Doe et al v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
SVITLANA DOE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
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Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-10495-IT
v. 	*
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KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
January 24, 2026
TALWANI, D.J.
This class action challenges steps taken by the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) regarding humanitarian parole programs. Most recently, in December 2025, DHS
terminated certain Family Reunification Parole programs and announced the termination of all
unexpired initial grants of parole awarded under these programs, effective January 14, 2026. See
Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes for Colombians, Cubans, Ecuadorians,
Guatemalans, Haitians, Hondurans, and Salvadorans, 90 Fed. Reg. 58032 (Dec. 15, 2025) [Doc.
No. 216-1] (the “Federal Register Notice” or the “Notice”). On January 10, 2026, after Plaintiffs
filed a Supplemented Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 239] and the court entered an
Order Modifying Class Definition and Appointing Additional Named Plaintiffs [Doc. No. 241],
this court granted an emergency fourteen-day stay of the Federal Register Notice insofar as it
revokes previously granted parole and work authorization issued to noncitizens paroled into the
United States pursuant to the relevant Family Reunification Parole programs. See Temporary
Restraining Order [Doc. No. 243]. Now pending before this court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction and/or Stay of En Masse Truncation of Family Reunification Parole [Doc.
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No. 216] seeking further preliminary relief or stay. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’
Motion is GRANTED.
I. 	Background1
Under the Immigration and Nationalization Act (“INA”), as amended:
The Secretary of Homeland Security may . . . in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-
case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien
applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not
be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall,
in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien
shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
other applicant for admission to the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).2 Pursuant to this authority, DHS has established various parole
programs granting temporary parole to noncitizen applicants who meet program requirements.
Four of these programs, referred to as the “CHNV Parole Programs,” were addressed
earlier in this litigation. As the First Circuit summarized,
DHS under the Biden Administration announced a new parole process to address
an increasingly high number of encounters with Venezuelan nationals at the
southern border. . . . This new process allowed Venezuelan nationals to obtain
advance authorization to “travel to the United States to seek a discretionary, case-
by-case grant of parole for up to two years.”
Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 279 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Implementation of a Parole Process
for Venezuelans, 87 Fed. Reg. 63507, 63508 (Oct. 19, 2022)). The Venezuela parole program
1 The court presumes familiarity with the factual background and procedural history of this
litigation and incorporates by reference this court and the First Circuit’s previous discussions of
both. See Doe v. Noem, 784 F. Supp. 3d 437 (D. Mass. 2025), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
Doe v. Noem, No. 25-1715 (1st Cir. Nov. 5, 2025); Doe v. Noem, 2025 WL 2201108 (D. Mass.
Aug. 1, 2025); Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272 (1st Cir. 2025). That background and the legal
findings, as relevant here, are discussed further below.
2 An “alien” is “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
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specified that discretionary grants of parole would be for a temporary period of up to two years,
during which time individuals could seek humanitarian relief or other benefits and receive work
authorization. See, e.g., Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 Fed. Reg. at
63508. “Modeled after the Venezuelan parole program, DHS launched similar programs for
nationals of Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua in January 2023.” Doe, 152 F.4th at 279–80 (citing
Implementation of Parole Process for Cubans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1266 (Jan. 9, 2023); Implementation
of Parole Process for Haitians, 88 Fed. Reg. 1243 (Jan. 9, 2023); Implementation of Parole
Process for Nicaraguans, 88 Fed. Reg. 1255 (Jan. 9, 2023)).
Like the CHNV Parole Programs, Family Reunification Parole processes also provide for
humanitarian parole. They differ, however, in that the Family Reunification Parole processes are
limited to applicants who are beneficiaries of a previously approved Form I-130 immigration
petition filed by a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. See, e.g., Implementation of a
Family Reunification Parole Process for Salvadorans, 88 Fed. Reg. 43611, 43613 (July 10,
2023); see also Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58033.
Parole also is only available under the Family Reunification Parole processes after the
petitioning U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident is invited by the United States government
to apply for parole for their Form I-130 approved family member. See, e.g., Implementation of a
Family Reunification Parole Process for Salvadorans, 88 Fed. Reg. at 43613; see also
Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58033. Under these
processes, the timing of such invitations is in the Secretary’s discretion, based on multiple factors
that could include the expected period of time until the beneficiary’s immigrant visa becomes
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available.3 See Implementation of a Family Reunification Parole Process for Salvadorans, 88
Fed. Reg. at 43618. Thus, while CHNV Programs anticipated that parolees not granted asylum or
other immigration benefits would need to leave the United States at the expiration of their
authorized period of parole or be placed in removal proceedings after the period of parole
expires, see, e.g., Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 Fed. Reg. at 63508,
the Family Reunification Parole processes anticipated that the process “will allow family
members to reunite in the United States while they wait for their immigrant visas to become
available.” Implementation of a Family Reunification Parole Process for Salvadorans, 88 Fed.
Reg. at 43611.
Nine Family Reunification Parole programs covering nationals of seven countries (the
“FRP Programs”) are at issue here. The first seven Programs are “for aliens from Colombia,
Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras, and their immediate family
members, under the Family Reunification Parole processes announced, or updated, by DHS in
2023[.]” Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58032.4 The
3 Immigrant visas for family-sponsored immigrant preference categories are numerically limited
and the visas therefore are not necessarily available when the visa petition is approved. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153.
4 See Implementation of a Family Reunification Parole Process for Guatemalans, 88 Fed. Reg.
43581 (July 10, 2023); Implementation of a Family Reunification Parole Process for
Colombians, 88 Fed. Reg. 43591 (July 10, 2023); Implementation of a Family Reunification
Parole Process for Hondurans, 88 Fed. Reg. 43601 (July 10, 2023); Implementation of a Family
Reunification Parole Process for Salvadorans, 88 Fed. Reg. at 43611; Implementation of
Changes to the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Process, 88 Fed. Reg. 54635 (Aug. 11,
2023); Implementation of Changes to the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Process, 88 Fed.
Reg. 54639 (Aug. 11, 2023); Implementation of a Family Reunification Parole Process for
Ecuadorians, 88 Fed. Reg. 78762 (Nov. 16, 2023). The programs are referred to here and in the
challenged Federal Register Notice as the “modernized FRP programs.”
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final two programs are older programs for noncitizens from Cuba and Haiti,5 which were first
implemented by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) in 2007 and 2014,
respectively.
II. 	The Termination of the Family Reunification Parole programs
The Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes for Colombians, Cubans,
Ecuadorians, Guatemalans, Haitians, Hondurans, and Salvadorans, 90 Fed. Reg. 58032 (Dec. 15,
2025), announced that the “temporary parole period of aliens who have been paroled into the
United States under the FRP programs, and whose initial period of parole has not already expired
by January 14, 2026[,] will terminate on that date.” Id.6 The Federal Register Notice identified
two exceptions where parole will not terminate on that date. First, parole will not terminate if a
parolee has filed a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status,7
that has been postmarked or electronically filed by December 15, 2025, and that is still pending
adjudication as of that date. Id. at 58032–33. Second, parole will not terminate on the announced
termination date if the Secretary of Homeland Security “determines otherwise on a case-by-case
5 See Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, 72 Fed. Reg. 65588 (Nov. 21, 2007);
Implementation of Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 75581 (Dec. 18,
2014). These programs are collectively referred to as the “legacy FRP programs.”
6 The Notice reported that since July 10, 2023, DHS granted parole to roughly 14,000
noncitizens through the modernized FRP programs, and that all of these parolees are within the
initial three-year grant of parole. Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed.
Reg. at 58043. The Notice reported further that approximately 1,060 Cubans and 100 Haitians
are in the United States with valid grants of parole under legacy programs, but did not identify
how many of these parolees are within an initial three-year grant. Id.
7 Generally, the Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, may
not be filed until an immigrant visa is immediately available to the applicant. See U.S.
C ITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION S ERVS ., I-485 FORM (2025).
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basis.” Id. at 58033.8
The Federal Register Notice also stated that all parolees “without a lawful basis to remain
in the United States following the termination of their parole must depart the United States
before their parole termination date.” Id. at 58033. The Federal Register Notice provided further
that “[f]ollowing this termination, . . . DHS generally intends to promptly remove aliens,
consistent with law, who entered the United States under the FRP programs and who stay in the
United States beyond their parole termination date with no lawful basis to remain in the United
States.” Id. at 58043.
