Jordan v. Big Blue Healthcare LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JAMES JORDAN, as surviving son of decedent and
as special administrator of the estate of ETHEL
JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BIG BLUE HEALTHCARE LLC, doing business as
Riverbend Post Acute Rehabilitation, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-2264-HLT-BGS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on motions for a protective order filed by Big Blue
Healthcare LLC, Gateway Healthcare, LLC, Ensign Group, Inc., Ensign Services, Inc., Ignite
Medical Resort Rainbow Boulevard, LLC, and Ignite Team Partners, LLC. See Docs. 97-102.
Plaintiff opposes the motions.1 See Docs. 103-108. For the reasons stated herein, the motions are
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. 	Background
This is a nursing home negligence and wrongful death case. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
were negligent in their care of decedent and asserts the following claims against the entities: (1) a
wrongful death claim in his capacity as an heir at law of decedent; and (2) a survival action in his
1 Plaintiff’s responses were filed five days after the applicable deadline and exceed the page limitations
prescribed by the Local Rules. See D. Kan. Rule 7.1(d)(1) (“Principal briefs in support of, or in response to,
discovery-related motions must not exceed 10 pages and replies must not exceed 3 pages.”). The Ignite
Defendants also filed reply briefs that well-exceeded the page limit. The parties neither sought leave of Court
nor provided an explanation for the untimely and/or excessive filings. Although the Court declines to strike
the briefs at this juncture—because doing so would unnecessarily delay resolution of the pending motions
and would not alter the Court’s analysis—counsel is advised that future filings that are untimely or that
exceed applicable page limitations may be summarily stricken.
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capacity as the administrator of the decedent’s estate. The complaint names six Defendants. Four
relate to the Riverbend Post Acute Rehabilitation facility (the “Riverbend Facility”), and two relate
to the Ignite Medical Resort Rainbow Boulevard facility (the “Ignite Facility”).
a. 	The Parties
For clarity, the Court will first summarize the six Defendants by facility and then describe
the relationships among them as alleged in the complaint. The following summary is drawn from
the operative complaint and does not reflect findings of fact.
The Riverbend/“Ensign” Entities2
Big Blue Healthcare, LLC, does business as Riverbend Post Acute Rehabilitation (“Big Blue”
or “the Riverbend facility”), a Kansas skilled nursing facility located in Kansas City, Kansas. Id. ¶ 6.
Gateway Healthcare, LLC, (“Gateway”) is alleged to have owned, operated, managed, maintained,
and controlled, in whole or in part, the Riverbend facility, including by providing nursing services
and exercising control over staffing budgets, nursing policies and procedures, hiring and firing the
administrator, and training and supervising nursing staff. Id. ¶¶ 9-13. The complaint also names
Ensign Services, Inc. and Ensign Group, Inc., alleging that they provided ancillary medical services
and, in that capacity, owned, operated, managed, maintained, or otherwise exercised control over the
Riverbend facility, in whole or in part. Id. ¶¶ 14-23. Specifically, Ensign Services is alleged to have
provided IT, legal, accounting, and human resources services to Big Blue. See Doc. 105, at 2. The
Ensign Group is alleged to be the publicly traded parent corporation that exercised ultimate control
over the decedent’s care at the Riverbend facility. See Doc. 106, at 2.
2 According to the Defendants’ diversity disclosure statements, the sole member of Big Blue Healthcare, LLC,
is Gateway Healthcare, LLC. The sole member of Gateway Healthcare, LLC, is the Ensign Group, Inc.,
which is a corporation registered in Delaware with a principal place of business in California. Docs. 30, 33.
Ensign Services, Inc., is a corporation registered in Nevada with a principal place of business in California.
Its parent company is Ensign Group, Inc. Docs. 15, 32.
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The Ignite Entities
Ignite Medical Resort Rainbow Boulevard, LLC, which does business under the same name,
is another Kansas skilled nursing facility also located in Kansas City, Kansas. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 24-26.
The complaint also names Ignite Team Partners, LLC, and alleges it was involved in the ownership,
operation, management, maintenance, and control of the Ignite facility. Id. ¶¶ 24-26. According to
the complaint, Ignite Medical Resort Rainbow Boulevard, LLC and Ignite Team Partners, LLC,
operated the Ignite facility as a joint venture.
Alleged Relationships Among Defendants
Beyond alleging that certain Defendants owned, operated, managed, maintained, and
controlled the facilities where the decedent resided, the complaint also alleges that the Defendants
operated through joint ventures and that The Ensign Group, Inc., operated through an alter-ego
relationship. First, the complaint alleges that Riverbend/Ensign Entities operated the Riverbend
facility through a joint venture and, as a result, owed a shared duty to exercise reasonable care for
the decedent’s safety while she was under their care and supervision at the facility. See id. ¶¶ 27-30.
Second, the complaint alleges that Ignite Medical Resort Rainbow Boulevard, LLC, and Ignite Team
Partners, LLC, operated the Ignite facility through a joint venture and, on that basis, owed a shared
duty to exercise reasonable care for the decedent’s safety while she was under their care and
supervision at the facility. See id. ¶¶ 31-34. Third, the complaint asserts an alter-ego theory against
The Ensign Group, Inc., alleging that it exercised such domination and control over the Riverbend
entity that the two were indistinct, including allegations that this control resulted in
undercapitalization and understaffing during the decedent’s residency. Id. ¶¶ 143-159.
b. 	Factual Background
Relevant Timeline
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The complaint alleges Ethel Jordan (the "decedent") suffered an avoidable pressure injury at
the Riverbend facility in July 2023 that caused necrotizing soft tissue infection resulting in her death
on September 10, 2023. Id. ¶ 1. The complaint then describes a sequence of events in late August
and early September 2023 involving care at both facilities and an eventual transfer to the University
of Kansas Hospital.
To begin, the record does not clearly establish the full dates of the decedent's residency at
the Riverbend facility. The complaint references an avoidable pressure injury sustained in July 2023
at Riverbend and states that the decedent was "readmitted" to the facility on August 21, 2023, but
does not identify the complete period of her stay. The parties' briefing likewise provides
inconsistent and incomplete information regarding the relevant timeframe, requiring the Court to
review discovery materials to locate more specific representations.
Based on the position statements submitted, the decedent resided at the Riverbend Facility
for approximately seven days in July 2023 and 21 days in August 2023. Big Blue’s position
statement further clarifies that the decedent's stay at Riverbend spanned from July 25, 2023, through
August 23, 2023. However, this is different than what is conveyed in Defendants’ motions. In
Defendant Big Blue’s motion for a protective order, Big Blue alleges the decedent resided at Big
Blue “off and on between July and August 2023” and that on “August 21, 2023, she was re-admitted
to Big Blue.” Later in the motion, Big Blue alleges decedent had a “two-day stay” at Big Blue. See
Doc. 99. For purposes of this Order, and based on the best information available in the record, the
Court assumes that the decedent resided at the Riverbend facility during the time frame of July 25,
2023 through August 23, 2023. The Court notes that it should not be required to search through
discovery responses to ascertain a basic factual predicate necessary to resolve the motions presented,
and counsel are reminded of their obligation to provide clear and consistent factual representations
in their submissions.
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The records from the Riverbend facility indicate that the decedent was at risk for developing
pressure injuries, had recently recovered from a prior sacral pressure injury, required maximum
assistance, and developed a new pressure injury the following day. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 57-60. She also
required extensive assistance with bed mobility and, before discharge, developed another avoidable
sacral pressure injury. Id. ¶¶ 61-62. The complaint further describes the facility as insufficiently
staffed to meet her care needs. Id. ¶ 63.
The decedent was transferred to the University of Kansas hospital on August 23, 2023, for
heart related issues. Doc. 99, at 1. On August 29, 2023, she was admitted to the Ignite facility.
Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 63-64. At that time, she was at risk of developing pressure injuries and subsequent
infections. Her care plan called for monitoring her skin, reporting changes, and use of a pressure-
reducing mattress. A social worker documented a stage III pressure injury on her coccyx on August
31, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 66-68. A stage III pressure injury was again noted on September 6, 2023, and
physicians ordered weekly skin checks. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. The complaint further alleges that the facility
was insufficiently staffed to meet her care needs.
On September 7, 2023, the decedent was again transferred to the University of Kansas
hospital. There, she was examined and found to have a large, non-blanchable, coccyx wound. On
September 10, 2023, she was diagnosed with bacterial infections caused by Bacteroides fragilis and
Proteus mirabilis. The complaint states that she died later that day from a necrotizing soft tissue
infection. See id. ¶¶ 73–76.
Allegations about Care Practices and Resource Allocation
The complaint also includes broader allegations about care planning, interventions, training,
and facility resources. For example, it alleges that despite the decedent’s risk for pressure injuries
and infection, facility staff did not create or implement a care plan addressing those risks and did not
appropriately supervise her while she was eating. Id. ¶¶ 77-78. It also alleges that management and
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staff associated with the facilities and corporate entities did not provide in-service training or clinical
education regarding assessment, prevention, interventions, monitoring, and reporting of developing
pressure injuries and infection incidents. Id. ¶ 80.
In addition, the complaint pleads more than mere generalized assertions of financial control;
it includes specific allegations describing how that control was exercised and how it allegedly
affected facility operations. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants implemented centralized cash
management and revenue systems through which facility funds were collected, pooled, and
redistributed, and that facility-level administrators lacked authority to retain or allocate revenues
independently. See id. ¶¶ 85–87, 98; see also Doc. 94 at 6–8 (seeking testimony of centralized financial
oversight and reporting structures). The complaint further alleges that, during the relevant period,
the facilities operated with limited cash on hand and negative fund balances, while simultaneously
making payments to affiliated entities for management and administrative services. See Doc. 1 ¶¶
88–92; see also Doc. 103 at 7. According to Plaintiff, these financial arrangements, together with
corporate oversight of budgets and expenditures—constrained the facilities’ ability to hire and retain
sufficient staff. See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 93–97. Plaintiff also alleges that staffing levels, including nursing and
CNA hours, were influenced by financial targets and resource limitations imposed at the corporate
level, resulting in chronic understaffing rather than an isolated lapse in care. See id. ¶¶ 98–103.
Claims Asserted
Based on these factual allegations, the complaint asserts three causes of action against the
Defendants.
• 	Count I—Wrongful Death (against all Defendants). The complaint asserts a wrongful-death
claim against all Defendants, alleging that the decedent was in a defenseless and dependent
condition; that she relied on Defendants for safety, protection, care, and treatment; and that
Defendants owed duties consistent with the standards of care required of those owning,
operating, managing, maintaining, and/or controlling a skilled nursing facility. It further
alleges those duties included implementing and enforcing appropriate policies and
procedures; ensuring sufficient and qualified staff; ensuring staff were properly educated and
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trained; and ensuring the facilities were properly capitalized. See id. ¶¶ 116-127.
• 	Count II—Pain and Suffering (survival claim against all Defendants). The complaint asserts
a claim by the Estate for pain and suffering against all Defendants. It pleads similar
allegations, including duties tied to the standards of care for those owning, operating, and
managing a skilled nursing facility, as well as duties related to policies and procedures,
staffing, training, and capitalization. See id. ¶¶ 128-142.
• 	Count III—Alter Ego (against Ensign Group, Inc.). The complaint asserts an alter-ego
theory against Ensign Group, Inc., alleging domination and control over the Riverbend
entity and pleading that this alleged control contributed to undercapitalization and
understaffing during the relevant period. See id. ¶¶ 143-159.
c. 	Procedural Background
The Court next summarizes the procedural history relevant to the pending discovery dispute.
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 15, 2025. The Court entered a scheduling order on August 6,
2025. See Doc. 36. On November 11, 2025, Plaintiff served Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notices on the
Defendants. See Docs. 64-69. Collectively, the notices identified hundreds of topics across the
Defendants, including topics addressing corporate structure, ownership, policies and procedures,
staffing, budgeting, and decision-making authority.
Following service of the notices, the parties engaged in a series of meet-and-confer
discussions to narrow the scope of the proposed topics. Those discussions did not resolve all
disputes. On December 22, 2025, the Court held an in-person hearing to address multiple discovery
issues, including the scope of the Rule 30(b)(6) notices. See Doc. 80. At the conclusion of that
hearing, the Court directed Plaintiff to provide Defendants with a narrowed and revised list of Rule
30(b)(6) topics. Id. On January 12, 2026, Plaintiff served revised deposition notices on Defendants.
Although the revised notices reduced the number of topics, Defendants objected that certain topics
remained overbroad, unduly burdensome, or outside the proper scope of Rule 30(b)(6) testimony.
Consistent with the Court’s instruction to continue conferring prior to court intervention,
counsel met and conferred again on February 2, 2026. During that conference, Defendants
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identified specific topics they contended were not reasonably suited for corporate representative
testimony or were better addressed through fact witness depositions. See, e.g., Doc. 97, at 3. On
February 9, 2026, Plaintiff served a third iteration of amended Rule 30(b)(6) notices on all
Defendants. See Docs. 91-96. Although some topics were further limited, Defendants maintain that
material disputes remain as to the scope and propriety of certain areas of inquiry.
On February 11, 2026, each Defendant filed a motion for protective order under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c), seeking limitations on the Rule 30(b)(6) topics noticed by Plaintiff. Each motion
addresses the same underlying dispute—Plaintiff’s request for corporate representative testimony—
but focuses on topics as they relate to the particular Defendant’s role and alleged conduct. Briefing
on the motions is complete and the Court is prepared to rule.
