May v. Garcia et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
LINDSAY TAYLOR MAY,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-2543-EFM-ADM
ERIC GARCIA & UNION HORSE
DISTILLING CO.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is a Title VII employment discrimination case filed by pro se Plaintiff Lindsay Taylor
May. She alleges that her former supervisor and employer, Defendants Eric Garcia and Union
Horse Distilling Company (“Union Horse”), subjected her to harassment, discriminated against
her based upon her sexual orientation, and retaliated against her because she made a complaint
about her phone. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff did not file a substantive
response. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background1
Plaintiff began working as an Officer Manager for Union Horse in October 2022. Around
June 2023, Plaintiff complained that the company had access to her personal phone through a
work-related application, and that there were three unapproved applications on her phone. She
began to experience several technical issues with her phone, online accounts, and her email.
1 The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are considered true for purposes of this Order.
Case 2:25-cv-02543-EFM-ADM Document 36 Filed 03/13/26 Page 1 of 7

-2-
Plaintiff noticed that her location was being shared with these applications, that her bank
accounts were affected, that her MacBook had a firmware lock on it, that she was blocked from
accessing government websites, that her information was encrypted when it did not need to be,
and that her phone made calls to her supervisor and several other employees by itself in the middle
of the night. These issues led her to believe that her supervisor, Eric Garcia, along with her ex-
boyfriend were stalking her through the use of these unauthorized and intrusive applications.
In April 2025, after these issues went unresolved, Plaintiff contacted Union Horse’s IT
manager and informed her of the issues. The IT manager responded that Union Horse only had
control over Plaintiff’s work account and that the IT manager would remove any device access to
Plaintiff’s work account. Plaintiff then asked that Union Horse immediately remove access to any
of Plaintiff’s personal devices. Union Horse’s IT manager responded that it did not have access to
or control over Plaintiff’s personal accounts. Unsatisfied, Plaintiff eventually insisted that she
would not be using her personal devices for work.
Plaintiff was discharged from her employment for failing to participate in meetings and for
ongoing technical issues. Plaintiff alleges that she was discharged for complaining about her phone
issues. Further, she alleges that she was discriminated against by her supervisor because he is
homosexual and he supported homosexual employees more than heterosexual employees like
Plaintiff.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 15, 2025. Plaintiff filed an untimely
response on November 25, 2025. Because she had not sought permission to file a response out of
time, the Court struck Plaintiff’s response and invited her to file a motion for leave to file out of
time. On December 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed an insufficient motion for leave to file out of time,
which the Court denied. Plaintiff made no further substantive response to Defendants’ motion.
Case 2:25-cv-02543-EFM-ADM Document 36 Filed 03/13/26 Page 2 of 7

-3-
II. 	Legal Standards
Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”2 A pro se litigant is entitled to a liberal construction of her pleadings.3 If a court can
reasonably read a pro se complaint in such a way that it could state a claim on which it could
prevail, it should do so despite “failure to cite proper legal authority . . . confusion of various legal
theories . . . or [Plaintiff’s] unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.”4 However, it is not the
proper role of a district court to “assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.”5 As it relates
to motions to dismiss generally, the court “accept[s] the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint
as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”6 “Well-pleaded”
allegations are those that are facially plausible such that “the court [can] draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 7
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move for dismissal of
any claim for which the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.8 Upon
such motion, the court must decide “whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’”9 A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads facts
2 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
3 See Trackwell v. U.S. Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Because [plaintiff] appears pro se, we
review his pleadings and other papers liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys.”).
4 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
5 Id.
6 Ramirez v. Dep’t of Corr., Colo., 222 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2000).
7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
9 Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Case 2:25-cv-02543-EFM-ADM Document 36 Filed 03/13/26 Page 3 of 7

