In Re: The Matter of Associated Federal Pilots and Docking Masters of Louisiana, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN THE MATTER OF ASSOCIATED
FEDERAL PILOTS & DOCKING
MASTERS OF LOUISIANA, LLC, ET
AL.
CIVIL ACTION
NO: 25-2368
SECTION: "A" (5)
ORDER
The following motions are before the Court: Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and to Increase Limitation Fund (Rec. Doc. 11) and
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. 21), both filed
by Carolyn Creppel, Darrin Creppel, Quinton Creppel, and Mindy Creppel, who are the
heirs to decedent Tilman Creppel (collectively referred to as “the Heirs”).
The first motion is opposed by the petitioners in limitation, Associated Federal
Pilots and Docking Masters of Louisiana, LLC., Federal Pilots, Inc., and Associated
Federal Coast Pilots of Louisiana, Inc. (collectively referred to as “the Limitation
Petitioners”).
The second motion is opposed by the intervenor parties, those Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, Tenecom Ltd., and The Ocean Marine Insurance
Company Limited, each subscribing severally, but not jointly, to policies of insurance
identified by cover note Nos. LCX-5-1184, LCX-6-1537, and LCX-10186 issued by
Underwriters Marine Services, Inc., and Century Indemnity Company (collectively
referred to as “the Intervenors”).
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The motions, submitted for consideration on March 4, 2026, are before the Court
on the briefs without oral argument.
Mr. Tilman Creppel, Jr. died on December 3, 2025, due to mesothelioma. Prior to
his death Mr. Tilman filed a lawsuit in state court alleging exposure to asbestos caused
by a number of defendants. During the course of that litigation, Mr. Tilman, who had
worked as a boat captain on river-pilot crew vessels, amended his petition to assert
claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law against Federal Pilots and
Docking Masters of Louisiana, LLC. Discovery later revealed that the two vessels
owned by that defendant that Mr. Creppel had worked aboard (from 1985 to 1992) were
the M/V FEDERAL PILOT I and the M/V FEDERAL PILOT III. The Limitation Petitioners
invoked this limitation proceeding and stipulated to a post-accident value for the two
vessels of $85,000.00 and $75,000.00, respectively, (totaling $160,000.00). (Rec .Doc.
4, Order).
The Intervenors, who issued policies to the Limitation Petitioners, subsequently
sought leave to intervene in the limitation proceeding to obtain declaratory relief as to
extent of coverage.
In the first motion, the Heirs first sought to challenge the applicability of the
Limitation Act given that the evidence suggests that Mr. Creppel served on vessels in
inland waters only. After the Limitation Petitioners filed their opposition, the Heirs
withdrew this challenge.1
1 The Court commends counsel for their candor in conceding that the argument was based
on an error of law.
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The Heirs maintain, however, that the limitation fund, which currently stands at
$160,000, should be increased pursuant to the flotilla doctrine because the Limitation
Petitioners owned and operated other vessels in a single enterprise, even if Mr. Creppel
did not work aboard those other vessels.
The flotilla doctrine provides a substantive avenue for claimants to challenge a
vessel owner's attempt to limit its liability by allowing them to assert that the value of the
limitation fund supplied by the vessel owner is insufficient because it does not cover the
value of all the vessels engaged in an enterprise. In re Bd. of Commissioners, 575 F.
Supp. 3d 669, 673 (E.D. La. 2021) (citing Cenac Towing Co. v. Terra Res., Inc., 734
F.2d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 1984)). The flotilla doctrine requires a limitation fund to include
the value of all vessels engaged in an enterprise when the vessels are: 1) owned by the
same person, 2) under a single command, and 3) engaged in a common enterprise. Id.
at 674 (citing Foret v. Trans. Offshore (USA), Inc., No. 09-4567, 2011 WL 3818635, at
*4 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2011)).
