Quiles v. Gray

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
JOEL QUILES, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
) 	Civil Action
v. 	) 	No. 23-cv-10497-PBS
)
DEAN GRAY, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
)
ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
March 24, 2026
Saris, J.
Both 	parties 	have 	filed 	objections 	(Dkts. 	39, 	40) 	to 	the
report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. 35). After
de 	novo 	review 	of 	the 	objections, 	I 	adopt 	the 	report 	and
recommendation 	and 	deny 	Petitioner 	Joel 	Quiles’ 	petition 	for
habeas corpus.
The 	Court 	assumes 	familiarity 	with 	the 	decisions 	of 	the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”), see Commonwealth v.
Quiles, 173 N.E.3d 1 (Mass. 2021), and of the Magistrate Judge. In
short, when the jury returned their initial verdict slip, the trial
judge 	mistakenly 	interpreted 	it 	as 	acquitting 	Quiles 	on 	all
theories of first degree murder. See id. at 7. Based on the answers
on 	the 	verdict 	slip, 	the 	judge 	stated 	at 	sidebar: 	“[A]s 	a 	matter
of 	law, 	that’s 	merger. 	And 	[Quiles] 	is 	not 	guilty 	of 	felony
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murder.” 	Dkt. 	13-14 	at 	71. 	The 	judge 	then 	instructed 	the 	jury 	in
open court that their “answers d[id] not support a conviction for
first degree murder” and that “the only issue for [them] to decide
now [wa]s whether or not the defendant is guilty or not guilty of
second degree murder.” Id. at 73; see Quiles, 173 N.E.3d at 7. The
jury 	deliberated 	for 	another 	hour 	before 	being 	excused 	for 	the
day. See Quiles, 173 N.E.3d at 7. The following morning, the judge
corrected 	his 	erroneous 	interpretation 	of 	the 	verdict 	slip 	by
reinstructing the jury to consider certain theories of first degree
murder, 	including 	felony 	murder 	predicated 	on 	armed 	robbery. 	See
id. at 7-8. The jury subsequently convicted Quiles of felony murder
predicated on armed robbery. See id. at 8.
Quiles’ petition argues that the trial judge’s actions after
review 	of 	the 	initial 	verdict 	slip 	amounted 	to 	an 	acquittal 	on
first degree murder and, thus, that directing the jury to further
consider 	that 	charge 	violated 	his 	Fifth 	Amendment 	protection
against 	double 	jeopardy. 	In 	rejecting 	Quiles’ 	double 	jeopardy
claim, 	the 	SJC 	stated 	that 	“the 	jury’s 	initial 	verdict 	slip 	was
silent on felony-murder predicated on armed robbery” and that this
“silence 	d[id] 	not 	amount 	to 	an 	acquittal.” 	Id. 	at 	14. 	The 	SJC’s
decision did not discuss the long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases
addressing double jeopardy claims based on erroneous acquittals by
trial 	judges. 	See, 	e.g., 	Evans 	v. 	Michigan, 	568 	U.S. 	313 	(2013);
Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005); Price v. Vincent, 538
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U.S. 	634 	(2003); 	Arizona 	v. 	Rumsey, 	467 	U.S. 	203 	(1984);
Sanabria v. 	United 	States, 	437 	U.S. 	54 	(1978); 	United 	States 	v.
Martin 	Linen 	Supply 	Co., 	430 	U.S. 	564 	(1977); 	Fong 	Foo 	v. 	United
States, 	369 	U.S. 	141 	(1962) 	(per 	curiam). 	This 	omission 	is
unsurprising because this line of cases was not highlighted either
in 	Quiles’ 	briefing 	on 	double 	jeopardy, 	the 	substance 	of 	which
focused 	on 	whether 	the 	jury’s 	initial 	verdict 	constituted 	an
acquittal, 	or 	at 	oral 	argument. 	Only 	in 	his 	motion 	for
reconsideration, which the SJC summarily denied, did Quiles refine
his 	double 	jeopardy 	claim 	into 	a 	court-ordered 	acquittal 	theory.
