Ryan v. Kansas, State of et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
LONNIE J. RYAN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID DAVIES, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-3154-DDC-GEB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
For a second time, this case comes before the court on a motion to dismiss. The court
granted in part and denied in part an earlier dismissal motion filed by all defendants except Sean
Osborn. Doc. 45. Now, Mr. Osborn likewise asks the court to dismiss pro se plaintiff Lonnie J.
Ryan, Jr.’s claims.1 Doc. 37. Mr. Osborn also asks the court to set aside a Clerk’s Entry of
Default against him. Doc. 33. And there are two other pending motions, both filed by plaintiff.
They intertwine with the court’s motion-to-dismiss conclusions. So, this Order rules those
motions, as well.
The court conducts its work here in the following order. First, it outlines the facts
governing the Motion to Dismiss. Second, it takes up Mr. Osborn’s Motion to Set Aside (Doc.
33). Then, it addresses Mr. Osborn’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37). Finally, the court rules two
1 	Plaintiff proceeds pro se. The court construes his filings liberally and holds them to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21
(1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But the court doesn’t assume the role of
advocate for the pro se litigant. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 1 of 23

2
other pending motions filed by plaintiff. When all this work is complete, it produces this bottom
line: Mr. Osborn’s entry of default is set aside and just one of plaintiff’s claims survives.
I. 	Factual Background
The following facts come from the Complaint (Doc. 1) and from judicially noticed court
documents attached to Mr. Osborn’s Motion to Dismiss.2 The court accepts plaintiff’s “well-
pleaded facts as true, view[s] them in the light most favorable to [him], and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences from the facts in” his favor. Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d
1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2021). But “factual allegations that contradict a properly considered
document are not well-pleaded facts that the court must accept as true.” Matney v. Barrick Gold
of N. Am., 80 F.4th 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2023) (quotation cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s Commitment under the KSVPA
In 1999, plaintiff was charged with and convicted of taking indecent liberties with a
minor and sentenced to 52 months in prison. Doc. 1 at 4 (Compl. ¶ C.2.A). After serving his
criminal sentence, the State of Kansas moved to commit plaintiff under the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predators Act (KSVPA). Id. (Compl. ¶ C.2.B). The Montgomery County, Kansas
District Court found plaintiff suffered from pedophilia—a mental abnormality— in 2002 and
committed him under the KSVPA. Id. (Compl. ¶ C.2.C).
Plaintiff’s Transitional Release
2 	When considering Mr. Osborn’s motion, the court can consider documents subject to judicial
notice. Mr. Osborn attaches state court documents to his supporting Memorandum (Doc. 38). Though it
evaluates material outside the Complaint, the court properly can take judicial notice of these proceedings
without converting the motion to dismiss into one seeking summary judgment. See Bruce v. City and
County of Denver, 57 F.4th 738, 741 n.3 (10th Cir. 2023) (“In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a federal
court may take judicial notice of another court’s publicly filed records if they have a direct relation to
matters at issue.”); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1264 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[F]acts subject to judicial
notice may be considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment.”). The court thus judicially notices Docs. 38-1, 38-2, 38-3, 38-4, 38-6,
38-6, 38-7, 38-8. Plaintiff never disputes the accuracy or authenticity of these documents. See generally
Doc. 41.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 2 of 23

3
In July 2020, the Montgomery County Court moved plaintiff to transitional release. Id. at
5 (Compl. ¶ C.2.G). The Complaint and the judicially noticed state court documents recount that
move differently, however. According to the Complaint, the Montgomery County Court found
plaintiff’s “mental abnormality or personality disorder reduced or . . . eliminated to the point that
Mr. Ryan was safe to be released.” Id. (Compl. ¶ C.2.H). But the undisputed court documents
suggest a more nuanced holding. For starters, the state’s Response to plaintiff’s transitional-
release petition expressed reservations. It clarified that the Progress Review Panel considered
plaintiff “not completely free of risk due to the nature of his mental abnormality/personality
disorder.” Doc. 38-3 at 2 (Def. Ex. C). Instead, the reviewers characterized his mental
abnormality as “significantly mitigated so he appear[ed] safe to be placed on Transitional
Release.” Id. (emphasis added). And Montgomery County, Kansas District Court Judge Jeffrey
D. Gossard similarly qualified his conclusion with limiting language. He explained that the court
was “convinced beyond reasonable doubt that [plaintiff’s] mental abnormality or personality
disorder ha[d] so changed that [plaintiff was] safe to be placed in transitional release.” Doc. 38-
4 at 5 (Def. Ex. D) (emphasis added). In sum, no state court document suggested Mr. Ryan “was
safe to be released” fully, as the Complaint alleges. Doc. 1 at 5 (Compl. ¶ C.2.H); see generally
Doc. 38-3 (Def. Ex. C).
Plaintiff’s Conditional Release
In December 2021, Judge Gossard placed plaintiff on conditional release. Doc. 1 at 5
(Compl. ¶ C.2.J). Once again, the Complaint and the attached state court documents employ
different language to justify that conditional release placement. The Complaint asserts that the
“Montgomery County Court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lonnie J. Ryan Jr’s mental
abnormality or personality disorder [was] reduced or was eliminated to the point that Mr. Ryan
was safe to be released.” Id. (Compl. ¶ C.2.K). But the state court recited the findings a bit
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 3 of 23

