Degree v. City of Lowell et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEVANTE DEGREE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-12415-NMG
THOMAS E. JANECZAK,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANT THOMAS JANECZAK’S MOTION TO DISMISS (#35.)1
KELLEY, U.S.M.J.
I. Introduction.
The Plaintiff, DeVanté DeGree, claims that from June 2015 to December 2020,2 he was
the victim of a campaign of harassment and intimidation where police charged him with numerous
criminal and civil violations, all of which were dismissed or resulted in his being found not
responsible. (#16 ¶¶ 1-2, 24, 59.) He alleges that the charges were brought in retaliation for his
and his mother’s exercising their First Amendment rights in protesting the death of a relative after
an encounter with the police. Id. ¶¶ 12-18. Degree brought this suit against the City of Lowell
(“the City”), several Lowell Police Department (“LPD”) officers, an LPD detective (collectively,
the “Lowell Defendants”), and a Massachusetts State Police trooper, Thomas Janeczak. (#1.) In
1 This matter was referred to this court for report and recommendation. (#38.)
2 As set out below, the four incidents which are the subject of this lawsuit actually occurred in
2020, 2022, and two in 2024. The court presumes the complaint misstates the date range of the
alleged campaign of harassment.
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the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (#16), Degree brings fifteen counts alleging
federal and state civil rights violations and common law claims and seeks monetary damages,
costs, and fees.
The Lowell Defendants previously moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (#19.) This court issued a report and recommendation recommending
that all claims against the City, the LPD detective, and all the LPD officers but for one, Danny
Perrin, Jr., be dismissed from the case (#47); District Judge Gorton adopted the recommendation
(#51). See Degree v. City of Lowell, Civil Action No. 24-12415-NMG, 2025 WL 2347548, at *1
(D. Mass. July 15, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2347433 (D. Mass. Aug.
12, 2025).
In this separate motion, Trooper Janeczak moves to dismiss Degree’s claims against him
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).3 (#35.) Degree opposes (#44); Janeczak filed a reply (#48).
For the reasons that follow, this court recommends that Janeczak’s motion (#35) be allowed
as to all claims, except for so much of Count 1 that asserts a Fourth Amendment claim under §
1983 based on the traffic stop of Degree and the inventory search of his car.
II. Background.
The facts are drawn from the SAC and at this stage of the case are accepted as true. See
McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2017).
A. Degree Is Targeted by the Police After Peacefully Petitioning.
3 Degree has agreed to dismiss Counts 9 through 12, alleging “Civil rights conspiracy under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3)” (Count 9), “Violation of the Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”
(Count 10), “Coercive common law conspiracy” (Count 11), and “Joint liability common law
conspiracy” (Count 12), without prejudice. Janeczak does not object to the dismissal being without
prejudice. See ##35, 37. The court does not address these counts here except to recommend that
they be dismissed without prejudice.
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The SAC alleges that over several months in 2020 and 2021, Degree’s mother, Tina
DeGree (“Tina”), peacefully petitioned the City together with other members of the community
for more information after Moses Harris, her nephew, died after an encounter with an LPD officer.
(#16 ¶¶ 16-17.)4 	According to Degree, because of her relationship to Moses Harris and her
petitioning, employees and representatives of the City and the LPD “targeted” Tina in order to
silence her. Id. ¶ 18.
Degree asserts that the Defendants have had “numerous interactions and exchanges” with
him, his mother, and Louise Harris Daddeh, (the mother of Moses Harris, the deceased), and that
the Defendants “visually recognize” them, know their residences, and recognize the cars they
drive. 	Id. ¶¶ 20-21. 	Degree alleges that they targeted him, both because he is Tina’s son and
because of “[his] exercise of [his] First Amendment rights.” Id. ¶¶ 15, 16, 22. He claims that the
Defendants “brought criminal charges and civil violations” against him “as a means to silence
him” and in retaliation for the petitioning.5 Id. ¶¶ 59-60.
The SAC states that Degree was charged in the Lowell District Court eleven times with
operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license and other motor vehicle charges, charges that
4 Tina, represented by the same attorney who represents Degree here, filed a suit in this Court that
is presently pending before District Judge Burroughs, Degree v. Gendreau, et al., Civil Action No.
24-10686-ADB, alleging civil rights and tort claims against members of the LPD and other
employees of the City. The case is based on Tina’s arrest at a protest outside police headquarters
on March 20, 2021, and her subsequent criminal prosecution. Moses Harris’ mother, Louise Harris
Daddeh, also represented by the same attorney, filed a suit against the City, its employees, and the
LPD, among others, alleging civil rights and tort claims based on the death of her son. That case
was dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Louise Harris Daddeh v. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, et al., Civil Action No. 23-13116-GAO. The facts of that case, in which Moses
Harris allegedly was chased by a LPD officer to the banks of the Concord River and then drowned,
are set out in District Judge O’Toole’s Order dismissing it. See id., Docket No. 29.