While Quiles did not squarely present this theory to the SJC, the
Court 	agrees 	with 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	that 	his 	presentation 	was
sufficient to exhaust state remedies. See Jaynes v. Mitchell, 824
F.3d 187, 192 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[A] petitioner must have tendered
his 	federal 	claim 	in 	such 	a 	way 	as 	to 	make 	it 	probable 	that 	a
reasonable jurist would have been alerted to the existence of the
federal 	question.” 	(quoting 	Sanchez 	v. 	Roden, 	753 	F.3d 	279, 	294
(1st Cir. 2014))).
Quiles concedes that the SJC adjudicated his double jeopardy
claim on the merits such that this Court must apply the deferential
standard outlined in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 112 (2020)
(per 	curiam). 	Quiles 	argues 	that 	he 	may 	be 	granted 	habeas 	relief
under 	this 	standard 	because 	the 	SJC’s 	denial 	of 	his 	claim 	was
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“contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined
by 	the Supreme 	Court.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2254(d)(1).1 	“[A] 	state-court
decision 	is 	contrary 	to 	clearly 	established 	federal 	law 	if 	the
state 	court 	employs 	a 	rule 	that 	contradicts 	an 	existing 	Supreme
Court 	precedent 	or 	if 	it 	reaches 	a 	different 	result 	on 	facts
materially indistinguishable from those of the controlling Supreme
Court precedent.” Garrey v. Kelly, 162 F.4th 27, 38 (1st Cir. 2025)
(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Janosky 	v. 	St. 	Amand, 	594 	F.3d
39, 47 (1st Cir. 2010)).
After 	reviewing 	the 	caselaw, 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	concluded
that 	the 	SJC’s 	decision 	was 	not 	contrary 	to 	clearly 	established
federal law. He reasoned that “no Supreme Court decision has held
that an initial misinterpretation of a verdict slip followed by a
correction 	during 	ongoing 	jury 	deliberations 	amounts 	to 	an
acquittal.” Dkt. 35 at 33.
While this is a very close case, I agree with the Magistrate
Judge’s conclusion. Quiles contends that the SJC applied the wrong
legal rule by finding no double jeopardy violation where the trial
judge acquitted him of first degree murder, reversed that decision,
and 	then 	allowed 	the 	jury 	convict 	on 	that 	charge. 	See 	Smith, 	543
1 	The 	Magistrate 	Judge 	concluded 	that 	Quiles 	had 	waived 	his
argument that the SJC’s rejection of his claim was “an unreasonable
application 	of[] 	clearly 	established 	Federal 	law.” 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). 	Quiles 	does 	not 	challenge 	that 	conclusion 	in 	his
objections to the report and recommendation.
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U.S. 	at 	467 	(“[S]ubjecting 	the 	defendant 	to 	postacquittal
factfinding 	proceedings 	going 	to 	guilt 	or 	innocence 	violates 	the
Double 	Jeopardy 	Clause.” 	(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting
Smalis v. 	Pennsylvania, 	476 	U.S. 	140, 	145 	(1986))). 	Fairly
construed, 	however, 	the 	SJC’s 	decision 	found 	that 	no 	acquittal
occurred 	in 	the 	first 	place. 	See 	Quiles, 	173 	N.E.3d 	at 	13-14. 	In
so finding, the SJC applied a state-law definition of an acquittal
that 	is 	comparable 	to 	the 	federal 	constitutional 	standard. 	See
Early 	v. 	Packer, 	537 	U.S. 	3, 	8 	(2002) 	(per 	curiam) 	(explaining
that the “contrary to” prong of the AEDPA standard requires neither
“citation” 	nor 	“awareness” 	of 	U.S. 	Supreme 	Court 	cases, 	“so 	long
as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision
contradicts them” (emphasis omitted)). Compare Quiles, 173 N.E.3d
at 	13 	(explaining 	that 	“[a]n 	acquittal 	occurs 	where 	there 	is 	a
ruling on ‘the facts and merits’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor,
159 N.E.3d 143, 156 (Mass. 2020))), with Martinez v. Illinois, 572
U.S. 	833, 	842 	(2014) 	(defining 	“acquittal” 	to 	mean 	a 	ruling 	that
“actually 	represents 	a 	resolution 	. 	. 	. 	of 	some 	or 	all 	of 	the
factual elements of the offense charged” (alteration in original)
(quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571)).
