Castro v. Kenner Gardens Hospitality, LLC et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DANIEL CASTRO CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 24-1158
KENNER GARDENS HOSPITALITY,
LLC SECTION: "A" (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
The following motion is before the Court: Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec.
Doc. 22) filed by the defendant, Kenner Gardens Hospitality, LLC. The plaintiff, Daniel
Castro, opposes the motion. The motion, submitted for consideration on February 4,
2026, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument.
The defendant, Kenner Gardens Hospitality, LLC, is the owner and operator of a
hotel located on Williams Boulevard in Kenner, Louisiana. The plaintiff, Daniel Castro,
was staying at the hotel on February 20, 2023, when he slipped and fell while exiting the
hotel’s only elevator. Castro contends that he sustained serious injuries in the fall that
required over $140,000 in medical treatment including emergency surgery. Photographs
taken immediately after the incident and made part of the summary judgment record,
confirm that the floor of the elevator had a significant amount of what appears to be
water. Castro has surmised that perhaps another guest had been using the pool and
entered the elevator while dripping wet.1
1 In its briefing Defendant has characterized the water in the elevator as a “puddle,” which
Castro believes is somewhat of an understatement. The post-incident pictures do suggest
that a significant amount of water was on the elevator floor.
Case 2:24-cv-01158-JCZ-KWR Document 25 Filed 02/13/26 Page 1 of 6

2
A nonjury trial is scheduled for March 30, 2026. (Rec. Doc. 13, Scheduling
Order).
Defendant now moves for summary judgment contending that Castro cannot
prove that the water created an unreasonable risk of harm because it was open and
obvious, and second that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the water
in the elevator. Defendant asserts that these are essential elements of Castro’s claim,
and given that he cannot prove them, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” when viewed
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact.” TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). A dispute about a
material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The court must
draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255). Once the moving party has initially shown “that there is an absence of
evidence to support the non-moving party’s cause,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward with “specific facts” showing a
genuine factual issue for trial. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Conclusional allegations and denials,
speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic
argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue
Case 2:24-cv-01158-JCZ-KWR Document 25 Filed 02/13/26 Page 2 of 6

3
for trial. Id. (citing SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993)).
When faced with a well-supported motion for summary judgment, Rule 56 places
the burden on the non-movant to designate the specific facts in the record that create
genuine issues precluding summary judgment. Jones .v Sheehan, Young, & Culp, P.C.,
82 F.3d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court has no duty to survey the entire
record in search of evidence to support a non-movant’s position. Id. (citing Forsyth v.
Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1992); Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d
1300, 1307 (5th Cir. 1988)).
Under the duty/risk analysis applicable to this case, the plaintiff must prove five
separate elements: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific
standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the
appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct
was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the
defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope
of duty element); (5) proof of actual damages (the damages element). Farrell v. Circle K
Stores, Inc., 359 So. 3d 467, 473 (La. 2023) (citing Malta v. Herbert S. Hiller Corp., 333
So. 3d 384, 395 (La. 2021)). The owner of property has a duty to keep the premises in a
reasonably safe condition, and to discover any unreasonably dangerous condition on
the premises. Id. at 473-74. He must either correct the condition or warn potential
victims of its existence. Id. When determining whether that duty has been breached, the
likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the
condition, is a factor to be considered. Id. at 474 (citing Bufkin v. Felipe’s La., LLC, 171
So. 3d 851, 856 (La. 2014)).
Case 2:24-cv-01158-JCZ-KWR Document 25 Filed 02/13/26 Page 3 of 6

4
The first question that the Court considers is whether the open and obvious
aspect of the water in the elevator forecloses as a matter of law the finding that it
presented an unreasonable risk of harm. Castro knew that the water was on the floor of
the elevator. He first encountered it when he returned to the hotel for the evening and
called the elevator to go up to his room. Castro did not fall in the water at that time and
he did not report the water to the hotel’s staff. Later that same evening Castro decided
to leave his room to go downstairs to smoke a cigarette. When the elevator door
opened Castro noticed that the water was still on the elevator floor yet he safely entered
the elevator and rode it to the lobby. Castro fell when the elevator door opened to the
lobby and he attempted to exit the elevator.
The water was not located in a corner in the far reaches of the lobby. An elevator
is a highly traversed area where guests of the hotel would be likely to encounter a
potential hazard. In fact, the elevator that Castro was using was the only elevator
available to guests so Castro had no choice but to use it. Whether a hazard is open and
obvious is relevant because the more obvious a risk the less likely it will be to cause
injury because it will be avoided. Farrell, 359 So. 2d at 474. It is therefore noteworthy
that even having twice avoided falling in the water, and having undisputable knowledge
that the water was present, Castro fell nevertheless. The Court is persuaded that
contrary to Defendant’s position, Castro’s knowledge of the hazard does not as a matter
of law bar his claim but rather goes to the issue of contributory fault. Knowing that the
water was present Castro either failed to exercise ordinary prudence, or he did exercise
ordinary prudence and due to no fault of his own fell nonetheless. The Court cannot
determine which at this juncture.
Case 2:24-cv-01158-JCZ-KWR Document 25 Filed 02/13/26 Page 4 of 6

5
The second question that the Court considers is whether Castro cannot prove
that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the water in the elevator.
Naturally Castro has no way of knowing how long the water had already been on the
elevator floor when he encountered it the first time and successfully avoided falling
down. Castro estimates that he was in his room for approximately 30 to 50 minutes
before returning to the elevator to go back downstairs and encountered the water once
again when he fell. (Rec. Doc. 23-2, Castro Affidavit ¶ 8). The hotel’s general manager,
Harvey Mansour, asserts that no other guest reported the water in the elevator.2 (Rec.
Doc. 22-4, Mansour Declaration ¶ 9). The general manager produced a long list of
duties for the lobby attendant to complete but the form is unsigned and Mansour makes
no attempt to explain who was performing those duties on the evening of Castro’s
accident, if anyone. In fact, it seems rather clear that if someone had been performing
those duties on the evening of Castro’s accident then the water in the elevator would
have been discovered and removed before Castro came back down to the lobby for the
second time. Given that the water was so open and obvious, and given the length of
time that the water was allowed to remain on the floor of the only guest elevator in the
hotel, the Court is persuaded that Castro has created an issue of fact as to whether
Defendant had constructive notice of the hazard.
In sum, Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2 Mansour declares that the facts in his declaration are based on personal knowledge but
he does not lay a proper foundation for that assertion. For instance, nothing in Mansour’s
declaration suggests that he was present at the hotel on the evening of Castro’s fall so as to
be able to state based on his personal knowledge that no one else had mentioned the water
to any staff member of the hotel. In fact, Mansour does not even explain what staff was on
duty that night other than the young lady working at the front desk.
Case 2:24-cv-01158-JCZ-KWR Document 25 Filed 02/13/26 Page 5 of 6

6
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 22) filed by
the defendant, Kenner Gardens Hospitality, LLC, is DENIED.
February 13, 2026
_______________________________
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:24-cv-01158-JCZ-KWR Document 25 Filed 02/13/26 Page 6 of 6