5 The SAC does not include any facts concerning Degree’s involvement in “petitioning.” See #16
¶¶ 17-22.
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were all eventually dismissed or resulted in Degree’s being found not responsible.6 Id. ¶ 23. The
SAC then alleges that “[t]he pattern of harassment and intimidation has continued” with four
criminal cases brought in the Lowell District Court “on which this civil rights action is based:
2011CR001972, 2211CR004419, 2411CR001834, and 2411CR001904.” 	Id. ¶ 24. 	The SAC
alleges that those four cases were either all dismissed or resulted in Degree’s being found not
responsible. Id. ¶ 2. Only the last of those four cases, the one involving Trooper Janeczak, is at
issue here, but the court will discuss all of them to put its decision in context.
B. The Eleven Charges of Driving Without a License and Other Motor Vehicle Offenses.
As noted above, the SAC states that the claims in this case are based on four Lowell District
Court cases that were brought against Degree, see id. ¶ 24; however, paragraph 23 of the SAC lists
eleven other cases that were brought against Degree in the Lowell District Court “as a means to
silence him.” Id. ¶ 22. On June 23, 2025, at oral argument on the Lowell Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, see #42, this court asked the parties whether Degree’s license was, in fact, suspended
when he was charged with the offenses listed in paragraph 23. Neither side knew. See #43 at 1-
2. The Lowell Defendants answered the question in a Notice of Supplemental Authority filed soon
after the argument. 	Id. 	Attached to the Notice is a certified copy of Degree’s driving history,
which counsel obtained via a public records request. Id. at 2; see #43-1, “Massachusetts Registry
of Motor Vehicles Driver History Report.”7
6 In two of the cases, Degree was charged with motor vehicle offenses other than driving with a
suspended license. 	In 1811CR006723, he was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a
suspended registration and an uninsured motor vehicle, and, in 2011CR003882, he was charged
with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended registration and concealing a number plate. (#16
¶ 23.)
7 On a motion to dismiss, a court may only consider those facts alleged in the complaint and the
exhibits attached to it. 	See Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2013)
(additional citations omitted). Certain “‘narrow exceptions’” exist, however, for “‘documents the
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According to Degree’s driving history, when each of the nine charges in which Degree was
charged with driving with a suspended license were brought, his license was, in fact, suspended.8
Regarding the disposition of each case, although the SAC states that the charges were dismissed,
and nothing more, if one looks at the Lowell District Court dockets of the cases—which are
available to the public—it appears that every case (except for 1511CR003923) was dismissed only
after Degree paid costs or did community service, or in one case (1511CR004145) after his
probation was terminated.9 Thus, while the cases were eventually dismissed, it is misleading to
suggest, as Degree repeatedly does, that all charges were resolved in his favor.
A final problem with the eleven cases listed in paragraph 23 is that although the SAC does
not give the dates of the charged offenses, the dates of offense for these eleven cases predate the
alleged petitioning activity. As listed in the court dockets, the dates of offense for seven of these
cases were in 2015, three more were in either 2017 or 2018, and one was in July 2020. Moses
Harris died in December 2020, see Daddeh, Civil Action No. 23-13116-GAO, Docket No. 29 at
2, and, according to the SAC, the protests which led to the arrest of Degree’s mother, Tina, took
place “over several months in 2020 and 2021.” (#16 ¶ 17.) Thus, it appears that the SAC alleges
that police were retaliating against and intimidating Degree for his and his mother’s exercise of
their First Amendment rights in protesting the death of Moses Harris years before Harris passed
authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; . . . official public records; . . . documents
central to plaintiffs’ claim; [and] . . . documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.’” Id. at
36 (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)) (ellipses and alteration in original).
Degree has not challenged the authenticity of the certified driving history report; it is a public
record, and it is central to his claims, so the court considers it.
8 See #43 at 2-3 (listing the cases and citations to the driving record where suspensions are found).
9 The court considers the dockets of these cases as they are official public records, the cases are
listed in the SAC, and the dates of the offenses and dispositions of the cases are central to Degree’s
claims. See supra, n.6.
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away.
C. The Four Lowell District Court Cases.
1. 2011CR001972 – The Threats Charges.
