Stonecrest Managers, Inc. v. Schreffler et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
STONECREST MANAGERS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
LISA K. SCHREFFLER and
CITIGROUP, INC., AS SUCCESSOR-IN-
INTEREST TO ARGENT MORTGAGE
COMPANY, LLC,
Defendants.
No. 22-cv-11167-PGL
(CORRECTED) ORDER ON MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND
LEVENSON, U.S.M.J.
INTRODUCTION
On November 6, 2025, Plaintiff Stonecrest Managers, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion for
Bond under the Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Docket No. 143. Plaintiff
requests that the Court order Defendant Lisa Schreffler (“Defendant”) to post a $55,3751 bond to
ensure the payment of Stonecrest’s attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal. Id. at 1. In addition,
Plaintiff requests that the Court order Defendant to make use and occupancy payments to
Plaintiff in the amount of $2,664.21 per month as a condition of her appeal. Id. On November 17,
1 In the Motion for Appeal Bond (Docket No. 143), Plaintiff requests an appeal bond in the
amount of $57,375. In the Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Appeal Bond
(Docket No. 144), Plaintiff requests an appeal bond in the amount of both $55,375 and $57,375
in different sections of the brief. Plaintiff’s calculation based on 140 hours at $350 per hour for
attorney time, 25 hours at $175 per hour for paralegal time, and $2,000 in printing costs comes to
$55,375, thus I will use this total as the requested bond amount.
Case 1:22-cv-11167-PGL Document 148 Filed 12/05/25 Page 1 of 8

2
2025, Defendant filed an opposition to the Motion for Bond, arguing that attorney’s fees are not
allowed in a Rule 7 bond, that her appeal includes a new factual position, and that typos
undermine the integrity of the motion. Docket No. 145 at 2–3.
For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is allowed in part and denied in part.
Specifically, I allow Plaintiff’s motion only to the extent that it seeks a bond to cover printing
costs and a modest allowance to reflect the prospect that an award of attorneys’ fees may
ultimately be appropriate in light of the apparently frivolous basis for the appeal.
I. 	Background
The factual and procedural background of this case is discussed in detail in my order on
the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. Docket No. 115 at 2–10. In summary,
Defendant purchased her former husband’s interest in their house at 25 Lemire Court,
Bellingham, Massachusetts (the “property”) in 2007, signing a note and a mortgage on the
property to Argent Mortgage Company, LLC. Id. at 3–4. Defendant defaulted on her payments in
2008, and the note and the mortgage were repeatedly assigned and reassigned in subsequent
years. Id. at 4. The parties’ disputes about the effectiveness of those various assignments and
reassignments were at the heart of this litigation. In 2021, Plaintiff acquired the note and later
commenced the present lawsuit seeking judgment to establish claim to the mortgage. See id.;
Docket No. 1 ¶ 36.
After nearly three years of contentious, motion-driven litigation, on December 12, 2024, I
issued a written decision allowing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and directed
Plaintiff to undertake a process of notifying potential claimants prior to applying for entry of
judgment. See Docket No. 115 at 24, 45. Following completion of that notification process, the
Court entered Judgment and an Equitable Order of Assignment on May 27, 2025. Docket Nos.
125, 129. Defendant was represented by counsel throughout the pendency of her case, but
Case 1:22-cv-11167-PGL Document 148 Filed 12/05/25 Page 2 of 8

3
Defendant’s counsel withdrew on June 24, 2025, approximately four weeks after the entry of
judgment. Docket No. 128. Defendant proceeded pro se thereafter. See Docket Nos. 131, 132.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Defendant was stranded by a last-minute
withdrawal by her counsel. On the contrary, the motion to withdraw is accompanied by a letter,
signed by Defendant herself, which recites: “In speaking with you, I acknowledge and
understand . . . that I have thirty (30) days from the entry of judgment, that is June 28, 2025 to
file a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. Rule 4.” Docket No. 128 at 3 (Letter of
Lisa Kim Schreffler, dated June 23, 2025).2
No timely notice of appeal was filed following entry of judgment.
On August 19, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), requesting relief, but not clarifying the grounds for such relief, and requesting
that the Court review “the full scope of conduct” of the loan assignees. See Docket No. 134 at 1–
3. I denied that motion, citing Defendant’s failure to identify any new factual material and
Defendant’s failure to make a showing of a meritorious defense. Docket No. 137 at 3. On
September 26, 2025, Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the First Circuit Court of
Appeals—timely, that is, with respect to any available appellate review of my order denying
Defendants Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment. Docket No. 139. On November 6,
2025, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Bond (Docket No. 143, 144), and on November 17,
2025, Defendant filed her opposition (Docket No. 145).
2 The letter appears to reflect a mistaken computation of the time for filing a notice of appeal (the
Judgment in this case was entered on May 27, not May 29). That two-day discrepancy is not
material to the present matter.
Case 1:22-cv-11167-PGL Document 148 Filed 12/05/25 Page 3 of 8

