . . . be reasonable.
Daynard, 290 F.3d at 60–61 (quoting Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d
138, 144 (1st Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the specific jurisdiction
analysis is fact-dependent and “not susceptible of mechanical application.” PREP Tours, Inc. v.
Am. Youth Soccer Org., 913 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
1. 	Relatedness
Generally, with regard to relatedness, the constitutional analysis requires more than “a
broad but-for argument” and “demands something like a proximate cause nexus,” but not “strict
adherence to a proximate cause standard.” See Lawrence, 774 F. Supp. 3d at 251 (citation
modified) (quoting Harlow v. Child.’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2005)). Out-of-state
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 11 of 17

12
“communications directed into Massachusetts may be considered contacts in the forum for
relatedness purposes.” Id. at 252; see also LaVallee v. Parrot-Ice Drink Prods. of Am., Inc., 193
F. Supp. 2d 296, 303 (D. Mass. 2002) (“The transmission of information into Massachusetts by
way of the mails, the internet, or the telephone is decidedly a contact for . . . the relatedness
analysis.”). Here, Fuller’s claims, all of which are related to the alleged nonpayment of wages
by Defendants, are sufficiently based on Defendants’ contacts directed to Fuller in
Massachusetts, in particular Nick Carrera’s phone call terminating Fuller’s employment. See id.
(finding that defendant employer’s remote communications with Massachusetts-based employee
bringing employment claims would satisfy “[e]ven . . . a strict proximate cause standard”).
Fuller thus satisfies the “flexible, relaxed” relatedness requirement. PREP Tours, 913 F.3d at 18
(quoting Adelson v. Hananel, 652 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2011)).
2. 	Purposeful availment
The Court finds that due process nonetheless bars this Court’s exercise of specific
jurisdiction over Defendants, because Defendants’ Massachusetts contacts do not “represent a
purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities” in the commonwealth, Daynard,
290 F.3d at 60 (quoting Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 144).
A nonresident defendant satisfies purposeful availment when it “create[s] a ‘substantial
connection’ with the forum State” by “deliberately direct[ing] its efforts toward” it. See C.W.
Downer, 771 F.3d at 68 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985));
id. (explaining that “[j]urisdiction has been upheld where the defendant purposefully reached out
beyond its State and into another by, for example, entering a contractual relationship that
envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts in the forum State” (citation modified)
(quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014))). The analysis focuses on “voluntariness
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 12 of 17

13
and foreseeability,” N. Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting
Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1391 (1st Cir. 1995)), in order to discern whether “a defendant
has purposefully directed its activities towards the forum state in a manner that could reasonably
subject it to that state’s jurisdiction,” Lawrence, 774 F. Supp. 3d at 252; see also PREP Tours,
913 F.3d at 19 (“The flip side of this deal, however, is that when the out-of-forum defendant has
not ‘manifestly . . . availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there,’ it would be
‘unreasonable to require [the defendant] to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum[.]’”
(omission and alterations in original) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476)). Remote
communications, which are “often the primary means by which business relationships are forged
and conducted,” may be sufficient on their own. PREP Tours, 913 F.3d at 20.
In the First Circuit, the question of whether an out-of-forum defendant’s remote
communications constitute purposeful availment “hinges” on three factors: (1) “the defendant[s’]
in-forum solicitation of the plaintiff’s services”; (2) “the defendant[s’] anticipation of the
plaintiff’s in-forum services”; and (3) “the plaintiff’s actual performance of extensive in-forum
services.” PREP Tours, 913 F.3d at 20–21 (emphases omitted) (quoting Copia Commc’ns, LLC
v. AMResorts, L.P., 812 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2016)). “The number and duration of the remote
contacts are significant to the analysis.” C.W. Downer, 771 F.3d at 68; see also PREP Tours,
913 F.3d at 20 (noting that the First Circuit’s factors for analyzing remote contacts reflect the
Supreme Court’s observation that whether a defendant should foresee out-of-state litigation “will
vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity” (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at
474–75)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ Massachusetts contacts include (1) negotiating
employment terms with Fuller while he was located in Massachusetts; (2) retaining Fuller as a
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 13 of 17

