O'Connell v. Newton Public Schools

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
SYDNI O’CONNELL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 25-CV-10192-AK
v. )
)
NEWTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON NEWTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
ANGEL KELLEY, D.J.
Sydni O’Connell (“O’Connell”), formerly Sydni Salvatore, brings this action against
Newton Public Schools (“NPS”). O’Connell alleges that NPS wrongfully terminated her for
non-compliance with its mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy (“Vaccination Policy”),
constituting religious discrimination and a violation of her First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion. [Dkt. 1]. O’Connell brings religious discrimination claims under both
federal and state law, while she brings her First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. NPS
filed a Motion to dismiss the action in its entirety [Dkt. 12], which O’Connell opposes [Dkt. 13].
For the following reasons, NPS’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2021, NPS, where O’Connell was working as a school psychologist,
instituted a Vaccination Policy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. [See Dkts. 1 at ¶¶ 10-11;
1-3; 12-2]. According to NPS, the Vaccination Policy maintained “consisten[cy] with public
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health guidance and the Governor’s Order.”1 [Dkt. 12-2]. The Vaccination Policy required all
NPS staff to either (1) show by October 15, 2021, that they had been vaccinated with an
authorized COVID-19 vaccine, or (2) request a medical or religious exemption, which NPS must
approve within that same timeframe. [Dkts. 1 at ¶¶ 11-12; 12-2; 12-4]. If exempted, employees
needed to either comply with weekly COVID-19 testing provided by NPS or provide NPS with
weekly, independently administered, negative COVID-19 test results. [Dkts. 1 at ¶ 12; 12-2].
According to O’Connell’s Complaint, she submitted a timely exemption request based on
her religion, Greek Orthodox Christianity, on October 15, 2021. [Dkts. 1 at ¶¶ 13-14; 1-3]. NPS
denied her exemption request, after which she submitted a grievance, which was denied on or
about December 6, 2021. [Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 15-16]. Conversely, NPS claims that O’Connell failed to
disclose multiple rounds of communication between her and NPS prior to the ultimate denial of
her exemption request. According to NPS, O’Connell first submitted a religious exemption
request on October 8, 2021, declaring herself exempt because her “religious beliefs prevent [her]
from being injected with any foreign substance.” [Dkt. 12-3]. On October 12, 2021, a human
resources director for NPS notified O’Connell that her request was denied because she failed to
identify her “sincerely-held religious belief or support that the belief precludes vaccination.”
[Dkt. 12-4]. O’Connell was told she could request reconsideration but would need to submit, by
October 15, a “signed affidavit from an authorized representative of [her] religious group” and
1 The Vaccination Policy referenced the Governor of Massachusetts’s Executive Order No. 595
(https://www.mass.gov/executive-orders/no-595-implementing-a-requirement-for-covid-19-vaccination-for-the-
commonwealths-executive-department-employees), and public health guidance from the Massachusetts Department
of Public Health (https://www.mass.gov/info-details/covid-19-vaccine-information), the Center for Disease Control
and Prevention’s August 5, 2021 “Guidance for COVID-19 Prevention in K-12 Schools”
(https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/108529), and the joint “COVID-19 Guidance for Districts and Schools: Fall 2021 –
July 30, 2021” memo from the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education and the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health (https://www.boston.com/news/education/2021/07/30/ma-releases-
mask-guidelines-for-the-fall-school-year/). Note that the website for the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
has been updated since the Vaccination Policy was adopted.
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“[r]ecent literature” from the religious group highlighting the belief(s) that prohibit the COVID-
19 vaccine. [Id.].
On October 15, 2021, O’Connell submitted a second religious exemption request; in it,
O’Connell identified her religion as Greek Orthodox Christianity and provided three quotations.
[Dkts. 1 at ¶¶ 13-14; 1-3]. The first quotation, from a church declaration, explained that since
the Greek Orthodox Church held a “categorical opposition to conducting experiments on human
embryonic cells,” receiving the COVID-19 vaccine would be a “contradiction” to the faith. [Dkt.