II. 	Legal Standard
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) governs the scope of discovery and states that
[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at state in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need
not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
As such, for the information to be discoverable, the requested information must be
nonprivileged, relevant, and proportional to the needs of the case. Holick v. Burkhart, No. 16-
1188-JTM-KGG, 2018 WL 372440, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 11, 2018). Relevance is “construed
broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter
that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,
437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). See also Smith v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 137 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D. Kan.
1991); Rowan v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp., No. 15-9227, 2016 WL 3745680, at *2 (D. Kan. July
13, 2016) (applying Oppenheimer after the 2015 amendment).
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Protective orders are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), which gives the court, “broad
discretion to utilize such a protective order to specifically define and/or narrow the disclosure or
discovery, including the terms, timing, and method of discovery’.” Orchestrate HR, Inc., 2023 WL
2269780, at *1. The Rule provides, in relevant part:
A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order
in the court where the action is pending.... The motion must include a certification
that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected
parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action. 	The court may, for
good 	cause, 	issue 	an 	order 	to 	protect 	a 	party 	or 	person 	from 	annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of
the following:
* * *
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery;
(B) specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery;
* * *
(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or
discovery to certain matters; ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
The party seeking a protective order bears the burden of demonstrating good cause.
Layne Christensen Co. v. Purolite Co., 271 F.R.D. 240, 244 (D. Kan. 2010). To meet its burden,
the moving party must make, “a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished
from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Jensen v. United States Tennis Ass'n, No. 20-2422-
JWL-TJJ, 2021 WL 6062584, at *1 (D. Kan., Dec. 22, 2021). “The ‘good cause’ standard of
Rule 26(c) is highly flexible, having been designed to accommodate all relevant interests as
they arise.” Rohrbough v. Harris, 549 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court has broad discretion to determine whether a protective order is warranted
and to tailor the scope of protection, including by limiting the terms, timing, or method of
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discovery. Orchestrate, 2023 WL 2269780, at *1.
Because Defendants seek protective orders as to topics designated in six Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition notices, the standard governing such depositions are also relevant to the Court’s analysis.
A Rule 30(b)(6) deposition allows a party to depose a corporation by designating topics for
examination and requiring the organization to produce one or more representatives to testify on its
behalf. Pursuant to the rule, the notice
. . . must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. 	The
named organization must designate one or more officers, directors, or managing
agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set
out the matters on which each person designated will testify. Before or promptly after
the notice or subpoena is served, the serving party and the organization must confer
in good faith about the matters for examination. A subpoena must advise a nonparty
organization of its duty to confer with the serving party and to designate each person
who will testify. 	The persons designated must testify about information known or
reasonably available to the organization.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
“In a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, there is no distinction between the corporate representative
and the corporation.” Sprint Communications Co. L.P. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 524, 527 (D.
Kan. 2006). To function effectively, the requesting party must designate, with sufficient specificity,
the subject areas for examination that are relevant to the issues in dispute. Id. at 528. Thereafter,
the responding party is required to “make a conscientious good-faith endeavor to designate the
persons having knowledge of the matters sought by [the deposing party] and to prepare those
persons in order that they can answer fully, completely, unevasively, the questions posed by [the
deposing party] as to the relevant subject matters.” Id. (citing Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193
F.R.D. 633, 638 (D.Minn.2000) (quotations omitted)). The corporation’s duty extends to reviewing
information reasonably available to it in preparation for the deposition. Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., No. 19-4007-DDC, 2023 WL 2269780, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 28,
2023).
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III. 	Analysis
The Court now turns to the disputed Rule 30(b)(6) topics. There are over 50 disputed topics
spanning across six motions. This order rules on them all—buckle up.
Although certain objections overlap, the Court addresses the disputes by Defendant to
ensure clarity and to account for the distinct roles each entity is alleged to have played. Because the
Defendants filed motions for a protective order, the Court will not rule on every single “objection”
and instead will decide whether a protective order is warranted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and
30(d). Orchestrate HR, Inc., 2023 WL 2269780, at *2.
a. 	Big Blue Healthcare, LLC’s Motion for Protective Order3
The Court begins with Big Blue, the entity that operated the facility where the decedent
resided in July-August 2023. Plaintiff claims that Big Blue had no autonomy to control its own
financial course or determine staffing levels. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 85. The Court first notes that Big Blue
organized its motion by individual deposition topic and presents its arguments accordingly. Plaintiff,
inexplicably, organizes its response by broad categories rather than by topic. This structure makes it
unnecessarily difficult to determine which of Plaintiff’s arguments correspond to any given topic
addressed in the motion. The Court has attempted to group Plaintiff’s arguments as best it can
based on the substance of the briefing. But to the extent Plaintiff’s arguments are not clearly tied to
a particular topic, the Court will not attempt to construct or develop arguments on Plaintiff’s behalf.
3 The Court notes that multiple Rule 30(b)(6) topics directed to the four Riverbend Defendants reference
“the time period of the sixty days prior to Resident’s stay at the Facility through the duration of her stay.” As
discussed above, the record does not clearly establish the precise dates of the decedent’s residency at the
Riverbend facility, and the Court has determined, for purposes of this order, to treat the relevant period as
July 25, 2023, through August 23, 2023. Accordingly, the Court construes this phrase, as used in topics
directed to the Riverbend Defendants, to mean the sixty-day period preceding July 25, 2023—i.e., May 26,
2023—through August 23, 2023. Unless otherwise noted, this period of time will be referenced as the
“Relevant Period” as to these four Defendants. The Ignite Defendants are addressed separately and are
subject to a different timeframe as set forth below.
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Big Blue challenges eleven deposition topics (2(ii) and (iii), 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
and 22) in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Rule 30(b)(6) Notice (Doc. 92) most of which concern
financial structure, cash management systems, capitalization, and staffing metrics during the period
preceding and surrounding the stay at Riverbend. The Court addresses each in turn.
i. 	“Chain Organization” Designation, Guaranties, and Financial
Commitments (Topic 2(ii) and (iii))
Topics 2(ii) and 2(iii) seek testimony concerning the relationship between Big Blue and The
Ensign Group, Inc., as of the time of decedent’s residency at the Riverbend facility, i.e., July 25,
2023-August 23, 2023. Specifically,
• 	Topic 2(ii): The Ensign Group, Inc.’s designation as the “chain organization” (Chain
Number HB1576) on the Facility’s CMS 2540 cost report and what this designation
reflects about the corporate relationship; and
• 	Topic 2(iii): any guaranties, credit support, or financial commitments made by The
Ensign Group, Inc. for the benefit of Big Blue.
Doc. 92, at 3.
Big Blue contends that these topics lack reasonable particularity and are not proportional to
the needs of the case. See Doc. 99, at 5. With respect to Topic 2(ii), Big Blue contends the term
“chain organization” is undefined in the notice and requires speculation. Big Blue asserts that, at
most, the term appears in the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual, which it characterizes as
containing non-binding interpretive guidance. According to Big Blue, the topic fails to identify
whose interpretation of “chain organization” is sought—Big Blue’s or CMS’s—and would require
Big Blue to speculate regarding a governmental agency’s interpretive rules. Big Blue therefore argues
the topic is vague and not stated with reasonable particularity under Rule 30(b)(6).
As to Topic 2(iii), Big Blue argues that the request is not relevant and is disproportionate to
the claims asserted. Big Blue contends that the complaint does not allege that it obtained credit or
financial commitments from lenders, nor does it include specific allegations concerning lending
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practices. In Big Blue’s view, the allegations of deficient care during a brief period of residency do
not justify discovery into broader financial arrangements between affiliated entities. Big Blue
maintains that the topic seeks intrusive financial information unrelated to the pleaded claims and
would result in undue burden and oppression.
In response, Plaintiff contends that the disputed topics are central to his theory of liability.
Plaintiff characterizes the unifying issue in the case as whether the Ensign Group exercised control
over Big Blue’s staffing decisions. According to Plaintiff, the complaint alleges that The Ensign
Group and related entities exercised substantial corporate authority over Big Blue’s operations,
including through financial controls and hierarchical oversight. Plaintiff argues that testimony
concerning the “chain organization” designation and any guaranties or financial commitments bears
directly on the nature and scope of that corporate relationship and the mechanisms through which
authority may have been exercised.
The Court finds that Topics 2(ii) and 2(iii) are sufficiently particularized and seek relevant
discovery. Topic 2(ii) specifically references The Ensign Group’s designation as the “chain
organization” on Big Blue’s CMS Form 2540 cost report. Seeking testimony regarding what that
designation reflects about the corporate relationship between the entities is relevant and is
sufficiently particularized.4 Further, as to Defendant’s vagueness argument, the topic does not
require the witness to speculate about CMS policy; rather, it seeks testimony regarding Big Blue’s
understanding of the designation reflected on its own regulatory filing. A corporate representative
may testify regarding the company’s understanding of the designation and the nature of the
4 The Court does not interpret the regulatory chain designation as establishing corporate control. Rather, the
designation is a factual classification appearing in the provider’s regulatory filings, and testimony explaining
the company’s understanding of that designation may assist in understanding the corporate relationships
reflected in those filings.
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corporate relationship reflected in the cost report, including information reflecting corporate
relationships or activities involving affiliated entities. See Sanofi-Aventis v. Sandoz, Inc., 272 F.R.D. 391,
394–96 (D.N.J. 2011) (requiring a corporation to prepare a Rule 30(b)(6) witness using information
reasonably available to it, including information from affiliated entities on which it relied upon in
regulatory submissions).
Topic 2(iii), which seeks testimony regarding guaranties, credit support, or financial
commitments made by The Ensign Group for Big Blue’s benefit, is likewise relevant to Plaintiff’s
theory that affiliated entities exercised financial control over the Riverbend facility’s operations. The
information sought bears directly on Plaintiff’s theory of financial control and is narrowly tailored to
the period of decedent’s residency at the facility. Consequently, Big Blue has failed to demonstrate
good cause for a protective order as to these topics and its request for a protective order as to
Topics 2(ii) and 2(iii) is denied. 5
ii. 	Centralized Cash Management, Sweep Accounts, and Lockbox
Accounts (Topic 11)
Topic 11 seeks testimony regarding the centralized cash management system, sweep
accounts, or lockbox accounts, used for Big Blue, for the Relevant Period, specifically: whether the
Facility’s accounts receivable were deposited into accounts not solely controlled by the
Facility; the identity of the person or entity that controlled such accounts; the process by
which the Facility obtained funds to pay its operating expenses (specifically payroll, vendor
invoices, supplies, and other costs); whether any person or entity outside the Facility had
authority to approve, deny, or delay disbursements; any inter-facility loans or transfers of
5 When the Court denies a request for protection as to a particular topic, it has determined that good cause
has not been shown. Conversely, when the Court grants a request for protection, it has found that good
cause exists. For the sake of efficiency, the Court will not repeat this finding for each topic but simply notes
it at the outset.
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funds; whether any such loans or transfers were documented by promissory notes specifying
repayment terms and interest; and any written agreements, policies, or procedures governing
the centralized cash management system. Doc. 92, at 6.
Big Blue first argues that the topic is duplicative because substantially similar cash
management topics were directed to multiple affiliated Defendants, including Gateway Healthcare,
LLC, The Ensign Group, Inc., and Ensign Services, Inc. In its view, requiring multiple entities to
prepare corporate representatives on overlapping financial systems would result in cumulative
discovery warranting limitation. Big Blue further contends that the detailed mechanics of its bank
accounts and cash management systems are neither relevant nor proportional to the claims asserted.
It argues that the complaint contains only generalized allegations regarding undercapitalization and
corporate control and does not specifically reference lockbox accounts, sweep accounts, Medicare
reimbursements, or interfacility loans. According to Big Blue, the decedent’s brief stay does not
justify discovery into sensitive and proprietary banking arrangements, and that Plaintiff may explore
corporate control and financial oversight through less intrusive means.
In response, Plaintiff contends that the requested testimony is directly relevant to his theory
of corporate control. In his response, Plaintiff points to financial data in Big Blue’s CMS cost
reports in support of his relevance argument. Plaintiff alleges the reports show that Big Blue carried
a negative fund balance of -$366,028 in 2022, which reduced to -$752,233 by fiscal year 2023.
During the same years, worksheet A-8-1 shows that Big Blue made related-party payments exceeding
$1.7 million annually, that the home office allocation alone was $750,457 in 2022 and $777,388 in
2023, portions of which were disallowed by Medicare as exceeding allowable costs. Plaintiff also
cites deposition testimony from Chad Keetch, the Ensign Group's Executive Vice President,
confirming that affiliated facilities are required to deposit accounts receivable into lockbox accounts
controlled by the corporate parent and must request operating funds through a revolving credit
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arrangement subject to corporate approval. Plaintiff contends that these financial arrangements are
directly relevant to his allegations that centralized cash management constrained Big Blue’s ability to
maintain adequate staffing.
The Court finds that Topic 11 seeks relevant discovery. Testimony regarding the existence
and operation of such systems may bear directly on the nature and extent of corporate control over
Big Blue’s financial affairs. Underlying financial transactions and relationships among affiliated
entities may be relevant when determining the nature and purpose of a provider’s financial
arrangements. Cf. Hinsdale Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 1395, 1401 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
determining whether a provider’s borrowing reflects a legitimate financial need may require
examining the underlying transactions and relationships that created the need for the loan). The
subparts are also not intended to be exhaustive; rather, they identify discrete areas over a narrow
time frame that are relevant to the nature and extent, or lack thereof, of control exercised over Big
Blue’s financial affairs and what impact, if any, that may have had on staffing decisions.