-4-
sufficient for the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.10
The plausibility standard reflects the requirement in Rule 8 that pleadings provide defendants with
fair notice of the nature of claims as well as the grounds on which each claim rests.11 Under Rule
12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, but need not afford
such a presumption to legal conclusions.12 “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 13
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff’s suit presents three Title VII claims: harassment, discrimination based upon her
sexual orientation, and retaliation. Defendants seek to dismiss all claims; the Court will take up
Defendants’ arguments on each claim in turn.
A. 	Harassment
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot bring a suit for harassment because Plaintiff has not
exhausted her administrative remedies on this claim. Before bringing a suit under Title VII, a
Plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies.14 To exhaust her administrative remedies, a
Plaintiff must make a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, describing the facts concerning the
action underlying each claim.15 “A party may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances
of discrimination, and then seek judicial relief for different instances.”16
10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
11 See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2).
12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
13 Id. at 663.
14 Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1409 (10th Cir. 1997).
15 Mackley v. TW Telecom Holdings, Inc., 296 F.R.D. 655, 669 (D. Kan. 2014).
16 Id. (quoting Schroder v. Runyon, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (D. Kan. 1998)).
Case 2:25-cv-02543-EFM-ADM Document 36 Filed 03/13/26 Page 4 of 7

-5-
Here, Plaintiff checked the block for “harassment” in her form Complaint, but she also
checked the block indicating that she did not complain of harassment in her charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. Indeed, reviewing her charge of discrimination (which Plaintiff
attached to her Complaint) Plaintiff makes no mention of a harassment claim. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Plaintiff is barred from bringing a claim of harassment because she did not exhaust
her administrative remedies on this claim.17
B. 	Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim for discrimination based
upon her sexual orientation because she relies on conclusory allegations rather than factual
averments. To state a discrimination claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must factually allege direct
evidence of discrimination or well-pleaded facts establishing she: “(1) is a member of a protected
class, (2) suffered an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the position at issue, and (4)
was treated less favorably than others not in the protected class.”18 While a complaint need not
plead any specific facts in particular, “a plaintiff must include enough context and detail to link
the allegedly adverse employment action to a discriminatory or retaliatory motive with something
besides ‘sheer speculation.’”19 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint merely states that “Eric is homosexual
and I was not.” Her charge of discrimination states that she felt like her supervisor supported
homosexual employees more than heterosexual employees. These are not factual averments, but
17 Plaintiff also checked blocks for age and race discrimination, but neither her Complaint nor charge of
discrimination mention any facts that might give rise to these types of claims. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s
Complaint contemplates claims for race or age discrimination, the Court finds that they are barred by Plaintiff’s failure
to exhaust her administrative remedies.
18 Mackley, 296 F.R.D. at 666 (citations omitted).
19 Bekkem v. Wilkie, 915 F.3d 1258, 1274–75 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d
1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2012)).
Case 2:25-cv-02543-EFM-ADM Document 36 Filed 03/13/26 Page 5 of 7

-6-
rather speculative and conclusory allegations. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not
pled facts sufficient to sustain a Title VII discrimination claim.
C. 	Retaliation
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim because she has not pled facts
sufficient to show that she engaged in protected activity. “To state a prima facie case for retaliation
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) that [s]he engaged in protected opposition to
discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse, and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially
adverse action.” 20 “Although no magic words are required, to qualify as protected opposition the
employee must convey to the employer his or her concern that the employer has engaged in a
practice made unlawful by Title VII. General complaints about company management will not
suffice.”21 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that she did not complain about harassment in her
charge of discrimination, and that she believes her employment was terminated for complaining
about her phone issues. Even a liberal reading of her Complaint cannot stretch this allegation into
activity protected by Title VII. Rather, her complaints about her phone issues are more properly
considered general complaints about company management. For that reason, Plaintiff has not pled
facts sufficient to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII.
D. 	Conclusion
Defendants raise several other arguments for dismissing Plaintiff’s claims. However, the
Court need not address them because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for the reasons stated
above.
20 Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1193 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 998
(10th Cir. 2011)).
21 Iweha v. Kansas, 121 F.4th 1208, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2024) (citation and alterations omitted).
Case 2:25-cv-02543-EFM-ADM Document 36 Filed 03/13/26 Page 6 of 7

-7-
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
This case is closed.
Dated this 12th day of March 2026.
ERIC F. MELGREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:25-cv-02543-EFM-ADM Document 36 Filed 03/13/26 Page 7 of 7