A. Rationale for Termination
The Federal Register Notice concluded that the FRP Programs no longer “serve a
significant public benefit, are not necessary to reduce levels of unlawful immigration, and are not
serving all their intended purposes.” Id. at 58034. The Notice stated that the Secretary found that
these reasons together supported termination of the program. Id.
1. 	Purposes of the Programs
The Federal Register Notice acknowledged that DHS, when creating these parole
processes, had found that the parole processes would provide a significant public benefit for the
United States by
(i) promoting family unity; (ii) furthering important foreign policy objectives; (iii)
providing a lawful pathway and timely alternative to unlawful migration at the
southwest land border; (iv) reducing strain on limited U.S. resources; and (v)
addressing 	the 	root 	causes 	of 	migration 	through 	economic 	stability 	and
development supported by increased remittances.
8 The Federal Register Notice stated that parolees may apply for re-parole, which would be
adjudicated and may be approved on a case-by-case basis, by filing Form I-131 and “must
demonstrate urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit specific to his or her case
and that he or she merits a favorable exercise of discretion for parole[.]” Termination of Family
Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58043.
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Id. The Federal Register Notice acknowledged further that the programs sought to promote
family unity by providing a faster pathway for United States citizens and lawful permanent
residents to reunite with family members while awaiting availability of their immigrant visas. Id.
DHS acknowledged “that aliens paroled into the United States under the FRP programs may
have been able to reunite with family members in the United States.” Id.
DHS concluded, however, that “that national security and fraud concerns, and the current
Administration’s priorities outweigh[ed] those interests” and supported termination. Id. As to
national security, the Federal Register Notice compared the FRP Programs’ vetting process to
that of individuals pursuing lawful permanent resident status through consular processing. Id. In
the latter case, applicants’ consular processing requires “an in-person interview outside the
United States, and submission of various documents to establish the necessary family
relationship with the petitioner[,]” while still outside of the United States. Id. The Federal
Register Notice contrasted this process with that of the modernized FRP Programs, where
beneficiaries would seek parole at a point of entry (“POE”), at which point, DHS asserted, they
would undergo “minimal public safety and national security vetting[.]” Id. at 58035. The Federal
Register Notice asserted that “biometrics were not submitted by each potential beneficiary until
they arrived at the interior POE to seek parole,” id., which prevented the U.S. government from
conducting additional vetting of applicants prior to their arrival. Id. Based on this factor,
alongside others listed in the Federal Register Notice, DHS concluded that the FRP Programs
created “an unacceptable level of risk to the United States’ national security and public safety.”
Id.
DHS similarly concluded that the programs “presented an unacceptable risk of abuse and
fraud.” Id. The Federal Register Notice pointed to a greater risk of fraud “[w]hen biometrics
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collection and interviews do not occur prior to a beneficiary’s arrival” in the United States,
where sponsors could misrepresent family relationships and falsely claim a familial tie, and
where beneficiaries from countries with “weak civil registry systems” could potentially submit
fraudulent documents to support their claims. Id.
As to the Administration’s priorities, DHS pointed to “current enforcement-based
priorities, namely to better ‘achieve the total and efficient enforcement, including through lawful
incentives and detention capabilities’ of U.S. immigration law,” and concluded that “[t]he
modernized FRP programs, initiatives of the prior administration, do not align with this
Administration’s emphasis on enforcing immigration law, deterring unlawful immigration, and
eliminating fraud and abuse.” Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 14159, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443 (Jan. 29,
2025))
The Federal Register Notice also concluded that the programs did not further the
Administration’s foreign policy objectives. Id. It explained that, given the Administration’s
“pivot to a foreign policy that prioritizes the United States’ interests in reducing and deterring
unlawful migration[,]” this Administration was pursuing a “regional migration management
strategy” different from the prior administration. Id. at 58036. Accordingly, the Administration
sought to focus on “other measures to deter and prevent the entry of illegal aliens into the United
States.” Id. at 58037.
The Federal Register Notice concluded further that the FRP Programs failed to
accomplish their goal of discouraging unlawful migration because “the confirmed beneficiaries
of the FRP programs constitute a tiny fraction of the total population of aliens from the seven
FRP countries that unlawfully attempted to enter the country during this time period.” Id. The
Notice stated that DHS had found that roughly 16,100 noncitizens were granted parole under the
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FRP Programs, while Customs and Border Patrol encountered over 888,000 noncitizens from
FRP countries in FY2024. Id. DHS accordingly “determined that the FRP programs did not
meaningfully reduce unlawful migration at the southwest border and are not needed to achieve
that goal.” Id. Instead, DHS determined that alternative policy actions, such as “increasing
interior enforcement actions, ramping up removals, building physical barriers along the border,
and deploying advanced surveillance technology[,]” represented “a more prudent approach” to
addressing unlawful migration. Id.
DHS also determined that the FRP Programs’ failure to reduce unlawful migration
resulted in an increase to DHS workload without any offset. Id. at 58039. The Notice stated that
DHS personnel were still required to invest resources in detention, monitoring, processing, and
removal while also processing FRP applications. Id. Noting that noncitizens who would have
otherwise sought lawful permanent resident status from the Department of State now applied for
parole under FRP, DHS concluded that the FRP programs “shifted the strain from the
Department of State to DHS personnel” and that the “reallocation of limited DHS personnel
resources caused by the FRP programs is unsustainable.” Id. at 58039–40.
The Federal Register Notice reported further that DHS found that FRP parolees did not
meaningfully affect the economic conditions of their countries of origin. Id. at 58040. DHS
originally intended that such beneficial effects would arise because parolees would earn higher
wages working under lawful employment authorization and then send money home through
remittances. Id. Analyzing the rates at which parolees participated in remittances, DHS
determined that “any contribution FRP parolees may make to the remittance volumes in their
home country is too small to substantially impact the overall economic stability of the country or
address the root causes of migration.” Id. DHS found that the United States was incapable of
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bearing “sole responsibility for the development and economic stability of other nations” and
stated that “U.S. immigration policy cannot serve as a surrogate for long-term development
solutions in foreign countries.” Id. at 58041.
2. 	Reliance Interests
The Federal Register Notice considered separately the reliance interest of prospective
parolees and current parolees. Id. at 58041–45.
As to current FRP parolees, DHS “recognize[d] the costs incurred by some aliens who
have been granted parole and moved to the United States.” Id. at 58044. Indeed, as DHS
acknowledged, “[p]arolees will have departed their native country; traveled to the United States;
obtained housing, employment authorization, and means of transportation; and perhaps
commenced the process of building connections to the community where they reside.” Id. DHS
recognized that the termination of FRP parole grants would also affect parolees’ employers,
parolees’ landlords, and businesses patronized by parolees. Id. Nonetheless, DHS stated, such
reliance interests cannot outweigh “the U.S. government’s strong interest in promptly returning
parolees when the basis for the underlying parole no longer exists.” Id. Further, DHS declined to
assign parolees’ reliance interests significant weight due to the discretionary and term-limited
nature of FRP. Id.
B. Notice
DHS published the Federal Register Notice on December 15, 2025—thirty days prior to
the date for termination of existing grants of parole. Id. at 58032, 58044. The Federal Register
Notice stated that after the January 14, 2025 termination, DHS “intend[ed] to promptly remove”
FRP parolees from the United States, regardless of the term length of the parolee’s grant. Id. at
58043. The Federal Register Notice asserted that its publication served as “constructive notice”
to parolees of the suspension and termination of the FRP grants and that, in DHS’s view,
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“publication of this notice in the Federal Register is legally sufficient notice to all interested or
affected persons regardless of actual knowledge or hardship resulting from ignorance.” Id. at
58045 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 1507). In addition, DHS stated its intent to “provide individual notice
to each parolee through their USCIS online account.” Id. For legacy parolees, who DHS
acknowledged would not have an online account (a “myUSCIS account”), DHS committed to
providing “personal, individual notice by mail.” Id.