4
differently, qualifying plaintiff’s “safe” status with limiting language. It explained that the
review panel had concluded that plaintiff’s “mental abnormality or personality disorder ha[d]
changed sufficiently so that it would be safe to be placed in Conditional Release.” Doc. 38-5 at
2 (Def. Ex. E) (emphasis added). The state court, for its part, simply held that it was “convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that [plaintiff was] appropriate for Conditional Release and
determine[d] that [plaintiff] should be placed on Conditional Release.” Id. at 2–3. At no time
did the court declare plaintiff safe for full discharge or unconditional release. See generally id.
Violation and Return to Secure Confinement Facility
As part of his conditional release, plaintiff signed a Conditional Release Agreement. It
outlined the terms and conditions of his conditional release plan. Doc. 38-6 (Def. Ex. F). In
April 2024, plaintiff’s conditional release monitor reported by sworn affidavit to the state court
that plaintiff “ha[d] violated material conditions of [his] treatment plan[.]” Doc. 38-7 at 2–3
(Def. Ex. G). So, Judge Gossard issued an emergency ex parte order authorizing law
enforcement to take plaintiff into custody and return him to the secure commitment facility at
Larned State Hospital. Id. On April 26, 2024, Mr. Ryan was returned to the secure confinement
facility. Doc. 1 at 5 (Compl. ¶ C.2.M).
After his return, the Montgomery County Court convened a hearing about plaintiff’s
status on May 30, 2024. Id. at 6 (Compl. ¶ C.2.Q); Doc. 38-8 at 2–3 (Def. Ex. H). At the
hearing, plaintiff stipulated that he had violated specified rules of his Conditional Release
Agreement. Doc. 38-8 at 3 (Def. Ex. H). Specifically, he stipulated that “he [had] engaged in
sexual activities with two individuals who were peers in the Sexual Predator Treatment Program
and members of his support group[.]” Id. He also stipulated that he had “failed to disclose the
nature of the relations to the Conditional Release Monitor, therapist or any other member of his
treatment team . . . until he was confronted.” Id.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 4 of 23

5
According to the Complaint, Judge Gossard then “found that Mr. Ryan should be
confined for the rule violation.” Doc. 1 at 6 (Compl. ¶ C.2.R). Again, though, the court
documents reveal a more nuanced holding:
The Court finds that the Sexual Predator Treatment Program is progressive by
design with skills learned, then demonstrated in behavior. 	[Plaintiff], while
engaging in sexual acts, failing to disclose his behavior and relationships
indicate[d] the absence of skills [he] needs to be safe in the community. [Plaintiff]
has shown that[,] while engaging in behavior that violates the conditions of his
release[,] he was dishonest with his Conditional Release Monitor and therapist,
which indicates his lack of interest in therapy, lack of desire to be successful, and
lack of remorse for his behavior and dishonesty. 	These factors along with the
results of the actuarial instrument indicate [plaintiff] poses a high degree of risk in
the community. The Court finds that it is in the best interests of [plaintiff] and the
community that he be returned to the secure care facility, to gain the skills needed
to live safely in the community.
Doc. 38-8 at 3 (Def. Ex. H). Based on these findings, Judge Gossard ordered plaintiff returned to
the secure commitment facility at Larned State Hospital. Id. at 3–4.
Before the court applies the law to these facts to decide whether plaintiff’s claims warrant
dismissal—as Mr. Osborn argues—it must first determine Mr. Osborn’s default status. It turns
to that task, next.
II. 	Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 32) and Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of
Default (Doc. 33)
The docket reflects that Mr. Osborn received service of summons and the Complaint on
March 31, 2025. Doc. 26. But Mr. Osborn failed to answer or otherwise respond. So, on July
21, 2025, plaintiff filed an Application for a Clerk’s Entry of Default against Mr. Osborn. Doc.
30. The court granted it the next day. Doc. 31. A couple weeks later, plaintiff moved for a
default judgment against Mr. Osborn. Doc. 32. But then, Mr. Osborn filed a Motion to Set
Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default. Doc. 33. The court considers the merits of that Motion to Set
Aside (Doc. 33), below.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 5 of 23

