Sallaj v. Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, Secretary of et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
LISA SALLAJ,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE
MIDWEST, INC.,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-1119-DDC-BGS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Just one claim from pro se1 plaintiff Lisa Sallaj’s Complaint survived the court’s recent
Order (Doc. 52). Because only a state-law claim remains, the court ordered plaintiff to show
cause why the court shouldn’t decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss this case.
Plaintiff timely responded. This Order resolves that jurisdictional issue. Also before the court
are two motions from plaintiff—one asking the court to certify its interlocutory order for appeal
(Doc. 71) and another asking for the undersigned to recuse (Doc. 72). The court takes up these
issues, in turn, starting with the jurisdiction issue.
I. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that the court has federal-question jurisdiction over this case.
See Doc. 1 at 1 (Compl. ¶ 1). But the court dismissed all federal claims in this case. See Doc. 52
at 26–27. The court thus ordered plaintiff to show cause why the court shouldn’t decline to
1 	Plaintiff proceeds pro se. The court construes her filings liberally and “hold[s] [them] to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But the court doesn’t “assume the role of
advocate for the pro se litigant.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim and dismiss this case.
Doc. 83. Plaintiff timely responded, arguing that (1) exceptional circumstances in this case
justify exercising supplemental jurisdiction and (2) diversity jurisdiction now exists. Doc. 84.
The court rejects both arguments and thus dismisses the Complaint (Doc. 1) without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. But, in the interest of judicial economy, the court will
refrain from closing this case and permit plaintiff to file a motion to amend her pleading within
14 days of this Order.
Start with supplemental jurisdiction. The court declines to exercise it. “Notions of
comity and federalism demand that a state court try its own lawsuits, absent compelling reasons
to the contrary.” Thatcher Enters. v. Cache Cnty. Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990).
No “compelling reasons to the contrary” exist here. Id. Plaintiff argues that dismissal would
lead to duplicative litigation in state court and would work manifest injustice against her because
she’s invested time and effort in this forum. Id. That’s not right. This case is in its early stages;
the parties haven’t expended much effort. Any effort expended in this court readily would
translate to a state-court proceeding. This case isn’t an exceptional one that warrants
supplemental jurisdiction in the absence of any federal claim. So, the court declines to exercise
it.
Now turn to diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that, after dismissing all nondiverse
defendants, the court now has diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 84 at 1–2. And she asserts, her claims
against defendant exceed the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. Id. at 2. The issue?
The Complaint alleges neither the amount in controversy nor that the court may exercise
diversity jurisdiction. See generally Doc. 1. That’s a problem. Ordinarily, courts decline to
“consider grounds for jurisdiction that are not asserted within the operative complaint.” Kehoe v.
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Nat’l Sci. Found., No. 23-cv-02690-DDD-SBP, 2025 WL 3242413, at *11 n.7 (D. Colo. Aug.
28, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3242372 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2025).
In other words, for the court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, “the complaint must allege that the
plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and that the amount in controversy is
greater than $75,000.” Rice v. Off. of Servicemembers’ Grp. Life Ins., 260 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th
Cir. 2001). And here, the Complaint never invokes diversity jurisdiction nor alleges that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See generally id. Plaintiff’s late-breaking effort to
invoke diversity jurisdiction is too little, too late. See Ryan v. Corizon Health, No. 20-CV-98-
ABJ, 2021 WL 3375674, at *11 (D. Wyo. July 22, 2021) (“[T]his Court, and others, are unaware
of any authority allowing a party to proceed under diversity jurisdiction when the case was
initiated on federal question jurisdiction, but the basis for the federal question disappeared and
diversity emerged.”); Henok v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 106 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2015)
(similar).
In short, the court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the operative pleading in this case.
This conclusion requires the court to dismiss the Complaint without prejudice. See Brereton v.
Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (instructing that dismissals for lack
of jurisdiction “must be without prejudice”). But, the court recognizes plaintiff has asserted
she’s armed with facts that might suffice for the court to exercise diversity jurisdiction. See Doc.
