Alianza Americas et al v. DeSantis et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:22-cv-11550-ADB Document 228 _ Filed 03/16/26 Page 1of9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

ALIANZA AMERICAS, YANET DOE,
PABLO DOE, and JESUS DOE, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 22-cv-11550-ADB
V.

VERTOL SYSTEMS COMPANY, INC.,

Defendant.

* * + * * *¥ ¥ *¥ KF KF KF KF KF ¥

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BURROUGHS, D.J.

Before the Court is a joint motion for a protective order by Plaintiffs Alianza Americas,
Yanet Doe, Pablo Doe, and Jesus Doe, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
(together, “Plaintiffs,”) and Defendant Vertol Systems Company (“Defendant” or “‘Vertol”’)
(collectively, the “Parties”). [ECF No. 212 (“Joint Mot. for Protective Order”)].! “The parties
agree that a protective order is necessary and appropriate in this case because discovery in this
matter is likely to include disclosure of confidential and sensitive information. Through
reasonable and good-faith efforts to meet and confer, the Parties have reached agreement on

many ... terms” of a protective order. [Id. at 1-2]. The motion is GRANTED. The Court will

' Defendant’s motion for reconsideration, [ECF No. 215], of the Court’s order granting
Plaintiffs’ ex parte motion to proceed pseudonymously remains under consideration.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
issue a protective order that contains the terms agreed on by the parties, see generally [ECF No.
212-3], and resolves the disputed terms as follows.
I. 	RESOLUTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
The Court has broad discretion to, “for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(c). This litigation stems from Defendant’s alleged participation, see [ECF No. 137 ¶¶ 56–
61, 108–09, 118–19, 128], in a scheme designed to generate political and media attention, e.g.,
[id. ¶¶ 121, 174, 177, 183, 214, 220], by deceiving Plaintiffs into boarding a flight operated by
Defendant, see, e.g., [id. ¶¶ 65, 75, 80–86, 121, 137, 141–50], after which they were deposited,
against their expectations, on an unfamiliar island accessible only by air and sea, [id. ¶¶ 150,
153]. Plaintiffs allege that the underlying scheme generated significant media attention, see, e.g.,
[id. ¶¶ 206–20], and involved bad-faith acts by multiple third parties coordinating with
Defendant, e.g., [id. ¶¶ 82–97]; [id. ¶ 98 (“[Perla] Huerta made . . . promises to numerous other
recent immigrants from Venezuela and Peru to convince them to accept transportation. In each
instance, she concealed [who she was working for] . . . and that she was arranging for
immigrants to be transported not to a major city, but to the small, isolated island of Martha’s
Vineyard.”)]; [id. ¶ 49 (“[Lawrence] Keefe continued to shepherd Defendant Vertol through the
Bidding Process.”)]; [id. ¶ 56 (“Text messages . . . indicate that [Lawrence] Keefe was in San
Antonio with representatives from Vertol . . . [, during which time he] met with both [James]
Montgomerie and [Perla Huerta] . . . regarding the flights to Martha’s Vineyard and Vertol’s
proposal.”)].
In light of Plaintiffs’ allegations, at this stage of the litigation the Court is satisfied that
good cause exists to issue a protective order that protects Plaintiffs’ identities, including their
Case 1:22-cv-11550-ADB Document 228 Filed 03/16/26 Page 2 of 9

3
names and other identifying information, to the greatest extent possible without prejudicing
Defendant’s defense. Unlike a case relied upon by Defendant, Martinez v. City of Ogden, No.
08-cv-00087, 2009 WL 424785 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2009), here, the threat of judicial “sanctions,
coupled with the clear imposition of obligations under the protective order,” id. at *3, is not by
itself adequate to guarantee the safety of Plaintiffs’ personal information. That the parties will
conduct themselves properly is not in doubt, but due to the tortuous history of this litigation and
its complicated underlying facts, as well as the sprawling nature of this discovery, which
includes third parties in several states, there is a risk that any information not carefully accounted
for could slip through a crack without any misdeed on the part of either party. The extensive
media coverage of this scheme—which allegedly exploited and humiliated Plaintiffs on the basis
of their national origin—persuades the Court that such information, once released, could expose
Plaintiffs to unwanted attention, perhaps even animosity and harassment, from third parties,
which even the most severe sanctions on Defendant could not remedy or deter. Accordingly, the
Court seeks to provide maximal protection to Plaintiffs’ personal information while recognizing
Defendant’s need to conduct discovery free of excessive administrative burdens.
The parties agree that there should be three standards of protection: (1) Confidential, (2)
Confidential—Doe Plaintiff (“DP”), and (3) Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only
(“AEO”). See [ECF No. 212-1 (“Pls.’ Proposed Order”) §§ 2.1, 2.2, 2.5]; [ECF No. 212-2
(“Def.’s Proposed Order”) §§ 2.1, 2.2, 2.5]. They disagree as to the access procedures that
should be required at each level of protection and the kinds of documents and information that
should receive each level of protection. A summary of the contested issues follows.
Case 1:22-cv-11550-ADB Document 228 Filed 03/16/26 Page 3 of 9