1-3]. The other two quotations, taken from religious passages, were offered as explanation for
why O’Connell does not believe in “coerced medical treatment” or “putting unnecessary
medicines” into her body. [Id.]. The Human Resources Office for NPS responded to
O’Connell’s second submission by email that same day and stated that she still had not met the
threshold for exemption. [Dkt. 12-5; see also Dkt. 1 at ¶ 15]. O’Connell was given an extension,
until October 20, to submit both the signed affidavit and religious literature that NPS previously
requested. [Dkt. 12-5].
On October 20, 2021, O’Connell told NPS that she would not be submitting the requested
materials but that she and NPS should continue to “engage in the interactive process” regarding
her request. [Id.]. Later that day, NPS told O’Connell that she would be placed “on unpaid leave
effective October 25th for failure to comply” with the Vaccination Policy. [Id.]. As stated above,
O’Connell then at some point grieved the denial of her October 15 request. The Newton School
Committee denied that grievance around December 6, 2021. [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 16]. O’Connell was
terminated from her employment with NPS on or about January 26, 2022. [Id. at ¶ 17].
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face” and
actionable as a matter of law. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Reading the complaint “as a whole,” the court
must conduct a two-step, context-specific inquiry. García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d
100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013). First, the court must perform a close reading of the complaint to
distinguish factual allegations from conclusory legal statements. See id. Factual allegations must
be accepted as true, while legal conclusions are not entitled to credit. Id. A court may not
disregard properly pleaded factual allegations even if actual proof of those facts is improbable.
Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted). Second, the court must determine whether the factual allegations present a “reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Haley v. City of Bos., 657 F.3d
39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint fails to
allege a “plausible entitlement to relief.” Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d
92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559).
III. DISCUSSION
a. Religious Discrimination (Count I)
Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, Massachusetts law prohibits
conditions of employment that “would require [an] individual to violate . . . [their] creed or
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religion.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1A). Chapter 151B, the “statute prohibiting
employment discrimination based on religion[,] ‘has been interpreted largely to mirror Title
VII.’” Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc., 113 F.4th 9, 12 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 2004)).
i. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
“Title VII requires an employee to file an administrative charge [with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)] as a prerequisite to commencing a civil action
for employment discrimination. The purpose of that requirement is to provide the employer with
prompt notice of the claim and to create an opportunity for early conciliation.” Fantini v. Salem
State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009). “[A] charge of discrimination under Title VII must
be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.” Andujar v. Nortel
Networks, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 306, 311 (D. Mass. 2005). Before a litigant can proceed in
federal court, the EEOC must either provide a right-to-sue letter to the employee or will itself
bring a civil action against the employer in its capacity as an enforcement agency. See Jorge v.
Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 2005). Once the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, a
plaintiff can file a complaint in federal court within ninety days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1);
29 U.S.C. § 626(e); see also Jorge, 404 F.3d at 564.
Massachusetts employs a similar exhaustion requirement, requiring employees to file a
complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (“MCAD”) before filing
suit in court. See Dunn v. Langevin, 211 N.E.3d 1059, 1062 (Mass. 2023); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
151B, § 9. MCAD has the same charge-filing deadline as the EEOC (within 300 days of the
alleged discriminatory act); however, it has its own statutory time limit to bring a suit after filing
a charge. A litigant may file a complaint in court ninety days after filing their charge with the
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MCAD, “or sooner if a commissioner assents in writing,” but no “later than three years after the
alleged” discriminatory act. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, §§ 5, 9.
