Hampton v. Family Dollar, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RUTH HAMPTON 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 25-2355
FAMILY DOLLAR, INC., ET AL. 	SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
This case is a personal injury action arising from injuries that plaintiff Ruth
Hampton (“plaintiff”) sustained as a result of the allegedly hazardous conditions in
the parking lot of a Family Dollar location in New Orleans maintained by Family
Dollar, 	Inc. 	and/or 	Family 	Dollar 	Stores 	of 	Louisiana, 	LLC 	(collectively,
“defendants”).1 Defendants removed this action to federal court on November 19,
2025,2 	asserting 	diversity 	jurisdiction 	as 	the 	basis 	for 	federal 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction.3 Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion4 to remand, and defendants
filed a response5 in opposition.
Plaintiff does not contest that diversity jurisdiction exists.6 Rather, the sole
dispute between the parties is whether defendants timely removed this action.7
Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and relevant caselaw, the Court remands the
above-captioned matter because it finds that defendants’ removal was untimely.
1 See generally R. Doc. No. 1-1.
2 See R. Doc. No. 1; see also R. Doc. No. 6-3, at 4; R. Doc. No. 10, at 6.
3 R. Doc. No. 1, at 2.
4 R. Doc. No. 6.
5 R. Doc. No. 10.
6 See generally R. Doc. No. 6.
7 See R. Doc. Nos. 6, 10.
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I. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
“Under the federal removal statute, a civil action may be removed from a state
court to a federal court on the basis of diversity.” Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C.
v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2016); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a)
and 1332. For diversity jurisdiction to exist, the amount in controversy must exceed
$75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and there must be complete diversity
between the plaintiff and all defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1446 dictates the procedures for removal
of civil actions to federal court. As it pertains to the timeliness of removal, § 1446(b)
requires that:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within
30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise,
of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon
which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the
service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then
been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant,
whichever period is shorter.
§ 1446(b)(1). In situations where “the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable,” § 1446(b)(3) permits that:
a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.
§ 1446(b)(3) (emphasis added). As the Fifth Circuit summarized in Mumfrey v. CVS
Pharmacy, Inc.:
Restated, if the initial pleading sets forth a claim that triggers the
removal clock, the defendant must file notice of removal within thirty
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days of receiving it. If the initial pleading did not trigger the thirty-day
removal clock, a notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of the
defendant’s receipt of a document from which it may ascertain that the
case is, or has become, removable.
719 F.3d 392, 397–98 (5th Cir. 2013). The removing party carries the burden of
establishing that removal was proper and timely. See Shawl v. Freedom Specialty
Ins. Co., No. 24-2125, 2025 WL 2267719, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2025) (Long, J.) (citing
Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002)). “Any
ambiguities are construed against removal and in favor of remand to state court.”
Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 397.
Plaintiff brought her action in Louisiana state court against defendants on
August 19, 2025,8 and defendants were served with plaintiff’s state court petition on
September 	17, 	2025, 	and 	September 	18, 	2025, 	respectively.9 	Consistent 	with
Louisiana law, plaintiff’s petition did not allege a specific amount of damages.10 See
L A. CODE C IV. P ROC. art. 893. Instead, plaintiff’s petition alleged categories of general
damages she was pursuing, such as “past, present, and future” physical and mental
“pain and suffering,” “medical expenses,” and “loss of enjoyment of life,” among other
damages.11 Neither party argues, nor could they, that service of plaintiff’s state court
petition 	triggered 	the 	30-day 	removal 	clock 	of 	§ 1446(b)(1).12 	There 	were 	no
quantifiable damages in the petition from which defendants could ascertain that the
8 R. Doc. No. 6-3, at 2; R. Doc. No. 10, at 1.
9 R. Doc. No. 6-3, at 2, 4; R. Doc. No. 10, at 3.
10 R. Doc. No. 1-1.
11 See id. at 1.
12 See generally R. Doc. Nos. 6, 10.
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amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional requisite for diversity jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 397–98, 400.
In fact, both plaintiff and defendants contend that § 1446(b)(3) applies.13 Their
disagreement lies in what “other paper” triggered the start of the 30-day period
within which removal must be filed.
“For a document to be considered ‘other paper’ under § 1446(b), it ‘must result
from the voluntary act of a plaintiff which gives the defendant notice of the changed
circumstances which now support federal jurisdiction.’” Fernando Garcia v. MVT
Servs., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 797, 803 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (quoting Addo v. Globe Life &
Acc. Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 2000)). The Fifth Circuit has confirmed that
correspondence and discovery materials exchanged by the parties can constitute
“other paper[s]” that confer the requisite notice and trigger the removal clock. See id.
(citing Addo, 230 F.3d at 761).
