Button et al v. Melcher

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
DUSTY BUTTON and MITCHELL
TAYLOR BUTTON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MAURA MELCHER,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 24-12632-WGY
ORDER
January 9, 2026
YOUNG, D.J.
In this action, pro se plaintiffs Dusty Button and Mitchell
Taylor Button filed a 121-page complaint in which they asserted
state law tort claims against Massachusetts attorney Maura
Melcher arising out of her representation of Sage Humphries. 	On
March 24, 2025, the Court dismissed this action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(D)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, concluding that the litigation privilege
precluded Plaintiff’s claims. 	(Dkt. #10). 	The Court found
that, given the broad scope of the litigation privilege, it
would be futile to give Plaintiffs the opportunity to file an
amended complaint.
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of the action. 	On
December 16, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the
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First Circuit issued its judgment, in which it affirmed in part
and vacated in part the Court’s order dismissing this action.
(Dkt. #22).1 	The First Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs had not
“demonstrated that the litigation privilege does not bar their
claims and allegations that related to the judicial proceedings
before the Boston Municipal Court or the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada.” 	Id. at 1.
Nonetheless, the First Circuit stated that the complaint
“contains certain allegations that appear unrelated to the
judicial proceedings,” such as Melcher “encourag[ing] her
client(s) to disseminate information to third persons for
posting on social media.” 	Id. at 2. 	The First Circuit
concluded that although these allegations were “insufficient to
state a claim,” “dismissal of the complaint without allowing the
appellants an opportunity to amend the claims that are not
barred by the litigation privilege was not warranted.” 	Id.
In accordance with the First Circuit’s remand, the Court
will give Plaintiffs an opportunity to file an amended complaint
limited to claims that are not barred by the litigation
privilege.
1 The mandate of the First Circuit issued on January 7, 2026.
(Dkt. #23).
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The amended complaint must contain a “short and plain”
statement of Plaintiff’s claims. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 	The
requirement of a “short and plain” statement of a claim
“proscribes the obfuscation of the plaintiff’s claims.” 	Kensu
v. Corizon, Inc., 5 F.4th 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2021).
“Unnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified
burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because
they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of
verbiage.” 	Miranda v. United States, 105 Fed. App’x 280, 281
(1st Cir. 2004) (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1281, at 522 (2d ed. 1990)).
Similarly, “where the lack of organization and basic coherence
renders a complaint too confusing to determine the facts that
constitute the alleged wrongful conduct, dismissal is an
appropriate remedy.” 	Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th
Cir. 2011).
In addition, the amended complaint must show that
Plaintiffs are “entitled to relief” under a cognizable legal
theory. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 	In other words, the complaint
must contain sufficient factual allegations, which, treated as
true, reasonably infer that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	In evaluating
the sufficiency of the complaint, the court only considers
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“well-pleaded” factual allegations. 	Id. at 678-79. 	Pleadings
that “are no more than conclusions[] are not entitled to the
presumption of truth.” 	Id. at 679. 	“While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported
by factual allegations.” 	Id. 	“If the factual allegations in
the complaint are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the
possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture, the
complaint is open to dismissal.” 	S.E.C. v. Tambone, 597 F.3d
436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010).
Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiffs file
an amended complaint within twenty-eight (28) days if they wish
to proceed with this action. 	Failure to do so will result in
dismissal of this action.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE
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