6
The “law dislikes judgments by default[.]” 10A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2686 (4th ed. 2025); see also Polaski v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 198 F. App’x 684,
685 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Default judgments are disfavored by courts.”). And “courts generally
would prefer to deny” a default judgment motion in favor of deciding the case on its merits.
Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2686; see also Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d
1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970) (“The preferred disposition of any case is upon its merits and not by
default judgment.”). Because defaults are disfavored, “any doubts usually will be resolved in
favor of the defaulting party.” Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2681. What’s
more, policy “weighs heavily in favor of trial on the merits and against default judgments in
cases”—like this one—“calling into question the constitutionality of a state statute or raising
other significant public issues.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), the court needs “good cause” to set aside an
entry of default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). This standard is a “fairly liberal” one. James v. XPO
Logistics Freight, Inc., No. 19-2390-HLT-ADM, 2020 WL 4569154, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 7,
2020). The court must strike a balance between the “defendant’s interest in adjudicating the case
on the merits” and “‘the interest of the public and the court in the orderly and timely
administration of justice.’” Id. (quoting Kiewel v. Balabanov, No. 10-2113-JTM, 2011 WL
1770084, at *2 (D. Kan. May 9, 2011)). To decide whether good cause exists, courts consider a
nonexclusive list of factors. See Pinson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 316 F. App’x 744,
750 (10th Cir. 2009). This list includes: “‘whether the default was willful, whether setting it
aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether a meritorious defense is presented.’” Id.
(quoting Dierschke v. O’Cheskey, 975 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1992)). “The good cause required
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) for setting aside entry of default poses a lesser standard for the
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 6 of 23

7
defaulting party than the excusable neglect which must be shown for relief from judgment under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).” Id. (quotation cleaned up). The court addresses these factors one-by-one
and, in the end, concludes that Mr. Osborn has shown sufficient good cause to set aside the
Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 31).
A. 	Willful
First, consider the willful-conduct factor. “A defendant’s knowledge of a lawsuit and his
postservice actions play a role in measuring the willfulness of a defendant’s default.” James,
2020 WL 4569154, at *2 (quotation cleaned up). And the “court should consider whether the
defendant was trying to stall litigation or was purposefully disregarding the authority of the
court.” Perez v. Dhanani, No. 13-1020-RDR, 2015 WL 437769, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 2015).
Our court has concluded that “inadvertently set[ting] aside” served papers, such that they aren’t
subject to the “company’s normal practice[,]” counsels against a finding of willfulness. James,
2020 WL 4569154, at *3; see also Fed. Ins. Co. v. TAT Techs., No. 16-2755-JWL, 2017 WL
11446208, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2017) (concluding defendant didn’t seem “especially
culpable” where the proof of service didn’t indicate who signed the receipt and “documents were
not routed properly to the responsible people”). Willfulness is also unlikely where defendant—
upon learning of the suit—swiftly acts to retain counsel and engage in the proceedings. See
James, 2020 WL 4569154, at *3.
Here, the court finds, Mr. Osborn didn’t act willfully in failing to meet his response
deadline. As in James and TAT Technologies, the served documents didn’t make it to the
responsible people—due to a series of unfortunate events. Mr. Osborn received service of
plaintiff’s Complaint by certified mail on March 31, 2025. Doc. 34-1 at 1 (Osborn Aff. ¶ 3);
Doc. 26. Then, the unfortunate events ensued. First, Mr. Osborn confused the present lawsuit
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 7 of 23

8
with another lawsuit involving his work as a social worker at Larned State Hospital. Doc. 34-1
at 1 (Osborn Aff. ¶¶ 1–2, 4). Then, he passed the papers on to his supervisor, who was supposed
to contact the insurance company who would defend against the suit. Id. (Osborn Aff. ¶ 5). But
his supervisor was out of the office on medical leave. Id. So, the papers didn’t get transferred to
the insurance company as Mr. Osborn had anticipated they would. Id. Indeed, due to a medical
leave and oversight on his supervisor’s return, the insurance intake department didn’t receive the
served papers until July 24, 2025. Id. at 2 (Osborn Aff. ¶ 9). Finally, Mr. Osborn later
discovered that his supervisor hadn’t received any communication from the insurance company
about the case because it had gone to an incorrect email address. Id. (Osborn Aff. ¶ 8); Doc. 34
at 6. This confluence of mishaps left Mr. Osborn unaware of his default status until co-
defendants’ counsel informed him on July 21, 2025, which set things in motion. Doc. 34-1 at 1
(Osborn Aff. ¶ 6). The insurance company received the papers on July 24, 2025 and then
provided Mr. Osborn with counsel on August 6, 2025. Id. at 2 (Osborn Aff. ¶ 11). Counsel filed
a Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 33) on August 13, 2025.
Plaintiff argues that these facts demonstrate “carelessness” on Mr. Osborn’s part. Doc.
41 at 2. And that carelessness precludes a finding of good cause, he contends. Id. So, plaintiff
asserts, the court shouldn’t set aside the default entry. Id. To be sure, Mr. Osborn could have
attended to matters more closely. It’s prudent to follow up with a supervisor or an insurance
company who’s responsible for addressing a lawsuit on one’s behalf. But nothing suggests that
Mr. Osborn “was trying to stall litigation or was purposefully disregarding the authority of the
court.” Perez, 2015 WL 437769, at *2. Mr. Osborn assumed others were handling the matter.
Then, Mr. Osborn took swift action once he realized there was a problem, securing counsel
within a few weeks and filing a motion shortly thereafter. Such swift action “does not
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 8 of 23

