Peebles et al v. JRK Property Holdings, Inc. et al

United 	States 	District Court
District 	of Massachusetts
Branda 	Peebles , 	et 	al.,
Plaintiffs.
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v . 	)
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Civil Action No.
23-10523-NMG
JRK Property 	Holdings , 	Inc ., 	et 	al . ,)
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Defendants . 	)
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MEMORANDUM 	& ORDER
GORTON , 	J .
Branda 	Peebles 	and 	Joshua 	Berger 	(collectively
"plaintiffs") 	filed 	a 	complaint 	on 	behalf 	of 	themselves 	and 	a ll
others 	similar l y 	situated 	against 	JRK 	Property 	Holdings , 	Inc .,
Stevens 	Pond Apartments 	Property 	Owner , 	LLC 	and 	One 	Webster
Apartments 	Property 	Owner, 	LLC 	(collectively 	"defendants") .
Plaintiffs 	are 	both 	former 	residents 	of 	residential 	properties
owned 	and 	managed 	by 	defendants.
The 	complaint 	challenges 	an 	addendum 	to 	their 	leases 	(the
"Move - Out 	Addendum" 	or 	"the 	MOA") , 	which 	requires 	outgoing
residents 	to 	have 	the 	apartment 	professionally 	cleaned 	and
provides 	a 	list 	of 	charges 	that 	wi ll 	be 	deducted 	from 	the
tenant ' s 	security 	deposit 	should 	they 	fail 	to 	do 	so .
allege 	that 	defendants 	wrongfully 	deducted 	charges 	for
Plaintiffs
reasonable 	wear 	and 	tear 	from 	their 	security 	deposits 	pursuant
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to 	the 	Move-Out 	Addendum 	in 	violation 	of 	M. 	G.L. 	c. 	186, 	§15B,
entitling 	them 	to 	recovery 	under 	that 	statute 	as 	well 	as 	under
M. 	G.L. 	c. 	93A, 	§9.
In 	November, 	2024, 	this 	Court 	certified 	two 	questions 	to
the 	Massachusetts 	Supreme 	Judicial 	Court 	("SJC"):
(1) 	When 	a 	tenant 	vacates 	a 	premises 	at 	the 	end 	of 	a
lease, 	under 	what 	circumstances, 	if 	any, 	does 	charging
him 	for 	painting, 	carpet 	repair 	or 	similar
refurbishment 	constitute 	a 	deduction 	for 	"reasonable
wear 	and 	tear" 	in 	violation 	of 	M.G.L. 	c. 	186, 	§15B(4)?
(2) 	Does 	inclusion 	of 	a 	provision 	in 	a 	lease 	requiring 	a
tenant 	to 	have 	the 	premises 	professionally 	cleaned 	at
the 	end 	of 	the 	lease 	or 	to 	bear 	the 	costs 	of 	later
repairs 	constitute 	a 	violation 	of 	M.G.L. 	c. 	186,
§15B(4)?
In August, 	2025, 	the 	SJC 	responded 	to 	the 	certified
questions 	that 	(1) 	the 	MOA 	violated 	§15B(4) 	because 	it 	allowed
for 	deductions 	from 	the 	security 	deposit 	for 	repairs 	regardless
o f 	whether 	the 	damage 	is 	reasonable 	wear 	and 	tear, 	and 	(2)
reasonable 	wear 	and 	tear 	is 	a 	fact-specific 	inquiry 	without 	a
brightline 	rule.
In 	September, 	2025, 	the 	parties 	renewed 	their 	motions 	for
summary 	judgment 	and 	plaintiff 	renewed 	its 	motion 	for 	class
certification.
I. 	Facts
Peebles 	is 	a 	former 	resident 	of 	Stevens 	Pond. 	She 	rented 	a
unit 	therein 	from 	August, 	2017, 	through 	August, 	2018. 	She
provided 	a 	$500 	security 	deposit 	at 	the 	beginning 	of 	her
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tenancy. 	Peebles 	did 	not 	attend 	the 	walkthrough 	conducted 	by
Stevens 	Pond 	staff 	after 	she 	moved 	out. 	The 	staff 	determined
that 	there 	was 	damage 	to 	the 	apartment 	beyond 	reasonable 	wear
and 	tear. 	Defendants 	incurred 	costs 	of 	$255 	to 	repair 	the
damage 	and 	charged 	Peebles ' 	security 	deposit 	$50 	for 	touch-up
paint 	and 	$65 	for 	carpet 	cleaning .