In the first of the four cases on which this suit is based, Degree alleges that an LPD officer
and an LPD detective “without probable cause charged [him] with two counts of making a threat
to commit a crime.” Id. ¶¶ 24-25. The docket of the case states that the date of offense for both
counts was July 17, 2020. On September 21, 2021, the first count was dismissed, and “a required
finding of not guilty” entered as to the second. Id. ¶ 36.
Previously, Judge Gorton dismissed Degree’s claims for malicious prosecution against the
two officers, Degree v. City of Lowell, 2025 WL 2347433, adopting this court’s reasoning in its
report and recommendation that there was no allegation that he was seized or suffered any
significant deprivation of liberty after being charged, see Degree, 2025 WL 2347548, at *8, and
where he offered no facts to show that there was not probable cause to charge him. Id., at *9.10
2. 2211CR004419 – The Motor Vehicle and Window Obstruction Charges.
On April 25, 2022, a different LPD officer stopped Degree “allegedly because [] Degree
was playing music . . . and his windows were tinted.” 	(#16 ¶ 38.) 	According to Degree, he
provided the officer who stopped him with proper documentation concerning the tint of the
windows, but the officer charged him anyway to continue the “pattern of harassment and
intimidation” Degree experienced. Id. ¶¶ 40-42.
That officer also charged Degree with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license.
Id. ¶ 37. According to Degree’s driving history, his license was suspended on that date. See #43-
10 See id., at *10-13 (recommending that Degree’s claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
and his abuse of process, conspiracy, and equal protection claims against these two defendants,
and all other LPD defendants, also be dismissed).
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1 at 12. That charge was dismissed on January 17, 2023, and the same day, Degree was found not
responsible with respect to the improper operation of a motor vehicle and window obstruction
offenses. (#16 ¶ 37.)
Again, Judge Gorton, agreeing with this court’s previous report and recommendation,
dismissed the claims against the arresting officer where Degree had not plausibly alleged that the
officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. See Degree, 2025 WL 2347548, at *4-5, 7.
3. 2411CR001834 – The Motor Vehicle Charge.
Over two years later, on May 14, 2024, two LPD officers stopped Degree, allegedly only
because one officer, Danny Perrin, “recognized” him. 	(#16 ¶ 44-45.) 	As Degree explains, the
officers then “charged him with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license to justify their
unlawful stop” and to further intimidate and harass him. Id. ¶ 46. The next day, May 15, 2024,
the charge was dismissed. Id. ¶ 47.
Judge Gorton adopted this court’s recommendation that Count 1, alleging a violation of
Degree’s Fourth Amendment rights under § 1983 against Perrin, should not be dismissed because
the SAC adequately pled that Perrin stopped Degree solely because he recognized him, and not
because he knew that his license was suspended. Thus, the SAC adequately pled that Perrin did
not have reasonable suspicion for the stop. See Degree, 2025 WL 2347548, at *4-5.
4. 2411CR001904 – The Motor Vehicle and Dangerous Weapon Charges.
Degree claims that on May 17, 2024, Janeczak observed him driving on Route 3 in
Billerica, Massachusetts, “at a speed below the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour.” (#16 ¶¶
49-50.) 	Although, according to Degree, Janeczak “knew” Degree was driving below the legal
limit, he stopped Degree anyway in order to “continue the well-documented pattern of harassment
and intimidation” Degree says motivated Janeczak. Id. ¶¶ 51-52.
Janeczak then “charged [Degree] with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license
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. . . to justify the unlawful stop” and so that he “could perform an inventory search” of Degree’s
car. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. During the search, Janeczak discovered two batons. Id. ¶ 55. Degree claims
that Janeczak “knew” Degree “did not have possession of the batons” and that he “knew they did
not constitute dangerous weapons under Massachusetts law” but that Janeczak, “without probable
cause[,]” “charged him with two counts of carrying a dangerous weapon anyway[.]” Id. ¶¶ 48, 56-
57. On July 24, 2024, the dangerous weapon charges were dismissed, and on September 12, 2024,
the suspended license charge was dismissed and Degree was found not responsible for speeding.
Id. ¶¶ 48, 58. Degree’s driving history report shows that on the date of the arrest, May 17, 2024,
his license was suspended, see #43-1 at 12, and the docket of the related Lowell District Court case
shows that the charge of driving without a license was only dismissed after being “Cont[inued]
For P[ay]m[en]t/Completion of Community Service[.]”11 (#36-4 at 4.)