In its Motion to Dismiss, NPS argues that the religious discrimination claims should be
dismissed because O’Connell failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under Title VII and
Chapter 151B, as required prior to filing a suit in either state or federal court. Jorge, 404 F.3d at
564; see also Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 551 (2019) (“Title VII’s charge-
filing provisions speak to a party’s [mandatory] procedural obligations. They require
complainants to submit information to the EEOC and to wait a specified period before
commencing a civil action.” (citation modified)); Lebron-Rios v. U.S. Marshal Serv., 341 F.3d 7,
14 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies ‘bars the courthouse door, as
courts long have recognized that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a prerequisite to the
commencement of suit.’” (quoting Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st
Cir. 1999))). A plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense,
which can be addressed through a motion to dismiss when the facts forming the defense are plain
and clear from the plaintiff’s pleadings. See Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, 126 F.4th 76,
82 (1st Cir. 2025) (citing Zenon v. Guzman, 924 F.3d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 2019)); Owens v. West,
182 F. Supp. 2d 180, 190 (D. Mass. 2001).
In this case, O’Connell does not allege in her Complaint [Dkt. 1] nor raise in her
Opposition [Dkt. 13] that she filed her claim with either the EEOC or MCAD; thus, she never
received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC or complied with Massachusetts state law
administrative requirements. As a result, it is clear from the pleadings that O’Connell has not
exhausted her administrative remedies and her claims of religious discrimination must be
dismissed. See Innocent v. HarborOne Bank, 319 F. Supp. 3d 571, 573-74 (D. Mass. 2018).
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One question remains: Is this dismissal with or without prejudice? The First Circuit has
made clear that while dismissal without prejudice is generally appropriate if the employee still
has an opportunity to file the charge with the EEOC, when “[t]he period for filing a charge ha[s]
lapsed,” the case should be dismissed with prejudice. Lebron-Rios, 341 F.3d at 14-15 (citing
Bonilla, 194 F.3d at 278). Given the date of O’Connell’s termination, she should have filed a
claim with the EEOC and/or MCAD by November 22, 2022, 300 days after she was
terminated—and more than three years ago. Because O’Connell can no longer timely file with
either agency, her federal and state religious discrimination claims must be dismissed with
prejudice and NPS’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to O’Connell’s religious discrimination
claims.
b. Free Exercise Violation (Count II)
“The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause . . . protects religious liberty against
government interference.” Does 1-6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)); see also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.
v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449, 458 (2017) (“The First Amendment provides, in part, that ‘Congress
shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].’”). The Free Exercise Clause
protects from unequal treatment based on religion, Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S. at 458, and from
“governmental compulsion either to do or refrain from doing an act forbidden or required by
one’s religion.” Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 103, 105 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
i. Standard of Scrutiny
When assessing a free exercise claim, the Court must first establish the correct standard
of scrutiny. “When a religiously neutral and generally applicable law incidentally burdens free
exercise rights, [courts] will [employ rational basis review to determine] if it is rationally related
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to a legitimate governmental interest. When a law is not neutral or generally applicable,
however, [courts] may sustain it only if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest,” thereby satisfying strict scrutiny. Does 1-6, 16 F.4th at 29 (citing Fulton
v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 532-33, 540-41 (2021)). Neutrality requires that a rule or
policy does not single out religion or religious practice, while general applicability requires a law
or regulation to provide equal treatment to both religious and comparable secular conduct. See
id. at 29-30. A rule is “not generally applicable if it treats any comparable secular activity more
favorably than religious exercise,” Lowe v. Mills, 68 F.4th 706, 714 (1st Cir. 2023) (citation
modified), or if it “invites the government to consider the particular reasons for a person’s
conduct by providing a mechanism for individualized exemptions.” Fulton, 593 U.S. at 533-34
(citation modified). Thus, if NPS “reserve[d] the authority to ‘grant exemptions based on the
circumstances underlying each application,’” strict scrutiny must apply. Does 1-6, 16 F.4th at 30
(quoting Fulton, 593 U.S. at 534).