Berger 	is 	a 	former 	resident 	of 	One 	Webster . 	He 	rented 	a
unit 	therein 	from 	July , 	2018, 	to 	August, 	2019 . 	Berger 	provided
a 	$1 , 000 	security 	deposit 	at 	the 	beginning 	of 	his 	tenancy . 	When
he 	moved 	out 	he 	requested 	and 	attended 	a 	walkthrough 	of 	his
unit , 	during 	which 	staff 	determ i ned 	there 	was 	no 	damage 	beyond
reasonable 	wear 	and 	tear . 	As 	such , 	t he 	only 	deduction 	from 	the
security 	deposit 	was 	for 	an 	unpaid 	utility 	bill .
II. 	Legal 	Standard
The 	role 	of 	summary 	judgment 	is 	" to 	pierce 	the 	pleadings
and 	to 	assess 	the 	proof 	in 	order 	to 	see 	whether 	there 	is 	a
genuine 	need 	for 	trial ." 	Mesnick 	v. 	Gen. 	Elec . 	Co ., 	950 	F . 2d
816 , 	822 	(1st 	Cir . 	1991) 	(quoting 	Garside 	v . 	Osco 	Drug, 	Inc.,
895 	F.2d 	46 , 	50 	(1st 	Cir . 	1990)). 	The 	burden 	is 	on 	the 	moving
party 	to 	show , 	through 	the 	pleadings , 	discovery 	and 	affidavits ,
"that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	dispute 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and
the 	movant 	is 	entitled 	to 	judgment 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law . " 	Fed . 	R.
Civ. 	P. 	56(a) .
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A fact 	is 	material 	if 	it 	"might 	affect 	the 	outcome 	of 	the
suit 	under 	the 	governing 	law[.]" 	Anderson 	v. 	Liberty 	Lobby,
Inc., 	477 	U.S. 	242, 	248 	(1986). 	A genuine 	issue 	of 	material
fact 	exists 	when 	the 	evidence 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	material 	fact
in 	dispute 	"is 	such 	that 	a 	reasonable 	jury 	could 	return 	a
verdict 	for 	the 	nonmoving 	party." 	Id.
If 	the 	moving 	party 	satisfies 	its 	burden, 	the 	burden 	shifts
to 	the 	nonmoving 	party 	to 	set 	forth 	specific 	facts 	showing 	that
there 	is 	a 	genuine, 	triable 	issue. 	Celotex 	Corp. 	v. 	Catrett, 	477
U.S. 	317, 	324 	(1986). 	The 	Court 	must 	view 	the 	entire 	record 	in
the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	non-moving 	party 	and make 	all
reasonable 	inferences 	in 	that 	party's 	favor. 	O'Connor 	v.
Steeves, 	994 	F.2d 	905, 	907 	(1st 	Cir. 	199 3) . 	Summary 	judgment 	is
appropriate 	if, 	after 	viewing 	the 	record 	in 	the 	non-moving
party's 	favor, 	the 	Court 	determines 	that 	no 	genuine 	issue 	of
material 	fact 	exists 	and 	that 	the 	moving 	party 	is 	entitled 	to
judgment 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law. 	Celotex 	Corp., 	477 	U.S. 	at 	322-23,
106 	S. 	Ct. 	2548.
When 	facing 	cross-motions 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	the 	court
must 	rule 	on 	each 	motion 	independently 	and 	decide 	whether 	either
moving 	party 	has 	met 	its 	burden 	under 	Rule 	56. 	Landino 	v.
Massachu setts 	Tchrs. 	Ass'n, 	621 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	185, 	189 	(D. 	Mass.
2022) .
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III . 	Analysis
The 	motions 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	as 	briefed 	by 	the
parties, 	turn 	on 	whether 	defendants 	enforced 	or 	attempted 	to
enforce 	the 	MOA 	or 	otherwise 	attempted 	to 	obtain 	a 	waiver 	of
plaintiffs ' 	rights 	such 	that 	defendants 	forfeited 	their 	right 	to
retain 	any 	amount 	of 	the 	security 	deposit 	pursuant 	to 	M. 	G.L. 	c.