D. Claims Regarding Janeczak’s Motivation in Charging Degree.
The court will not consider allegations in the SAC that Janeczak stopped Degree and
charged him with crimes because he was conspiring with LPD officers and others.12 First, Judge
Gorton recently allowed an unopposed motion to sever Perrin and Janeczak’s cases as improperly
joined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 because they do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence,
as the Rule requires. See ##54, 55, 58. The Order severing the cases was well-supported because,
11 Janeczak attaches five exhibits to his supporting memorandum (#36), the first of which is the
police report concerning the incident, which the court does not consider for reasons explained
below. Exhibit 4 (#36-4) is a copy of the docket of this case (2411CR001904), which the court
does consider, because it is an official public record and it is central to Degree’s claims.
12 With regard to Degree’s Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 concerning the traffic stop,
discussed below, Janeczak’s motive is irrelevant, as “a Fourth Amendment inquiry centers on the
existence of reasonable suspicion at the time of the traffic stop, rather than the officer’s personal
motivations or animus.” 	Lipscomb v. Rhode Island, Civil Action No. 22-319 WES, 2025 WL
384586, at *5 (D.R.I. Feb. 4, 2025) (citing United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001)
and Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)).
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as mentioned above, Judge Gorton previously adopted this court’s report and recommendation and
dismissed all claims against the Lowell Defendants save one—Perrin—and dismissed all
conspiracy-related claims against all the Lowell Defendants because the SAC did not plausibly
allege any agreement among them. 	See Degree, 2025 WL 2347548, at *11-13. 	Moreover, as
previously noted, Degree has agreed to dismiss claims alleging that Janeczak was engaged in a
conspiracy against him. See ##35, 37. Finally, for the reasons explained above, this court will not
consider the eleven charges listed in paragraph 23 for driving without a license and other motor
vehicle charges as evidence of a conspiracy against Degree. In sum, the court finds that there are
no facts in the SAC to support the allegation that there was any conspiracy against Degree, and so
certainly there are no facts which show that Janeczak had any part in one.
III. Legal Standard.
A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	In assessing a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the court employs a two-step process in which it first “isolate[s] and ignore[s] statements
in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action
elements.” 	Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)
(additional citation omitted). It then “take[s] the complaint’s well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-
speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor” to “see if they
plausibly narrate a claim for relief.” 	Id. 	In short, a complaint must provide sufficient factual
allegations for the court to find the claim “‘plausible on its face.’” 	Garcia-Catalan v. United
States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
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IV. Discussion.
Degree brings eight claims against Janeczak. (#16 ¶¶ 62-88.)
A. Count 1 – Fourth Amendment Violation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Degree alleges that as a result of Janeczak’s actions, he “was denied his rights as guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Id. ¶ 64. Title 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 creates a private right of action against any person who, under color of state law, “subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any . . . person within the jurisdiction [of the United States] to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 	A
claim under § 1983 has two elements, the first of which is not at issue here: “1) that the conduct
complained of has been committed under color of state law, and 2) that this conduct worked a
denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 	Barreto-Rivera v.
Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (additional citation omitted).
1. The Initial Stop.
Traffic stops are subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment, see Whren, 517 U.S. at
809-10, because “[a] traffic stop, by definition, embodies a detention of the vehicle and its
occupants.” 	Chhien, 266 F.3d at 5. 	The standard for assessing a traffic stop, however, is not
whether there was probable cause for the stop, but whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion
to make it: “a stop for a mere traffic violation, even when supported only by a reasonable suspicion
that such violation occurred, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Fagan, 71
F.4th 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2023) (additional citation omitted). 	“[R]easonable suspicion is ‘an
intermediate standard’ between a naked hunch and probable cause that necessitates a case-by-case
analysis based on a ‘broad-based consideration of all attendant circumstances.’” Lipscomb, 2025
WL 384586, at *3 (quoting Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6). In evaluating whether reasonable suspicion
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exists, the court applies “an objective standard, rather than assessing the subjective intent of an
individual officer,” and considers the “‘totality of the surrounding circumstances.’” United States
v. Tiru-Plaza, 766 F.3d 111, 116 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Ruidiaz, 529 F.3d 25,
29 (1st Cir. 2008)).