DHS reports that on January 5, 2026, USCIS sent 3,501 FRP parolees, including five
FRP parolees who are Class Representatives, electronic notice of the January 14, 2026 parole
termination via their myUSCIS accounts. See Kernochan Decl. ¶¶ 15, 17 [Doc. No. 250-1].9
DHS reports that approximately 1,841 termination notices had been accessed by January 12,
2026, including by two of the Class Representatives. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. On January 10, 2026, DHS
halted the issuance of electronic termination notices to 4,213 “modernized FRP parolees” in light
of the court’s TRO. Id. ¶ 16. As of January 15, 2026, DHS had not yet mailed notice to the 628
legacy parolees who are in their initial period of parole. Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
Defendants have represented to this court their intent, once this court’s stay is lifted, “to
issue new notices to all impacted FRP parolees providing notice that their parole will terminate
30 days from the date of the notice.” Id. ¶ 22. The new notices “will also provide that any
associated [employment authorization documents] will be revoked no sooner than 30 days from
the date of the notice, unless the FRP recipient submits countervailing evidence demonstrating
9 The notices stated that both parole and parole-based employment authorization would be
terminated on January 14, 2026. Kernochan Decl. at ECF 7 [Doc. No. 250-1]. Defendants report
that the notices “included a typo, indicating that the [employment authorization documents]
would be revoked as of January 14, 2026, the date of parole termination, rather than January 20.”
Id. ¶ 20.
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their continued eligibility for parole-based employment authorization before that date.” Id.
Defendants state further that “notices will be transmitted electronically to parolees who were
granted parole through an electronic application process, and sent in paper form to the current
address of record to parolees who were granted parole by filing a paper request.” Id. ¶ 23.
III. 	Jurisdiction
Defendants contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars the court from exercising
jurisdiction here. Defs.’ Opp’n 6 [Doc. No. 251] This argument is incorrect.
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) establishes that no court shall have jurisdiction to review:
[A]ny . . . decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other
than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Defendants point out that the decision whether to terminate FRP
grants of parole is within the Secretary’s discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and is
therefore precluded from review by Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Defs.’ Opp’n 6 [Doc. No. 251].
That position is not controversial: the parole statute, which is in the same subchapter,
provides that an alien’s parole may be terminated “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the
opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(emphasis added). Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to matters where discretion is conferred by
statute on the Secretary, see Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251–52 (2010) (emphasis added).
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), Congress has placed, by statute, individual parole
determinations, and the decision of whether to revoke such individual grants of parole, within the
Secretary’s discretion.
But there is a separate question as to whether Congress, by statute, also sought to divest
courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to the procedures employed by the Secretary to reach
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such determinations. In short, at issue is not whether the Secretary may exercise her discretion to
terminate an individual’s parole—she may—but rather whether the procedures adopted in this
case for the exercise of such discretion are in accordance with law. See, e.g. Castaneira v. Noem,
138 F.4th 540, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“In other words, the issue before us is whether 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I), in granting USCIS ‘sole and unreviewable discretion’ to ‘determine[ ]
that the citizen poses no risk,’ also affords the agency discretion to depart from its own binding
regulations or precedents in making this determination. We hold that it does not.”). The answer
to that question is no.
Here, Plaintiffs seek to challenge the procedure, or lack thereof, relied upon to terminate
Plaintiffs’ grants of parole. Plaintiffs challenge how the decision was made and contend that the
Secretary’s reasoning was arbitrary and capricious because DHS failed to properly consider the
purpose of the FRP programs, the reliance interests of Plaintiffs, and the alternatives available to
the agency. Pls.’ Mem. ISO Prelim. Inj. and/or Stay of En Masse Truncation of Family
Reunification Parole 10–14 [Doc. No. 218] (“Pls.’ Mem.”). Relatedly, Plaintiffs allege that the
Secretary exceeded her authority by failing to adhere to statutory requirements. Id. at 14–16.
Plaintiffs also challenge how the decision was communicated, alleging that notice to parolees
was deficient. Id. at 17–18. And finally, Plaintiffs challenge the approach taken to promulgate
the decision itself, claiming that such a decision could only be issued following a notice-and-
comment period. Id. at 18–19. None of these challenges go to the Secretary’s ultimate decision to
terminate parole. Instead, they speak to whether the steps taken to do so were proper.
The statute is silent on whether the procedures employed by Secretary to terminate grants
of parole are likewise left to the discretion of the Secretary. In Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233
(2010), in considering whether Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) barred judicial review of an
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administrative determination, the Supreme Court emphasized “a familiar principle of statutory
construction: the presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” Id. at 251.
“When a statute is ‘reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation, [the Court] adopt[s] the
reading that accords with traditional understandings and basic principles: that executive
determinations generally are subject to judicial review.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Pursuant to Kucana, the First Circuit has further held that “a statutory provision must expressly
and specifically vest discretion in the Attorney General (for example, by explicitly using the
words ‘in the discretion of the Attorney General’) rather than simply leave to the executive
branch certain decisions and determinations that happen to be discretionary in nature.” Valerio-
Ramirez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 289, 294 (1st Cir. 2018). Here, where the statute does not
explicitly state that the procedures employed by the Secretary are left entirely to her discretion,
the court declines to adopt an interpretation would run counter to the presumption of
reviewability. Accordingly, the court finds Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar the court’s
jurisdiction.10
Defendants also briefly contend that even if § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not preclude review,
review under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) is unavailable where “the parole
termination decision is ‘committed to agency discretion by law.’” Defs.’ Opp’n 7 [Doc. No. 251]
(quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988)).
The APA “establishes a ‘basic presumption of judicial review [for] one ‘suffering legal
wrong because of agency action[,]’” but that presumption may rebutted, including by a showing
10 Plaintiffs raise additional arguments in support of this court’s jurisdiction. See Pls. Reply 6–9
[Doc. No. 253]. Where the court finds that it has jurisdiction, it need not reach these additional
grounds at this time.
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that the “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2020) (first alteration in original) (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court has read this exception “quite narrowly, restricting it to those rare
circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Dep’t of Com. v. New
York, 588 U.S. 752, 772 (2019) (quotation omitted).
Here, despite the broad discretion accorded to the Secretary, the parole statute does
include meaningful standards for the Secretary’s exercise of discretion both in granting parole—
in that such grants must be made on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or
public benefit—and in terminating the grant of parole, by requiring a determination by the
Secretary that “the purposes of such parole . . . have been served[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
Moreover, the Secretary’s own regulations import notice requirements which limit her discretion.
This court finds further support for the view that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Federal
Register Notice is reviewable in the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland
Security v. Regents of the University of California, 591 U.S. 1 (2020). Rejecting the
government’s argument that decisions related to Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(“DACA”) were committed to agency discretion by law, the Court determined that DACA was
not an unreviewable non-enforcement policy, but was rather a program for conferring affirmative
immigration relief, including the conferral of eligibility for work authorization and Social
Security. Id. at 18–19. On that basis, the Court reasoned that “[t]he creation of that program—
and its rescission—is an ‘action [that] provides a focus for judicial review.’” Id. at 18 (second
alteration in original) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
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For these reasons, the court is not without jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ challenge to
Defendants’ en masse termination of existing grants of parole.
IV. 	Standard of Review
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” that shall enter only if a plaintiff
makes a clear showing of entitlement to such relief. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). In evaluating a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court considers
four factors:
(1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm [to
the movant] if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of relevant impositions, i.e.,
the hardship to the nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the
movant if no injunction issues; and (4) the effect (if any) of the court’s ruling on
the public interest.
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig–Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 17–18 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Bl(a)ck
Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2004)).
The first factor is the most important: if the moving party cannot demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits, “the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity.” New Comm
Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). “To demonstrate
likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiffs must show ‘more than mere possibility’ of
success—rather, they must establish a ‘strong likelihood’ that they will ultimately prevail.”
Sindicato Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting
Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 622 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 2010)).
V. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A. Exceeds Authority
Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary’s en masse termination of parole granted under the FRP
Programs exceeded her statutory authority because she did not properly determine that the
“purpose” of the FRP Programs (i.e. family reunification) had been accomplished. Pls.’ Mem.
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14–16 [Doc. No. 218]; see Doe, 152 F.4th at 286 (“Congress allows the Secretary to terminate
parole ‘when the purposes of such parole shall, in [her] opinion . . . have been served.’”) (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). But the Secretary may also terminate parole, even if the purpose is
not accomplished, “[o]nce the executive branch determines . . . that achieving the [previously
established] policy aim is no longer possible or desired[.]” Doe, 152 F.4th at 286. Here, the
Secretary determined that family reunification no longer warranted the FRP parolees’ presence in
the United States. Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58034–
35. For the purposes of the ultra vires inquiry, that determination is sufficient. See Doe, 152
F.4th at 291 (accepting “somewhat conclusory” statement in the CHNV parole termination
notice). Accordingly, for the purposes of a motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs have
not shown a substantial likelihood of success as to this claim.