Further, the Court is not persuaded that the topic warrants protection because it is
duplicative. Each entity may possess distinct institutional knowledge regarding the operation of the
financial systems at issue, and the mere fact that that similar topics were directed to affiliated
defendants does not render the discovery cumulative as to Big Blue. Nor does the Court find the
discovery disproportionate at this stage, notwithstanding the relatively brief duration of the
decedent’s stay. Accordingly, Defendant has not met its burden and the request for a protective
order as to Topic 11 is denied.
iii. 	Communications Regarding Staffing and Quality Concerns (Topic 13)
Topic 13 seeks testimony regarding all notifications between the Riverbend and Ensign
entities, or a cluster partner, concerning staffing levels, staffing shortages, agency usage, quality
concerns, survey deficiencies, or budget constraints for the Relevant Period, specifically, daily or
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weekly operational reports submitted by the Facility Administrator, any communications regarding
the Facility’s nursing hours per patient day, any communications regarding the Facility’s use of
agency staffing; and any communications regarding quality metrics or concerns.6 Doc. 92, at 7.
Big Blue contends that the topic is unduly burdensome because it identifies two different
timeframes—sixty days prior to the decedent’s stay and six months preceding the last day of her
stay—which, in its view, significantly expands the scope of preparation required for a corporate
representative. It further maintains that the terms “operational reports” and “quality metrics and
concerns” are overbroad and encompass matters beyond the wound-care allegations at issue. Big
Blue therefore requests that the Court limit the topic in both timeframe and subject matter.
In response, Plaintiff contends that Topic 13 is neither vague nor overbroad and instead
seeks routine operational communications commonly generated in nursing home management.
Plaintiff asserts that “operational reports” in this context refers to identifiable categories of
documents such as daily census reports, staffing level updates (including HPPD metrics), incident
reports, infection surveillance data, staffing vacancy reports, and quality dashboards. Plaintiff argues
that these materials are not undefined abstractions but standard forms of inter-entity reporting
within a chain organization. Plaintiff further contends that communications and reports flowing
between Big Blue and affiliated corporate entities are central to his theory of corporate control, as
they are probative of corporate knowledge concerning staffing adequacy and demonstrate how
staffing levels, financial constraints, and quality concerns were communicated within the corporate
hierarchy.
The Court finds that Topic 13 seeks relevant discovery. Communications between Big Blue
and affiliated entities regarding staffing levels, staffing shortages, agency usage, quality concerns,
6 The topic as drafted also references a six-month timeframe preceding the last day of the decedent’s stay.
The Court understands this to be a drafting inconsistency and addresses that timeframe separately below.
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survey deficiencies, and budget constraints may be relevant to demonstrate a defendant’s knowledge
regarding the adequacy—and potential dangers—of staffing at a facility, particularly where the
plaintiff alleges that operational or managerial decisions resulted in understaffing. See Murray v.
ManorCare of Topeka KS, LLC, 2020 WL 1819884, at *7 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2020) (holding that
communications regarding staffing levels, budgets, and operational oversight were relevant to
whether defendants had knowledge of inadequate and potentially dangerous staffing conditions).
These communications may also serve as evidence of knowledge and oversight, which is central to
corporate liability theories.
The Court is not persuaded that the subject matter of the topic is impermissibly vague or
overbroad to warrant protection, as the types of operational reports described by Plaintiff appear to
reflect routine categories of facility reporting. The Court does agree, however, that the notice
references two different timeframes—sixty days prior to the decedent’s stay and six months
preceding the last day at the facility—which creates unnecessary ambiguity. The Court therefore
modifies the scope of the topic to encompass the shorter proposed period beginning sixty days
preceding the decedent’s admission through the duration of her stay at the facility. Subject to that
limitation, Big Blue’s request for a protective order as to Topic 13 is granted in part.
iv. 	Bonus, Incentive, and Profit-Sharing Arrangements (Topic 15)
Topic 15 seeks testimony regarding the bonus, incentive, or profit-sharing arrangements for
the Facility Administrator and other management staff at Big Blue Healthcare, LLC, during the
Relevant Period, specifically: any metrics tied to financial performance, revenue, census, occupancy,
or profitability; any metrics tied to labor costs or nursing hours per patient day; any metrics tied to
quality outcomes; who established the bonus criteria; and the source of funds for bonus payments.
Doc. 92, at 8.
Big Blue represents that it is willing to produce a witness to testify generally as to whether
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such incentive arrangements exist. However, it argues that inquiry into the specific financial terms,
performance criteria, and funding mechanisms for such bonuses is not relevant to the claims
asserted and would intrude into sensitive and proprietary information. Big Blue further contends
that disclosure of detailed compensation structures could create competitive concerns, particularly
given that other defendants operate facilities in the same market.
In response, Plaintiff argues that incentive and bonus arrangements for the Facility
Administrator and management staff are directly relevant to his theory of corporate control over
staffing decisions. Plaintiff contends that compensation structures tied to financial performance or
labor costs may demonstrate how corporate entities exercised influence over staffing levels and that,
if administrator bonuses were linked to labor cost containment or other financial metrics, such
arrangements could bear on whether staffing decisions were shaped by financial targets rather than
resident care considerations. Plaintiff further asserts that such discovery is probative of whether
affiliated corporate entities monitored and enforced financial performance metrics at the Riverbend
facility. In Plaintiff’s view, this line of inquiry is not merely collateral to the claims but instead relates
to the alleged mechanisms through which staffing levels may have been constrained.
The Court finds that Topic 15 seeks relevant discovery. Compensation structures that
reward cost-cutting or other financial targets may bear on whether staffing decisions were influenced
by financial considerations. This is particularly true because compensation incentives may serve as a
mechanism of corporate influence. The Court is not persuaded that the requested testimony is
irrelevant or disproportionate to the needs of the case, nor does the Court find that the confidential
nature of compensation arrangements warrants a protective order. Any legitimate confidentiality
concerns may be addressed through the existing protective order governing discovery.
To the extent Big Blue contends that disclosure of precise compensation figures would raise
competitive concerns, the Court agrees that such figures need not be disclosed. Testimony
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regarding the existence and structure of incentive programs and the metrics used to determine such
compensation is sufficient. Accordingly, Big Blue’s request for a protective order as to Topic 15 is
granted in part.
v. 	CMS Cost Reports and Home Office Allocations (Topic 16)
Topic 16 seeks testimony regarding CMS Form 2540-10 (Skilled Nursing Facility Cost
Report) 7 for Big Blue for the cost reporting period January 1, 2022, through December 31, 2022,
specifically: the identity of all persons involved in preparing or certifying the report; and, regarding
the “HOME OFFICE ALLOCATION” reported on Worksheet A-8-1, the Administrative &
General Home Office Allocation and Skilled Nursing Facility Home Office Allocation, what specific
services these allocations represent; and how these amounts were calculated. Doc. 92, at 8.
Big Blue argues that Plaintiff’s reliance on CMS Form 2540-10 is misplaced because the
form serves a narrow, regulatory purpose unrelated to the claims asserted. According to Big Blue,
the cost report exists solely to facilitate fair and equitable reimbursement for services rendered to
Medicare beneficiaries and must be completed using CMS-defined accounting methods. Big Blue
contends that Plaintiff is attempting to “weaponize” a third-party regulatory form designed for
Medicare reimbursement to obtain binding corporate testimony about the Riverbend facility’s
broader financial affairs, and emphasizes that the complaint contains no allegations concerning
Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement and does not allege that information submitted in the cost
reports establishes undercapitalization, understaffing, or deficient care. Big Blue further contends
that the 2022 cost report falls outside the relevant timeframe, that the request lacks reasonable
particularity, and that testimony regarding how home office allocations were calculated for Medicare
7 CMS Form 2540-10 is a Medicare cost report used by skilled nursing facilities to report their financial and
operational data to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). It is typically filed annually and is
used by CMS to evaluate reimbursement, compliance with regulations, and facility operations.
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reimbursement purposes is not relevant to the claims asserted and would impose an undue burden.
Plaintiff responds that CMS Form 2540-10 is not vague, but rather a defined regulatory term
appearing in mandatory cost reports submitted to CMS under federal regulations. Further, the
financial data and deposition testimony summarized in Topic 11 applies here and supports the same
relevance finding.
The Court finds that Topic 16 seeks relevant discovery. CMS Form 2540-10 reflects the
facility’s reported financial structure, including home office allocations that identify services
provided by affiliated entities and how costs were distributed to the facility. Testimony regarding
who prepared the report and how those allocations were calculated may bear on the nature and
extent of corporate involvement in the facility’s financial and operational management, and it is not
an undue burden for a corporate representative to explain the company’s own filings.
The Court is not persuaded that the regulatory purpose of the cost report renders the
information irrelevant, nor does the fact that the 2022 cost report predates the decedent’s stay
preclude discovery, as financial arrangements existing during that period may provide relevant
background regarding the Riverbend facility’s financial structure. Because the topic references a
specific regulatory filing and worksheet, the Court finds it stated with reasonable particularity. To
the extent Big Blue contends that testimony would require interpretation of CMS regulations, the
Court construes the topic as seeking testimony regarding Big Blue’s preparation and understanding
of its own cost report. Big Blue has not met its burden to establish that protection is warranted and
has a duty to prepare a corporate representative to testify about information within the company’s
knowledge. Layne Christensen Co., 271 F.R.D. at 244; Orchestrate HR, Inc., 2023 WL 2269780, at *1.
Accordingly, Big Blue’s request for a protective order as to Topic 16 is denied.
vi. 	Operating Losses and Related Communications (Topic 17)
Negative Balance and Capital Contributions (Topic 18)
Bank Accounts, Loans, and Cash Transfers (Topic 19)
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Topics 17, 18, and 19 each seek financial information regarding the Riverbend facility's
reported operating losses, fund balance, and cash transfers. Big Blue raises substantially similar
objections to each — that the topics exceed the relevant timeframe, seek information unrelated to
the wound-care allegations, and would require preparation on sensitive financial matters
disproportionate to the needs of the case. Plaintiff responds in each instance that the requested
testimony bears on his theory that affiliated corporate entities exercised financial control over the
facility in a manner that constrained staffing. Further, as discussed in connection with Topics 11
and 16, Big Blue's own CMS cost reports and the Keetch deposition testimony provide support for
Plaintiff's contention that the facility's financial arrangements and related-party payments are directly
relevant to his corporate control and understaffing allegations. The Court addresses each topic in
turn.
Topic 17 seeks the following testimony regarding the Riverbend facility’s reported
consecutive net operating losses in 2022 and 2023 (Worksheet G-3, Line 31): whether the cost
reports are accurate; what factors contributed to the operating losses; communications between the
Riverbend/Ensign entities regarding operating losses; and any actions taken or proposed to address
the losses. Doc. 92, at 9.
The Court finds that this testimony may bear on Plaintiff’s theory that affiliated corporate
entities exercised financial control over the Riverbend facility’s operations and that such control
affected staffing levels. Notably, Plaintiff alleges that corporate decisions left Big Blue with a
negative fund balance of over $700,000. Doc. 103, at 6 n. 8. Communications regarding operating
losses and related financial conditions may therefore be relevant to whether corporate entities were
aware of financial constraints affecting facility operations. The Court agrees, however, that the two-
year timeframe identified in the topic is broader than necessary. To ensure that the discovery
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remains proportional to the needs of the case, the Court limits the communications portion of the
topic (subsection (c)) to the six months preceding the decedent’s last day at the facility. Big Blue’s
request for a protective order as to Topic 17 is granted in part.
Topic 18 seeks testimony concerning the negative difference between the Riverbend facility’s
General Fund Balance as of December 31, 2022 (Worksheet G, Line 52), and December 31, 2023
(Worksheet G, Line 52), specifically: whether Big Blue agrees that the General Fund Balance
declined between these periods; if so, whether capital contributions were made or requested from
other defendants during the year 2023; and how the facility continued to operate despite the
negative fund balance. Doc. 92, at 9.
The Court concludes that the requested testimony falls within the scope of discovery.
Information concerning the Riverbend facility’s reported financial condition—including whether the
facility operated with a negative balance and whether capital contributions were made—may bear on
whether affiliated entities exercised financial oversight or control affecting the Riverbend facility’s
available operating resources. Testimony explaining the meaning of those financial entries and the
circumstances surrounding any capital contributions may provide context for evaluating Plaintiff’s
allegations concerning corporate financial practices and staffing conditions.
The topic is also sufficiently particular because it refers to financial information reflected in
the Riverbend facility’s regulatory cost reports for the identified years rather than a generalized
inquiry into the facility’s finances, and preparing a corporate representative to explain those reported
financial figures does not impose a burden disproportionate to the needs of the case. Big Blue’s
request for a protective order as to Topic 18 is therefore denied.
Topic 19 seeks testimony regarding the Riverbend facility’s report of negative ‘Other
Current Assets’ as of December 31, 2022 (Worksheet G, Line 9), and $(1,331,325) as of December
31, 2023 (Worksheet G, Line 9), specifically: whether the reporting is accurate; how the Facility
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arrived at a negative Other Current Assets balance; whether this balance represents amounts
transferred to related entities as defined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services through
lockbox accounts, sweep accounts, or intercompany loans; the terms of any intercompany loans
including interest rates and repayment terms; how cash was transferred from the Facility while it was
operating at a loss with a negative fund balance; who authorized these transfers; and whether facility
management had authority to prevent or control these transfers. Doc. 92, at 9.
The Court finds that Topic 19 overlaps substantially with Topic 11, which already addresses
centralized cash management systems and related financial transfers, and that testimony regarding
detailed banking mechanics or account structures would be cumulative and not proportional to the
needs of the case. However, testimony regarding whether the “negative current asset” balances
resulted from capital contributions or intercompany loans may bear on how funds were managed
and whether the Riverbend facility retained sufficient operating capital. Accordingly, the Court
limits Topic 19 to testimony regarding loans to or from Big Blue and capital contributions or
transfers affecting the Riverbend facility’s operational funding during the relevant period.