At most the Heirs can show that the Limitation Petitioners owned other vessels
that performed similar transport work to the two vessels that Mr. Creppel worked on.
This alone is insufficient to apply the flotilla doctrine to increase the limitation fund. The
Heirs’ motion to do so is therefore denied.
In the second motion, the Heirs move the Court to dismiss the Intervenors’
complaint arguing that interpretation of the policy(ies) at issue does not fall within the
Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, and that underwriters have no right of limitation under the
Limitation Act.
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The Intervenors are not asserting claims under the Limitation Act itself. The relief
they seek, which is to limit their exposure to that allowed to their insured under the
Limitation Act, is determined by the terms of their policies. The Intervenors are
essentially seeking declaratory relief on coverage which is fine so long as the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction. The Declaratory Judgment Act itself confers no subject
matter jurisdiction.2
On that note, the Intervenors have no right to seek relief as part of this limitation
proceeding, their assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. Therefore, they cannot
piggy back on the admiralty jurisdiction that the Limitation Petitioners enjoy and escape
jurisdictional scrutiny by simply intervening in this matter. The Intervenors must
establish subject matter jurisdiction over their claims just the same as if they had filed a
separate declaratory judgment action in federal court.3
2 In their Reply (Rec. Doc. 30) the Heirs argue that the restraining order that this Court
issued in favor of the Limitation Petitioners and their insurers should not extend to certain
additional insurers who the Heirs do not identify by name. The restraining order correctly
states to whom it applies. This Court has no control over the state court’s implementation of
the restraining order. If it has been applied too broadly then the Court would suggest that
the Heirs takes up that issue with the state court judge presiding over their case.
3 The Court also notes that the Intervenors filed a waiver of service executed by Ameron
International Corp. (Rec. Doc. 20), which is not a party to the limitation proceeding. The
Court’s Case Manager contacted counsel for the Intervenors to question the filing given that
Ameron is not a party to the case. Counsel advised that since Ameron had been a
defendant in the state court lawsuit filed by the Creppels, Intervenors decided to serve
Ameron with the intervention complaint in case Ameron wanted to respond to it. Intervenors
cannot confer standing to non-parties to participate in this lawsuit by unilaterally deciding to
serve them with pleadings. And Intervenors certainly cannot bring Ameron into the case as
a party by unilaterally choosing to serve a summons on the entity. The federal rules do not
allow for participation by interlopers so absent an appropriate procedural mechanism that
would allow Ameron to become a party to this case, the Court will not entertain a response
to the intervention complaint by Ameron.
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The Court is persuaded that the Intervenors have not properly alleged subject
matter jurisdiction. The Intervenors accuse the Heirs’ subject matter jurisdiction
challenge as being “nonsensical,” (Rec. Doc. 26, Opposition at 1), but the intervention
complaint does not properly allege a basis for admiralty jurisdiction. The complaint does
not even expressly allege that the policies at issue are maritime contracts. It is not
enough that a ship or vessel was involved or that the policy may cover some marine
risks. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Commissioners of Port of New
Orleans, 418 Fed. Appx. 305 (5th Cir. 2011). The Heirs do not have the burden of
negating subject matter jurisdiction. It is solely the Intervenors’ burden to establish it.
The appropriate course of action is to allow the Intervenors to move to amend their
complaint in order to properly and adequately allege subject matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and to Increase Limitation Fund (Rec. Doc. 11) filed by Carolyn
Creppel, Darrin Creppel, Quinton Creppel, and Mindy Creppel, the heirs to decedent
Tilman Creppel, is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. 21) filed by Carolyn Creppel, Darrin Creppel, Quinton
Creppel, and Mindy Creppel, the heirs to decedent Tilman Creppel, is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that by March 31, 2026, the Intervenors must move
to amend their complaint to properly invoke subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall strike Record Document
no. 20 from the record (see footnote 3 above).
March 13, 2026
_________________________________
Judge Jay C. Zainey
United States District Court
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