Degree claims that Janeczak lacked reasonable suspicion to perform the May 17 traffic
stop because he was not speeding when Janeczak pulled him over. See #16 ¶¶ 48-58. Janeczak’s
argument that he had a reasonable suspicion that Degree was speeding is based entirely on his
unsigned police report, which is attached to his memorandum. See #36-1, Exhibit 1 – State Police
Arrest Report. The court will not consider the report, as it does not fall into any of the “‘narrow
exceptions’” to the rule that on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only those facts alleged
in the complaint and the exhibits attached to it. Freeman, 714 F.3d at 36-37 (declining to consider
“police incident reports”) (additional citation omitted).13
Based on the record before the court, and crediting Degree’s allegations as the court must
do at this stage, Degree has adequately claimed that he was not speeding and that Janeczak’s stop
of his car was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See Plourde v. Unknown Me. State
Police Officer #1, Civil Action No. 1:19-00486-JAW, 2022 WL 293967, at *9 (D. Me. Feb. 1,
2022) (motion to dismiss denied where, accepting plaintiff’s claim that he was not speeding, there
was no evidence to suggest that the trooper who stopped him “had an objectively reasonable
suspicion that [plaintiff] was violating the law”); see also Lipscomb, 2025 WL 384586, at *6
(denying motion to dismiss because the court could not engage in fact-specific inquiry for
13 Janeczak argues that the report was sufficiently referred to in the complaint for the court to
consider it, see #48 at 2, but in fact it is not mentioned at all. See Casciano-Schlump v. JetBlue
Airways Corp., Civil Action No. 17-2196 (GAG), 2017 WL 6542409, at *3 (D.P.R. Dec. 21, 2017)
(declining to consider a document which “was not sufficiently referenced—or indeed, referenced
at all—in the complaint”).
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reasonable suspicion for traffic stop at that stage of case); compare Tahoun v. Barrasso, Civil
Action No. 24-12756-DJC, 2025 WL 2254449, at *3 (D. Mass. July 21, 2025) (dismissing Fourth
Amendment claim under § 1983 where complaint acknowledged that trooper’s decision to conduct
traffic stop “was justified based on his observation of what he believed to be a traffic violation and
[based on plaintiff’s] refusal to obey a traffic order by an officer directing traffic”).
Janeczak argues that qualified immunity shields him from liability. The court disagrees.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from individual-capacity suits
for damages under § 1983 ‘when [they] ma[de] a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient,
reasonably misapprehend[ed] the law governing the circumstances [they] confronted.’” Lachance
v. Town of Charlton, 990 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020)
(per curiam)) (additional citation omitted) (alterations in original). 	Officials are thus “immune
from such suits unless ‘(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.’” Id. (quoting Irish v. Fowler,
979 F.3d 65, 76 (1st Cir. 2020)) (additional quotations and citation omitted). A right is clearly
established “if it was ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would [have understood] that
what he is doing violates that right.’” Berge v. Sch. Comm. of Gloucester, 107 F.4th 33, 39 (1st
Cir. 2024) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)) (alteration in original).
As discussed above, Degree has plausibly alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. With regard to the second step of the qualified immunity inquiry, “the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from investigatory stops in the absence of reasonable suspicion” was a right clearly
established well before the stop occurred. Eldredge v. Town of Falmouth, 662 F.3d 100, 106 (1st
Cir. 2011) (collecting cases).
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Janeczak claims that “[a]ny reasonable person” would have understood “that effectuation
of a motor vehicle stop of an individual for excessively speeding . . . does not violate any
constitutional or statutory right.” 	(#36 at 9.) 	Although the First Circuit has reasoned, in this
context, that “the relevant inquiry” for purposes of qualified immunity “is not whether reasonable
suspicion to conduct the stop in fact existed, but whether a reasonable officer could have believed
that it did[,]” see Eldredge, 662 F.3d at 106, again, Degree plausibly alleges that he was traveling
at a speed below the legal limit and that Janeczak “knew” this fact but elected to stop him anyway.
(#16 ¶¶ 50-52.) 	At this early stage in the case, the court cannot determine whether reasonable
suspicion was “at least arguable” such that Janeczak is entitled to qualified immunity. Eldredge,
662 F.3d at 106 (additional citations omitted); see Tahoun, 2025 WL 2254449, at *9 (concluding
that without further record development, the question whether an officer was shielded by qualified
immunity could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage).
2. The Arrest and Subsequent Search of Degree’s Car.
Degree also claims that Janeczak, after performing the stop, “used the license-suspension
charge as a pretext to legitimize the stop and enable a search.” (#44 at 7); see #16 ¶ 54 (“He also
so charged him [with driving without a license] so he could perform an inventory search of the
vehicle Mr. DeGree was operating.”) 	According to Degree, because the initial stop was not
justified, “[his] ensuing arrest [was] the fruit of that poisonous tree[,]” and “the purported
inventory search was likewise invalid.” 	Id. at 7, 9; see id. (arguing that “[a]n officer cannot
bootstrap an illegal seizure into a justified arrest by uncovering a license status that would not have
come to light but for the illegal stop.”) Degree’s invocation of the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
doctrine, “an extension of the exclusionary rule which dictates that evidence obtained through an
unlawful search and seizure must be suppressed at trial[,]” does not apply in this context. Campbell
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v. Casey, 166 F. Supp. 3d 144, 150 (D. Mass. 2016) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484-88 (1963)) (recognizing the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply “in the
context of § 1983 claims” and acknowledging that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly declined to
expand the exclusionary rule to non-criminal contexts”) (collecting cases).