84 at 1–4. So, in the interest of judicial economy, the court will delay entering judgment and
closing this case. Plaintiff, at her option, may file a motion for leave to amend her complaint
within 14 days. If she elects to do so, she must comply with all governing procedural rules. See
D. Kan. Rule 15.1; Fed R. Civ. P. 15. If plaintiff doesn’t file a motion for leave to amend within
14 days, the court will enter judgment and close this case.
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II. 	Motion to Reserve Right to Appeal (Doc. 71)
Plaintiff next has filed a Motion to Reserve Right to Appeal (Doc. 71). She asks the
court to acknowledge her right to appeal the court’s prior Memorandum and Order (Doc. 52) and
to enter that Order “as a final judgment” for “the dismissed parties and claims[.]” Doc. 71 at 2.
The court declines.
The court liberally construes plaintiff’s motion as one filed under Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b)
provides that when an action involves multiple claims or parties, “the court may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). District courts do not
grant Rule 54(b) requests “routinely.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10
(1980). As our Circuit has cautioned, “trial courts should be reluctant to enter Rule 54(b) orders
since the purpose of this rule is a limited one: to provide a recourse for litigants when dismissal
of less than all their claims will create undue hardships.” Okla. Tpk. Auth. v. Bruner, 259 F.3d
1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation cleaned up). Before entering a Rule 54(b) judgment, the
court must make two determinations: first, the court “must determine that the order it is
certifying is a final order[,]” and second, the court must conclude “that there is no just reason to
delay review of the final order until it has conclusively ruled on all claims presented by the
parties to the case.” Id. (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 7–8). As the court explains
next, plaintiff can’t satisfy this second element. So, the court needn’t consider the first.
Plaintiff hasn’t shown that there’s “no just reason to delay” entry of judgment. Id.
Courts ordinarily make this “determination only in the infrequent case in which a failure to do so
might have a harsh effect.” 10 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2659 (4th ed.
2026). The court weighs “Rule 54(b)’s policy of preventing piecemeal appeals against the
hardship or injustice that might be inflicted on a litigant because of the delay.” McKibben v.
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Chubb, 840 F.2d 1525, 1528 (10th Cir. 1988) (quotation cleaned up). Plaintiff’s motion doesn’t
identify any “undue hardship” that she might face. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 259 F.3d at 1242 (quotation
cleaned up). To the contrary, this case is a run-of-the-mill one, one where the general policy
against piecemeal appeals militates against certifying this case for immediate appeal. That’s
especially so because the factual basis for plaintiff’s surviving breach-of-contract claim is “so
intertwined” with her dismissed claims so “as to be inseparable” from one another. Id. at 1243.
In other words, the dismissed claims “have so much factual overlap” with the surviving claim
that a “certification under Rule 54(b) of an order disposing” of the other claims is inappropriate
and contrary to the policy against piecemeal appeals. Id.
The court thus denies plaintiff’s Motion to Reserve Right to Appeal (Doc. 71). The court
takes up plaintiff’s motion asking the court to recuse, next.
III. 	Motion to Disqualify (Doc. 72)
Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Disqualify (Doc. 72), asking the undersigned to recuse.
Plaintiff argues that (1) the undersigned worked at the law firm who now represents defendant
and (2) the court dismissed many of plaintiff’s claims. The court isn’t persuaded.2
Start with the governing legal standard. Two statutes govern judicial recusal, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 144 and 455. See Burleson v. Sprint PCS Grp., 123 F. App’x 957, 959 (10th Cir. 2005). For
disqualification under § 144, the moving party must submit an affidavit showing bias and
prejudice. Id. at 959–60 (citing Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988)). The
bias and prejudice must be personal, extrajudicial, and identified by “‘facts of time, place,
persons, occasion, and circumstances.’” Id. at 960 (quoting Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937,
2 	Because the court lacks jurisdiction over the operative pleading, plaintiff’s recusal request is
moot. See Stein v. New Mexico, 684 F. App’x 720, 720 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[O]ur conclusion that the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction also renders the recusal issue moot.”). But because the court won’t
dismiss the case yet, it takes up the substance of the recusal motion.