Accordingly, Big Blue’s motion for a protective order as to Topic 19 is granted in part.
vii. 	Home Office Fees and Management Fees (Topic 20)
Topic 20 seeks testimony regarding the Riverbend facility’s claimed home office allocation
fees to Gateway Healthcare in 2022 (Worksheet A-8-1) while reporting a net operating loss
(Worksheet G-3, Line 31), and the facility’s similar claim of home office fees while there was a net
loss in 2023, specifically, whether the reporting in the 2022 and 2023 cost reports referenced above
are accurate; why management fees were not reduced when the Facility was operating at a loss;
services provided by Gateway Healthcare in exchange for these fees; how management fees were
calculated; whether the management fees equated to the market value of services received; and
authority of facility management to negotiate or reduce management fees. Doc. 92, at 10.
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Big Blue argues that Topic 20 is not stated with reasonable particularity because it references
both “home office fees” and “management fees,” without clarifying whether those terms are
intended to be synonymous or distinct, leaving uncertainty as to the precise subject of inquiry. Big
Blue further contends that the topic improperly seeks hypothetical or opinion testimony regarding
whether management fees equated to the market value, which it argues would require speculation
and comparative analysis beyond the knowledge of a corporate representative.
In response, Plaintiff argues that inquiry into the nature of home office and management
fees bears on the scope of corporate control and oversight over Big Blue, including whether
centralized administrative functions affected operational decision-making at the facility. Plaintiff
further notes that CMS regulations governing related-party transactions require facilities to report
whether such costs exceed the amount a prudent buyer would pay for comparable services, making
inquiry into the market value of management fees appropriate.
The Court finds that Topic 20 seeks relevant discovery in part. Testimony regarding the
existence, structure, and calculation of home office fees or management fees paid by Big Blue as set
forth in subparts (a)-(d) and (f) may bear on the financial relationship between the facility and
affiliated entities and is relevant to Plaintiff’s corporate control allegations. 	Big Blue’s motion for a
protective order as to those subparts is denied. The Court agrees, however, that subpart (e),
whether such fees equated to “market value”, is not stated with reasonable particularity and may
require opinion testimony beyond the knowledge of a corporate representative. See Miller v. Union
Pac. R. Co., No. 06-2399-JAR-DJW, 2008 WL 4724471, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2008) (“[T]he
designated corporate representative does not give his or personal opinion like an individual does, but
rather presents the corporation's position on the topic.”). Accordingly, Big Blue’s request for a
protective order as to Topic 20, subpart (e) is granted. Big Blue shall produce a witness prepared to
testify regarding the existence, structure, and calculation of any home office or management fees
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paid by the facility, but testimony requiring comparison to market value or industry benchmarks is
not required.
viii. 	CNA Hours, Budget Constraints, and Staffing Metrics (Topics 21 and
22)
Topics 21 and 22 both concern staffing levels at the Riverbend facility and are addressed
together. Topic 21 alleges that between 2022 and 2023, CNA hours per patient declined while total
patient days increased, and seeks testimony regarding the following: whether the allegation is
accurate and, if so, why CNA staffing per patient day declined while census increased; the budget
constraints limiting CNA staffing; the impact on hands-on care including repositioning, skin checks,
and incontinence care, CNA-to-patient ratios during various shifts; frequency of repositioning and
turning for immobile residents; whether insufficient CNA staffing contributed to pressure injuries;
and requests to increase CNA staffing and responses.
Topic 22 alleges that in the six months prior to decedent’s last day at the facility, total
nursing hours per patient day declined, and seeks testimony regarding the following: whether the
allegation is accurate and if so, why total nursing hours per patient day declined; budget constraints
limiting total nursing staffing; communications regarding staffing adequacy; correlation between
nursing hours and resident outcomes including pressure injuries; and staffing levels during August–
September 2023. Doc. 92, at 10.
Big Blue objects to both. As to Topic 21, it argues that the two-year timeframe is overbroad
given the duration of the decedent’s stay and contends that any inquiry into CNA staffing should be
limited to the sixty days preceding her stay through the end of that stay. As to Topic 22, Big Blue
argues that the six-month timeframe encompasses a period it characterizes as non-relevant, that the
intended recipients of the communications sought are unclear, and that the topic seeks irrelevant
and overbroad information about other residents and outcomes outside of pressure injuries.
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In response, Plaintiff contends that staffing data spanning 2022 and 2023 is relevant because
the complaint alleges systemic understaffing, not an isolated incident confined to the decedent’s
specific dates of residency. Plaintiff argues that evidence of CNA hours and staffing patterns over
time bears on whether inadequate staffing was routine rather than anomalous. According to
Plaintiff, limiting discovery to the precise dates of the decedent’s stay would prevent meaningful
examination of whether broader staffing trends contributed to the alleged deficiencies in care.
The Court finds that both topics seek discovery relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations that the
facility was inadequately staffed. See Billings v. ManorCare of Wichita, KS LLC, No. 2:21-cv-02295-
KHV-TJJ, 2022 WL 4016572, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Sept. 2, 2022) (finding discovery relevant where the
plaintiff alleged inadequate staffing caused the decedent’s death, including information bearing on
the defendant’s knowledge of staffing levels and related operational decisions). Topic 21 concerns
decreases in CNA hours between 2022 and 2023 and the impact of those changes on staffing ratios
and care. Topic 22 seeks testimony regarding total nursing hours per patient day during the six
months preceding the decedent’s last day at the Riverbend facility. Because Plaintiff alleges systemic
understaffing, information regarding staffing levels and staffing metrics may bear directly on
whether inadequate staffing existed during the relevant period and whether it was chronic rather
than isolated.
The Court, however, agrees that to the extent the topics seek testimony regarding “resident
outcomes” in a generalized sense, they are broader than necessary. Discovery concerning other
residents must be limited to pressure injuries experienced by other residents during the relevant
period. See Billings, 2022 WL 4016572, at *3–4 (permitting discovery where it bore on alleged
inadequate staffing and its effect on resident care). Accordingly, the topics are limited to staffing
metrics and, to the extent Plaintiff seeks information concerning other residents, such inquiry shall
be confined to outcomes related to pressure injuries.
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Further, the two-year timeframe identified in Topic 21 is broader than necessary. To ensure
the discovery remains proportional to the needs of the case, Topic 21 is limited to CNA staffing
levels during the six months preceding the decedent’s last day at the Riverbend facility, consistent
with the time frame applicable to Topic 22. The Court finds that the six-month timeframe identified
in Topic 22 is reasonable and proportional in light of Plaintiff’s allegations. Further, the Court
construes the “communications regarding staffing adequacy” to be referring to interfacility
communications and internal communications between staff. Accordingly, Big Blue’s request for a
protective order as to Topics 21 and 22 are granted in part.
In conclusion, Big Blue’s motion for protective order (Doc. 99) is granted in part and
denied in part as set forth above.
b. 	Gateway Healthcare, LLC’s, Motion for Protective Order
Gateway is alleged to be the “cluster leader” that is “directly responsible for overseeing Big
Blue Healthcare’s operations” which includes “making decisions regarding staff allocation, budget
allocation, operational performance, and quality metrics across the facilities it oversees.” Doc. 104.
Plaintiff alleges Gateway jointly operated the Riverbend facility. Gateway challenges Topics 3,
4(a)(vi), 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15(d) in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Rule 30(b)(6) Notice (Doc. 93).8
These topics generally concern cluster governance, oversight of the Facility Administrator, financial
reporting relationships, centralized cash management, bonus structures, and corporate relationships
with affiliated entities. The Court addresses each disputed topic below.
8 Plaintiff provides argument regarding Topic 1. However, Gateway Healthcare LLC did not move for a
protective order as to Topic 1, and its motion does not challenge it. Nor is this topic addressed anywhere in
its brief. Accordingly, there is no dispute before the Court regarding Topic 1. To the extent Gateway
Healthcare LLC may have previously asserted objections to this topic, such objections are deemed abandoned
where they are not pursued in the motion for protective order. See Booth v. Davis, No. 10-4010-RDR, 2014
WL 3542059, at *1 (D. Kan. July 17, 2014) (finding objections not raised in response to a motion to compel
were abandoned). The Court therefore does not consider any such objections further.
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i. 	Cluster Governance and Organizational Structure (Topic 3)
Topic 3 seeks testimony regarding the cluster structure used by Gateway to supervise Big
Blue during the Relevant Period, specifically: the identity of the “cluster” to which Big Blue was
assigned; the names, titles, and employers of all individuals who served as “cluster partners”; the
identity of any “cluster leader”; the frequency, format, and typical agenda of cluster meetings; topics
discussed at cluster meetings; any written charter, guidelines, or policies governing the cluster’s
authority and responsibilities; and how decisions affecting Big Blue were made within the cluster
structure. Doc. 93, at 4.
Gateway argues that the topic is duplicative of a request directed to Big Blue and that
requiring multiple Defendants to prepare corporate representatives to testify regarding the same
subject would impose unnecessary burden. It further asserts that the topic encompasses facilities
and matters not involved in the current litigation and that “cluster-level meetings” would likely
involve operational and business issues unrelated to the claims asserted.
Plaintiff responds that the topic is not duplicative because Gateway and Big Blue occupy
different roles within the alleged cluster structure. According to Plaintiff, Big Blue can testify only
from the perspective of a member facility—such as what meetings it attended, what reports it
submitted, and what directives it received—whereas Gateway, as the cluster leader, can testify
regarding its oversight of Big Blue, the information it reviewed, and the decisions or approvals made
at the cluster-management level. Plaintiff further points to deposition testimony by Mr. Keetch
confirming “that Ensign-affiliated facilities are organized into ‘clusters’ of four to five facilities, that
each cluster holds weekly meetings with ‘full access to each other’s financials,’ and that facilities
within a cluster are held accountable for performance through the cluster structure.” Doc. 104 at 3.
Plaintiff also notes that Big Blue’s CMS cost reports identify Gateway as the chain home office.
Plaintiff asserts that other facilities participating in the same cluster does not render the topic
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irrelevant because the cluster structure is the mechanism through which Gateway allegedly exercised
oversight of Big Blue.
The Court finds that Topic 3 seeks information relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations that
affiliated corporate entities exercised oversight and control over Big Blue’s operations. See Grano v.
Pinnacle Health Facilities XXXIII, LP, No. 17-11-JAP/LF, 2017 WL 4712212, at 6–8 (D.N.M. Oct.
18, 2017) (finding that a related entity providing legal and regulatory compliance services, including
cost report certification, played a “vital role” in the operation and management of a nursing facility).
The Court is not persuaded by Gateway’s argument that the discovery is cumulative. Big Blue can
testify only regarding its role as a facility participating in the cluster, whereas Gateway can testify
regarding the oversight exercised at the cluster-management level. Testimony from Gateway
therefore concerns a distinct corporate perspective that cannot be obtained from Big Blue alone.
To the extent clarification is warranted, the Court construes Topic 3 as limited to testimony
regarding the structure and operation of the cluster as it relates to the supervision and oversight of
Big Blue Healthcare LLC, and not as permitting a broad inquiry into the operations of other facilities
within the cluster. With that clarification, Gateway’s request for a protective order as to Topic 3 is
denied.
ii. 	Administrator Supervision and Performance (Topic 4(a)(vi))
Topic 4(a)(vi) seeks testimony regarding Gateway’s role in hiring, evaluating, supervising,
and terminating facility administrators at Big Blue, during the Relevant Period, specifically: the
process by which the Executive Director/Administrator of Big Blue was selected and hired, and
who made or approved the hiring decision; whether the Administrator was hired by, or at the
direction of, any individual or entity other than Big Blue; the individual or entity to whom the
Administrator reported; how the Administrator’s performance was evaluated and who conducted
such evaluations; whether cluster partners had authority to recommend or effectuate termination of
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the Administrator; any performance evaluations, performance improvement plans, or disciplinary
actions involving the Administrator; and Gateway’s involvement in Administrator compensation
decisions. Doc. 93, at 5.
Gateway argues that the complaint contains no allegations concerning the Administrator’s
job performance or any employment-related claims. It contends that the topic is therefore not
relevant to the claims asserted and exceeds the proper scope of discovery.
Plaintiff responds that the topic does not concern employment claims but rather goes to the
scope of Gateway’s alleged oversight of Big Blue’s operations. Plaintiff argues that Gateway, as
cluster leader, exercised control over staffing and operational decisions at the facility, and the
Administrator was the individual through whom that oversight was implemented. Plaintiff contends
that testimony regarding whether Gateway evaluated the Administrator’s performance, imposed
improvement plans, participated in compensation decisions, or possessed authority to recommend
or effectuate termination bears directly on the extent and effectiveness of Gateway’s supervision.
Plaintiff argues that such information may demonstrate either that Gateway identified deficiencies in
the Administrator’s performance but failed to act, or that Gateway failed to meaningfully evaluate
the Administrator despite its oversight role.