18 6, 	§15B ( 6) ( c) . 1 	That 	statute 	provides, 	in 	relevant 	part ,
The 	lessor 	shall 	forfeit 	his 	right 	to 	retain 	any 	portion 	of
the 	security 	deposit 	for 	any 	reason, 	or, 	in 	any 	action 	by 	a
t enant 	to 	reco v er 	a 	security 	deposit , 	to 	counterclaim 	for
any 	damage 	to 	the 	premises 	if 	he. 	. 	uses 	in 	any 	lease
signed 	by 	the 	tenant 	any 	provi s ion 	which 	conflicts 	with 	any
prov i sion 	of 	this 	section 	and 	attempts 	to 	enforce 	such
provision 	or 	attempts 	to 	obtain 	from 	the 	tenant 	or
prospective 	tenant 	a 	waiver 	of 	any 	provision 	of 	th i s
section.
Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	defendants 	attempted 	to 	enforce 	the
MOA 	or 	obtain 	waiver 	by 	attaching 	the 	MOA 	to 	its 	standard 	form
lease , 	requiring 	plaintiffs 	t o 	execute 	both 	the 	lease 	and 	the
MOA 	and 	making 	deductions 	to 	Peebles' 	security 	deposit 	for
touch - up 	paint 	and 	carpet 	cleaning. 	Defendants 	respond 	that 	the
mere 	inclusion 	of 	the 	MOA 	in 	the 	lease 	does 	not 	constitute 	an
attempt 	to 	enforce 	it 	and 	that 	the 	deductions 	to 	Peebles '
1 Plaintiffs did not address 	their argument 	that 	the damage 	to Peebles '
apartment was not 	in excess of reasonable wear and tear , 	nor did 	they add r ess
their as s ertion that Berger ' s 	security deposit was not 	returned wi t hin th e
statutorily required 30 - day period. 	The Court will , 	therefore, 	find those
claims to be waived . 	See Montany v . 	Univ . 	of New England , 	858 F . 3d 34 , 	41
( 1st Cir . 	2017) .
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. ' 	..
security 	deposit 	were 	for 	damage 	beyond 	reasonable 	wear 	and
tear.
The 	Court 	agrees 	with 	defendants . 	By 	its 	plain 	meaning 	and
terms , 	the 	statute 	is 	conjunctive, 	i . e. 	t he 	de f endant 	mu st 	use
and 	attempt 	to 	enforce 	the 	violating 	provision . 	If 	mere
inclusion 	of 	the 	offending 	provision 	was 	sufficient, 	the 	second
half 	of 	the 	statute 	would 	be 	superfluous . 	See 	Ropes 	& Gray 	LLP
v . 	Jalbert , 	910 	N.E. 	2d 	330 , 	412 	(Mass. 	2009) . 	The 	Court
declines 	to 	adopt 	such 	an 	interpretation . 	If 	there 	is 	no
evidence 	of 	enforcement , 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	of 	a 	v i o l ation .
Plaintiffs' 	assertion 	that 	defendants 	enforced 	or 	attempted
to 	enforce 	the 	MOA 	by making 	deductions 	from 	Peebles ' 	security
deposit 	also 	fails 	because 	the 	record 	clearly 	shows 	that 	the
deductions 	from 	Peebles ' 	deposit 	were 	for 	amounts 	less 	than 	the
penalty provision 	in 	the 	MOA 	and 	explicitly 	differentiated
between 	what 	was 	reasonable 	wear 	and 	tear 	and 	what 	wasn't .
Indeed, 	Peebles 	herself 	admitted 	that 	such 	charges 	were 	for
damage 	beyond 	reasonable 	wear 	and 	tear 	and , 	as 	noted 	earlier ,
plaintiffs 	abandoned 	that 	claim on 	summary 	judgmen t.
Plaintiffs 	have 	failed 	to 	show 	that 	defendants 	attempted 	to
enforce 	the 	MOA 	and 	thus 	defendants 	have 	not 	forfeited 	their
right 	to 	retain 	portions 	of 	the 	security 	deposit 	for 	otherwise
lawful 	reasons.
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> ' 	'.l
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons , 	defendants' 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment 	(Docket 	No . 	47) 	is 	ALLOWED , 	and 	plaintiffs' 	Motion 	for
Summary 	Judgment 	(Docket 	No . 	52) 	and 	Motion 	for 	Class
Certification 	(Docket 	No . 	49) 	are 	DENIED.
So 	ordered.
Natha~oton
Senior 	United 	States 	District 	Judge
Dated : 	November l5" , 	2025
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