4
II. 	Legal Standard
Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the district courts to “require
an appellant to file a bond or provide other security in any form and amount necessary to ensure
payment of costs on appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 7. “Costs on appeal” refer to “costs which ‘the
appellee stands to have reimbursed’ should he prevail on appeal.” Tennille v. W. Union Co., 774
F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Adsani v. Miller, 139 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998)). In the
First Circuit, “[a] Rule 7 bond may include appellate attorneys’ fees if the applicable statute
underlying the litigation contains a fee-shifting provision that accounts for such fees in its
definition of recoverable costs and the appellee is eligible to recover them.” Muehe v. City of
Boston, 340 F.R.D. 229, 231 (D. Mass. 2022) (quoting Int'l Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Dziemit, 420
Fed. App'x. 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2011)).
“While a notice of an appeal ordinarily divests a district court of jurisdiction and confers
it on the court of appeal . . . district courts retain jurisdiction to issue orders regarding bonds.”
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, 628 F. Supp. 1438, 1440
(D.D.C. 1986). “The determination of the nature and amount of the bond is a matter left to the
sound discretion of the district court.” Sckolnick v. Harlow, 820 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1987)
(citing Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty, 627 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir. 1980)).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff seeks a hefty appeal bond—$55,375—as security for payment of the attorneys’
fees and costs that Plaintiff asserts it will incur to defend against Defendant’s appeal.
A. 	It is Doubtful Whether the Underlying Contract Provides a Viable Basis for
Recovering Attorneys’ Fees (Fee Shifting)
As an initial matter, Plaintiff cites no fee-shifting provision in any applicable statute in
its demand for attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff contends that the loan agreement that Schreffler signed in
Case 1:22-cv-11167-PGL Document 148 Filed 12/05/25 Page 4 of 8

5
2007 controls, and that under the terms of that agreement, Plaintiff is entitled to recover costs
incurred protect its rights and interest in the property. Docket No. 144 at 9.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the 2007 loan agreement would serve to shift the fees
such that they would necessarily—or even likely—be recoverable by Plaintiff. In the eighteen
years since their inception, the note and the mortgage have been assigned multiple times in a
hopelessly haphazard manner. Moreover, Defendant has completed personal bankruptcy
proceedings. See Docket Nos. 115 at 5; 134-24. While the mortgage itself was not extinguished
and was equitably assigned by virtue of the entry of judgment in May of 2025, it is doubtful
whether the various terms of the original loan agreement—apart from the conveyance of a
mortgage—remain in force. On the contrary, it seems likely that Defendant’s personal
obligations (as opposed to the mortgage, which is an encumbrance on real property) would have
been discharged in her personal bankruptcy.
In short, there is nothing in the record to suggest that any generalized contractual
provision will permit recovery of attorneys’ fees.
B. 	Frivolous Appeal
The First Circuit has ruled that attorneys’ fees may be included in an appeal bond if the
district court determines that “the appeal might be frivolous and that an award of sanctions
against plaintiff on appeal [is] a real possibility.” Sckolnick v. Harlow, 820 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir.
1987). Thus, as a second basis for including attorneys’ fees in the bond calculation, Plaintiff
argues that Defendant’s appeal is frivolous, and that Plaintiff can reasonably expect to be
awarded attorneys’ fees on appeal.
There are good reasons to doubt the merits of Defendant's appeal. As noted in the
September 2, 2025, denial of Defendant’s Motion for Post-Judgment Relief, “[t]here is no
indication in Defendant’s present motion that she has anything new to raise, let alone that she
Case 1:22-cv-11167-PGL Document 148 Filed 12/05/25 Page 5 of 8

