USA v. Akpieyi et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 23-190
KENNETH G. AKPIEYI 	SECTION "H"
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Kenneth Akpieyi’s Motion for New Trial
(Doc. 153). For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On July 25, 2025, a federal jury found Defendant Kenneth Akpieyi guilty
on charges of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit
money laundering, and aiding and abetting mail fraud. On August 29, 2025,
Defendant filed the instant Motion, arguing that “[b]ased upon the evidence
and its presentation, the jury could not conclude that this Defendant held
sufficient mens rea to defraud,” and thus the verdict was contrary to the law
and evidence.1 The Government opposes.
1 Doc. 153.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) states, “[u]pon the defendant’s
motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest
of justice so requires.”2 The Fifth Circuit has held “the trial court should not
grant a motion for new trial unless there would be a miscarriage of justice or
the weight of evidence preponderates against the verdict. A new trial is
granted only upon demonstration of adverse effects on substantial rights of a
defendant.”3 The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that a new trial
is justified.4
LAW AND ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court notes that Defendant’s Motion is untimely. “Any
motion for new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered
evidence must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty.”5
Prior to the expiration of the original fourteen-day period, Defendant moved
for, and the Court granted, a fourteen-day extension. Defendant filed the
instant Motion seven days after the expiration of that extension, making it
untimely.6
Notwithstanding the untimely filing, Defendant is not entitled to a new
trial. Defendant makes the bare assertion that the verdict is “contrary to the
law and evidence” as the evidence presented regarding the mens rea element
of the fraud-based charges is insufficient to substantiate the verdict.7 In
2 FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
3 United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 466 (5th Cir. 2004).
4 United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1997).
5 FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(2).
6 To the extent the Court could construe Defendant’s Motion as one for a judgment of acquittal
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, such a motion would also be untimely.
7 Doc. 153.
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deciding whether to grant a motion for new trial on these grounds, the Court
“may 	weigh 	the 	evidence 	and 	assess 	the 	credibility 	of 	the 	witnesses 	in
considering 	the 	motion.”8 	Despite 	the 	Court’s 	inherent 	discretion 	when
considering a motion for new trial, the Court “may not reweigh the evidence
and set aside the verdict simply because it feels some other result would be
more reasonable.”9 Instead, “[t]he evidence must preponderate heavily against
the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict
stand.”10
In the instant Motion, Defendant fails to identify any evidence as to his
culpability that cuts against the jury’s verdict, much less “preponderate[s]
heavily against” it.11 Despite the assertion in Defendant’s Motion and his
self-serving testimony at trial, the record is teeming with evidence supporting
Defendant’s intent to defraud. Defendant testified at trial that he used the fake
name, Phillip Anderson, to open bank accounts and repeatedly deposit checks
containing victim funds. Although Defendant testified that he had never
contacted the victims and that he believed the funds were for his car resale
business, the Government presented evidence that established, at a minimum,
Defendant ignored clear signs that he was engaging in fraudulent conduct.12
Particularly, when Defendant testified that he believed that the victims’ checks
were 	for 	automobile-related 	transactions, 	the 	Government 	highlighted
Defendant’s inability to provide details, such as vehicle specifications or the
8 United States v. Arnold, 416 F.3d. 349, 360 (5th Cir. 2005).
9 Id. at 360.
10 Id.
11 Likewise, Defendant fails to cite any legal authority that supports that the verdict is
contrary to the law.
12 See United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 73 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Exceeded, and then
super-exceeded, were the limits of such possible, though hardly probable, explanations as
mistake, omission, coincidence, and naivete. At some point, knowledge may be imputed.”);
see also United States v. Agbi, 84 F. 4th 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2023).
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identity 	of 	parties, 	for 	those 	transactions. 	Further, 	the 	Government
demonstrated that Defendant engaged in several tactics to attempt to avoid
detection, including failing to pay taxes, depositing two large checks from the
same victim at different banks on the same day, and initiating transfers of
funds 	that 	were 	then 	forwarded 	to 	domestic 	and 	international 	entities.
Accordingly, the weight of the evidence does not preponderate against the
verdict, and no miscarriage of justice would result from letting the verdict
stand.13 Defendant has failed to meet his burden under Rule 33.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 5th day of December, 2025.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13 Although Defendant did not move for a judgment of acquittal, the Court notes that such a
motion would also fail. The record contains sufficient evidence such that “a rational trier of
fact could have found that each element of the charged criminal offense was proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.” See Arnold, 416 F.3d. at 358.
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