In Bosky v. Kroger Texas, LP, 288 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit
established that “the information supporting removal” in such other paper “must be
‘unequivocally clear and certain’ to start the time limit running for a notice of removal
under” § 1446(b)(3). See id. at 211 (emphasis added). It found that this “clear[]
threshold promotes judicial economy” and “should reduce ‘protective’ removals by
defendants faced with an equivocal record.” Id.
Plaintiff avers that information about the amount in controversy was conveyed
to defendants’ counsel through a series of communications, medical records, and
13 R. Doc. No. 6-3, at 4; R. Doc. No. 10, at 3.
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billings that were “other paper[s]” sufficiently unequivocally clear and certain to
trigger the 30-day removal clock in § 1446(b)(3).14 According to plaintiff, these other
papers gave defendants notice that the case was removable by September 25, 2025.15
Specifically, plaintiff explains that, prior to filing her lawsuit in state court,
plaintiff’s counsel sent defendants’ counsel a letter indicating that she had been
“recommended for shoulder surgery” and that surgery would be “scheduled on the
next available date.”16 This correspondence also requested that defendants “advise
immediately” if they wanted to schedule an independent medical examination
(“IME”) of plaintiff prior to this to-be-scheduled surgery.17
Next, plaintiff’s counsel sent defense counsel an email on September 25, 2025,
confirming that plaintiff’s “shoulder and ankle surgery” was “set” for October 31,
2025, and again asking defendants to “let [them] know immediately” whether they
would like to conduct an IME prior to this surgery.18 The email also stated that the
surgery was “a medical necessity and [would] not be postponed.”19
Plaintiff then explains that defendants’ counsel responded by email the next
day, September 26, 2025. In that email, defendants’ counsel confirmed that it had
“received [the] notice of [plaintiff’s] upcoming surgeries,”20 and indicated that it
14 See R. Doc. No. 6-3, at 4–9.
15 See id. at 6.
16 Id. at 2; see also R. Doc. No. 6-4 (August 12, 2025, correspondence).
17 R. Doc. No. 6-4, at 1.
18 R. Doc. No. 6-3, at 2–3; R. Doc. No. 6-7, at 1. The Court notes that nowhere in the
parties’ briefs is it confirmed that the October 31st surgery indeed occurred on
October 31st.
19 R. Doc. No. 6-7, at 1.
20 R. Doc. No. 6-9, at 1–2.
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“intend[ed] to have an IME done PRIOR to her surgery.”21 Defendants’ counsel also
asked in this email that plaintiff’s counsel “forward all medical records and billings
associated with [plaintiff’s] treatment and claims.”22 Plaintiff’s counsel provided
defense counsel with the requested records that same day.23
As is relevant to the present motion, the billing-related records provided by
plaintiff’s counsel included: a surgery quote for her right ankle, which totaled
$9,082.00;24 a 	surgery 	quote 	for 	her 	shoulder, 	which 	totaled $19,646.00;25 an
ultrasound quote for her right ankle, which totaled $850.00;26 and a bill for shoulder
X-rays and reports, which totaled $990.00.27 The surgery quotes do not include costs
and fees for anesthesia.28 Plaintiff’s medical records also indicated, in a visit note of
July 29, 2025,29 that she had previously undergone surgery on her right ankle related
to her fall in the Family Dollar parking lot.30
It 	is 	plaintiff’s 	position 	that 	the 	September 	25th 	email 	correspondence
confirming her shoulder and ankle surgeries was sufficient to trigger the removal
clock because it “clearly demonstrate[d]” to defendants that “the potential value of
21 Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
22 Id.
23 See R. Doc. Nos. 6-10, 6-11.
24 R. Doc. No. 6-14, at 1.
25 Id. at 3.
26 Id. at 6.
27 Id. at 9.
28 Id. at 1, 3.
29 Id. at 10.
30 Id. at 10–11.
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the case ha[d] increased.”31 Alternatively, plaintiff argues that defendants had notice
that this case had become removable by September 26th, because the medical records
indicated that plaintiff had already “incurred costs related to [her] previous surgery”
and “future surgery costs alone” would total at least $30,000.00.32 According to
plaintiff, this information was “clearly available in the documents provided” to
defendants and should have put defendants on notice that the case was removable.33
Therefore, defendants’ removal of this case fifty-five or, alternatively, fifty-four, days
later was untimely.34
Defendants, in contrast, contend that the 30-day removal clock was not
triggered until October 27, 2025, when plaintiff returned her response to defendants’
request for admissions.35 Within her response, plaintiff stated that “the amount of
damages in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.”36 Plaintiff also therein declined to
“remit, waive, and relinquish in State Court any award of damages in excess of
$75,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs.”37 Defendants urge that it is this “other
paper” that opens the 30-day removal window and that, consequently, their removal
on November 19, 2025, less than thirty days later, was timely.38
31 R. Doc. No. 6-3, at 5–6 (“Plaintiff’s September 25, 2025 correspondence was a
voluntary act that gave the Defendants notice of the changed circumstances (i.e., Ms.
