Sheckles v. Medical - Correct Care Solution et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PADUCAH DIVISION
FREDERICK SHECKLES PLAINTIFF
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-CV-00033-JHM
MEDICAL - CORRECT CARE SOLUTION, et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Frederick Sheckles filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner action
proceeding in forma pauperis. By prior Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court conducted
an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed the action without
prejudice and with leave to amend the complaint. (DNs 13, 14). Plaintiff has filed an amended
complaint. (DN 15). The Court will reopen the action and undertake initial review of the amended
complaint pursuant to § 1915A.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s initial complaint alleged that Defendants Correct Care Solutions, Kentucky
Department of Corrections, and Nurse Jane Doe violated his Eighth Amendment constitutional
rights when he suffered from seizures, memory loss, and brain damage following the
administration of a flu vaccine in 2017. Plaintiff further alleged that on an unspecified date, he
remained in a segregation cell while having multiple seizures without being transported to an
outside hospital. (DN 1).
The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). However, leave to amend the complaint was granted
to afford Plaintiff an opportunity to provide additional facts concerning his allegation that he was
left in segregation cell while having ongoing, repeated seizures without medical intervention.
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Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint. (DN 15). The Court construes the amended
complaint (DN 15) as requesting to reopen this case, which the Court GRANTS. The Court
DIRECTS the CLERK OF COURT to restore this case to the Court’s active docket. The
Court will review the amended complaint pursuant to § 1915A.
II. SUMMARY OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is a convicted inmate housed at the Luther Luckett Correctional Complex. He
names as Defendants “Medical – Correct Care Solutions” and Correction Officers Jane Doe and
John Doe.1 Plaintiff alleges that on December 9, 2017, he was “left to lay in the segregation cell,
having one seizure after the other. Nurse Jane Doe and unnamed Correction Officers allowed this
man to suffer . . . .” He further alleges that he “layed suffering in the hospital” as indicated by
medical records attached to the complaint. The exhibits to the complaint reveal that Plaintiff was
hospitalized at Baptist Health Paducah from December 9 to December 18, 2017, for altered mental
status and seizure-like activity. Provider notes indicate that Plaintiff reported an allergic reaction
to a flu shot two weeks prior.
Plaintiff states that Defendants “were aware of [his] vulnerabilities and the risk of
administering said flu shot.” He alleges that he has “many medical and mental health needs, he
has trouble taking care of himself, this all at the hands of nurses and officers at Eddyville on
12-9-2017.”2 As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer,
or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
1 In his Statement of Claims, Plaintiff also references a Nurse Jane Doe.
2 The Court presumes that “Eddyville” refers to the Kentucky State Penitentiary.
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which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). A claim is legally frivolous
when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to
survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must
construe the complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations
as true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing
court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
IV. ANALYSIS
A court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint if it is clear from its face that the claims are
time-barred. See Alston v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 28 F. App’x 475, 476 (6th Cir. 2022) (holding
that sua sponte dismissal is appropriate when “the statute of limitations defect [is] obvious from
the face of the complaint”). Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations,
federal courts borrow the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275–80 (1985). In Kentucky, § 1983 actions are limited by the one-year
statute of limitations found in Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a). Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing,
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896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990). Although the statute of limitations turns on state law, the
question of when a § 1983 claim accrues to trigger the statute is a matter of federal law. Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).
The Sixth Circuit recognizes two formulations of the accrual rule: the standard, or
“occurrence” rule, which triggers the limitations period on the first day that every element of a
claim has occurred such that the plaintiff may sue in court over the claim; and the “discovery” rule,
which postpones the limitations period to the date that the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably
should have discovered, basic facts about the claim. Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 879-80
(6th Cir. 2024).
As the Sixth Circuit has recently explained,
Under the so-called “occurrence” rule, the Supreme Court has held that a statute of
limitations “presumptively” starts on the first day that “a complete and present
cause of action” exists. McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 (2019) (quoting
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388); see Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879. In other words, this rule
triggers the limitations period when a claim’s elements have all arisen, see Reguli,
109 F.4th at 879, such that the plaintiff can sue in court on the claim, see Wallace,
549 U.S. at 388. Our cases, by contrast, have departed from this presumptive
occurrence rule in § 1983 suits by regularly following a “discovery” rule instead.
See Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879–80. This rule starts the limitations period on the date
that the plaintiff learned of (or should have learned of) certain “facts about the
claim.” Id.
Abbey v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 182 F.4th 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2026).
In Abbey, the Sixth Circuit declined to adopt a definitive accrual rule because the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claims were untimely under either standard. 182 F.4th at 500–01 (“Because the
complaint alleges facts showing that Abbey did not timely file her three claims under either accrual
rule, we need not choose between them to resolve this case.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also, e.g., Coleman v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 130 F.4th 593, 602
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(6th Cir. 2025) (“[W]e can assume that the more plaintiff-friendly discovery rule applies here
because the difference does not matter to the outcome.”).
The limitations period in this case is one year. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a). Applying
the more favorable “discovery” rule of accrual, Plaintiff had one year from the time he knew or
had reason to know of the injury which formed the basis of his action. 	Plaintiff initiated this
lawsuit on February 2, 2026. 3 It is clear from the amended complaint, however, that Plaintiff knew
of his injuries in December 2017, when they occurred. 	The one-year statute of limitations for
Plaintiff’s claim expired in December of 2018, approximately seven years before this action was
commenced. Because it is time-barred, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 215) (“If the allegations . . .
show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim[.]”).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss this action.
Date:
cc: 	Plaintiff, pro se
4414.015
3 Under the prisoner mailbox rule, a civil action is deemed filed on the date that it is deposited in the prison mail
system for mailing. See Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the mailbox rule “applies to
civil complaints filed by pro se petitioners incarcerated at the time of filing”).
October 7, 2026
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