B. Arbitrary and Capricious
“An agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency relied on improper
factors, disregarded ‘an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that runs counter
to the evidence,’ or when a reasonable explanation for the agency’s decision cannot be
discerned.” Gulluni v. Levy, 85 F.4th 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). “[A] court ‘is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency’ but rather determine ‘whether there has been a
clear error of judgment.’” Id. (quoting Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009)).
1. 	Rationale for Terminating the Parole of Parolees under the FRP Processes
Plaintiffs object that the Secretary “justified terminating the FRP processes using the
same template and reasoning she applied to CHNV” when the FRP processes “differ so
fundamentally” from the CHNV Programs. Pls.’ Mem. 9 [Doc. No. 218]. They contend that the
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Federal Register Notice fails to recognize that the FRP Programs, unlike the CHNV Programs,
were not designed or intended to provide a deterrent to irregular migration but instead were
directed at family reunification. Id. at 10. But as Defendants point out, deterring irregular
migration was included as a factor (albeit a minor one) in the notices establishing the FRP
Programs, and the Secretary was within her discretion in considering whether that purpose was
served by the termination of the FRP Programs. Mem. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Emergency Mot. for a
TRO and/or Stay 11–12 [Doc. No. 233]; Implementation of a Family Reunification Parole
Process for Colombians, 88 Fed. Reg. 43591, 43593 (Jul. 10, 2023).
2. 	Weighing of Reliance Interests
Plaintiffs also contend that the Secretary failed to adequately weigh Plaintiffs’ reliance
interests such that the termination of existing parole grants was arbitrary and capricious.
“Agencies are free to change their existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned
explanation for the change.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221 (2016). “[I]n
explaining its changed position, an agency must be cognizant that longstanding policies may
have ‘engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.’” Id. (quoting F.C.C.
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515(2009)). “The agency must ‘assess whether
there were reliance interests, determine whether they were significant, and weigh any such
interests against competing policy concerns.’” Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Kennedy, No. 25-2236, 2026
WL 49499, at *3 (1st Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (quoting DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S.
1, 33 (2020)).
The court agrees that Plaintiff has established a strong likelihood of success on this
ground for two reasons. First, the Secretary improperly understated the reliance interests of FRP
parolees. Second, the Secretary overstated countervailing concerns regarding insufficient vetting
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and fraud where these concerns were unsupported by the Administrative Record and the Federal
Register Notice itself.
a. 	Plaintiffs’ Reliance Interests
Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary failed to adequately consider FRP parolees’ reliance
interests and accordingly did not engage in reasoned decisionmaking. Pls.’ Mem. 12 [Doc. No.
218]. First, Plaintiffs highlight that the Secretary’s “discussion of FRP reliance interests is nearly
identical to what she said about CHNV” despite the significant differences between the two
groups of parolees. Id. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the Secretary did not consider that
every FRP parolee is a beneficiary of an I-130 petition, and as a result is on a path to becoming a
lawful permanent resident once their priority date became current; that FRP parolees had close
U.S. citizen and lawful permanent resident relatives in the United States; that these relatives were
invited to participate in the program by the State Department; that FRP was meant to serve as a
bridge for future adjustment of status; and that the purpose of the program was to promote family
unity and that terminating parole would instead produce family separation. Id. at 13.
Defendants respond that the Secretary’s use of similar language across the Federal
Register Notices “does not mean she failed to consider” the FRP parolees’ reliance interests.
Defs.’ Opp’n 10 [Doc. No. 251]. Further, Defendants contend that while some differences exist,
“the reliance interests of CHNV parolees and beneficiaries and FRP parolees and beneficiaries
are overall more similar than different.” Id. And, to the extent that the two groups do differ,
Defendants contend that the Secretary considered at least one difference, that the FRP supporters
had received an invitation. Id.
The Federal Register Notice acknowledged that it was “announc[ing] a reversal of a prior
policy of which many stakeholders have taken advantage after being invited to participate.”
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Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58041. The Notice
recognized
the costs incurred by some aliens who have been granted parole and moved to the
United States. Parolees will have departed their native country; traveled to the
United 	States; 	obtained 	housing, 	employment 	authorization, 	and 	means 	of
transportation; and perhaps commenced the process of building connections to the
community where they reside.
Id. at 58044. Still, the reliance interests of FRP Parolees are considerably more significant.
FRP Parolees have arrived in the United States after a long process, following all
directives from USCIS, to obtain lawful permanent residence in this country. The process began
when a United States citizen or Long-term Permanent Resident petitioner submitted a Form I-
130 petition. It can take a year, often more, for an I-130 petition to be approved. David Doe
Decl. ¶ 5 (I-130 submitted in October 2012, approved February 2020) [Doc. No. 214-2];
Francisca Doe Decl. ¶ 5 (I-130 approved after one year) [Doc. No. 214-3]; John Doe Decl. ¶ 6 (I-
130 approved after one year) [Doc. No. 214-4]; Luciana Doe Decl. (I-130 approved after three
years) [Doc. No. 214-6].
After this approval, an invitation from the United States government was sent to the U.S.
Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident petitioner who submitted the I-130 petition. This
invitation allowed the petitioner to “file a request and initiate consideration” under the FRP
Process. Implementation of a Family Reunification Parole Process for Colombians, 88 Fed. Reg.
at 43598. The time between the approval of an I-130 petition and the issuance of an invitation
may also take years. David Doe Decl. ¶ 5–6 [Doc. No. 214-2] (over three years between approval
of I-130 petition and issuance of invitation); Francisca Doe Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9 [Doc. No. 214-3] (I-130
petition approved in 2013, petitioner received invitation in 2023); John Doe Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10 [Doc.
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No. 214-4] (nearly four years between approval and invitation); Jose Doe Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8 [Doc. No.
214-5] (ten years between approval and invitation).
Because the FRP Programs are designed for individuals who are in line to adjust to
permanent lawful status, many parolees, upon receiving approval to travel to the United States
and seek parole, prepare for a permanent move. See USCIS, FAMILY R EUNIFICATION P AROLE
P ROCESSES – AFTER THE B ENEFICIARY IS P AROLED INTO THE UNITED S TATES (“We expect
beneficiaries who are paroled into the United States under these processes to apply, when
eligible, for a Green Card once their visa becomes available.”) https://www.uscis.gov/FRP (last
visited Jan. 24, 2026). This often means individuals have given up their entire lives in their home
countries. Francisca Doe Decl. ¶10 [Doc. No. 214-3] (“We had to sell our car in Guatemala to be
able to afford [the medical exams]. We also sold the rest of our property in Guatemala, like our
house and the bookstore, to afford the move to the United States”); John Doe Decl. ¶ 11 [Doc.
No. 214-4] (“I sold my vehicle and other belongings and ended the lease on my rented
apartment”); Jose Doe Decl. ¶ 10 [Doc. No. 214-5] (“We sold everything we had to come to the
United States through the FRP process.”); Luciana Doe Decl. ¶ 8 [Doc. No. 214-6] (“I believed I
was making a permanent move to the U.S.; I believed in good faith I would never return to
Colombia. I sold my car, my apartment, and all of my possessions. I also left my university
studies[.]”).
The Federal Register Notice failed to acknowledge these reliance interests. The Notice
did acknowledge that parolees have incurred costs moving to the U.S., and while they have lived
in the U.S., but it did not consider what parolees gave up in their home countries after being
invited by the United States to apply. Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90
Fed. Reg. at 58041. Nor did the Notice consider how feasible it would be for parolees to return to
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their home countries after selling their homes and belongings and giving up their jobs to move to
the United States. See Luciana Doe Decl. ¶ 11 [Doc. No. 214-6] (“Returning would mean
starting completely from scratch. I would not have a job to go back to, and I wouldn’t be able to
finish my degree, since enough time has passed that I would no longer be eligible to restart at the
university where I left off; I would have to start over with my education.”)