“The Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures of the person demands
that an arrest be supported by probable cause.” Santiago, 891 F.2d at 383. Though he does not
allege it explicitly, to the extent Degree brings a Fourth Amendment claim based on his arrest for
operating with a suspended license,14 it fails where Degree’s license was in fact suspended and
Janeczak therefore had probable cause to arrest him under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 21.15 See
Machado v. Weare Police Dep’t, Civil Action No. 10–256–SM, 2010 WL 5477728, at *4-6
(D.N.H. Dec. 6, 2010) (rejecting plaintiff’s fruit of the poisonous tree argument and concluding,
with respect to his false arrest claim under § 1983, that his arrest was supported by probable cause
“based on facts that, in the context of a civil rights action, [we]re not excluded from the Court’s
consideration by the illegality of the motor vehicle stop”), report and recommendation adopted,
2010 WL 5477759 (D.N.H. Dec. 30, 2010).
Under the Fourth Amendment, “[a] warrantless search is per se unreasonable, ‘subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” United States v. Mensah, 796
F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (D. Mass. 2011) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009))
(additional citation omitted). 	The “‘community caretaking function’” is one such exception.
Boudreau v. Lussier, 901 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d
14 Both sides agree that Degree was placed under arrest for operating with a suspended license.
See #36 at 2, #44 at 7.
15 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 21 authorizes the warrantless arrest of an individual who drives after
his license has been suspended.
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233, 237-38 (1st Cir. 2006)) (additional citation omitted). Thus, “when their role as ‘community
caretakers’ calls for officers to, for example, ‘remove vehicles that impede traffic or threaten public
safety and convenience,’ they need not obtain a warrant before doing so.” Id. (quoting Coccia,
446 F.3d at 238). 	The impoundment of a vehicle for community caretaking purposes comports
with the Fourth Amendment “‘so long as the impoundment decision was reasonable under the
circumstances.’” 	Id. (quoting Coccia, 446 F.3d at 239) (additional citation omitted); see
McClintock v. Pollawit, Civil Action No. 3:24-30039-KAR, 2025 WL 928781, at *7 (D. Mass.
Mar. 27, 2025) (“‘The impound decision must be justified by a legitimate, non-investigatory
purpose and cannot be a mere subterfuge for investigation, [but] the coexistence of investigatory
and caretaking motives will not invalidate the seizure.’”) (quoting United States v. Sylvester, 993
F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2021)) (additional quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original).
Following impoundment, “‘the Fourth Amendment allows officers to perform an inventory search
to catalog the vehicle’s contents without a warrant.’” Id., at *8 (quoting United States v. Vick, 742
F. Supp. 3d 79, 105 (D. Mass. 2024)) (additional quotations and citation omitted). The search is
permissible if “‘carried out pursuant to a standardized policy,’” and “‘on the basis of something
other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity’”) Id. (quoting United States v. Sylvester, 993
F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2021)).
Degree challenges whether there was justification for the impoundment, and claims that
the inventory search of his vehicle was not in accordance with Massachusetts State Police policy.
See #44 at 8-9. 	Janeczak disputes this, but whether the circumstances of the impoundment and
subsequent inventory search were proper is a question that cannot be resolved on this record and
will be left to summary judgment. Accordingly, so much of Count 1 that asserts a Fourth
Amendment claim under § 1983 for the initial stop and the inventory search should not be
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dismissed.
B. Count 2 – Article XIV Violation Under G.L. c. 12, § 11I.
Degree’s claim under § 11I of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”) fails. The
MCRA provides a cause of action to one whose rights under the Constitution or laws of the United
States or Massachusetts has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, by “‘threats,
intimidation, or coercion.’” 	Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49, 51-52 (Mass. 1989)
(quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11H). Although the MCRA is largely “co-extensive with §
1983[,]” it differs on “two points.” 3137, LLC v. Town of Harwich, 126 F.4th 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2025).
First, it does not require state action, and second, it “‘requires a violation by threats, intimidation,
or coercion.’” Id. (additional citations omitted); see Sheffield v. Pieroway, 361 F. Supp. 3d 160,
166 (D. Mass. 2019). 	Coercion is defined as “‘the application to another of such force, either
physical or moral, as to constrain him to do against his will something he would not otherwise
have done.’” Murrell v. Patriot Front, 762 F. Supp. 3d 65, 77 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing Currier v.