Hampton will indeed be undergoing the recommended surgeries and that they are
scheduled on October 31, 2025) which now support federal jurisdiction.”).
32 R. Doc. No. 6-3, at 7.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 8.
35 R. Doc. No. 10, at 2.
36 R. Doc. No. 1-3, at 2.
37 Id.
38 R. Doc. No. 10, at 2.
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Courts following Bosky have found that other papers “describing injuries and
other damages that seem likely to exceed the amount in controversy requirement, but
which do not show unequivocally that the requirement is met, are insufficient to
trigger the removal clock.” Darensburg v. NGM Ins. Co., No. 14-1391, 2014 WL
4072128, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (Barbier, J.); Cole ex rel. Ellis v. Knowledge
Learning Corp., 416 F. App’x 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The necessity of independent
research to ascertain the amount in controversy shows the discovery responses were
not ‘unequivocally clear and certain.’” (cleaned up)). Indeed, “if a defendant has to
analyze and dissect medical treatment records to divine whether the nature and
cause of a plaintiff’s injuries satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, then
those papers do not suffice to trigger the 30 day time period.” Shehadeh v. Bergeron,
No. 	19-228, 	2020 	WL 	9720423, 	at 	*5 	(M.D. 	La. 	Feb. 	24, 	2020), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 19-228, 2020 WL 9720158 (M.D. La. Mar. 10, 2020).
To the extent that plaintiff expected defendants to extract from her medical
records the fact that she had undergone surgery in January 2025—without any
guidance from plaintiff’s counsel that such surgery had occurred and was reflected in
those medical records—and, from there, infer that the jurisdictional amount was
reached, jurisprudence counsels against imposing such an expectation.39 See, e.g., id.
However, the Court finds that plaintiff’s other potential damages—those
discernable from plaintiff’s surgery quotes, medical bills, and state petition—were
39 R. Doc. No. 6-3, at 7–8 (“Defendants should have ascertained that this case is one
that would be removable.”).
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unequivocally clear and certain to defendants to trigger § 1446(b)(3)’s 30-day removal
clock. As of September 26th, plaintiff had provided defendants with notice of at least
$30,568 	in 	quantifiable 	medical 	damages, 	notice 	of 	additional 	costs 	and 	fees
associated with those medical expenses, and notice that she was seeking additional
general damages arising from the incident.40 See Medrano v. KLLM Transportation
Servs. LLC, No. 21-581, 2022 WL 17833284, at *5 (M.D. La. Aug. 30, 2022) (finding
that itemized damages “with the aid simple mental calculations” are sufficiently clear
to reveal the amount in controversy); Shawl, 2025 WL 2267719, at *3 (“The amount
in controversy ‘concerns what the plaintiff is claiming,’ ‘not whether the plaintiff is
likely to win or be awarded everything he seeks.’” (quoting Robertson v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 814 F.3d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 2015)).
This is not a situation where the quantifiable damages were so low or the
expectation of other damages so unknown that defendants were unable to ascertain
that the amount in controversy exceeded the minimum jurisdictional amount of
$75,000 by September 26th. Cf. Cole, 416 F. App’x at 440 (holding insufficiently clear
and certain to trigger § 1446(b)(3)’s removal clock the plaintiff’s medical bills totaling
“less than $3,400” when coupled with medical records demonstrating that “the CT-
scan, X-ray, and neuropsychological assessment reported no abnormalities; and the
treating 	physician 	recommended 	simple 	home 	remedies 	for 	[the 	individual’s]
recovery—the application of a cool compress to the bruised area and an over-the-
40 Defendants do not address plaintiff’s claim for general damages anywhere in its
response. See R. Doc. No. 10.
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counter pain reliever”); Smith v. Avina, No. 22-561, 2022 WL 17347792, at *4 (M.D.
La. Nov. 10, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-561, 2022 WL
17345770 (M.D. La. Nov. 30, 2022) (holding that the 30-day removal clock was not
triggered where the quantifiable damages provided did not reach the jurisdictional
threshold 	and, 	“[b]eyond 	the 	quantifiable 	measures 	of 	damages 	provided, 	the
discovery 	responses 	only 	provide that the 	amount of 	damages 	sought 	for the
remaining categories are ‘unknown’”).
The Court finds that the 30-day period for removal began when plaintiff’s
counsel confirmed plaintiff’s surgery and sent the accompanying medical bills and
quotes. Cf. Shawl, 2025 WL 2267719, at *3 (finding the plaintiff’s email confirming
that the plaintiff had undergone shoulder surgery and lumbar radiofrequency
ablation was sufficient to trigger the 30-day removal clock).
For these reasons, the Court agrees with plaintiff that removal was untimely.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED and that
the above-captioned case is REMANDED to the Civil District Court for the Parish
of Orleans.
New Orleans, Louisiana, February 11, 2026.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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