The Secretary could not provide a reasoned explanation of the agency’s change in policy
without acknowledging these interests. Accordingly, failure to do so was arbitrary and
capricious.
b. 	Weighing the Countervailing Interests: Insufficient Vetting and Fraud
The Secretary’s consideration of reliance interests was also arbitrary and capricious
because it overstated the agency’s countervailing interests, namely, DHS’s purported concerns
regarding insufficient vetting and fraud. These concerns were unsupported by the factual record
and, as introduced in the Federal Register Notice, not relevant to the Secretary’s decision to
terminate grants of parole. Pls.’ Reply 12–13 [Doc. No. 253]. Defendants contend that these
factors were appropriately considered. Mem. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Emergency Mot. for a TRO and/or
Stay 14 [Doc. No. 233] (“First Opp’n”).
As Defendants note, an agency need only “examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quotation omitted); First Opp’n 10–11 [Doc. No. 233]. DHS
alleged numerous possible ways an applicant could fraudulently acquire a grant of parole. Yet, it
provided no credible facts to suggest that fraud had actually occurred.
DHS justified terminating existing grants of parole on the ground that “allowing parolees
under the FRP programs to continue to remain in the United States despite the lackluster or
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insufficient vetting they received prior to entry creates vulnerabilities for the U.S., undermining
efforts to safeguard national security and public safety.” Termination of Family Reunification
Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58044; id. at 58035 (reporting that DHS concluded the
“procedures set forth under the modernized FRP programs created an untenable likelihood that
malicious actors could enter the interior of the United States without proper vetting, thereby
posing an unacceptable level of risk to the United States’ national security and public safety”).
Plaintiffs contend that “even if [the Secretary’s] vetting theory had merit, the [Administrative
Record] is completely devoid of information support it.” Pls.’ Reply 13 [Doc. No. 253].
Plaintiffs assert that “[t]here is no analysis of whether FRP parolees pose security risks, no
comparison of vetting outcomes, no data whatsoever.” Id. The court agrees.
As evidence of the purported fraud by parolees whose parole is being terminated, DHS
cited “a recent internal audit [that] revealed that over 700 requests to be a supporter were filed
under the names of deceased individuals of which USCIS confirmed approximately half.”
Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58041. This audit also
reportedly concluded that “the vetting standards applied to co-supporters under the modernized
FRP programs were even weaker than those for primary supporters, further compromising
program integrity.” Id. Defendants’ administrative record, however, includes no such audit, nor
any other information to suggest Defendants’ fraud concerns are supported by the record.
Moreover, even if 350 fraudulent Form I-134As were confirmed, there is no evidence in the
record that any individuals who were awarded parole were associated in any way with those
fraudulent applications.
Instead, while a supporter’s confirmed Form I-134A would allow a beneficiary to submit
additional information, including biographic and biometric information to USCIS, travel
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approval still would not be granted until the beneficiary “passes all the requisite vetting.”
Implementation of a Family Reunification Parole Process for Colombians, 88 Fed. Reg. at
43598. Accordingly, it is not possible to conclude from the one data point regarding I-134A
Forms that any parolees fraudulently acquired parole.
The Federal Register Notice also asserted that, under the modernized program, DHS
would only conduct “minimal public safety and national security vetting of [FRP] supporters
based on biographic information” provided by the supporters on their Form I-134A. Termination
of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58034–35. For example, DHS would
verify that the supporter listed on the Form I-134A was the same person as the named petitioner
on the Form I-130—the initial form submitted by the supporter—and that supporters were
confirmed to be LPRs. Id. at 58035. Additionally, the notice suggested that U.S.-based
petitioners could misrepresent or falsely claim familial ties, or that relationships might change
between the time a form I-130 is filed and the grant of parole (e.g. where spouses decide to
divorce). Id.
This suggestion of minimal supporter vetting ignores the extensive vetting of supporters
by USCIS, as required under the FRP programs prior to the issuance of travel documents for the
beneficiary. DHS fails to take into account as to USCIS’s vetting: (1) the petitioner (a U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident) had to initiate the visa process for their family member
through a Form I-130; (2) only after USCIS approved that petition, and with consideration of
numerous factors, including when an immigrant visa would be available, would an invitation be
sent by USCIS to the petitioner; (3) the petitioner was required to then submit a Form I-134A
and evidence establishing their income, assets, and family relations; and (4) USCIS would then
conduct a background check on the petitioner before allowing the parole beneficiary to create an
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online account so that USCIS could confirm the beneficiary’s eligibility. See, e.g.,
Implementation of a Family Reunification Parole Process for Colombians, 88 Fed. Reg. at
43598. The Federal Register Notice is silent as to this additional vetting of supporters.
As for the parole applicants themselves, the Federal Register Notice highlighted various
factors that could increase the risk of fraud. Termination of Family Reunification Parole
Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58035. First, it noted that DHS would not collect certain biometric
data or conduct an interview before a beneficiary’s arrival in the U.S. Id. The Notice further
explained that adjudicators could also miss key indicators of fraud and that beneficiaries from
countries with “weak civil registry systems” could submit fraudulent documents. Id. The Notice
asserted that requiring interviews and “having in-country experts familiar with local
documentation” could help prevent such instances of possible fraud. Id.
Plaintiffs suggest that the Secretary’s security concerns with respect to insufficient
vetting do not bear a rational relation to the termination of grants of parole. Pls.’ Reply 13 [Doc.
No. 253]. Specifically, Plaintiffs note that even if there were insufficient vetting concerns, this
concern would have been salient when parole recipients first arrived 12 to 28 months ago. Id.
Plaintiffs contend that now
every class member has been interviewed in person (at least once), had their
biometrics collected, undergone further vetting if they applied for other benefits
(such as work authorization), and lived in the United States without incident.
Secretary Noem offers no explanation for why the timing of their initial interview
and biometrics collection—when they arrived at the port of entry rather than
before—creates any ongoing security concern.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
The court agrees in part with Plaintiffs’ argument. Plaintiffs are not challenging the
termination of the FRP programs. Plaintiffs are challenging the termination of grants of parole
held by individuals already in the United States. The Notice alleged various concerns
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surrounding how beneficiaries may perpetuate fraud. Termination of Family Reunification
Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58035. It also presented possible solutions to these concerns,
such as requiring applicants to interview and submit biometrics while abroad. Id. Yet, as noted,
at no point did the Federal Register Notice or the Administrative Record suggest that fraud has
occurred involving the affected parolees. That Plaintiffs have since been further vetted is not
directly relevant. More relevant is that the Notice identified potential concerns with vetting
generally and then relied on these concerns to look backwards and justify the termination of
grants that have already been awarded, without ever presenting tangible evidence that individuals
currently holding grants of parole were responsible for fraud. See Termination of Family
Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58035.
Finally, the Secretary’s security justification fails on another, related, ground. The
Federal Register Notice specifies that the agency’s national security concerns specifically apply
to the modernized FRP programs. Id. (“Given these critical differences, the procedures set forth
under the modernized FRP programs created an untenable likelihood that malicious actors could
enter the interior of the United States without proper vetting, thereby posing an unacceptable
level of risk to the United States’ national security and public safety.”). At the same time, the
Federal Register Notice acknowledged that “processing of applications that were pending under
legacy CFRP continued according to the process established in December 2014.” Id. at 58033
n.2. And the Notice reported “USCIS continued to interview pending legacy CFRP beneficiaries
at the USCIS Field Office in Havana, Cuba through January 2025 when processing was paused.”
Id. at 58035 n.14.11 Despite recognizing that the concerns raised regarding the modernized
11 The Legacy Haitian Family Reunification Parole program also required interviews. See
Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58035 (“In the legacy
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programs did not apply to the legacy programs, the Federal Register Notice nonetheless
announced termination for legacy parolees in their initial grant of parole. Id. at 58033.
In sum, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong likelihood that they will prevail on their
claim that the termination of existing awards of parole was arbitrary and capricious because DHS
both improperly weighed Plaintiffs’ reliance interests and used unsupported allegations regarding
insufficient vetting and fraud of current parolees as countervailing factors.
C. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Plaintiffs argue further that the “mass truncation” of existing FRP grants was a legislative
rule that required notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA. Pls.’ Mem. 18 [Doc. No. 218]
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)).12 They contend that, where the termination of existing FRP grants
“binds both the agency and the public” and “impos[es] new obligations where none previously
existed,” the termination was necessarily a legislative rule for which DHS was required to
undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 18–19. Defendants respond that the decision to
terminate parole grants was not a rule, but a policy statement exempt from the notice-and-
comment requirement, where it neither imposes any rights or obligations nor binds the agency in
light of “the discretion the notice expressly preserves.” Defs.’ Opp’n 22–23 [Doc. No. 251].
As relevant here, “general statements of policy” are “statements issued by an agency to
advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a
discretionary power.” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v.
CFRP program and legacy HFRP program, interviews provided an opportunity to gather
additional information about the beneficiary and identify any discrepancies between their
application and their in-person statements, as well as to surface any other potential concerns
through their testimony.”).
12 Plaintiffs do not argue that notice-and-comment rulemaking was required for the termination
of the FRP processes themselves. Pls.’ Mem. 19 n.23 [Doc. No. 218].
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Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979)) (emphases added). Whether an agency has issued a
policy statement or a legislative rule is an inquiry “enshrouded in considerable smog.” Northwest
Bypass Grp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 552 F. Supp. 2d 97, 120 n.27 (D.N.H. 2008)
(quoting Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see Lincoln,
508 U.S. at 197 (“Whatever else may be considered a general statement of policy, the term
surely includes an announcement . . . that an agency will discontinue a discretionary allocation of
unrestricted funds from a lump-sum appropriation.” (cleaned up)). Nevertheless, a key
distinction between the two is whether “an agency has issued a binding norm[.]” Wilderness
Soc’y v. Norton, 484 F.3d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see Northwest Bypass Grp., 552 F. Supp.
2d at 120; Conservation L. Found. of New England, Inc. v. Harper, 587 F. Supp. 357, 368 (D.
Mass. 1984) (documents issued by Department of Interior and Department of Agriculture not
properly categorized as general policy statements where they may have “establish[ed] binding
norms effectively supplanting administrative discretion”). A critical issue, then, is whether the
statement has “genuinely left the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion.”
Northwest Bypass Grp., 552 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (quoting CropLife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876,
883 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up)); see also Wilderness Soc’y, 484 F.3d at 595 (considering
whether the action has binding effects on private parties or on the agency). Where the
categorization of agency action as a legislative rule or policy statement largely turns on whether
the agency action is binding or permits the exercise of discretion, see CropLife Am., 329 F.3d at
883 and General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 383–85 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the court focuses the
inquiry there.
“[I]f a statement denies the decisionmaker discretion in the area of its coverage, so that
[the agency] will automatically decline to entertain challenges to the statement’s position, then
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the statement is binding, and creates rights or obligations.” General Elec. Co., 290 F.3d at 382
(quotation omitted). Here, the Federal Register Notice emphasizes the termination of all grants of
parole under the FRP Programs. See, e.g., 90 Fed. Reg. at 58043 (“DHS has determined that . . .
the parole of all aliens who have been paroled into the United States under the FRP programs
described in this notice, and whose initial period of parole has not already expired by January 14,
2026, will terminate on that date.”). Nonetheless, the Notice also explicitly references the
Secretary’s continuing discretion to determine “on a case-by-case basis” whether to keep an
affected noncitizen’s parole status in place. See id. (“There are two circumstances where an
alien’s parole will not terminate: (1) the alien filed a Form I-485[13] before December 15, 2025
that is still pending adjudication as of January 14, 2026; or (2) the Secretary determines
otherwise on a case-by-case basis.”); see also id. at 58043 n.90 (“[A]liens paroled into the United
States have been able, and will continue to be able, to apply for re-parole on a case-by-case basis
by filing Form I-131”); id. at 58043 (“[W]ith respect to re-parole requests filed by aliens who
were initially paroled under one of the FRP programs. . . . [t]he alien still must demonstrate
urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit specific to his or her case and that he or
she merits a favorable exercise of discretion for parole[.]”); id. at 58047 (“As of the date of this
notice Form I–131 may not be used to request an initial or new period of parole under one of the
FRP programs, but it may be used by a previous FRP beneficiary to request a new period of
parole, or re-parole, under DHS’s existing parole authority, on a case-by-case basis for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”).
13 A Form I-485 is an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status and is used
to apply for lawful permanent residency (a “green card”).
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Accepting that discretionary review prior to en masse termination of FRP parole grants is
in fact available as the Federal Register Notice asserts, the Federal Register Notice is a policy
statement for purposes of notice-and-comment that does not interfere with, change, or augment
the statutorily discretionary nature of the parole revocation. See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302
(whether an agency rule is one “affecting individual rights and obligations” is “an important
touchstone for distinguishing those rules that may be ‘binding’”); see also CropLife Am., 329
F.3d at 883 (“little doubt” that an agency directive bound private parties and agency with the
force of law where it “clearly establishe[d] a substantive rule declaring that third-party human
studies are now deemed immaterial in” regulatory decision-making under two statutory
schemes); General Elec. Co., 290 F.3d at 385 (an EPA guidance document “impose[d] binding
obligations upon applicants to submit applications that conform to the Document and upon the
Agency not to question an applicant’s use of [a particular toxicity factor]”); Conservation L.
Found., 567 F. Supp. at 367–68 (documents describing agencies’ “departmental procedures for
inventorying, selling or otherwise disposing of federal properties according to the Property
Review Board’s program” potentially binding where they may “effectively supplant[]
administrative discretion” in this area of agency action).
In sum, the court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of
success on their claim that notice-and-comment was required prior to the en masse termination of
FRP parole grants.14
14 The court notes, however, that, contrary to the assurances that a noncitizen’s parole “will not
terminate” if the Secretary exercises her discretion otherwise, and the further assurance that
parolees may “continue to be able to apply for re-parole on a case-by-case basis by filing a Form
I-131,” the electronic notice sent on January 5, 2026, made no mention of this discretionary
process. See Kernochan Decl. at ECF 7 [Doc. No. 250-1]. Instead, the notice is captioned
“Termination of Parole” and states, without exception, that DHS “is terminating your parole by
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D. Notice
Plaintiffs contend that DHS failed to give proper notice of termination, and that this
failure violated both DHS regulation and constitutional due process requirements. Here,
Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claims.
1. 	DHS Regulations
Under DHS regulations, “[p]arole shall be automatically terminated without written
notice” in two circumstances only: (1) upon the noncitizen’s departure from the United States;
and (2) at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1). In
all other circumstances, parole may only “be terminated upon written notice to the alien[.]” See 8
C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). Defendants do not dispute that the “written notice” requirement applies
here. See 90 Fed. Reg. at 58043 n.89 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)).
a. 	Notice by Publication
Defendants contend that Federal Register publication serves as “constructive notice” to
the parolees, sufficient for termination of their parole. 90 Fed. Reg. at 58045; Defs.’ Opp’n 17–
20 [Doc. No. 251]. But publication in the Federal Register does not directly communicate the
grant termination to the parolee. And, contrary to Defendants’ interpretation, the regulation does
not allow for constructive notice.
Defendants rely on 44 U.S.C. § 1507, which states in part that filing of a document with
the Office of the Federal Register, with a copy available for public inspection, “is sufficient to
issuing this Notice of Termination of Parole.” Id. The electronic notice states further that “[y]our
parole will terminate upon the earlier of (1) your original parole expiration date or (2) January
14, 2026.” Id. (emphasis added). If DHS continues to use notices in this form, without reference
to the purported re-parole process as an exception to the termination, Plaintiffs may renew their
argument that notice-and-comment is required.
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give notice of the contents of the document to a person subject to or affected by it.” Id. However,
that provision includes two significant caveats: (1) “[u]nless otherwise specifically provided by
statute,” and (2) “except in cases where notice by publication is insufficient in law.” Id. The
court finds that a plain reading of the pertinent DHS regulation renders the latter caveat
applicable; notice by publication “is insufficient,” id., where the law requires “written notice to”
the parolee. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i).