National Board of Medical Examiners, 965 N.E.2d 829, 838 (Mass. 2012)).
“‘A direct violation of civil rights is not, without a showing of coercive behavior,
actionable [under the MCRA].” 	Orwat v. Maloney, 360 F. Supp. 2d 146, 164 (D. Mass. 2005)
(additional citations omitted). “The majority of courts have held that in cases involving wrongful
arrests or excessive force, the fact of a Fourth Amendment violation, standing alone, does not give
rise to a claim under the MCRA.” Ciolino v. Eastman, 128 F. Supp. 3d 366, 380 (D. Mass. 2015);
see Brown v. Butler, Civil Action No. 17-30030-MAP, 2017 WL 9673712, at *13 & n.12 (D. Mass.
Dec. 22, 2017) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1326391 (D.
Mass. Mar. 15, 2018). Here, Degree has not pled any facts beyond a Fourth Amendment violation
plausibly alleging that Janeczak engaged in threats, intimidation, or coercion to deprive him of any
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rights. See Degree v. Gendreau, et al., Civil Action No. 24-10686-ADB, 2025 WL 3702535, at
*5 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2025) (allegations that plaintiff was arrested to chill the exercise of her First
Amendment rights did not support her claim that officers engaged in threats, intimidation, or
coercion under MCRA); see also Salmon v. Lang, 57 F.4th 296, 316-17 (1st Cir. 2022).
Count 2 should be dismissed.
C. Counts 3, 4, and 5 – Malicious Prosecution Claims.
Degree claims malicious prosecution under the common law (Count 3), under § 1983
(Count 4), and under the MCRA (Count 5). 	He alleges that although “[t]here was no probable
cause for a number of the charges contained in the criminal proceedings” against him, Janeczak
“commenced and continued the criminal proceedings against [him] with actual malice,” and that
these proceedings later terminated in his favor. (#16 ¶¶ 68-82.)
At the outset, as discussed previously, the court notes that there was probable cause for the
charge of driving without a license, as Degree’s license was suspended at the time Janeczak pulled
him over. See #43-1 at 12. Therefore, the charges for possession of a dangerous weapon (i.e., the
two batons that were found in the car Degree was driving) and speeding are the only charges at
issue in these counts.16
A common law 	malicious prosecution 	claim 	requires 	“(1) the commencement or
continuation of a criminal proceeding against the eventual plaintiff at the behest of the eventual
defendant; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) an absence of probable
cause for the charges; and (4) actual malice.” 	Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.
2001) (citing Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Mass. 1991)). “[M]alice is defined as ‘any
16 The dangerous weapon charges were dismissed, and Degree was found not responsible for
speeding. See supra, at 8.
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wrong or unjustifiable motive’ and may be inferred from the facts, including that the defendant
effectuated a criminal prosecution despite knowing there was no probable cause to do so.” Smith
v. Egan, --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, Civil Action No. 24-11794-DLC, 2025 WL 2777646, at *5 (D. Mass.
Sept. 29, 2025) (additional citation omitted).
The SAC does not plead any facts to support a claim that Janeczak acted with malice, other
than the conclusory allegation that he stopped Degree “to continue the well-documented patten of
harassment and intimidation perpetrated against Mr. Degree by Defendants.” 	(#16 ¶ 52.) 	The
court already has explained that it will not consider this motive as it is not plausibly alleged. See
Wilmot v. Tracey, 938 F. Supp. 2d 116, 149 (D. Mass. 2013) (dismissing common law malicious
prosecution claim where plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of malice were not supported by “any
factual allegations to support an improper motive”) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Count 3 should
be dismissed.
“To succeed on a constitutional claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must ‘establish
that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by
probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in the plaintiff's favor.’” Price v. Mori,
Civil Action No. 1:18-12035-IT, 2021 WL 352351, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 1, 2021) (quoting
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir. 2013)) (additional quotations and citation
omitted). A plaintiff seeking to prove a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 “‘must show a
deprivation of liberty, pursuant to legal process, that is consistent with the concept of a Fourth
Amendment seizure.’” 	Watson v. Mita, 396 F. Supp. 3d 220, 224 (D. Mass. 2019) (quoting
Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2010)). See Gendreau, 2025 WL 3702535,
at *9. When a plaintiff is arrested without a warrant, that arrest, because it came before any legal
process, “‘cannot be part of the Fourth Amendment seizure upon which they base their section
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1983 claims.’” Id. (quoting Nieves, 241 F.3d at 54). In such cases, a plaintiff must show “‘some
post-arraignment deprivation of liberty that amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure,’ such as
being ‘detained after the initiation of the criminal charge, forced to post a pecuniary bond,
subjected to travel restrictions, or otherwise burdened with any significant deprivation of liberty.’”