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939 (10th Cir. 1987)). Alternatively, under the relevant parts of § 455, a judge must disqualify
himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or
“[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1).
The test for determining impartiality is an objective one, based on a judge’s “outward
manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351
(10th Cir. 1995). “Ordinarily, when a judge’s words or actions are motivated by events
originating within the context of judicial proceedings, they are insulated from charges of bias.”
United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 1298 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 554–56 (1994)). “Recusal may be appropriate, however, when a judge’s decisions,
opinions, or remarks stem from an extrajudicial source—a source outside judicial proceedings.”
Id. (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554–55). And while judges “have a strong duty to recuse when
appropriate,” they also owe “a strong duty to sit[.]” United States v. Wells, 873 F.3d 1241, 1251
(10th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff’s first argument—that the undersigned worked at the law firm who now
represents defendant—isn’t compelling. The court already raised this issue with the parties, Doc.
29, and gave them an opportunity to lodge objections, Doc. 28. Plaintiff didn’t object to the
undersigned presiding over this case. Or she objected and the Chief Judge of our court
determined that the undersigned needn’t recuse. See id. Either way, her current objection—filed
only after the court ruled against her—rings hollow. Regardless, binding precedent instructs that
“a judge’s prior membership in a firm who counsel appears before the court” doesn’t
automatically “require recusal.” Farmer v. Banco Popular v. N. Am., 791 F.3d 1246, 1256 n.5
(10th Cir. 2015); see also N.M. Horsemen’s Ass’n v. Sunray Gaming of N.M., LLC, No. 24-cv-
00235-MLG-DLM, 2024 WL 2804121, at *5 (D.N.M. May 31, 2024) (compiling cases for
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proposition that judge’s prior involvement with firm in case “is insufficient grounds to warrant
. . . recusal”).
Nor is plaintiff’s second argument—that the court ruled against her—persuasive. Our
Circuit’s law is clear: “‘[A]dverse rulings cannot in themselves form the appropriate grounds for
disqualification.’” Nickl, 427 F.3d at 1298 (quoting Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1305
(10th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff simply hasn’t cited any “‘factual grounds’” that would “‘cause a
reasonable, objective person, knowing all the relevant facts, to question the judge’s
impartiality.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1277 (10th Cir. 2000)). So
the court denies her request for recusal.
Plaintiff’s motion also asks the court to reconsider its Memorandum and Order (Doc. 52)
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Doc. 72 at 3–4. The court denies this request. Rule 59(e) applies
only to final judgments. Cummings v. Othmer, No. 20-2371-DDC-JPO, 2021 WL 3710016, at
*1 n.4 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 2021). And the court hasn’t entered any final judgment in this case.
So, Rule 59(e) has no bearing here. Nor can plaintiff succeed in her motion for reconsideration
under our local rule, D. Kan. Rule 7.3. That’s so because her motion is untimely under that rule,
which requires litigants to seek reconsideration within 14 days of a ruling. D. Kan. Rule 7.3.
Plaintiff filed her motion here 23 days after the court published its Order (Doc. 52). The court
thus denies plaintiff’s request to reconsider its previous ruling in this case.3
Finally, plaintiff’s motion asks for leave to amend her Complaint to include a demand for
a jury trial. Doc. 72 at 4. Because this Order has dismissed plaintiff’s Complaint, her request to
add a jury-trial demand to it is moot, and the court denies it. To reiterate, plaintiff may seek
3 	Plaintiff’s reply brief faults the court for not offering her a chance to amend her pleading. Doc.
81 at 3. But plaintiff never has requested leave to amend. And, with this Order, the court expressly offers
plaintiff the opportunity to move for leave to amend before the court dismisses this action. Plaintiff is
reminded that the court can’t serve as her advocate.
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leave to amend her Complaint within 14 days of this Order. She is free to include a jury-trial
demand in her proposed amended pleading, should she choose to file one.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the Complaint (Doc. 1) is
dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to amend her pleading within
14 days of this Order. If plaintiff fails to do so, the court will enter judgment and close this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff’s Motion to Reserve the Right to Appeal
(Doc. 71) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify (Doc. 72) is
denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 4th day of May, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
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