9
demonstrate purposeful disregard for the court’s authority.” James, 2020 WL 4569154, at *3;
Cannon v. SFM, LLC, No. 18-2364-JWL, 2018 WL 5791614, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 5, 2018)
(finding no willfulness where “counsel promptly reached out to plaintiff’s counsel and this court
to fix the mistake”). The willfulness factor thus favors a finding of good cause.
B. 	Prejudice
Next, consider prejudice to plaintiff. In this context, prejudice refers to “‘acts done by the
moving party or events that have occurred which have in some way impaired or thwarted the
non-moving party’s ability to litigate or defend the case.’” Kiewel, 2011 WL 1770084, at *4
(quoting McCook v. Flex Fin. Holding Co., No. 08-2039-CM-GLR, 2008 WL 1924129, at *2 (D.
Kan. Apr. 29, 2008)). Mr. Osborn advances two reasons why plaintiff wasn’t prejudiced. First,
the short delay between entry of clerk’s default and Mr. Osborn’s motion to set aside that entry is
insufficient to show prejudice. Doc. 34 at 7. And, second, the “case has been pending for
months with no significant activity[.]” Id. Plaintiff’s Response never identifies any prejudice he
has experienced from Mr. Osborn’s delay. See generally Doc. 41.
Our court has found good cause to set aside a default where a plaintiff doesn’t allege
prejudice and the case is in the early stages. See TAT Technologies, 2017 WL 11446208, at *2
(finding no prejudice where plaintiff didn’t argue prejudice and wouldn’t “suffer from the delay
in the litigation of its claims”); McCook, 2008 WL 1924129, at *2 (finding no prejudice where
plaintiff didn’t identify any, little discovery was exchanged, and few case deadlines had passed).
This case is still in its early stages. And less than 30 days elapsed between entry of the clerk’s
default and Mr. Osborn’s motion to set it aside. Doc. 31 (Clerk’s Entry of Default entered July
22, 2025); Doc. 33 (Motion to Set Aside filed August 13, 2025). In sum, the court “can see no
reason why Plaintiff would suffer any prejudice from setting aside the entry of default.” King of
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 9 of 23

10
Freight LLC v. Viva Express, Inc., No. 22-1187-EFM-TJJ, 2022 WL 17555397, at *2 (D. Kan.
Dec. 9, 2022). So, the second factor likewise favors a finding of good cause.
C. 	Meritorious Defense
The last factor asks whether Mr. Osborn has a meritorious defense. Like the good cause
standard as a whole, “the burden to show a meritorious defense is light.” Kiewel, 2011 WL
1770084, at *4 (quotation cleaned up). A defendant needn’t show “a likelihood of success on the
merits.” Crutcher v. Coleman, 205 F.R.D. 581, 585 (D. Kan. 2001). Instead, a defendant’s
motion “need only plausibly suggest the existence of facts which, if proven at trial, would
constitute a cognizable defense.” Id.
Mr. Osborn has discharged his burden here. For example, Mr. Osborn argues—in part—
that “plaintiff’s facts are demonstrably false in view of public records.” Doc. 38 at 8 (quotation
cleaned up). To support this argument, he explains that no court ever has found plaintiff safe and
appropriate for final release. Id. at 10. But some of plaintiff’s requests for relief turn on the state
court having deemed him safe. See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 8 (Compl. ¶ E.1.5) (“Declare that on or about
July 2020, when the Montgomery County Court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ryan
was no longer a danger, it was unconstitutional to continue confinement under the KSVPA.”).
Where Mr. Osborn argues that some of plaintiff’s claims rest on challenged facts, he has
shouldered his burden. See Adams v. Keystone Props., Inc., No. 14-1409-JTM-KGG, 2015 WL
1646407, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2015) (finding “defendant’s assertion [meets] the minimal
standard” where defendant challenged the facts on which plaintiff’s claims turned).
In short, this situation isn’t one where defendant is “essentially unresponsive[.]” In re
Rains, 946 F.2d 731, 732 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation cleaned up) (recognizing that default
judgments normally are “available only when the adversary process has been halted because of
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 10 of 23

11
an essentially unresponsive party” (quotation cleaned up)). Mr. Osborn didn’t act willfully.
Setting aside the default wouldn’t prejudice plaintiff. And Mr. Osborn has asserted meritorious
defenses. The court thus finds Mr. Osborn has shown good cause, grants Mr. Osborn’s motion
(Doc. 33), and sets aside the Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 31). The court also denies plaintiff’s
Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 32). Given the analysis above, the court will take the
preferred course and decide the case on its merits. And it turns to those merits—and Mr.
Osborn’s dismissal motion—next.
III. 	Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37)
Mr. Osborn’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37) identifies three reasons purportedly
warranting dismissal: the Complaint doesn’t satisfy the pleading requirements under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9; Mr. Osborn’s entitled to qualified immunity; and the
Complaint fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 1–2. The
court’s earlier Order already provided a fulsome analysis of Mr. Osborn’s 12(b)(6) arguments.
So, the court incorporates by reference its earlier Order (Doc. 45). And it explains in an
abbreviated fashion the conclusions it already reached. But first, the court addresses Mr.
Osborn’s pleading requirement and qualified-immunity arguments.
A. 	Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 & 9
Mr. Osborn first argues that the Complaint fails to satisfy the pleading standards
established in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9. Doc. 38 at 6–7. He contends that the
Complaint fails to provide notice to Mr. Osborn of the claims against him. Id. at 7. And he
characterizes plaintiff’s filing as a “‘kitchen-sink’ style Complaint consist[ing] solely of
rambling, disorganized legal conclusions and a smattering of factual allegations[.]” Id. at 8. The
court disagrees.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 11 of 23

