Ndayizeye v. Carter

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JERVE NDAYIZEYE, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25-3200-JWL
)
Warden, Chase County Detention Center, 1 )
)
Respondents. )
)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
by which he challenges his detention by immigration officials. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants the petition. Respondent shall release petitioner from custody,
subject to an appropriate order of supervision, by December 1, 2025, and shall provide
notice to this Court when that release is effected.
Petitioner is a native of Tanzania and a citizen of Burundi. Petitioner entered the
United States in 2008 and became a lawful permanent resident the following year. In 2021,
however, he was convicted of robbery in federal court in Illinois. On August 30, 2024,
after his release from federal custody, petitioner was taken into custody by immigration
officials, and removal proceedings were initiated. On January 16, 2025, an immigration
judge denied petitioner’s requests for relief, terminated his status as a lawful permanent
1 In light of petitioner’s apparent transfer to a different facility, the Court has
substituted as the proper respondent the warden of petitioner’s present place of detention.
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resident, and ordered petitioner’s removal. Both petitioner and the Government had
waived any right to appeal that decision, which therefore become final on the date it was
issued.
Petitioner is presently detained within this judicial district. On September 19, 2025,
petitioner filed the instant habeas action; respondent has filed a answer to the petition,
petitioner has filed a reply brief, and the matter is therefore ripe for ruling.
Petitioner claims that his continued detention by immigration authorities is
improper. To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28
U.S. C. § 2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory
and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003).
Petitioner claims that his detention has become unreasonably indefinite and that his
release is therefore required under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court noted that an
alien must be detained during the initial 90-day removal period and that the Government
may continue to detain an alien after that period or release the alien under supervision. See
id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), (6)). The Court held, however, that “once removal
is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by the
statute.” See id. at 699. The Court elaborated on that standard as follows:
In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether
the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s
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basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of
removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.
In that case, of course, the alien’s release may and should be conditioned on
any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the
circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a
violation of those conditions. . . .
We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take
appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the
Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent
in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and
the Nation’s need to “speak with one voice” in immigration matters. But we
believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without
abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien’s
continued detention.
See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then established a presumptively
reasonable detention period of six months in which to accomplish removal, after which the
reasonableness of an alien’s detention should be determined as follows:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior
postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable
future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of
course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after
six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has
been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
See id. at 701; see also, e.g., Anyimu v. Department of Homeland Security, 2017 WL
193180, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017) (Lungstrum, J.) (applying this framework); Kaliku
v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2-3 (D.
Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (Lungstrum, J.) (same); Vargas v. Noem, 2025 WL 2770679, at *2-3
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (Lungstrum, J.) (same).
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The Court finds that petitioner has met his burden to provide “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” in
his case. The Court disagrees with respondent’s contention that petitioner can point to
nothing more than the failure to effect his removal within six months. Petitioner has now
been detained for more than 10 months after his removal order became final, a significant
period beyond the presumptively-reasonable period of six months, and he has been in
custody for nearly 15 months total. Petitioner has also noted that officials have been unable
in that time to obtain a travel document for him from either Tanzania or Burundi.
The Court further concludes that respondent has not rebutted that showing by
petitioner. According to evidence submitted by respondent, immigration officials sent a
travel document request to Burundi in May 2025, petitioner was interviewed in July 2025
by the Burundian Embassy, officials requested documents from petitioner’s mother (she
was unable to provide any), and officials responded to a Burundian request for an identity
document in August 2025. The Court does not find such evidence to be sufficient,
however. Despite the efforts listed above, officials have been unable to obtain a travel
document for petitioner. Moreover, there is no evidence that any concrete efforts to remove
petitioner have been undertaken in the last three months.2 Respondent has not provided
any explanation for why they have been unable to obtain a travel document or any reason
why additional efforts have not been undertaken, nor has respondent identified any
2 Respondent filed her answer to the petition on October 20, 2025, which is also the
date of the declaration submitted in support of that answer, and respondent has not sought
to supplement that answer with evidence of any recent efforts to remove petitioner.
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particular efforts that will be made in the future. See Manago v. Carter, 2025 WL 2841209,
at *2-3 (D. Kan. Oct. 7, 2025) (citing similar facts in concluding that the respondents failed
to rebut the petitioner’s showing under Zadvydas). Finally, respondent has not disputed
petitioner’s claim that the required 90-day or 180-day custody determinations have not
been completed in the ten months since his removal period began, and that fact belies any
claim that officials have exercised diligence with respect to petitioner’s case.
In sum, respondent has not been able to provide evidence or even point to any
specific fact that creates a significant likelihood that, even though officials failed in their
earlier attempts to remove petitioner, and even though officials do not appear to have made
any recent progress towards removal, petitioner will nonetheless be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably indefinite,
and the Court therefore concludes that petitioner must be released, subject to appropriate
terms of supervision. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700.
Accordingly, the Court grants the petition for habeas relief, and respondent is
ordered to effect petitioner’s release by December 1, 2025.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted. Respondent shall release petitioner
from custody, subject to an appropriate order of supervision, by December 1, 2025, and
shall provide notice to this Court when that release is effected.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 21st day of November, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
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