Defendants cite inapposite caselaw in support of their assertion that notice by publication
suffices in this case. See Defs.’ Opp’n 18 [Doc. No. 233] (citing Bank of Com. v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 513 F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1975)). The Tenth Circuit found that
bank charter applicants, who were not directly involved in the proceeding and claimed no direct
deprivation of property, had notice via publication that a competitor’s application was to be filed
because, inter alia, the applicants were represented by competent counsel and knew that notices
of such applications were published in the Federal Register. Id. at 167. Moreover, no applicable
statute or regulation required notice to competitors, and instead, the Board’s regulations required
publication in the Federal Register. Id. at n.4. Notably, the court explicitly stated, “We do not say
that notice by publication in the Federal Register would be sufficient in all cases.” Id. at 167.
This court finds notice by publication insufficient here. Where a plain reading of 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5(e)(2)(i) requires that DHS provide “written notice to” parolees whose grant is being
terminated, those parolees are being deprived of far more than property, they are not
sophisticated business entities, and they have no reason to anticipate that the parole termination
would occur through the Federal Register, notice by publication cannot suffice. Accord Camp v.
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 183 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (notice by publication was
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“insufficient in law” because the BLM had an “independent legal duty” to provide personal
notice to adjoining landowner of land exchange under federal regulations).
b. 	Individual Notices
In the Federal Register Notice, DHS described its intention to notify parolees in the
modernized FRP Programs of the termination through their online myUSCIS accounts. 90 Fed.
Reg. at 58045; Kernochan Decl. ¶ 12 [Doc. No. 250-1] (parolee applicants “were required to
create a myUSCIS online account in order to participate in the [modernized] FRP process.”). For
the legacy FRP program parolees, DHS stated that it intended to notify that group by mail. 90
Fed. Reg. at 58045.
Although the Federal Register Notice was issued on December 15, 2025, giving a
termination date of January 14, 2026, by the end of December, when Plaintiffs filed their
emergency motion, no electronic or mail notice had yet issued to the parolees. See Kernochan
Decl. ¶¶ 15–16, 18–19.
Instead, on January 5, 2026, after Plaintiffs sought emergency relief, DHS sent electronic
notices to a portion of the affected parolees. Kernochan Decl. ¶ 15 [Doc. No. 250-1] (“Of the
7,776 FRP parolees who were identified to have their parole terminated under the terms of the
Federal Register Notice, 3,501 terminations were pushed out to FRP parolees’ myUSCIS
accounts.”). Accordingly, even at that late date, DHS sent emails to a little less than half of the
affected parolees, “notifying them to check their case on their my USCIS account[;]” after
logging onto their accounts, the parolees would be able to view the electronic termination notice.
Id. at ¶ 14.
As noted above, the electronic notices announced a firm decision, effective just days
away, and made no mention of the Secretary’s discretionary review. Id. at ECF 7 (Electronic
Termination Notice, dated Jan. 5, 2026). The electronic notices also informed the recipient FRP
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parolees that their work authorizations would be revoked as of January 14, 2026, the same date
as the effective FRP Programs termination. Id. DHS regulations require that beneficiaries receive
fifteen days’ notice prior to the revocation of their work authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.14(b)(2).
Pursuant to the January 5, 2026 electronic notices (which only a portion of parolees received),
DHS only provided nine days’ notice. See Kernochan Decl. at ECF 7 [Doc. No. 250-1] (“your
unexpired parole-based employment authorization will be revoked as of January 14, 2026”).
Thus, the affected parolees did not receive proper notice of the revocation of their work
authorizations. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 274a.14(b)(2).15
Roughly half of the affected parolees did not receive any type of actual notice, let alone
the faulty January 5 electronic notice. DHS failed to send electronic notices to over four
thousand FRP parolees who had online accounts. Id. ¶ 16. DHS also failed to mail written
notices to the legacy FRP parolees, despite stating in the Federal Register Notice that such
written notices would be mailed to them. Id. ¶ 18. In sum, DHS’s attempt to comply with the
regulation’s “written notice” requirement failed. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). Less than a quarter of
the affected FRP parolees viewed any type of written notice, and those that did viewed a notice
with faulty information, Kernochan Decl. ¶¶ 17, 20 [Doc. No. 250-1], in contravention of DHS’s
regulations, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(e)(2)(i); 274a.14(b)(2), and without notice of the discretionary
re-parole specified in the Federal Register Notice. See 90 Fed. Reg. at 58043.
15 DHS states that the January 14 date for the revocation of employment authorization was a
“typo” and that DHS intended to list the date as January 20. Kernochan Decl. ¶ 20 [Doc. No.
250-1]. That assertion is not credible, as it would mean that DHS intended to terminate
employment authorization based on parole status five days after parole had already expired, an
untenable outcome.
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Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiffs have a high likelihood of success on showing
that Defendants did not provide the FRP parolees with written notice of the termination, as
required by regulation. The court acknowledges that Defendants have represented that, should
the court’s stay be lifted, “USCIS intends to provide new individualized notice to affected
parolees 30 days in advance of the termination of their parole grants, which should remedy the
Court’s concerns regarding notice.” Defs.’ Opp’n 2 [Doc. 251].16 The parties are welcome to
update the court as to any supplemental notice issued to the parolees. At present, the court finds
that proper notice was not provided.
2. 	Due Process
Plaintiffs also are likely to prevail on their claim that Defendants’ failure to provide
written notice of the grant terminations violated the FRP parolees’ due process rights. See
A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends
to all persons in the United States, regardless of status). When USCIS invited the FRP parolees
to submit their I-130 Petitions and move to this country, and DHS granted them multi-year terms
of parole, the parolees had reasonable expectations that they would be entitled to retain their
16 The court notes that, contrary to Defendants’ representation, the USCIS website currently
includes no such assurance of a 30-day notice period. Referring to the court’s Temporary
Restraining Order [Doc. No. 243], a December 12, 2025 press release states:
The stay will be in effect until Jan. 24, 2026, which means that the parole and
corresponding employment authorization of those who are affected by the parole
revocation will not terminate before Jan. 25, 2026. USCIS vehemently disagrees
with and continues to contest the court’s order but we will follow the terms of the
order pending further actions by the court.
USCIS, DHS ENDS THE ABUSE OF THE HUMANITARIAN P AROLE P ROCESS AND TERMINATES
FAMILY R EUNIFICATION P AROLE P ROGRAMS , https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/alerts/dhs-ends-
the-abuse-of-the-humanitarian-parole-process-and-terminates-family-reunification-parole (last
visited Jan. 24, 2026).
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liberty pursuant to some additional quantum of process. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
601–03 (1972) (finding reliance on governmental representations may establish a legitimate
claim of entitlement to a constitutionally-protected interest).
Defendants maintain that notice by publication satisfies due process requirements, see
Defs.’ Opp’n 20–21 [Doc. No. 251], but the court finds it highly unlikely that any parolees were
made aware of their grant terminations by a Federal Register Notice.17
Defendants cannot render the FRP parolees’ presence in the United States unlawful
without minimally informing the parolees of such a decision. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950) (The Constitution requires “notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action[.]”). Due
process demands that DHS provide parolees with individualized and meaningful notice. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1972) (a parolee’s “liberty is valuable and must be
seen as within the protection of” due process). That notice is particularly critical here where
Defendants defend the termination of existing grants of parole on the ground that exceptions to
termination may be made in the Secretary’s case-by-case discretion. See Defs.’ Opp’n 23 [Doc.
No. 251]; 90 Fed. Reg. at 58033. Also of crucial importance, Plaintiffs, in many cases, have
waited for more than a decade for an immigrant visa, see Francisca Doe Decl. ¶ 7 [Doc. No. 214-
3], and may forfeit that opportunity if they remain in this country after being stripped of their
parole, and concomitant legal status, without notice. See supra Sections V.B.2.a (“Plaintiffs’
Reliance Interests), infra VI (“Irreparable Harm”).
17 Cf. California ex rel. Lockyer v. F.E.R.C., 329 F.3d 700, 707–11 (9th Cir. 2003) (notice by
publication sufficient for “a public utility that participates in a heavily regulated industry” and
non-violative of 5th Amendment rights).
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VI. 	Irreparable Harm18
“‘Irreparable injury’ in the preliminary injunction context means an injury that cannot
adequately be compensated for either by a later-issued permanent injunction, after a full
adjudication on the merits, or by a later-issued damages remedy.” Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr.,
Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 76 (1st Cir. 2005). “[T]he measure of irreparable harm is not a rigid
one; it has been referred to as a sliding scale, working in conjunction with a moving party’s
likelihood of success on the merits.” Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 485
(1st Cir. 2009). “[T]he issuance of a preliminary injunction requires a showing of irreparable
harm to the movant rather than to one or more third parties.” CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean
Coast Props., Inc., 48 F.3d 618, 622 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted). And “plaintiffs seeking
preliminary relief [are required] to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of
an injunction.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (emphasis omitted).