Case 1:22-cv-11550-ADB Document 228 Filed 03/16/26 Page 4 of 9
Access Disputes
Topic Pls.’ Proposed Order Def.’s Proposed Order
Who retains DCUs “shall be made available to DCUs remain in the possession of
Declaration and | the counsel for the Party who counsel for the “retaining” party.
Confidentiality | [designated the information as [§ 5.1(c)]; accord [§ 5.3(b)].
Undertakings AEO].” [§ 5.1(c)]; accord [§ 5.3].
(“DCUs”).
Who may view | People who both (1) have access to | People who have access to AEO
Doe Plaintiff AEO information and (2) have information, people who have access
information executed DCUs. [§ 5.3]. to Confidential information, and
third-party witnesses. [§ 5.3(a)(b)].
People without AEO access must
execute a DCU. [§ 5.3(b)].
Whether certain | No provision. “{ Third-party witnesses who appear
third-party on the face of a document as an

witnesses may
view certain
documents

author, recipient, or custodian, or
who have already been identified
through discovery as having
authored or received the document
(or related documents), may have
such information disclosed without
[executing a DCU]... .” [§ 5.4

(d)].

Case 1:22-cv-11550-ADB Document 228 Filed 03/16/26 Page 5of9
Tier-of-Protection Disputes
Information type Pls.’ Proposed Order Def.’s Proposed Order

Protected health AEO protection. [§ 2.5]. Confidential protection.

information [§ 2.1(b)].

Names of Doe Plaintiffs DP protection. [§ 2.2]. Confidential protection,
[§ 2.1(c)], except where the
name “appeat[s] together with
at least one additional personal
identifier,” [§ 2.2(a)], in which
case DP protection.

Personally identifying AEO protection. [§ 2.5]. Also | Confidential protection,

information related to Doe | DP protection. [§ 2.2]. [§ 2.1(c)], but if the

Plaintiffs (e.g., date of information appears “together

birth, immigration case
details, alien registration
number, government-
issued identification,
residential address, phone
number, email address)

with” the Doe Plaintiff's true
legal name, [§ 2.2(a)], or if it
“consists of other personally
identifying information” about
the Doe Plaintiff, [§ 2.2(b)],
then it will receive DP
protection. “A designation of
[DP] should be made in good
faith and narrowly tailored to
information for which such
protection is necessary and
appropriate.” [§ 2.2]. “For the
avoidance of doubt, [DP]
information may not serve as
the basis for an [AEO]
designation.” [§ 2.5].

Personally identifying AEO protection. [§ 2.5]. Also | Confidential protection.
information related to DP protection. [§ 2.2]. [§ 2.1(c)].

putative or actual class

members

Personally identifying AEO protection, except for Confidential protection.
information related to photos and videos (not listed). | [§ 2.1(d)].

current or former Vertol
employees or contractors,
including photographs and
videos

[§ 2.5].

6
A. 	Specific protection for information related to Doe Plaintiffs and putative
or actual class members
Plaintiffs have shown good cause for the Court to protect their identities and the identities
of putative or actual class members from unnecessary disclosure and association with this
litigation during the discovery process. At the same time, Defendant is reasonable to object that
the protective order as proposed by Plaintiffs would hamper Defendant’s ability to participate in
its own defense. [Joint Mot. for Protective Order at 12]. Accordingly, the Court will permit the
individuals proposed by Defendants—that is, anybody who may view AEO or confidential
information, and any third-party witnesses—to view DP information, but as requested by
Plaintiffs, the Court will require each such person to execute a DCU prior to viewing DP
information.
Concerning which information is entitled to DP protection, the Court sees minimal
difference between the parties’ positions. Defendants propose that “other personally identifying
information” about a Doe Plaintiff will be entitled to DP protection, see [Def.’s Proposed Order
§ 2.2(b)], which would give DP protection to everything that Plaintiffs seek except (1) the names
of Doe Plaintiffs, appearing by themselves, and (2) personally identifying information relating to
putative or actual class members. The names of Doe Plaintiffs identify them, of course, and the
Court sees no reason to treat their names differently from other identifying information.
Similarly, the concerns of the putative class—including the risks associated with disclosure of
putative class members’ personal information—are sufficiently similar to those of Doe Plaintiffs
to justify a similar level of protection. Accordingly, the Court will grant DP protection to the
categories of information and documents proposed by Plaintiffs.
Case 1:22-cv-11550-ADB Document 228 Filed 03/16/26 Page 6 of 9