Although not a model of clarity, O’Connell’s Complaint alleges sufficient facts to
reasonably infer that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard. Assuming all facts in the
Complaint as true, while the Vaccination Policy was almost certainly neutral, it is plausible that
the Vaccination Policy was not generally applicable. The Vaccination Policy allowed for two
types of exemptions: (1) medical and (2) religious. In reviewing O’Connell’s Complaint, it
remains plausible that NPS assessed these exemptions differently, allowing NPS to grant
exemptions based on the circumstances underlying each application. O’Connell alleged that
NPS did, in fact, grant at least one exemption, without identifying if it was medical or religious
in nature. In making her request, O’Connell was told that a religious exemption required two
types of supporting documentation, an affidavit and recent literature. It remains unclear if the
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same or similar requirements were needed for a medical exemption. Reviewing the Complaint
as a whole and assuming all facts as true, it is plausible that religious exemptions were treated
differently from medical exemptions, requiring additional documentation not otherwise required
for the secular, medical exemption. Additionally, it remains plausible that NPS exercised
discretion in determining the sufficiency of the requested “recent literature.” See Lowe, 68 F.4th
at 709 (requiring further factual development where potential for unequal treatment was alleged);
but see Does 1-6, 16 F.4th at 30 (stating that acceptance of a written statement from a medical
professional for an exemption was not an exercise of discretion). Thus, at this stage, it is
reasonable to infer the Vaccination Policy was not enforced with general applicability, and as a
result, strict scrutiny must apply.
ii. Strict Scrutiny
Dismissal of O’Connell’s free exercise claim at this stage would require the Court to find
that, based on the facts in the Complaint, NPS’ Vaccination Policy withstands strict scrutiny.
See Lowe, 68 F.4th at 717-18. On this record, NPS is unable to meet that standard. Strict
scrutiny requires the Vaccination Policy to “be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.” Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 18 (2020) (citation
modified). Narrow tailoring means NPS employed the “least restrictive means” possible to
achieve the stated interest. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. Of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981). In other words, if NPS could “achieve its interests in a manner that does not burden
religion, it must do so.” Lowe, 68 F.4th at 717 (quoting Fulton, 593 U.S. at 541).
While NPS argues, and the Court agrees, there was a compelling interest, namely the
health and safety of teachers, staff, students, and the general public, it is less clear whether the
policy was sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. See Does 1-6, 16 F.4th at 32
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(“Few interests are more compelling than protecting public health against a deadly virus.”);
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35 (“[T]he legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the
common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.”).
Specifically, the First Circuit has held that citing health guidance from state agencies to
rationalize a vaccination policy as the “least restrictive means” does not suffice to establish the
policy satisfied strict scrutiny. Lowe, 68 F.4th at 718. Overall, sufficient facts exist in the
Complaint to reasonably infer that the Vaccination Policy was not the least restrictive means
possible to achieve the stated compelling interest. As it remains plausible that strict scrutiny
applies, which the Vaccination Policy fails to satisfy, NPS’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to
O’Connell’s free exercise claim.
c. O’Connell’s Other Claims
O’Connell’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 13] introduces new
claims that are not present in her Complaint. From trying to morph her Title VII claim into a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, and adding retaliation and free speech allegations,
O’Connell essentially rewrites her Complaint through the Opposition. O’Connell can only add
new claims by amending her original Complaint: “[A] plaintiff[] cannot, of course, add
allegations or claims by furnishing them for the first time in an opposition to a motion to
dismiss.” Ortiz v. Jimenez-Sanchez, 98 F. Supp. 3d 357, 365 n.5 (D.P.R. 2015); see also Rasla v.
Wells, No. 23-CV-12499-DJC, 2024 WL 3952752, at *2 n.2 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2024)
(“[Plaintiff] cannot assert new claims in an opposition and, therefore, the Court does not consider
these allegations.”); Ellis v. N. Andover Pub. Schs., 569 F. Supp. 3d 61, 65 (D. Mass. 2021)
(holding it is “well-settled” that new theories of liability may not be raised in opposition papers,
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but rather an amended complaint). Therefore, O’Connell’s additional claims will not be
considered here.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, NPS’ Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 12] is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 23, 2026 /s/ Angel Kelley
Hon. Angel Kelley
United States District Judge
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