Here, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of irreparable
harm where Plaintiffs and the class “are aware that parole is a discretionary benefit, terminable at
any time[,]” were “at no point” guaranteed parole or re-parole, and are not necessarily foreclosed
from alternative paths to remaining in the country. Defs.’ Opp’n 24–25 [Doc. No. 251]; see id. at
25 (arguing that litigants “may apply for another period of parole” or “pursue a family-based
immigrant visa from abroad” and stating that “those parolees whose adjustment applications
have been or will be denied . . . when the TRO expires[] lack any argument to remain in the
United States”).
18 Defendants argue irreparable harm, balance of the equities, and the public interest together.
See Defs.’ Opp’n 23–25 [Doc. No. 251].
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But Defendants do not meaningfully engage with the significant real-world harms
identified by Plaintiffs. Centrally, Plaintiffs, many of whom left jobs or school and sold their
homes, cars and other possessions, came to the United States to reunite with their family
members, pursuant to a program to which the government invited them to apply. See
Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes, 90 Fed. Reg. at 58034, 58041–42. They
are now faced with two injurious choices should the Secretary’s Federal Register Notice take
effect: (1) separate from those families, communities, and jobs, leave the United States,
potentially abandon or moot their APA claims challenging the Notice, and return to countries in
which they no longer have homes and jobs; or (2) remain in the United States, begin accruing
unlawful presence here, and risk consequences ranging from detention and removal, forfeiture of
their priority date for an immigrant visa, to multi-year bans19 on readmission. See, e.g., David
Doe Decl. ¶ 17 [Doc. No. 214-2] (“If we [Doe, his wife, and two sons] had to leave, I would
have to give up my job, and we do not have jobs or possessions to return to in Ecuador, which
will make it hard to ensure we can provide for our family consistently.”); id. (“We would have to
return to a situation in Ecuador that is not stable or safe for our family.”); Francisca Doe Decl.
¶¶ 7, 16 [Doc. No. 214-3] (attesting to frequent gang threats faced by parolee and her children in
their native country and stating that “going back would mean returning to the same economic
hardships and threats to our safety that we had escaped before.”); Jose Doe Decl. ¶ 18 [Doc. No.
214-5] (“We have nothing to go back to in Honduras. No car, no roof, no bed.”). The harm
19 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (noncitizens who voluntarily depart after accruing more
than six months but less than one year of unlawful presence are barred from admission for three
years); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (noncitizens who voluntarily depart or are removed after
accruing one year or more of unlawful presence are barred from admission for ten years).
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flowing to Plaintiffs is thus significant, immediate, and very likely impossible to rectify through
final relief that may come at an indeterminate future point.
Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that irreparable
harm is likely to occur should the court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for preliminary relief [Doc. No.
216].
VII. 	Balance of Equities and the Public Interest
The balance of equities and public interest factors “‘merge when the [g]overnment is the
opposing party.’” Does 1-6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20, 37 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)) (alteration in original).
Plaintiffs point to “the concrete and irreparable injury facing Plaintiffs and other FRP
parolees, as well as their U.S. citizen and LPR families,” described supra, as support for their
position that the balance of equities and the public interest weigh in favor of preliminary
injunctive relief. Pls.’ Mem. 20 [Doc. No. 218]. Defendants assert, inter alia, that the nation
“suffers a form of irreparable harm to its democratic system when it is prohibited from
effectuating the President’s policies” and that preliminary injunctive relief would constitute
“‘unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy’” (quoting Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013)); injure the “Legislative Branch’s prerogatives”
by “bypass[ing] a judicial-review bar”; “improperly encroach[] on the core Executive function of
managing the immigration system”; and unnecessarily consume DHS resources with individual
parole terminations while delaying the agency’s “ability to address the national security and
public safety concerns that animated, in part, the Secretary’s decisions to terminate parole
grants.” Defs.’ Opp’n 23–24 [Doc. No. 251].
The Secretary, and the Executive Branch more broadly, possess significant discretion in
the administration of this country’s immigration system. See Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667,
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702 (2018) (“[T]he admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial
control.” (quotation omitted)). And, as Defendants rightly emphasize, the Secretary’s discretion
in the particular area of immigration law with which this case is concerned—the grant or
termination of parole—is made plain in the statutory language. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). The
court’s order here does not restrain that discretion writ large—if the Secretary choses to prioritize
“enforcement-based priorities” over reunification of law-abiding family members, that certainly
falls within her discretion. But the court must also weigh the “substantial public interest in
having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and
operations.” New York v. McMahon, 784 F. Supp. 3d 311, 372 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting League
of Women Voters of the United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
The court further considers the limited nature of the relief contemplated in this order.
Preliminary relief in this instance does not authorize the entry of any individual or class of
individuals into the United States, compel the Secretary to alter criteria for the admission of
individuals into the United States, or extend or re-issue the FRP grants of parole at issue. Instead,
the court’s order would only maintain the status quo: noncitizens living in the United States
under FRP grants of parole that have not yet expired would continue to live in this country with
legal status, just as they would have absent the Secretary’s procedurally defective FRP Federal
Register Notice. Nor does the court’s order prohibit early termination of FRP grants of parole
following an administrative process that fairly weighs reliance interests, avoids unsubstantiated
fraud allegations, provides proper notice of changes, and allows time for the Secretary’s
discretionary review before such termination.
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Accordingly, the court finds the balance of equities and public interest weigh in favor of
preliminary relief.
VIII. 	Defendants’ Bond Request
Defendants request that, should the court grant “temporary injunctive relief,” it should
impose a bond on Plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). Defs.’ Opp’n 25
[Doc. No. 251].
Under Rule 65(c), the court “may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary
restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to
pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or
restrained.” The First Circuit has noted the “ample authority for the proposition that the
provisions of Rule 65(c) are not mandatory and that a district court retains substantial discretion
to dictate the terms of an injunction bond.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 925 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1991).
The court considers the damages and costs Defendants would incur if they were
wrongfully enjoined. Defendants indicate that “[a] stay by the district court would force DHS to
individually terminate each grant of parole, costing the agency time and resources[.]” Defs.’
Opp’n 24 [Doc. No. 251]. But Defendants do not state such costs with specificity and, in any
event, the objection contradicts Defendants’ repeated statements that the Secretary retains
discretion as to individual parole decisions. Nor do Defendants explain what, if any, monetary
damages they will sustain should it later be determined that the court erred in granting Plaintiffs’
motion. See, e.g., Liu v. Noem, 780 F. Supp. 3d 386, 405 (D.N.H. 2025) (waiving bond
requirement where defendants requested that plaintiff post bond but did not “request a specific
amount,” “explain any costs they will incur by complying with the preliminary injunction,” or
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describe “any damages they will have sustained” if the preliminary injunction was later found to
be erroneous).
Where Defendants have not sufficiently demonstrated the loss they will purportedly
incur, and where the court finds that the imposition of a bond would pose a substantial hardship
and unduly burden Plaintiffs’ ability to seek to enforce their procedural rights, the court waives
the bond requirement under Rule 65(c). See Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano
Moving, 679 F.2d 978, 1000 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[I]n non-commercial cases, the court should
consider the possible loss to the enjoined party together with the hardship that a bond
requirement would impose on the applicant[,]” and “[s]econd, in order not to restrict a federal
right unduly, the impact that a bond requirement would have on enforcement of the right[.]”).
IX. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and/or Stay of
En Masse Truncation of Family Reunification Parole [Doc. No. 216] is GRANTED as follows:
The Termination of Family Reunification Parole Processes for Colombians, Cubans,
Ecuadorians, Guatemalans, Haitians, Hondurans, and Salvadorans, 90 Fed. Reg. 58032 (Dec. 15,
2025) is hereby preliminarily ENJOINED under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and STAYED pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 705 insofar as it terminates previously granted parole and revokes work authorization
issued to noncitizens paroled into the United States pursuant to the FRP Programs prior to the
noncitizens’ originally stated parole expiration dates.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 24, 2026 	/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
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