7
B. 	Protection for other personally identifying information
Plaintiffs have not explained why protected health information (“PHI”) should
categorically be subject to an AEO designation, and the Court does not see good cause for such a
blanket rule. Accordingly, the Court will accord Confidential protection to PHI, while noting
that a party may apply an AEO designation to any information that is “extremely sensitive” and
“the disclosure of which to another [p]arty or non-party would create a substantial risk of serious
harm that could not be avoided by less restrictive means.” [Def.’s Proposed Order § 2.5].
Similarly, Plaintiffs have not explained why other forms of personally identifying information,
such as that related to Defendant’s employees or third parties, should receive an AEO
designation. Accordingly, the Court will adopt Defendant’s preferred definition of AEO
information and designate personally identifying information not related to Doe Plaintiffs or
putative or actual class members as Confidential except where the information is subject to
another provision of the protective order.2
C. 	Retention of Declaration and Confidentiality Undertakings
The Court understands Plaintiffs’ argument that DCUs should amount to more than an
honor code self-administered by the parties, see [Joint Mot. for Protective Order at 9], but it also
recognizes Defendant’s concern that requiring the parties to provide executed DCUs to their
opponents could reveal their litigation strategy, see [id. at 23]. To resolve both concerns, the
Court will instruct the parties to, once per week, file ex parte and under seal any new DCUs that
were executed. The Court will record those documents without disclosing them to the opposing
2 Because the information that is subject to each level of protection is clear on the face of the
protective order adopted by the Court, the Court will not include Defendant’s language clarifying
that DP information may not serve as the basis for an AEO designation.
Case 1:22-cv-11550-ADB Document 228 Filed 03/16/26 Page 7 of 9

8
party. Upon a showing of good cause, a party may petition the Court for confirmation that a
DCU was executed by a particular person.
D. 	Whether third-party witnesses may view certain documents
With slight modification, the Court will include the language proposed by Defendant as
to the right of third-party witnesses who are authors, recipients, and custodians to view
documents without executing DCUs. It is logical that a person should be able to view a
document that he or she authored, had custody of, or received prior to the commencement of this
litigation. Defendant’s proposed protective order, however, would also permit a third-party
witness who authored or received a document to view any other “related document” without
executing a DCU. [Def.’s Proposed Order § 5.4(d)]. The notion of a “related document” is too
vague to be manageable, and it is unclear why a person should be entitled to view something that
he or she did not author, had not previously received, and did not have custody over. The Court
will adopt Defendant’s proposal with the “related document” provision omitted.
E. 	Miscellaneous disagreements
There are other, minor differences between the versions proposed by the parties, which
the Court resolves here. First, Defendant seeks to remove the emphasized words from the
following sentence: “[DP-designated information shall not be used for] initiating or referring any
immigration enforcement action against any Plaintiff or putative or actual class member.” [ECF
No. 212-3 § 4.3 (emphasis added)]. The Court does not see any reason why the protections
afforded to putative class members and named plaintiffs should not also be afforded to actual
class members, so it will not remove those words. Second, in certain places, Defendants seek to
replace Plaintiffs’ references to “Doe Plaintiffs” with the words “pseudonymous litigants.” E.g.,
[id. at 11]. The Court is satisfied with the language proposed by Plaintiffs, and Defendants have
Case 1:22-cv-11550-ADB Document 228 Filed 03/16/26 Page 8 of 9

9
not articulated a clear reason why it should be changed. Finally, Defendants seek to remove the
emphasized words from this sentence: “For avoidance of doubt, a Party’s receipt of a document
in discovery in this Action that it previously possessed or obtained from an independent source
that had a lawful right to provide such document or information to such Party does not impose
any restriction on the Party’s use of the information . . . .” [Id. § 20]. Documents obtained
outside the scope of the discovery process are not covered by this Rule 26 order, which applies to
documents exchanged through the parties’ discovery process, and neither party has identified a
legal basis for their preferred language. The Court will remove the entire disputed sentence from
the protective order. If the issue is subsequently presented, the Court will invite briefing from
the parties.
F. 	Additional language
The Court will also add standard language concerning its right to allow disclosure of
information covered by the protective order or to modify the order at any time in the interests of
justice and to ensure that any proceeding before the Court is fair, efficient, and consistent with
the public interest.
II. 	CONCLUSION
The motion for protective order, [ECF No. 212], is GRANTED. The Court will issue a
full protective order incorporating the details described above.
SO ORDERED.
March 16, 2026 	/s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:22-cv-11550-ADB Document 228 Filed 03/16/26 Page 9 of 9