12
Under Rule 8, plaintiffs must “state their claims intelligibly” and thus “inform the
defendants of the legal claims being asserted.” Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th
Cir. 2007). Complaints run afoul of Rule 8 when they're “‘written more as a press release, prolix
in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are
suing for what wrongs[.]’” Id. (quoting McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Rule 8 doesn’t require plaintiff to plead “‘detailed factual allegations’” to survive at the motion
to dismiss stage. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff needs only plead “a short and plain statement of
the claim[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Complaint here hits that mark.
The Complaint alleges, for example, that plaintiff’s return to secure confinement for
breaking a release rule violated his Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights because the return
“occurred prior to any finding of the return of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
made him likely to commit another sexually violent offense.” Doc. 1 at 5 (Compl. ¶¶ C.2.M, N).
And it identifies Mr. Osborn as “a therapist under the KSVPA” who, “acting on behalf of the
State of Kansas, . . . confined Mr. Ryan for a rule violation.” Id. at 2 (Compl. ¶ A.7). So, it
identifies the alleged wrong committed and Mr. Osborn’s alleged role in it. This satisfies the
pleading standard required by Rule 8.
Mr. Osborn also invokes Rule 9 to argue for dismissal. He contends that plaintiff’s
Complaint doesn’t satisfy “Rule 9’s heightened requirement of pleading with particularity.”
Doc. 38 at 8. And he asserts that the Complaint doesn’t distinguish “what acts are attributable to
whom,” making it “impossible for Mr. Osborn to ascertain what particular unconstitutional acts
he is alleged to have committed.” Id. at 6.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 12 of 23

13
Rule 9 explains what’s required for pleading special matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9. So, when
alleging fraud or mistake, “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting the
fraud[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). But this heightened standard doesn’t apply when a plaintiff
premises his allegations on a wrong other than fraud. See Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc.,
124 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he case at bar is not premised on fraud and does not
trigger Rule 9(b) scrutiny.”); Summit Elec. Supply Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 07-0431
MCA/DJS, 2008 WL 11451895, at *2 (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2008) (“Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement applies only to claims that are premised on fraud.”). Plaintiff here doesn’t allege
fraud or mistake, so Rule 9 provides no basis for dismissal.
Although Rule 9 doesn’t apply, Mr. Osborn’s particularity argument isn’t completely off-
base. Some § 1983 claims require greater particularity to identify a defendant’s personal
participation. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In § 1983
cases, defendants often include the government agency and a number of government actors sued
in their individual capacities. Therefore it is particularly important in such circumstances that
the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each
individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from
collective allegations against the state.” (emphasis omitted)). But this special need for
particularity stems from individual-capacity claims and doesn’t inhere when a plaintiff alleges
just official-capacity claims. See Miskovsky v. Jones, 559 F. App’x 673, 676 (10th Cir. 2014)
(affirming and agreeing fully where district court relegated personal-participation requirement to
individual-capacity claims); Spiess v. Fricke, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1191 (D. Kan. 2005)
(“[Defendant’s] lack of personal involvement in any retaliation is irrelevant because this is an
official capacity claim essentially against the State.”); Clark v. Bartling, No. CIV-08-05-C, 2009
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 13 of 23

14
WL 112985, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 15, 2009) (“[Defendant’s] lack of personal participation
would not affect the official capacity claim.”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)
(“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity.”). All of plaintiff’s claims here assert purely official-capacity claims. Doc. 41 at 5
(clarifying that plaintiff brings “‘official capacity’ claim[s] seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief”). So, any lack of individual particularity in pleading doesn’t require dismissal. The court
thus denies Mr. Osborn’s motion to the extent it premises dismissal on Rules 8 and 9.
B. 	Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff’s choice to restrict his claims to official-capacity claims also has implications for
Mr. Osborn’s next line of argument. Mr. Osborn contends he’s entitled to qualified immunity.
Doc. 38 at 12. In so doing, he explains that a “state official sued in her individual capacity is
entitled to qualified immunity[.]” Id. But plaintiff doesn’t assert any individual-capacity claims.
Instead, he clarifies—explicitly—that he asserts only official-capacity claims. Doc. 41 at 5. And
qualified immunity doesn’t apply to official-capacity claims. See Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231,
1239 n.1 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The defense of qualified immunity is available only in suits against
officials sued in their personal capacities, not in suits against officials sued in their official
capacities.” (quotation cleaned up)). So, qualified immunity doesn’t preclude suit against Mr.
Osborn. And the court thus denies Mr. Osborn’s motion where it argues for dismissal on
qualified-immunity grounds.
C. 	Failure to State a Claim
Finally, Mr. Osborn argues that plaintiff fails to state a claim against him because
plaintiff bases his requests for relief on factually unsupported allegations. Doc. 38 at 8.
Specifically, he challenges claims premised on two allegations: plaintiff’s allegation that his
return to secure confinement was punitive and plaintiff’s allegation that the state court found that
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 14 of 23