The Court finds that Topic 4(a)(vi) seeks discovery relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations that
Gateway exercised oversight and control over Big Blue’s operations. As to Gateway’s argument that
these topics relate to employment issues not at issue in the case, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff does
not seek discovery regarding employment claims but rather the scope of Gateway’s alleged
supervisory authority over the Riverbend facility’s leadership. Evidence during the relatively narrow
period of time concerning whether Gateway evaluated the Administrator’s performance, participated
in compensation decisions, or possessed authority to recommend disciplinary action or termination
may bear on the extent of Gateway’s oversight and control over facility operations. Because the
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Administrator served as the primary managerial official responsible for implementing operational
and staffing decisions at the Riverbend facility, Gateway’s role in supervising that position is relevant
to Plaintiff’s theory of corporate control. Accordingly, Gateway’s request for a protective order as
to Topic 4(a)(vi) is denied.
iii. 	Financial Reporting Relationship and Benchmarks (Topic 5)
Topic 5 seeks testimony regarding the financial reporting relationship between Big Blue and
Gateway during the Relevant Period, specifically: what financial reports the Facility was required to
submit to Gateway Healthcare, LLC; how frequently such reports were submitted; the format and
categories of content contained in such reports; how Gateway used these reports to monitor the
Facility’s operations; and any benchmarks, targets, or thresholds Gateway established for the
Facility’s financial performance and staffing. Doc. 93, at 5.
Gateway seeks a protective order to the extent the topic requests testimony regarding the
specific contents of financial reports and associated targets. Gateway distinguishes between
acknowledging whether such reports exist and testifying to their substantive financial data, arguing
that inquiry into actual financial figures and proprietary report contents exceeds the scope of the
allegations in the complaint and intrudes into sensitive business information.
Plaintiff responds that the requested testimony is directly relevant to the complaint’s
allegations that Gateway exercised financial control over Big Blue’s operations. According to
Plaintiff, the format and content of financial reports sent from Big Blue to Gateway, as well as any
benchmarks or performance thresholds established by Gateway, would reveal what aspects of the
Riverbend facility’s finances Gateway monitored and what standards it imposed. Plaintiff argues
that such information is necessary to understand the mechanisms through which Gateway allegedly
directed financial decisions affecting staffing and operations.
Plaintiff further relies on Mr. Keech’s testimony that performance benchmarks—including
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financial and clinical metrics tied to administrator bonuses—were established at the cluster level
where Gateway operated. Plaintiff also argues that Gateway’s assertion that the information is
proprietary is unpersuasive because Big Blue’s financial condition is already reflected in publicly filed
CMS cost reports, and that if Gateway established financial targets for the facility despite its negative
financial position, those targets may bear on whether financial priorities influenced staffing and care
decisions.
The Court finds that Topic 5 seeks discovery relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations that Gateway
exercised financial oversight over Big Blue’s operations. Gateway’s proprietary-information
objection does not justify a protective order. Information regarding the financial reporting structure
between Big Blue and Gateway may bear on the scope of Gateway’s alleged oversight and control,
and any confidentiality concerns may be addressed through the existing protective order. The Court
does note an important limitation, however. As framed, Topic 5 targets the reporting structure and
oversight mechanism, specifically, the existence, frequency, format, and general categories of
financial reports, and the nature of any benchmarks or targets Gateway imposed, rather than
testimony of line-by-line financial figures contained in the reports. The topic does not, on its face,
seek testimony about actual dollar amounts, account balances, or granular financial data appearing in
the reports. Testimony at the deposition should be understood accordingly, and the parties should
be guided by this limitation if disputes arise regarding the permissible scope of questioning under
this topic. Subject to that clarification, Gateway’s request for a protective order as to Topic 5 is
denied.
iv. 	Centralized Cash Management and Financial Control (Topics 10 and
11)
Topic 10 seeks testimony, for the Relevant Period, regarding the centralized cash
management system, sweep accounts, or lockbox accounts used by Gateway for Big Blue,
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specifically: how the Facility’s accounts receivable flowed through accounts which Gateway had
access to; Gateway’s control over or access to such accounts; the process by which the Facility
obtained funds to pay operating expenses; any inter-facility loans or transfers of funds regarding
Facility; and Gateway’s role in financial transactions on behalf of the Facility.
Topic 11 seeks testimony regarding Gateway’s access to and control over bank accounts of
Big Blue, for the Relevant Period, specifically: whether Gateway had signatory authority on any of
the Facility’s bank accounts; whether Gateway could direct disbursements from the Facility’s
accounts; whether Gateway could access the Facility’s accounts receivable or revenue; and any
written agreements or arrangements governing Gateway access to the Facility’s funds. Doc. 93, at 7-
8.
Gateway argues that these topics are duplicative of similar requests directed to Big Blue and
incorporates by reference Big Blue’s arguments that such inquiries seek proprietary financial
information that is neither relevant nor proportional to the claims asserted.
Plaintiff responds that the requested testimony is not duplicative and is directly relevant to
the complaint’s allegations that Gateway exercised centralized control over Big Blue’s financial
operations. Plaintiff contends that Topics 10 and 11 seek information about the mechanisms—
sweep accounts, bank account access, lockbox arrangements, signatory authority, and payment
authorization—through which Gateway allegedly controlled cash management, revenue, and
expenditures at the Riverbend facility. Plaintiff asserts that this testimony is relevant because
Gateway, as the designated chain home office and cluster-level management entity, occupied a
different role in the financial hierarchy than Big Blue and is therefore uniquely positioned to explain
how those centralized systems operated and what oversight or authority Gateway exercised over Big
Blue. Plaintiff further argues that financial records and prior testimony indicate that cash flows,
home office allocations, and related financial controls were managed through corporate-level
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systems, making testimony regarding those arrangements relevant to understanding the degree of
corporate control over the facility’s operations and resources.
The Court finds that Topics 10 and 11 seek discovery relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations that
Gateway exercised centralized financial oversight over Big Blue’s operations. Gateway’s contention
that this discovery is cumulative of the discovery directed to Big Blue is unpersuasive. Big Blue and
Gateway occupied separate and distinct roles within the cluster structure: Big Blue doing business as
the Riverbend facility, while Gateway served as the cluster-level management and chain home office
entity. Testimony from Gateway therefore concerns a distinct corporate perspective concerning the
operation and oversight of centralized financial operations that is not obtainable from Big Blue.
Moreover, it is well established that parties are not limited to a single witness’s account of
disputed facts, particularly where multiple corporate entities were involved in the same transactions
or operational decisions. See Martley v. City of Basehor, Kansas, No. 19-2138-DDC-GEB, 2021 WL
4134307, at *2–3 (D. Kan. Sept. 10, 2021) (finding that Rule 30(b)(6) testimony is not unreasonably
cumulative merely because it addresses subjects covered in prior written discovery and deposition
testimony); see also Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt. Holdings, LLC, No. CIV.A. 07-2388-DJW, 2008
WL 3895474, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2008) (“[I]t is a generally accepted practice for litigants to
engage in successive forms of discovery such as the production of documents and depositions”).
Requiring a party to accept as complete and accurate the testimony of a single corporate
representative, particularly where the entities involved had distinct perspectives on the same
financial arrangements would be inconsistent with the purpose of discovery.
To the extent any of the testimony involves confidential financial information, there is an
existing protective order in place that is sufficient to address those concerns. Further, the Court
notes that the topics as described target the financial relationship between the parties – who held
what authority, how systems were structured, and what processes were in place to govern the flow
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of funds. The topics do not seek testimony of specific financial figures, dollar amounts, or account
balances, and testimony at the deposition should be understood accordingly. Accordingly,
Gateway’s request for a protective order as to Topics 10 and 11 is denied.
v. 	Bonus, Incentive, and Profit-Sharing Arrangements (Topic 12)
Topic 12 seeks testimony regarding all bonus, incentive, or profit-sharing arrangements
between Gateway and administrators or staff at Big Blue, for the Relevant Period, specifically: any
financial performance metrics affecting bonuses; any census or occupancy metrics affecting bonuses;
any labor cost or staffing metrics affecting bonuses; who established the bonus criteria; and the
source of funds for bonus payments. Doc. 93, at 8.
Gateway argues that the topic is duplicative of Topic 15 directed to Big Blue and
incorporates those arguments by reference. It further contends that the requested metrics and
financial data constitute proprietary information and that inquiry into the source of bonus payments
intrudes into sensitive financial matters not proportional to the claims asserted.
Plaintiff contends that Gateway, as the cluster-level management entity, established the
bonus criteria, set the performance benchmarks, and determined the source of funding, while Big
Blue’s personnel were merely recipients of those bonuses. Plaintiff notes that Mr. Keetch testified
that bonuses were tied to cluster-level benchmarks involving both financial and clinical performance
and that performance at other facilities within the cluster could affect bonus eligibility. Plaintiff
further contends that discovery regarding bonus metrics and benchmarks may reveal the incentive
structure through which Gateway allegedly influenced facility operations, including staffing and
financial performance.
The Court finds that incentive structure is relevant to Plaintiff’s theory of the case. If
Gateway established bonus criteria related to financial performance metrics, those criteria may have
created financial incentives that influenced staffing and operational decisions at the facility level.
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Testimony from Gateway goes to the design and administration of the incentive structure itself,
information that Big Blue, as recipients, are not positioned to provide. As with Topics 10 and 11,
Gateway’s cumulative objection is unpersuasive. The relevant distinction is not just that they are
separate entities, but they occupied different positions with respect to the bonus arrangements at
issue. Further, Gateway’s proprietary objection does not justify a protective order. Any
confidentiality concerns can be adequately addressed by the existing protective order. Accordingly,
Gateway’s request for a protective order as to Topic 12 is denied.
vi. 	Communications and Reports Regarding the Riverbend Facility’s
Finances (Topic 14)
Topic 14 seeks testimony, for the Relevant Period, of the following: (a) communications
Gateway received from the facility regarding financial distress; (b) reports provided to Gateway
regarding facility financial performance; and (c) whether Gateway ever reduced its fees collected
from the Facility. Doc. 93, at 9.
Gateway argues that the phrase “financial distress” is undefined and lacks the reasonable
particularity required under Rule 30(b)(6), leaving the scope of the request unclear. It further
contends that the request for reports regarding financial performance is overly broad and could
encompass a wide range of documents unrelated to the allegations in the complaint. According to
Gateway, the complaint’s generalized undercapitalization allegations do not justify intrusive
discovery into proprietary financial reporting.
Plaintiff responds that the terms “financial distress” and “reports” are sufficiently clear in
context and relate directly to the facility’s documented financial condition during the relevant period.
Plaintiff contends that Big Blue’s CMS cost reports show substantial negative fund balances,
minimal cash on hand, and significant staffing reductions, which together demonstrate that the
facility was experiencing financial difficulties. Plaintiff argues that communications and reports
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regarding the facility’s financial performance to Gateway will show what information Gateway
received about the facility’s condition and how it responded. Plaintiff further maintains that the
“reports” referenced in subpart (b) have a commonly understood meaning in the context of
corporate oversight of healthcare facilities, including items such as financial statements, profit-and-
loss reports, census data, staffing expense reports, and variance analyses.
The Court finds that Topic 14 seeks discovery relevant in part to Plaintiff’s allegations that
Gateway exercised oversight of Big Blue’s financial condition and operations. Subparts (a) and (c)
are not impermissibly vague. Read in context, the phrase “financial distress” identifies a sufficiently
defined subject matter and satisfies the reasonable particularity requirement of Rule 30(b)(6).
Testimony regarding what communications Gateway received from the Riverbend facility’s financial
condition and whether Gateway ever reduced its fees in response, bears directly on what Gateway
knew or didn’t know and how it responded in its oversight role. Gateway’s proprietary objection is
addressed by the existing protective order.
Subpart (b) requires a limiting instruction. As written, the subpart could be read to
encompass any written communication touching on financial matters that could loosely be
characterized as “reporting” on financial performance. The Court is not inclined to construe the
topic so broadly. Accordingly, the Court limits the term “reports” to structured financial reporting
documents generated and transmitted in the context of corporate oversight.
Accordingly, Gateway’s request for a protective order as to Topic 14 is granted and denied
in part.
vii. 	Staffing Levels During August–September 2023 (Topic 15(d))
Topic 15(d) seeks testimony regarding whether Gateway approved staffing levels at the
Riverbend facility during August–September 2023. Doc. 93, at 9.
Gateway objects to the scope of the request arguing that testimony regarding staffing levels
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in September 2023, when decedent was no longer a resident, is irrelevant and should be precluded.
Plaintiff responds that the inclusion of September 2023 is appropriate because the complaint
alleges systemic corporate control and undercapitalization rather than isolated negligence tied to
specific dates of the decedent’s stay. Plaintiff argues that conditions at the facility in the weeks
immediately following the decedent’s transfer—including staffing levels, budget performance, and
operational circumstances—may reflect the same systemic conditions that existed during the
decedent’s residency and therefore provide relevant context. Plaintiff also contends that Gateway’s
actions or inactions in the period following the decedent’s deterioration and transfer may bear on
the extent of Gateway’s ongoing oversight of the facility, and that the addition of a single month
beyond discharge is a limited and reasonable given the nature of the allegations. 9
The Court finds that Topic 15(d) seeks discovery relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations that
Gateway exercised oversight and control over staffing decisions at the Riverbend facility. See Murray,
2020 WL 1819884, at *5–6 (holding that staffing data over a broader time period was relevant where
the plaintiff alleged systemic understaffing). Gateway’s relevance and proportionality arguments are
not persuasive in the context of the claims asserted. Here, Plaintiff alleges systemic understaffing
and corporate control rather than isolated negligence tied solely to the precise dates of the
decedent’s stay. Evidence regarding Gateway’s staffing approval authority in September 2023 may
provide context on whether the staffing conditions that existed during her residency reflected a
9 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s response cites Murray v. ManorCare, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1012 (D. Kan.
2013), which does not appear to correspond to the authority discussed in the briefing. The Court
understands Plaintiff to be referring to Murray v. ManorCare of Topeka KS, LLC, No. 19-2148-DDC-KGG,
2020 WL 1819884 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2020). Plaintiff cited that case correctly in the proceeding sentence. He
also correctly refers to it throughout his other responses. See, e.g., Docs. 103 at 13, 25; 104 at 11, 15–16; 106
at 13; 107 at 12; 108 at 15. The Court also notes the same incorrect citation appears once in Doc. 105 at 11.