Id. (quoting Harrington, 610 F.3d at 30).
Degree’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails because he has not alleged any facts
concerning a Fourth Amendment seizure pursuant to legal process. Degree was arrested without
a warrant, and there are no allegations in the SAC asserting that he suffered any post-arraignment
loss of liberty. See Gendreau, 2025 WL 3702535, at *10 (dismissing § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim where plaintiff did not allege that she was subject to post-arraignment deprivation of liberty
that could amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure). Count 4 should be dismissed.
Malicious prosecution under the MCRA (Count 5) also fails where Degree’s claim is based
on the same allegations that underpin Count 4. See Tahoun, 2025 WL 2254449, at *4, 7 (because
plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim under the MCRA was “premised on the same allegations
raised in her § 1983 [malicious prosecution claim][,]” where her allegations could not support the
§ 1983 claim, they could not support the related MCRA claim either); see also Gendreau, 2025
WL 3702535, at *10 (same).
Counts 3, 4, and 5, the malicious prosecution claims against Janeczak, should be dismissed.
D. Counts 6, 7, and 8 – Abuse of Process Claims.
Degree alleges common law abuse of process (Count 6), abuse of process under § 1983
(Count 7), and abuse of process under the MCRA (Count 8), stating only that Janeczak “used
process for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose resulting in damage to Mr. Degree.” (#16 ¶¶ 83-88.)
The First Circuit has recognized that “abuse of process -- as a claim separate from a claim
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that there was no probable cause to make the arrest or institute the prosecution -- is not cognizable
as a civil rights violation under § 1983.” Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 388 (1st Cir. 1989);
see O’Brien v. Mulligan, Civil Action No. 19-11433-LTS, 2020 WL 1027782, at *7 (D. Mass.
Mar. 3, 2020) (citing Santiago and dismissing “‘abuse of process’ claim pursuant to Section 1983”
where the claim “fail[ed] as a matter of law”). Count 7 should be dismissed.
Degree’s claim under the MCRA for abuse of process (Count 8), also fails under Santiago.
See Gendreau, 2025 WL 3702535, at *11 (“The First Circuit has held that ‘proof of abuse of
process alone cannot support a finding of liability under § 1983,’ . . . and this holding also disposes
of Plaintiff’s MCRA claim[.]”) (quoting Santiago, 891 F.2d at 388); see also Tahoun, 2025 WL
2254449, at *7 (MCRA abuse of process claim failed alongside a related § 1983 claim premised
on the same allegations).
The abuse of process claim under the common law (Count 8) fails, too. 	“Under
Massachusetts law, an abuse of process claim requires a plaintiff to show that ‘process’ was used
for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose and resulted in damages.” Yacubian v. United States, 750
F.3d 100, 110 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Vittands v. Sudduth, 730 N.E.2d 325, 332 (Mass. App. Ct.
2000)). “‘More specifically, abuse of process has been described as a form of coercion to obtain
a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of
property or the payment of money.’” 	Fabre v. Walton, 781 N.E.2d 780, 783 n.3 (Mass. 2002)
(quoting Vittands, 730 N.E.2d at 332) (additional citation and quotations omitted).
As stated above, the SAC does not plausibly allege that Janeczak charged Degree with
possession of dangerous weapons or speeding to obtain some “collateral advantage” or that he
used process for an unrelated, ulterior, or illegitimate purpose. See Cooper v. J.C., Civil Action
No. 24-11958-AK, 2024 WL 4476498, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 11, 2024) (dismissing abuse of process
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claim where complaint provided “only conclusory allegations to support the inference that any
criminal proceeding against [the plaintiff] had a goal of achieving some collateral objective” and
where there were “no factual allegations about the criminal proceedings to allow such an
inference”).
Counts 6, 7, and 8 should be dismissed.
V. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, this court recommends that Janeczak’s motion (#35) be allowed
except with regard to so much of Count 1 that asserts a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 based
on the initial stop of Degree and the inventory search of his car. Counts 9-12 should be dismissed
without prejudice.17
January 12, 2026 	/s/ M. Page Kelley
M. Page Kelley
United States Magistrate Judge
17 The parties are advised that under the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party who objects
to this Report and Recommendation must file specific written objections with the Clerk within
fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. The objections must specifically
identify the portion of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and state the
basis for such objections. 	A party’s failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) will preclude
further appellate review. 	See Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168–69 (1st Cir.
2016).
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