15
plaintiff no longer presented a danger. Id. Mr. Osborn also contends that the Complaint doesn’t
allege the requisite facts to support an equal protection violation. Id. at 16.
The court already has addressed these arguments in its earlier Order ruling the other
defendants’ dismissal motion. And those conclusions apply with equal force to Mr. Osborn. The
court thus doesn’t repeat its full dismissal analysis here. Instead, it briefly summarizes that
Order’s conclusions, below, and refers readers interested in the full analysis to its earlier Order
(Doc. 45).
There, the court concluded that most, but not all, of plaintiff’s constitutional claims fail as
factually unsupported. Doc. 45 at 14. First, it explained that the judicially noticed court
documents demonstrate that plaintiff’s return to Larned State Hospital wasn’t punitive. Id. at
16–17. Those court documents clarify that his return didn’t serve to exact retribution or deter
future violations. Id. Instead, it served to hold him until he’s no longer a threat. Id. And the
United States Supreme Court has held such a purpose constitutionally permissible and
nonpunitive in nature. Id. at 15–17 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361–69 (1997)).
So, any claims predicated on plaintiff’s assertion that his return to secure confinement was
punitive fail as factually unsupported and as unfounded under Hendricks.
Second, the court agreed with defendants (and now with Mr. Osborn, as well) that no
court ever has deemed plaintiff safe or no longer a danger. Id. at 19–20. Instead, the judicially
noticed court documents reveal that the state court found plaintiff fit for transitional or
conditional release—not full release. Id. That is, all findings that plaintiff was “safe” were
qualified by phrases like “safe to be placed” in transitional or conditional release. Id. at 20
(citing various state court documents). So, plaintiff’s constitutional claims premised on the court
having deemed him “no longer a danger” fail as unsupported by judicial records. Id. at 20–21.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 15 of 23

16
The court also addressed, separately, plaintiff’s assertion that his continued confinement under
the KSVPA is unconstitutional. This attack appears to challenge the fact of his confinement—a
challenge appropriate under a habeas action but not on a § 1983 claim. Id. at 21 (citing, among
others, Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2005)). So, plaintiff’s claims
premised on a “no-longer-a-danger theory” fail, too.
Third, the court concluded that it also must dismiss plaintiff’s equal protection claim. Id.
at 12–13. Plaintiff never alleges that he’s a member of suspect class, nor does the Tenth Circuit
recognize sex offenders as a suspect class. Id. at 12 (citing Hines v. Addison, 117 F. App’x 713,
715 (10th Cir. 2004)). And the Complaint never identifies similarly situated individuals or
differential treatment to support a class-of-one equal protection theory. Id. at 12–13. So,
plaintiff’s equal protection claim likewise falters.3
The court thus grants Mr. Osborn’s dismissal motion for claims that rely on these three
theories: punitive return, no-longer-a-danger finding, and equal protection. In doing so, the
court adopts and incorporates the reasoning of its earlier Order. Doc. 45. That Order also held
that one procedural-due-process claim survives. Id. at 21–24. And here, on this motion, Mr.
Osborn presents no arguments that would warrant a different conclusion. See generally Doc. 38.
In short, the court construed one of plaintiff’s claims to challenge whether the state can employ a
rule violation as a proxy for a renewed finding of mental abnormality. Doc. 45 at 22. While the
state court determined that plaintiff’s rule violation demonstrated dangerousness, a finding of
dangerousness alone doesn’t suffice to justify commitment. Id. at 23 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S.
at 358). Proof of some additional factor—like mental abnormality—is necessary. Id. So, the
3 	Plaintiff asks the court to reconsider this equal protection conclusion in his Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 46). The court addresses that motion at the end of this Order. See § IV.A.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 16 of 23