Given the volume of briefing submitted across six discovery motions, the Court attributes the discrepancy to
carelessness rather than any more concerning issue. The Court therefore takes no further action but cautions
counsel to carefully review citations in future filings.
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consistent operational posture by Gateway, or whether any changes occurred in that period are
probative of Gateway’s oversight role and authority. See id. The evidence is relevant to Plaintiff’s
theory of corporate control. Further, the timeframe is very narrow and only encompasses an
additional month beyond decedent’s discharge. Accordingly, Gateway’s request for a protective
order as to Topic 15(d) is denied.
It is therefore ordered that Gateway’s motion for a protective order (Doc. 100) is
granted in part and denied in part.
c. 	Ensign Services, Inc.’s Motion for Protective Order
The Court next addresses Ensign Services, Inc. (“ESI”). ESI challenges Topics 4, 5,
6(a)(vii), 13(a)(i), 15(a)(ii), 17, 19, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 28 in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Rule 30(b)(6)
Notice (Doc. 91).10 ESI is alleged to be at “the corporate epicenter” of this case as “the shared
services entity providing accounting, IT, legal, and human resources services” to Big Blue and other
facilities within the Ensign corporate family. Doc. 105, at 2. The disputed topics concern human
resources investigations, corporate reporting and analytics, accounts receivable management, board-
level actions, cash management systems, capital contributions, intercompany transfers, and CMS
cost report designations. The Court addresses each category below.
i. 	Centralized Cash Management (Topic 4)
Topic 4 seeks testimony, for the Relevant Period, regarding ESI’s role in the centralized cash
management system regarding Big Blue specifically: management of facility funds; ESI’s designation
10 Plaintiff provides detailed argument regarding Topics 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and
26. However, Ensign Services did not move for a protective order as to those topics, and its motion does not
challenge them. Nor are those topics addressed anywhere in Ensign Services’ brief. Accordingly, there is no
dispute before the Court regarding those topics. To the extent Plaintiff’s response addresses matters not
raised in the motion, the Court does not consider those arguments. Moreover, to the extent Ensign Services
may have previously asserted objections to those topics, such objections are deemed abandoned where they
are not pursued in the motion for protective order. See Booth v. Davis, No. 10-4010-RDR, 2014 WL 3542059,
at *1 (D. Kan. July 17, 2014) (finding objections not raised in response to a motion to compel were
abandoned).
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as "borrower representative" under the revolving credit facility; ESI's authority to direct
disbursements from centralized accounts; and the process by which Big Blue obtained funds to pay
operating expenses. Doc. 91, at 4.
The Court notes that Defendants frequently incorporate arguments by reference across
multiple topics rather than presenting discrete, topic-specific analysis. This practice is not helpful
and is generally disfavored, as it requires the Court to search through the briefing to identify the
precise basis for each objection. See Sandoval v. Jones, No. 11-5022, 2011 WL 2321451, at *4 n.6 (10th
Cir. June 14, 2011) (recognizing that attempts to incorporate arguments by reference are disfavored).
At the same time, Plaintiff does not always provide a topic-specific response and instead advances
arguments in a more generalized manner across the briefing. Under ordinary circumstances, the
Court would not consider arguments that are not clearly presented in connection with a particular
issue. However, given the breadth of the topics at issue, the volume of briefing, and the substantial
overlap in the arguments raised, the Court declines to disregard Defendants’ incorporated arguments
or deem Plaintiff’s responses waived. Instead, the Court has reviewed the briefing as a whole and,
where necessary, considers arguments raised elsewhere to fully capture each party’s respective
positions on the disputed topics.
Here, ESI argues that the topic is substantially similar to Topic 11 directed to Big Blue and is
therefore duplicative and cumulative. ESI incorporates by reference Big Blue’s arguments that such
inquiry seeks proprietary financial information and is not relevant or proportional to the claims
asserted. Plaintiff’s response brief does not specifically address Topic 4. Instead, Plaintiff’s
discussion groups Topics 4-6 and focuses on human-resources services, staffing decisions, and HR
investigations, which are not subjects reflected in Topic 4 and instead correspond to Topic 6.
Accordingly, the Court evaluates Topic 4 based on the subject matter actually described in the
deposition notice, and considers Plaintiff’s arguments directed to Big Blue’s Topic 11, which present
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substantially similar issues.
Plaintiff’s broader theory of the case provides the relevant backdrop. Plaintiff contends that
ESI designed, operated, and controlled the cash management system, and that ESI determined the
timing and amount of cash distributions among facilities and the corporate parent. Plaintiff further
contends that this system resulted in ESI maintaining tight control over cash reserves and directing
available funds toward corporate management fees rather than facility-level staffing. In support,
Plaintiff references testimony from Mr. Keetch indicating that ESI, as the service center, submits
financial projections to The Ensign Group for review, and that this system generated approximately
$1.7 million in costs for 2022 and 2023, during a period when the facility carried a negative fund
balance. Doc. 105, at 6 n.6.
The Court finds that Topic 4 seeks relevant discovery. Testimony regarding the existence
and operation of such systems may bear directly on the nature and extent of corporate control over
Big Blue’s financial affairs. The subparts are targeted, discrete, and the temporal scope is narrow.
They address the financial relationship between ESI and Big Blue, specifically whether ESI managed
facility funds, what authority ESI had as borrower representative, and whether ESI could direct
disbursements, etc. These topics all bear directly on Plaintiff’s theory that ESI exercised some
degree of control over the flow of funds to and from the Riverbend facility. Cf. Hinsdale Hosp. Corp.
v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 1395, 1401 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that evaluating the legitimacy of a financial
arrangement may require examining the underlying transactions and relationships that created the
need for the borrowing).
ESI’s duplication objection is unpersuasive for reasons previously stated in connection with
other Topics. Each entity may possess distinct institutional knowledge regarding the operation of
the financial systems at issue, and the mere fact that that similar topics were directed to affiliated
defendants does not render the discovery cumulative. Accordingly, Defendant has not met its
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burden and the request for a protective order as to Topic 4 is denied.
ii. 	Payroll Processing, Accounts Payable, and Financial Operations
(Topic 5)
Topic 5 seeks testimony regarding ESI’s involvement in payroll processing, accounts
payable, and other financial operations for Big Blue, for the Relevant Period, specifically: how
payroll is processed; how vendor payments are processed; what authority ESI has to delay, prioritize,
or modify payments; and who at ESI has access to the Facility’s bank accounts. Doc. 91, at 4.
As noted above, the parties frequently rely on incorporation by reference and do not always
present arguments on a topic-by-topic basis. Given the overlap in issues and the volume of briefing,
the Court has reviewed the briefing as a whole and considers arguments raised elsewhere as
necessary to capture each party’s position.
ESI represents that it has produced its Independent Contractor Agreement with Big Blue
and staffing punch-detail data for the Relevant Period. ESI argues that additional testimony
concerning the mechanics of payroll and vendor payment systems is not relevant or proportional to
the needs of the case and would be burdensome in light of the documents already produced.
Plaintiff’s response does not directly address the substance of Topic 5. Plaintiff’s response focuses
primarily on ESI’s alleged role in human resources functions, staffing decisions, and HR
investigations at the facility. But Plaintiff does argue in support of topics involving payroll and
financial operations elsewhere throughout the brief.
The Court concludes that Topic 5 seeks relevant and proportional discovery. Plaintiff
alleges that corporate entities exercised control over the Riverbend facility’s financial and operational
functions in a manner that affected staffing levels and resident care. Testimony regarding ESI’s role
in payroll processing, accounts payable, and related financial operations, including its authority over
payments and access to facility accounts, may bear directly on the extent of that control. Although
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ESI contends that prior document production is sufficient, the Court is not persuaded that
documents alone obviate the need for Rule 30(b)(6) testimony explaining how these systems
operated in practice and what authority ESI exercised. While Plaintiff’s response does not directly
address Topic 5, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s arguments regarding financial control and
payroll operations as presented elsewhere in the briefing. Given the discrete subject matter and
defined timeframe, the Court finds that preparing a corporate representative to address Topic 5 does
not impose a burden disproportionate to the needs of the case. Accordingly, ESI’s request for a
protective order as to Topic 5 is denied.
iii. 	Human Resources Investigations (Topic 6(a)(vii))
Topic 6(a)(vii) seeks testimony regarding ESI’s role in any HR investigations at the
Riverbend facility for the Relevant Period. Doc. 91, at 4-5.
ESI argues that the topic is overbroad because it is not limited to employees involved in the
decedent’s care or to issues related to the allegations in the complaint. According to ESI, testimony
about all HR investigations during the stated period is not relevant or proportional to the needs of
the case.
Plaintiff argues that testimony concerning human resources investigations conducted at the
facility is appropriately limited in scope and proportional to the needs of the case. Plaintiff contends
that if ESI conducted investigations relating to staffing adequacy, employee conduct, or safety issues
during that period, such information may bear on the company’s knowledge of conditions at the
facility and its response to potential staffing or operational concerns prior to the decedent’s stay.
The Court finds that Topic 6(a)(vii) seeks discovery that is relevant in part but overly broad
as drafted. The topic, as written, could encompass a wide range of employment matters unrelated to
the underlying litigation. However, investigations concerning staffing adequacy, employee conduct
affecting resident care, or safety issues at the Riverbend facility during the Relevant Period may bear
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on what corporate entities knew regarding operational conditions at the facility and how they
responded to those concerns. To ensure the discovery remains proportional to the needs of the
case, the Court limits Topic 6(a)(vii) to human resources investigations during the relevant period
that concern staffing levels, employee conduct affecting resident care, or resident safety issues.
Accordingly, ESI’s request for a protective order as to Topic 6(a)(vii) is granted in part.
iv. 	Reports, Dashboards, and Analytics Provided to or Concerning the
Facility (Topics 13(a)(i) and 22)
Topic 13(a)(i) seeks testimony regarding all data reports, dashboards, or analytics provided
by ESI to Big Blue or Gateway regarding financial reports for the Relevant Period. Topic 22 seeks
testimony, for the Relevant Period, regarding the types of: (a) financial reports generated regarding
facility performance sent to Gateway or Ensign Group regarding financial condition; (b) whether
ESI recommended changes to related party fee structure; and (c) whether ESI continued charging
fees under the above conditions and the impact of the facility’s financial condition on services
provided. Doc. 91, at 10.
As to both Topics, ESI argues that phrase “financial reports” is overly broad and not stated
with reasonable particularity, as the term could encompass a wide range of documents. ESI further
contends that detailed financial reporting is not relevant to the allegations in the complaint and that
generalized undercapitalization allegations do not justify intrusive discovery into proprietary financial
materials. ESI further contents that Topic 22 is duplicative of Topic 13(a)(1), differing only in that it
includes Ensign Group as an additional recipient.
Plaintiff responds that ESI is the entity responsible for providing IT and accounting services,
which designed and maintained systems that tracked facility performance metrics and generated
reports distributed within the corporate structure. Plaintiff contends that testimony regarding what
metrics were monitored, how those reports were generated, and how information regarding the
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facility’s financial condition and staffing was communicated to corporate leadership is relevant to
understanding the scope of corporate oversight and the flow of information within the organization.
Plaintiff argues that such reporting may demonstrate what aspects of facility operations corporate
entities monitored and what information they received about the facility’s financial condition,
staffing levels, and operational performance during the relevant period.
The Court finds that Topics 13(a)(i) and 22 seek discovery relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations
that affiliated corporate entities exercised oversight and control over Big Blue’s operations. The
Court finds that the topics are not wholly duplicative; however, to the extent that any topics overlap,
any duplication may be managed through the deposition itself rather than through a protective
order. Given the allegations that ESI provided IT and accounting services that generated
performance reports distributed within the corporate structure, testimony regarding the types of
reports generated, the metrics tracked, and the manner in which financial and operational
information was communicated to corporate leadership, may bear on the scope of corporate
oversight and the flow of information regarding the Riverbend facility’s condition. To ensure the
discovery remains proportional to the needs of the case, the Court limits both topics to the
reporting systems utilized, the metrics monitored, and the distribution of such reports, rather than a
detailed recitation of every financial figure contained therein. Accordingly, ESI’s request for a
protective order as to Topics 13(a)(i) and 22 is granted in part.
v. 	Accounts Receivable Management (Topic 15(a)(ii))
Topic 15(a)(ii) seeks testimony regarding ESI’s involvement in accounts receivable
management for the Riverbend facility for the Relevant Period. Doc. 91, at 7.
ESI argues that “accounts receivable management” is vague and not stated with reasonable
particularity, leaving the scope of inquiry unclear and undefined. It further contends that the
complaint contains no allegations concerning difficulties in collecting accounts receivable or related
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financial issues.
Plaintiff responds that Topic 15(a)(ii) is relevant because ESI, as the entity providing
accounting services to Big Blue, allegedly managed the Riverbend facility’s accounts receivable
collection process. Plaintiff contends that the way accounts receivable are collected and managed
directly affects the facility’s available cash flow and therefore its ability to fund operating expenses,
including staffing. According to Plaintiff, testimony regarding ESI’s role in accounts receivable
management may demonstrate how cash moved through the corporate structure and whether
centralized financial systems affected the resources available to the facility.