14
remote, probationary employee for about three months while aware of his Massachusetts
residency; (3) deriving revenue from Fuller’s Massachusetts-based work; and (4) sending Fuller
to a client pitch meeting in Massachusetts. While the question of purposeful availment for a
remote employee, at least under the facts of this case, remains “more grey than black and white,”
PREP Tours, 913 F.3d at 29–30 (citation modified), on the present record, and as to all
defendants, the Court finds that current precedent falls short of requiring a finding of purposeful
availment where the at-issue remote employment was as transient as Fuller’s, so slightly touched
on Massachusetts commerce, and had an appreciable aspect of fortuity. Cf. Collision
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nokia Sols. & Networks Oy, 485 F. Supp. 3d 282, 296 (D. Mass. 2020)
(calling defendants’ Massachusetts contacts “simply ‘fortuitous’” and declining to find
purposeful availment where New Hampshire employer allowed one of its own employees to
work remotely from Massachusetts and then sought, on that basis, to hale a Finnish company
into Massachusetts court (quoting Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1391)).
As to transience, Fuller approximates that he worked a total of ten days for Carrera &
Partners, and he was terminated after just a few months, at or around the end of an “initial
probationary period” with the company. [Compl. ¶ 19]; [Carrera Aff. ¶ 33]. Nick Carrera, the
individual defendant, “did not train, manage, [or] supervise” Fuller, or “participate in any
communications . . . or meetings with customers or potential customers” with Fuller, [Carrera
Aff. ¶ 34]. Cf. PREP Tours, 913 F.3d at 29–30 (finding no purposeful availment where it could
not be reasonably inferred that the parties’ communications “show[ed] that the defendants were
contemplating the kind of ongoing and close-working relationship . . . that could establish the
requisite substantial connection between the defendants and the forum” (first citing Cossart, 804
F.3d at 21; and then citing C.W. Downer, 771 F.3d at 67)); Cossart, 804 F.3d at 16–17, 21–22
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 14 of 17

15
(finding purposeful availment where employment contracts between defendant company and
plaintiff stated that the company would provide plaintiff with business equipment, including a
computer, printer, cell phone, and video conference equipment, to facilitate his remote work
from Massachusetts; where defendant company, acting through its president, registered a
Massachusetts sales office one day after hiring plaintiff and kept that registration current while
retaining plaintiff; and where plaintiff “did significant work for [defendant company] in
Massachusetts” over a period of roughly three years); Lawrence, 774 F. Supp. 3d at 250–53
(“There is no dispute that [the defendant CEO and plaintiff] met regularly over Zoom during the
just over ten-month period [that plaintiff served as general counsel for defendant company]. . . .
[The CEO] purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of Massachusetts law by
regularly communicating with and supervising a resident employee to conduct a significant part
of his business . . . .”); id. at 253–57 (explaining that “what matter[ed] most [for the question of
purposeful availment was] that, per the terms of her initial offer letter, [plaintiff] was anticipated
to be working remotely from Massachusetts throughout the course of her work for [defendant
company], which [defendant CEO] knew, and did in fact complete extensive work there in the
period in which she met regularly with [the CEO]” (emphasis added)).
Further, as to Massachusetts commerce, Carrera & Partners is not registered to do
business in Massachusetts, does not have a registered agent for service of process in
Massachusetts, and has never hired a Massachusetts resident aside from Fuller, [Carrera Aff.
¶¶ 12, 14–15]. Nick Carrera “[has] never performed work for the Company in Massachusetts,”
[id. ¶ 11], and no Carrera & Partners employee “has traveled to Massachusetts to conduct
business, to meet with customers or potential customers, or to attend any conferences,” [id. ¶ 20].
While Fuller alleges that his client accounts generated significant net revenue for Carrera &
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 15 of 17

16
Partners during his probationary period, [Fuller Aff. ¶ 7]; see also [Compl. ¶¶ 22–23], and that he
physically attended a client pitch meeting in Danvers, Massachusetts at the direction of the
company, Fuller does not dispute, and the record does not contradict, Defendants’ assertion that
“[t]he Company has never derived revenue from any customer that was based in or operated out
of Massachusetts,”4 [Carrera Aff. ¶ 18]. The Court also notes that Fuller was allowed, rather
than required, to work from Massachusetts, and there is no suggestion that Defendants intended
his efforts to be primarily focused on Massachusetts. See [Offer Letter at 19 (stating that Fuller
would be “Full Time working from home, with visits to Clients and home office”)]; [Fuller Aff.
¶ 3 (same)]; [Carrera Aff. ¶ 30 (“Plaintiff was hired to work as a remote employee. The
Company did not require or request that Plaintiff work from Massachusetts. The Company
sought no benefit and derived no benefit from Plaintiff’s residence in Massachusetts.”)].
In sum, Fuller has not shown that Defendants established the requisite “substantial
connection” with the commonwealth, C.W. Downer, 771 F.3d at 68. Fuller fails in particular to
show that his handful of days’ work amounted to an “actual performance of extensive in-forum
services” making it reasonably foreseeable that Defendants would be haled into Massachusetts
court,” PREP Tours, 913 F.3d at 20 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Copia, 812 F.3d at 6). Given
that Fuller performed only approximately ten days of work for Defendants, the fact that the
employment relationship did not progress past Fuller’s initial probationary period, and the thin
evidence surrounding Defendants’ business connections with Massachusetts, the Court does not
find that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in
4 Fuller argues in his memorandum of opposition that his “work from Massachusetts led to
business opportunities for Defendants in the Commonwealth,” [Pl.’s Opp. at 12], but does not
elaborate. He does not, for example, proffer that the meeting in Danvers resulted in
Massachusetts business for Carrera & Partners.
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 16 of 17

17
the commonwealth. Therefore, the Court may not exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendants,
and stops the minimum contacts analysis short of a discussion of whether such exercise would be
reasonable.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction is GRANTED without prejudice and with leave to amend within 21 days.
SO ORDERED.
March 31, 2026 	/s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-11565-ADB Document 18 Filed 03/31/26 Page 17 of 17