17
court concluded plaintiff’s procedural-due-process claim challenging what the state must show to
demote an individual who violates a release rule was viable. Id. at 21–24. The same claim
survives Mr. Osborn’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37).
IV. 	Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 46) & Motion to Clarify (Doc. 47)
The court completes its current assignments by addressing two motions filed by plaintiff
after the court’s earlier Order. Plaintiff filed a reconsideration motion and a clarification motion.
The court takes up each one, in turn.
A. 	Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 46)
In his Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 46), plaintiff argues that the court should
reconsider dismissing his equal protection claim. Id. at 1. He contends that, in a Memorandum
of Law (Doc. 2) contemporaneously filed with his Complaint, he identified that he is similarly
situated to—but treated differently than—criminal prisoners in Kansas. Doc. 46 at 2–3. And he
asserts that defendants4 failed to account for these arguments in their Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
15). Doc. 46 at 2. Defendants respond by noting plaintiff’s failure to address—at all—his equal
protection claim in his motion-to-dismiss briefing. Doc. 51 at 3. Defendants are right.
Defendants explicitly challenged plaintiff’s equal protection claim in their Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 15). They argued that “the Complaint is void of specific facts to support an equal
protection allegation.” Id. at 14. And they asserted that “[a]bsent alleging membership in a
specific class or group, [plaintiff] must contend he was treated differently from similarly situated
individuals”—and he didn’t. Id. Plaintiff’s Response never addressed defendants’ challenge.
Indeed, it didn’t even mention plaintiff’s equal protection claim anywhere, much less identify
similarly-situated individuals or differential treatment. See generally Doc. 18. Nor did
4 	The court’s use of defendants in this section refers to those defendants who were a party to the
first Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15), which includes all surviving defendants except Mr. Osborn.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 17 of 23

18
plaintiff’s Response ever cite Doc. 2 or reference plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in any way.
Id. Where a plaintiff doesn’t respond to an argument, the court isn’t “required to do his work for
him and dissect the [defendants’] plausible argument.” Cayetano-Castillo v. Lynch, 630 F.
App’x 788, 794 (10th Cir. 2015). Instead, the plaintiff “waives, as a practical matter anyway,
any objections not obvious to the court[.]” Id. (quotation cleaned up) So, the court could deny
plaintiff’s reconsideration motion based solely on this failure to respond. But that’s not the only
reason for denial. Even if the court reached the merits, it would deny the motion.
Let’s imagine—for the sake of argument—that plaintiff’s Response had pointed to his
Memorandum of Law and argued he was similarly situated to criminally detained persons. His
equal protection claim still would have failed. Here’s why. When the Supreme Court reviewed
the constitutionality of the KSVPA, it went to great lengths to distinguish KSVPA confinement
from criminal punishment. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361–62. The Court determined that the
KSVPA didn’t implicate either of criminal punishment’s two primary objectives: retribution or
deterrence. Id. And so, the Court concluded that—while the confinement had a potentially
indefinite duration—it wasn’t punitive like criminal punishment. Id. at 363. That’s so because
the confined person “is statutorily entitled to immediate release” and “at any time” once he “is
adjudged ‘safe to be at large[.]’” Id. (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a07).
Such distinctions between the purposes of KSVPA confinement and those of criminal
confinement militate against the court finding plaintiff similarly situated to criminally detained
persons. These distinctions suggest that confined sexually violent predators and criminal
detainees are in “meaningfully dissimilar situations[.]” SECSYS, LLC v. Vigil, 666 F.3d 678, 684
(10th Cir. 2012). The Tenth Circuit even has held inmates in the same facility not similarly
situated. See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1210 (10th Cir. 2018). In Requena, two
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 18 of 23

19
inmates in the same facility both requested use of a phone, but the requests involved two
different phones and calls for two different purposes. Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1210
(10th Cir. 2018). Our Circuit found these inmates—both confined for criminal violations in the
same facility—not sufficiently “alike in all relevant respects” to qualify as similarly situated for
equal protection purposes. Id. (quotation cleaned up). So, the fact of confinement alone can’t
supply the requisite similarity—and even more so here, where the confinement is in different
facilities and for expressly different purposes.
Equally convincing, our court already has considered and rejected plaintiff’s precise
argument. Namely, our court has dismissed a sexually violent predator’s equal protection claim
predicated on being similarly situated to criminal detainees. Merryfield v. Turner, No. 09-3130-
SAC, 2010 WL 559730, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 16, 2010) (finding plaintiff failed to state an equal
protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment—in part—because, as a sexually violent
predator, he was “not similarly-situated with prison inmates”). Both our court and our Circuit
consistently have distinguished sexually violent predators from those criminally detained, as well
as those civilly committed for other reasons. See Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923, 927 (10th
Cir. 2009) (finding sexually violent predator not a “prisoner” under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act because he was civilly committed “due to a finding that he poses a future danger due to a
mental abnormality or personality disorder” and not for criminal violation); Beyer v. Deslauriers,
No. 17-3002-SAC, 2019 WL 2409603, at *2 (D. Kan. June 7, 2019) (“[A]s a civil committee
under the KSVPA, Plaintiff is not a person who is civilly committed only for mental health
issues, but neither is he a prisoner.”); Burch v. Jordan, No. 07-3236, 2010 WL 5391569, at *12
(D. Kan. Dec. 22, 2010), (“[A]s a civil committee under the KSVPA[,] [p]laintiff is not an
inmate; nor is he a person who is civilly committed merely for mental health issues. Rather,
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 19 of 23