The Court finds that Topic 15(a)(ii) seeks discovery relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations that
affiliated corporate entities exercised centralized financial control over Big Blue’s operations. The
Court is not persuaded by ESI’s argument that the topic is impermissibly vague. Accounts
receivable management is a commonly understood accounting function, and the topic provides
sufficient notice of the subject matter to permit preparation of a corporate representative. Plaintiff
alleges that corporate entities controlled financial operations affecting the Riverbend facility’s
available resources. Testimony regarding whether ESI managed or participated in the Riverbend
facility’s accounts receivable processes may bear on how revenue was collected and how funds
became available for the Riverbend facility’s operations.
To be clear however, the scope of permissible inquiry is limited to ESI’s role and
involvement in accounts receivable management, i.e., the process, systems, and functions ESI
performed in connection with the Riverbend facility’s accounts received. It does not extend to the
identity of individual debtors, specific amounts owed, or underlying details of accounts. The
relevant inquiry is whether and how ESI participated in accounts receivable functions, not the
substantive content of individual receivables. Accordingly, ESI’s request for a protective order as to
Topic 15(a)(ii) is denied.
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vi. 	Board Meetings and Corporate Actions Affecting the Facility (Topic
17)
Topic 17 seeks testimony regarding all board meetings, resolutions, or corporate actions by
ESI affecting Big Blue during the six-month period preceding decedent’s last day at the facility,
specifically: any resolutions regarding services to the Facility; any policy decisions affecting the
Facility; any budget decisions affecting the Facility; and any other actions affecting the Facility’s
operations. Doc. 91, at 8.
ESI argues that the six-month timeframe is overbroad and burdensome given the limited
period at issue in this case. It further contends that the phrases “policy decisions” and “any other
actions affecting the Facility’s operations” lack reasonable particularity and could encompass matters
far beyond the allegations in the complaint. According to ESI, the undefined scope of the topic
renders its outer limits unclear and warrants protection.
Plaintiff responds that the six-month timeframe requested in Topic 17 is reasonable and
proportional because it captures the corporate decision-making period preceding and surrounding
the decedent’s stay at the facility. Plaintiff argues that board meetings, resolutions, and other
corporate actions during that period may reflect policy decisions, budget approvals, or operational
directives that governed staffing and facility operations. Plaintiff contends that such information
may help establish the scope of corporate oversight and decision-making authority affecting the
facility. Plaintiff further contends that courts have permitted discovery of similar corporate
governance materials over comparable time periods where corporate control and operational
decision-making are at issue. 11
11 The Court notes that Plaintiff cites Murray v. ManorCare, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1012 (D. Kan. 2013),
which does not appear to correspond to the authority discussed in the briefing. The Court understands
Plaintiff to be referring to Murray v. ManorCare of Topeka KS, LLC, No. 19-2148-DDC-KGG, 2020 WL
1819884 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2020). Plaintiff cited that case correctly elsewhere in the briefing. See, e.g., Docs.
103 at 13, 25; 104 at 11, 15–16; 106 at 13; 107 at 12; 108 at 15. The Court also notes the same incorrect
citation appears once in Doc. 104 at 16. Given the volume of briefing submitted across six discovery
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The Court finds that Topic 17 seeks discovery that is relevant in part but overly broad as
drafted. Plaintiff alleges that corporate entities exercised oversight and control over staffing and
operational decisions at the Riverbend facility. See Murray, 2020 WL 1819884, at *9–10 (allowing
discovery into staffing budgets and financial oversight because such information could bear on
whether corporate entities influenced staffing and operational decisions at the facility). Board
meetings or corporate actions addressing staffing policies, budgeting decisions, or operational
oversight during the relevant timeframe may bear on the scope of that corporate involvement.
The Court, however, agrees that the phrase “any other actions affecting the Facility’s
operations” is broader than necessary and lacks the reasonable particularity required to permit
meaningful preparation of a corporate representative. Accordingly, the Court limits Topic 17 to
board meetings, resolutions, or corporate actions during the six-month period that specifically
concern staffing levels, budget allocations, or operational oversight of the Riverbend facility. The
broader catchall language, “any other actions affecting the Facility’s operations” and “policy
decisions” without further qualification is overbroad.
Regarding the temporal scope, the Court notes that Topic 17 uses a six-month lookback
period rather than the sixty-day period applied to other topics. The Court finds the longer
appropriate here given that corporate governance decisions are typically made on a prospective basis
and may precede operational effect by weeks or months. A sixty-day window could fail to capture
decisions that were made that shaped conditions at facility during period of time at issue. Thus, the
six-month period is proportional to the nature of discovery sought.
Accordingly, ESI’s request for a protective order as to Topic 17 is granted in part. ESI
shall designate a witness prepared to testify regarding board meetings, resolutions, or corporate
motions, the Court attributes the discrepancy to carelessness rather than any more concerning issue. The
Court therefore takes no further action but cautions counsel to carefully review citations in future filings.
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actions during the six-month period that relate to staffing policies, budget decisions, or corporate
oversight of the Riverbend facility.
vii. 	Centralized Cash Management and Transfers (Topic 19)
Topic 19 seeks testimony, for the Relevant Period, regarding the following: whether
Medicare and Medicaid accounts receivable of Big Blue are swept into lockbox accounts controlled
by ESI; the mechanics of the cash sweep process; who authorized such transfers from the Facility;
whether facility management could prevent or control such transfers; whether such transfers were
documented as loans with repayment terms and interest; and how the Facility obtained funds for
operating expenses after cash sweeps. Doc. 91, at 9.
ESI argues that this request is duplicative of Topic 4 as directed to ESI and incorporates
arguments previously raised concerning centralized cash management. According to ESI, inquiry
into these financial mechanisms is not relevant to the claims asserted and is not proportional to the
needs of the case.
Plaintiff argues that testimony regarding the facility’s cash management system is necessary
because ESI—not Big Blue—designed and operated the centralized financial structure through
which facility funds were managed. Plaintiff contends that ESI established the lockbox and cash
management arrangements, managed the revolving credit facility, calculated intercompany balances,
and controlled the timing and amount of cash transfers between facilities and the corporate parent.
Plaintiff further contends that because ESI created and administered these systems, discovery into
their operation cannot be characterized as unduly burdensome or shielded merely on the grounds
that the information may be commercially sensitive.
The Court finds that Topic 19 seeks discovery that is relevant but broader than necessary as
drafted. Testimony regarding the existence and operation of a centralized cash management system,
including whether facility revenues were swept into corporate controlled accounts, who authorized
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or controlled such transfers, and how the facility obtained operating funds thereafter, may bear on
the degree of corporate oversight exercised over the facility’s finances and its ability to fund
operations, including staffing, during the Relevant Period.
Regarding ESI’s objection that the Topic is duplicative, the Court has reviewed Topic 4 as
directed to ESI. While Topic 4 addresses ESI’s role in centralized cash management generally,
Topic 19 seeks testimony directed to specific operational mechanics. These are distinct lines of
inquiry that go beyond the general cash management framework addressed in Topic 4. To the
extent any specific subpart of Topic 19 is subsumed within Topic 4, that overlap may be managed at
the deposition itself and does not warrant a protective order as to the same.
The Court, however, agrees that certain subparts of Topic 19 extend beyond what is
necessary. Inquiry into the full mechanics of the cash sweep process and intercompany loan
documentation could extend into detailed corporate financial arrangements not sufficiently
connected to the facility’s operations. The Court therefore limits Topic 19 to testimony regarding
whether Big Blue’s Medicare and Medicaid receivables were swept into centralized or lockbox
accounts controlled by ESI or affiliated entities, who authorized or controlled those transfers,
whether facility management could prevent or control the transfers, and how the facility obtained
funds for operating expenses after such transfers during the Relevant Period. Accordingly, ESI’s
request for a protective order as to Topic 9 is granted in part.
viii. 	Capital Contributions and Negative Fund Balances (Topic 24)
Topic 24 seeks testimony regarding the negative difference between the Facility’s General
Fund Balance as of December 31, 2022 (Worksheet G, Line 52), and December 31, 2023
(Worksheet G, Line 52), specifically: does ESI agree that the General Fund Balance declined
between these periods and if not, explain; if ESI agrees, whether capital contributions were made or
requested from other defendants during the year 2023; and how the facility continued to operate
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despite the negative fund balance. Doc. 91, at 11.
As noted earlier, the parties frequently rely on incorporation by reference and do not always
present arguments on a topic-by-topic basis. Given the overlap in issues and the volume of briefing,
the Court has reviewed the briefing as a whole and considers arguments raised elsewhere as
necessary to capture each party’s position.
ESI argues that this topic is duplicative of Topic 18 directed to Big Blue and incorporates
those arguments by reference. It further contends that the complaint contains no specific
allegations concerning capital contributions or fund balances, and that the burden and intrusiveness
of this financial inquiry outweighs any potential benefit. Plaintiff response doesn’t address the
substance of the information sought in this topic, therefore, as done earlier, the Court will consider
Plaintiff’s arguments raised elsewhere in the briefing.
The Court concludes that Topic 24 seeks relevant and proportional discovery. Plaintiff
alleges that corporate entities exercised financial oversight and control over the Riverbend facility in
a manner that affected its available operating resources and staffing levels. Testimony regarding
changes in the facility’s General Fund Balance, the existence of any capital contributions, and how
the facility continued to operate despite a negative balance may bear directly on those allegations by
providing insight into the facility’s financial condition and the role of corporate entities in addressing
it.
The Court is not persuaded that the topic is impermissibly duplicative of discovery directed
to Big Blue, as ESI may possess distinct knowledge regarding financial decisions and corporate-level
responses. Although ESI argues the topic is not relevant and unduly burdensome, those objections
are not sufficiently substantiated. While Plaintiff does not directly address this topic, the Court has
considered Plaintiff’s broader arguments regarding corporate financial control as presented
elsewhere in the briefing. Given the discrete subject matter and defined timeframe, the Court finds
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that preparing a corporate representative to address these issues does not impose a burden
disproportionate to the needs of the case. Accordingly, ESI’s request for a protective order as to
Topic 24 is denied.
ix. 	Medicare/Medicaid Payment Transfers and Intercompany Loans
(Topic 25)
Topic 25 seeks testimony regarding the Riverbend facility’s negative ‘Other Current Assets’
as of December 31, 2022 (Worksheet G, Line 9), and $(1,331,325) as of December 31, 2023
(Worksheet G, Line 9), specifically: whether the figures are accurate; and, if so, how the Facility
arrived at a negative Other Current Assets balance; whether this balance represents amounts
transferred to related entities as defined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services through
lockbox accounts, sweep accounts, or intercompany loans; terms of any intercompany loans
involving the Facility including interest rates and repayment terms; how cash was transferred from
the Facility while it was operating at a loss with a negative fund balance; who authorized these
transfers from the Facility; and whether facility management had authority to prevent or control
these transfers. Doc. 91, at 11.
ESI argues that this request is duplicative of Topic 2(iii) directed to Big Blue and
incorporates Big Blue’s arguments concerning guarantees and financial commitments by reference.
ESI further contends that generalized allegations of undercapitalization do not justify intrusive
discovery into confidential and proprietary banking and transfer information.
Plaintiff responds that Topic 25 seeks relevant information regarding intercompany loans
and related financial arrangements that allegedly governed how cash moved between Big Blue and
affiliated corporate entities. Plaintiff contends that testimony regarding the terms, authorization, and
repayment of such loans may show how financial obligations imposed by the corporate structure
affected the facility’s available resources and operational decisions. Plaintiff further contends that
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ESI, as the entity responsible for accounting services and financial management functions, would
have knowledge of how these loan arrangements were structured and administered, making its
testimony necessary to explain how those financial systems operated and affected the facility’s
finances.
The Court finds that Topic 25 seeks discovery that is relevant and not duplicative of Topic
2(iii). See Martley, 2021 WL 4134307, at *2–3 (finding that Rule 30(b)(6) testimony is not
unreasonably cumulative merely because it addresses subjects covered in prior written discovery and
deposition testimony); see also Foreclosure Mgmt. Co., 2008 WL 3895474, at *5 (“[I]t is a generally
accepted practice for litigants to engage in successive forms of discovery such as the production of
documents and depositions”). Big Blue and ESI occupy different roles within the alleged corporate
structure. ESI is identified as the entity providing accounting and financial management services to
the facility, and as such may possess distinct knowledge regarding how intercompany loans or
financial transfers were structured and administered, knowledge that Big Blue, may not
independently possess.
Plaintiff alleges that corporate entities exercised centralized control over the Riverbend
facility’s finances and that mechanisms such as intercompany loans and cash management systems
affected the resources available for staffing and operations. A negative Other Current Assets
balance of nearly $1 million as of the end of 2023, during a period in which the facility was allegedly
operating at a loss, may provide insight as to the effects of centralized financial control. Testimony
regarding the existence, authorization, and administration of such financial arrangements may bear
on those allegations. ESI has not demonstrated good cause that preparing a witness to address this
topic would impose an undue burden or expense disproportionate to the needs of the case.
Accordingly, ESI’s request for a protective order as to Topic 25 is denied.
x. 	CMS Cost Reports and “Chain Organization” Designation (Topics 27
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and 28)
Topic 27 seeks testimony regarding The Ensign Group, Inc.’s identification as the chain
organization (Chain Number HB1576) on Big Blue’s CMS 2540 cost report, for the Relevant Period,
specifically: the meaning of this chain designation under CMS regulations; what relationship this
designation reflects; any home office services provided through the chain organization; and any
regulatory or reporting obligations arising from this chain designation. Doc. 91, at 12.