Nor has Quiles identified any U.S. Supreme Court case finding
an acquittal under materially indistinguishable circumstances. As
the Magistrate Judge noted, Evans, Smith, and other Supreme Court
cases on judge-ordered acquittals involved the granting of motions
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for a judgment of acquittal or directed verdict. See, e.g., Evans,
568 U.S. at 316; Smith, 543 U.S. at 465; Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 59;
Martin 	Linen, 	430 	U.S. 	at 	566; 	Fong 	Foo, 	369 	U.S. 	at 	142. 	Here,
the relevant ruling by the trial judge concerned his interpretation
of the jury verdict, not his own assessment of the sufficiency of
the 	prosecution’s 	evidence. 	Moreover, 	in 	the 	cases 	in 	which 	the
Supreme Court has determined that an acquittal occurred, the trial
judge entered a formal judgment or order memorializing his or her
ruling that demonstrated that the acquittal was final. See Smith,
543 	U.S. 	at 	465 	(noting 	that 	the 	defendant’s 	motion 	was 	endorsed
and 	the 	order 	was 	entered 	on 	the 	docket); 	Price, 	538 	U.S. 	at 	640
(holding 	that 	a 	state 	court’s 	decision 	that 	a 	trial 	judge’s
purported 	acquittal 	was 	not 	sufficiently 	final 	to 	bar 	further
proceedings 	was 	not 	contrary 	to 	clearly 	established 	federal 	law
and 	distinguishing 	then-existing 	Supreme 	Court 	precedent 	in 	part
on 	the 	basis 	that 	in 	those 	cases 	“the 	trial 	courts 	. 	. 	. 	entered
formal 	orders 	from 	which 	appeals 	were 	taken”). 	In 	this 	case, 	the
acquittal 	was 	reflected 	in 	a 	docket 	entry 	but 	not 	in 	a 	formal
order. These distinctions are sufficient to conclude that the SJC’s
resolution of Quiles’ claim was not contrary to clearly established
federal law.
Were 	this 	Court’s 	review 	de 	novo, 	it 	very 	well 	might 	find
merit 	in 	Quiles’ 	double 	jeopardy 	claim. 	See 	United 	States 	v.
Fernandez, 	722 	F.3d 	1, 	38 	& 	n.27 	(1st 	Cir. 	2013) 	(holding 	that 	a
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trial judge’s dismissal of a charge based on his interpretation of
the 	jury 	verdict 	amounted 	to 	an 	acquittal 	for 	double 	jeopardy
purposes). 	The 	SJC’s 	rejection 	of 	the 	claim, 	however, 	was 	not
contrary 	to 	clearly 	established 	federal 	law 	as 	determined 	by 	the
U.S. Supreme Court, which bars the grant of habeas relief.
A court may issue a certificate of appealability “only if the
applicant 	has 	made 	a 	substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a
constitutional 	right.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2253(c)(2). 	This 	standard
requires a habeas petitioner to show “that ‘jurists of reason could
disagree 	with 	the 	district 	court’s 	resolution 	of 	his
constitutional 	claims 	or 	that 	jurists 	could 	conclude 	the 	issues
presented 	are 	adequate 	to 	deserve 	encouragement 	to 	proceed
further.’” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017) (quoting Miller-
El 	v. 	Cockrell, 	537 	U.S. 	322, 	327 	(2003)). 	A 	reasonable 	jurist
could come out differently on Quiles’ double jeopardy claim given
the nature of the trial court’s ruling and the significant indicia
of finality associated with that ruling.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	ADOPTS 	the 	report 	and 	recommendation
of 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	(Dkt. 	35) 	and 	DENIES 	the 	petition 	for
habeas 	corpus 	(Dkt. 	1). 	The 	Court 	issues 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability 	with 	respect 	to 	Quiles’ 	Fifth 	Amendment 	double
jeopardy claim.
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SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS__________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge
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