20
plaintiff is committed . . . upon the basis that he is a sexually violent predator from whom society
needs to be protected.”), aff’d sub nom., Burch v. Jordan, 444 F. App’x 236 (10th Cir. 2011).
These persistent distinctions kneecap plaintiff’s similarly-situated argument.
Plaintiff tries to salvage his equal protection claim by citing Chubb v. Sullivan, 330 P.3d
423 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). Doc. 46 at 2. He contends that the Kansas Court of Appeals, in
Chubb, “held that an SVP in Kansas is similarly situated to a prisoner in Kansas and the rights of
a prisoner set a floor for determining what rights [plaintiff] is entitled to.” Id. at 2–3. But
plaintiff misreads Chubb. Chubb involved a sexually violent predator’s claim that he’d been
deprived of a liberty interest when his secure facility prohibited a visit from his brother. 330
P.3d at 426. And so, the Kansas Court of Appeals addressed the conditions at the secure facility
preventing the visit. It thus compared the conditions afforded sexually violent predators at their
secure facility with the conditions at facilities for criminal detainees and other civilly committed
persons. Id. at 428. Chubb never suggested that sexually violent predators are similarly situated
to criminally detained persons. Just the opposite. Chubb emphasized the same distinctions
outlined in Hendricks—drawing boundaries between criminal confinement, KSVPA
confinement, and other civilly committed individuals. And it did so in the context of facility
conditions—not the release rule violations at issue here. Chubb thus explains that persons “‘who
have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment conditions of
confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.’” 330 P.3d
at 428 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982)). In brief, Chubb does
nothing to help plaintiff establish the requisite similarly-situated prong of an equal protection
claim. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 46) is denied.
B. 	Motion to Clarify (Doc. 47)
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 20 of 23

21
Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Clarify (Doc. 47), asking the court to clarify that his claim
for a Fourteenth Amendment violation based on impugning of his good name or character is
valid.5 Doc. 47 at 1–2. Defendants respond that this allegation “does not assert an independent
violation” but instead “alleges a harm resulting from the constitutional violations he claims.”
Doc. 50 at 2.
Best the court can tell, plaintiff adopts this impugning language to invoke a doctrine
commonly referred to as “stigma plus.” Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir.
2004). A plaintiff asserting a stigma plus claim contends “that the government has violated the
Due Process Clause by impugning his or her good name, reputation, honor, or integrity[.]” Id.
(quotation cleaned up). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the government made a statement about him or her that is sufficiently derogatory
to injure his or her reputation, that is capable of being proved false, and that he or
she asserts is false, and (2) the plaintiff experienced some governmentally imposed
burden that “significantly altered [his or] her status as a matter of state law.”
Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–11 (1976)). “Damage to one’s reputation
alone . . . is not enough to implicate due process protections.” Id.
Plaintiff’s Complaint doesn’t allege facts to establish such a claim. It alleges that his
sudden move back to secure confinement caused him to miss work without warning and thus
caused him to lose his job. Doc. 1 at 5 (Compl. ¶ C.2.P). And the Complaint alleges that
plaintiff lost his job and income, he ran into debt problems and thus affected his credit report and
lines of credit. Id. But it never alleges the requisite false statement. See generally Doc. 1. Nor
does it allege that plaintiff asserts the government’s rule-violation accusation was false. Id.
5 	Plaintiff’s clarification motion also asked the court to clarify whether its earlier Order (Doc. 45)
addressed Mr. Osborn’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37). Doc. 47 at 2. To clarify, it did not. But this Order
does. To the extent plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 47) seeks clarification about Mr. Osborn’s
dismissal motion, it is granted.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 21 of 23

22
Instead, plaintiff stipulated that he had violated his release conditions. Doc. 38-8 at 3 (Def. Ex.
H). And while the Complaint alleges that he was fired, that’s because he was “a no call at
work”—not because of any false statement. Doc. 1 at 5 (Compl. ¶ C.2.P). So, the court denies
plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 47) to the extent it asks that the court to identify this claim as
valid. The court clarifies that no Fourteenth Amendment claim for impugning plaintiff’s
character or name can proceed on these facts.
V. 	Conclusion
The court concludes that Mr. Osborn’s default was neither willful nor would setting it
aside prejudice plaintiff. And it finds that Mr. Osborn presents a meritorious defense. So, the
court sets aside the Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 31) against Mr. Osborn and denies plaintiff’s
default judgment motion. The court also grants Mr. Osborn’s dismissal motion to the extent it
requests dismissal of plaintiff’s claims premised on the punitive nature of his return to secure
confinement; the alleged state-court finding that plaintiff is safe; and equal protection. It denies
Mr. Osborn’s motion in all other respects. One procedural-due-process claim survives. The
court also denies plaintiff’s reconsideration motion and grants in part, denies in part plaintiff’s
clarification motion.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant Seth Osborn’s
Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 33) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff Lonnie J. Ryan, Jr.’s Motion for Default
Judgment (Doc. 32) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT defendant Seth Osborn’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 37) is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth in this Order.
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 22 of 23

23
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff Lonnie J. Ryan, Jr.’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 46) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff Lonnie J. Ryan, Jr.’s Motion to Clarify
(Doc. 47) is granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 19th day of March, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
Case 5:24-cv-03154-DDC-GEB Document 55 Filed 03/19/26 Page 23 of 23