6
was prevented from raising pertinent factual and legal contentions in a timely fashion.” Docket
No. 137 at 4.
Given that there was no timely appeal from the Judgment itself, the only question for the
Court of Appeals appears to be whether the denial of Defendant’s Rule 60(b) motion was an
abuse of discretion. As the First Circuit has noted, the appellate court’s inquiry “is confined to
the supportability of the district court's denial of the motion for relief from judgment.”
Nansamba v. N. Shore Med. Ctr., Inc., 727 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2013). Given that relief under
Rule 60(b) is itself an extraordinary and rare event, appellate reversal is a long shot:
Familiar principles guide this inquiry: “relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in
nature and [ ] motions invoking that rule should be granted sparingly.” [Karak v.
Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2002).] Finality is an important element
in the judicial process, and setting aside a final judgment requires more than the
frenzied brandishing of a cardboard sword. Such a motion must satisfy a special set
of criteria; it is not enough merely to cast doubt on the soundness of the underlying
judgment. See Fisher v. Kadant, Inc., 589 F.3d 505, 512 (1st Cir.2009).
Id. at 37.
In other words, whatever may be the merits of my rulings in this case, there remains only
the remote prospect that the Court of Appeals may find an abuse of my discretion under Rule
60(b). Under these circumstances, I find that the appeal bears “the indicia of frivolousness,” and
that it makes sense to include some allowance for a potential award of attorneys’ fees in the
bond.
While some bond is appropriate, the dollar amount that Plaintiff requests is grossly
excessive.
First, Plaintiff’s estimate of its future outlays for attorneys’ fees appears overstated.
Given the narrow scope of an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, Plaintiff’s
comparisons with unrelated (merits-based) appeals in the First Circuit are misplaced. The
Case 1:22-cv-11167-PGL Document 148 Filed 12/05/25 Page 6 of 8

7
attorneys’ fees for defending an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion should be a
fraction of the anticipated cost of defending an appeal on the merits.
Second, although Defendant has not proffered any information about her finances, it
seems likely that requiring an individual to post a bond in excess of $50,000 as a precondition for
pursuing her appellate rights could unduly chill her pursuit of her appellate rights. As the Ninth
Circuit has cautioned “[a]llowing district courts to impose high Rule 7 bonds on where the
appeals might be found frivolous risks ‘impermissibly encumber[ing]’ appellants’ right to appeal.
. . .” Azizian v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 499 F.3d 950, 961 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re
Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
An appeal bond is appropriate, but it should be an order of magnitude smaller than what
Plaintiff proposes.
I conclude that a bond of $5,000 is appropriate here. There should be some limitation—
even if modest—on a party’s pursuit of frivolous and time-consuming litigation. This reflects
Plaintiff’s estimate of $2,000 in printing costs, which seems plausible, and a token sum of $3,000
for a possible award of attorneys’ fees. Given that fee awards for frivolous appeals are relatively
rare and given that Plaintiff’s initial estimate feels like an over-reach, such a token sum is
sufficient is serve the purpose of requiring a party (in this case Defendant) to consider seriously
whether there is a good-faith basis for appeal.
C. 	Use and Occupancy
Plaintiff notes that it has paid $23,062.01 towards insurance and real estate taxes since
acquiring Defendant’s loan and argues that Defendant’s non-payment has imposed a significant
burden on Plaintiff with regard to its carrying costs. But the Court is not aware of any authority
for ordering Defendant to make use and occupancy payments as a condition of her appeal, and
Plaintiff has not pointed to any. Accordingly, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Case 1:22-cv-11167-PGL Document 148 Filed 12/05/25 Page 7 of 8

8
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for an appeal bond is ALLOWED in part and
DENIED in part. Defendant is ordered to post an appeal bond in the amount of $5,000. The
request for an order requiring Defendant to make use and occupancy payments pending her
appeal is DENIED.
/s/ Paul G. Levenson
Paul G. Levenson
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated: November 26, 2025/corrected December 5, 2025
Case 1:22-cv-11167-PGL Document 148 Filed 12/05/25 Page 8 of 8