Topic 28 seeks testimony regarding the Riverbend Facility’s 2540 Medicare cost reports for
2022 and 2023 which identify Ensign Group as the “chain organization” with Chain Number
HB1576 (Worksheet S-2, Part I, Lines 44–47)12 specifically: Is the reporting in the 2022 and 2023
cost reports referenced above accurate?; and if so, describe what the “chain organization”
designation under Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ regulations indicates about Ensign
Group’s relationship to the Facility; obligations arising from chain organization designation; whether
Ensign Group completes CMS Form 287 (Home Office Cost Report) for its chain of facilities; what
Ensign Group’s understanding is of the meaning of “controlled” for purposes of chain designation;
and how many facilities are included in Chain #HB1576. Id.
As to Topic 27, ESI argues that the complaint contains no allegations concerning regulatory
or reporting obligations, and that inquiry into such matters is not relevant or proportional to the
wound-care allegations at issue. ESI also notes that similar topics have been directed to other
Defendants and argues that the request is duplicative and cumulative. As to Topic 28, ESI argues
that the topic is duplicative of Topic 27 and overlaps with requests directed to The Ensign Group,
Inc. ESI further contends that the wording of the topic creates confusion by inquiring of ESI about
The Ensign Group’s understanding of certain terms.
12 The home office address is listed as 29222 Rancho Viejo Rd Suite 127, San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675.
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Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding The Ensign Group’s identification as the chain
organization on Big Blue’s CMS cost reports is relevant because those reports expressly designate
The Ensign Group as Chain Number HB1576 and identify related entities within the corporate
structure. Plaintiff contends that ESI, as the accounting and administrative services provider,
participated in preparing and submitting these reports and therefore possesses knowledge regarding
the meaning and implications of the chain organization designation under CMS regulations. Plaintiff
further contends that the term “chain organization” is defined in CMS guidance and reflected in the
cost report filings prepared by ESI, and that testimony regarding the reporting requirements, the
relationships reflected in those filings, and the services provided through the chain organization
structure is relevant to understanding the scope of corporate oversight of the Riverbend facility.
The Court agrees, however, that the topics as drafted are broader than necessary in two
respects. First, to the extent that Topics 27 and 28 seek testimony requiring ESI to interpret CMS
regulations and offer legal conclusions regarding regulatory obligations under federal law, the request
exceeds the proper scope of Rule 30(b)(6) testimony. See Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Theglobe.com, Inc.,
236 F.R.D. 524, 528–29 (D. Kan. 2006) (explaining that a Rule 30(b)(6) witness testifies regarding
the corporation’s knowledge of facts reasonably available to the organization and does not provide
personal opinions); Nazario v. Univ. of Kansas Hosp. Auth., No. 24-2448-TC-TJJ, 2026 WL 411823, at
*8 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2026) (distinguishing between testimony regarding underlying facts bearing on
legal issues and questions calling for legal conclusions). Second, Topic 28’s inquiry into Ensign
Group’s subjective understanding of the term “controlled” for purposes of the chain designation is
more appropriately directed to Ensign Group rather than to ESI, and ESI cannot be reasonably
expected to speak to another entity’s regulatory understanding.
Accordingly, the Court limits Topics 27 and 28 to testimony regarding the preparation and
submission of the cost reports, the contents of the reports including entities identified in the chain
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designation, and the corporate relationships reflected in the filings. ESI’s request for a protective
order as to Topics 27 and 28 is granted in part.
It is therefore ordered that ESI’s motion for protective order (Doc. 102) is granted in
part and denied in part as set forth above.
d. 	Ensign Group, Inc.’s Motion for Protective Order
The Court next addresses The Ensign Group, Inc. (“TEG”), the publicly traded parent
corporation of ESI, that allegedly exercised control over the decedent’s care at the Riverbend
Facility. TEG challenges Topics 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, and 17 in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Rule
30(b)(6) Notice (Doc. 94). The disputed topics concern capitalization policies, financing
arrangements, centralized cash management, real estate relationships, and CMS cost report
designations. Because Plaintiff asserts an alter-ego theory against TEG, several of these topics
implicate corporate control and financial structure. The Court addresses each below.
i. 	Authority Over Hiring, Evaluation, and Termination of Senior
Leadership (Topic 4)
Topic 4 seeks testimony, during the Relevant Period, regarding TEG’s role in hiring,
evaluating, or terminating senior leadership at Gateway or Big Blue, specifically: the authority of the
CEO of TEG, or other TEG officer, director, board member, or employee to hire, appoint, or
terminate officers or administrators at affiliated entities within the chain organization including the
Facility; any authority of TEG’s Board of Directors and/or officers over personnel decisions at
affiliated entities within the chain organization including the Facility; and the process by which
administrators are hired and terminated at affiliated entities within the chain organization including
the Facility. Doc. 94, at 3.
TEG argues that although the topic initially references specific entities, subsequent subparts
expand the scope to “affiliated entities,” rendering the request overbroad. TEG contends that
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discovery should be limited to the named Defendants and that inquiry into personnel authority over
other facilities not involved in the decedent’s care is not relevant to the claims asserted.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding TEG’s role in hiring, evaluating, or terminating
senior leadership at Gateway Healthcare and Big Blue is relevant to the complaint’s allegations that
corporate entities exercised control over staffing and facility operations. Plaintiff argues that
authority over hiring and termination decisions is a key indicator of corporate control and may
demonstrate whether TEG influenced or directed staffing decisions affecting resident care. Plaintiff
further points to prior testimony indicating that TEG possessed authority to hire or fire
administrators and directors of nursing at affiliated facilities, which Plaintiff contends supports
inquiry into the scope of that authority.
The Court agrees with TEG. Authority to hire, evaluate, or terminate facility leadership may
bear on Plaintiff’s allegations that corporate entities exercised oversight and control over the
operations of Big Blue and Gateway, and testimony regarding TEG’s authority over leadership
positions at those entities is therefore relevant. However, the phrase “affiliated entities” expands the
scope of the topic beyond the entities involved in this litigation and could encompass facilities or
corporate relationships unrelated to the claims asserted. Accordingly, Topic 4 is limited to testimony
concerning TEG’s authority to hire, evaluate, or terminate leadership at Gateway and Big Blue and
the process by which administrators at those entities are hired or terminated. Because TEG’s
objection is directed solely to the inclusion of “affiliated entities,” the Court adopts that limitation
and therefore grants TEG’s request for a protective order as to Topic 4. TEG shall produce a Rule
30(b)(6) witness prepared to testify on Topic 4 as so limited to Gateway Healthcare and Big Blue.
ii. 	Capital Expenditures and Source of Capital (Topic 5)
Topic 5 seeks testimony regarding TEG’s involvement in capital allocation decisions for Big
Blue, for the Relevant Period, specifically: how capital is allocated to Big Blue; any capital investment
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decisions affecting Big Blue; any approval required from TEG for capital expenditures at the
Facility; and the source of capital for affiliated facilities. Doc. 94, at 4.
TEG seeks to limit Topic 5, noting that subsection 5(iv) references “affiliated facilities” and,
in TEG’s view, should be narrowed to Big Blue only. TEG further argues that Topic 5 lacks
reasonable particularity because the terms “capital expenditure” and “source of capital” are
undefined and could encompass a broad range of financial information.
Plaintiff argues that testimony regarding TEG’s authority over capital expenditures and
funding sources for facility operations is relevant to understanding the extent of corporate oversight
and financial control over Big Blue and related entities. Plaintiff contends that capital expenditure
decisions may affect the resources available for facility operations, including staffing and patient
care. Plaintiff also maintains that references to “affiliated entities” reflect the operational structure
of the organization, in which facilities were allegedly managed through cluster-based oversight and
shared financial and operational decision-making.
The Court finds that testimony concerning capital expenditures and funding sources for Big
Blue may bear on Plaintiff’s allegations that corporate entities exercised financial control over the
facility’s operations and resources. The Court is not persuaded by TEG’s argument that the terms
“capital expenditure” and “source of capital” are impermissibly vague. These terms carry their
ordinary financial meaning and, in the context of the topic, are sufficiently particular to permit TEG
to prepare a corporate representative. However, the reference to “affiliated facilities” expands the
topic beyond the entities involved in this litigation and is therefore broader than necessary. The
Court limits Topic 5 to capital expenditures and sources of capital relating to Big Blue. TEG’s
request for a protective order as to Topic 5 is granted in part.
iii. 	Revolving Credit Facility and Financing Arrangements (Topic 6)
Topic 6 seeks testimony regarding any revolving credit facility or other financing
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arrangements in effect during the Relevant Period in which Big Blue or Gateway participated,
specifically: whether TEG serves as guarantor; whether Big Blue, Gateway, or any affiliated entity is
a borrower, co-borrower, or loan party; whether the Facility’s accounts receivable are pledged as
collateral; any approval required under the credit agreement before the Facility can take certain
actions; and whether census or any other metric regarding the operation of Big Blue is a condition of
the revolving credit facility or other financing arrangements. Doc. 94, at 4.
TEG argues that the topic is substantially similar to Topic 2(iii) directed to Big Blue
concerning guaranties and financial commitments and incorporates those arguments by reference.
According to TEG, the complaint contains no specific allegations concerning credit facilities or
lending practices, and the generalized undercapitalization allegations do not justify discovery into
financing arrangements. TEG contends that inquiry into such lending or credit matters is not
relevant to the allegations in the complaint and is not proportional to the needs of the case.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding revolving credit or other financing arrangements
involving Big Blue or Gateway is relevant to the complaint’s allegations that corporate entities
exercised centralized control over financial management and resource allocation. Plaintiff argues
that such arrangements may reveal how facility funds were accessed or distributed and whether
corporate-level decisions affected the facility’s ability to fund operations, including staffing. Plaintiff
further contends that testimony from TEG is necessary to explain the corporate authorization and
structure of these financing mechanisms.
The Court is not persuaded that the topic is improper. Financing arrangements—such as
revolving credit facilities—may bear on how operating capital was obtained, who controlled access
to those funds, and whether corporate-level financial decisions affected the resources available for
facility operations. Testimony concerning the existence and structure of such arrangements and
TEG’s role in authorizing or administering them may therefore be relevant to Plaintiff’s theory of
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corporate control. However, to the extent the topic seeks testimony regarding financing
arrangements involving “affiliated entities,” the Court finds that aspect of the topic to be broader
than necessary, as it could encompass entities and transactions unrelated to the claims at issue.
Consistent with the Court’s prior rulings, the topic is limited to financing arrangements involving
Big Blue and, where applicable, Gateway.
The Court also rejects TEG’s duplication argument. Big Blue may testify regarding its own
financial obligations or borrowing arrangements, but TEG may possess distinct knowledge
concerning the corporate-level financing mechanisms and approvals governing those arrangements.
Discovery is not cumulative where different entities have different roles within the alleged corporate
structure. See Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P., 236 F.R.D. at 528–29 (explaining that a Rule 30(b)(6) witness
presents the corporation’s position and must testify regarding information known or reasonably
available to that entity); Monroe v. Monsanto Co., 531 F. Supp. 426, 432–34 (D.S.C. 1982) (recognizing
that affiliated corporations may maintain separate identities and functions despite a common
parent). Finally, TEG has not demonstrated that preparing a corporate representative to address
financing arrangements involving Big Blue or Gateway during the relevant timeframe would impose
an undue burden or is disproportionate to the needs of the case. TEG’s request for a protective
order as to Topic 6 is therefore denied.
iv. 	Capitalization Policies and Adequacy Assessments (Topic 7)
Topic 7 seeks testimony regarding TEG’s policies, formal or informal, regarding
capitalization of subsidiary operating companies and the adequacy of capital to meet resident care
needs, for the Relevant Period, specifically: minimum capitalization requirements; how capitalization
adequacy is assessed; any policies for providing additional capital to Big Blue; and any metrics for
assessing the need for capital at Big Blue. Doc. 94, at 5.
TEG argues that the topic is overbroad because it references “subsidiary operating
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companies,” which could encompass entities beyond those named as defendants in this action.
TEG further contends that the complaint contains no specific allegations concerning capitalization
policies or misuse of accounting practices, and that inquiry into such policies is not relevant to the
wound-care allegations asserted. TEG states the request exceeds the bounds of proportional
discovery and intrudes into confidential financial policies, warranting protection.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding TEG’s policies for capitalizing subsidiary
facilities and assessing whether they had adequate financial resources to meet resident care needs is
directly relevant to the complaint’s allegations that corporate decisions left Big Blue undercapitalized
and unable to maintain adequate staffing. Plaintiff contends that the topic concerns corporate
policies and decision-making regarding capital allocation, not accounting conventions, and may
reveal whether TEG had procedures for evaluating financial distress at subsidiary facilities or
providing additional capital when needed. Plaintiff asserts such testimony may bear on whether
corporate-level financial decisions affected the resources available for staffing and patient care at the
facility.
The Court finds the topic is relevant in part but overly broad as drafted. Plaintiff alleges that
the corporate Defendants exercised centralized control over the Riverbend facility’s financial
resources and that corporate decisions left Big Blue undercapitalized and unable to maintain
adequate staffing. Corporate policies governing how affiliated facilities are capitalized, or how their
financial adequacy is evaluated, may bear on whether corporate decision-making affected the
resources available for facility operations. To the extent Defendants contend the requested
testimony implicates confidential or proprietary financial information, those concerns may be
adequately addressed through the existing protective order governing confidential materials in this
case.
However, the reference to “subsidiary operating companies” expands the scope beyond the
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entities involved in this litigation and could encompass facilities unrelated to the claims at issue.
Discovery into capitalization policies applicable to the entire corporate network is broader than
necessary to explore Plaintiff’s theory of corporate control over Big Blue. Accordingly, Topic 7 is
limited to testimony concerning TEG’s policies for assessing the capitalization or financial adequacy
of Big Blue and, to the extent relevant, Gateway during the relevant period. Subject to this
limitation, the requested testimony falls within the scope of permissible discovery. TEG’s request
for a protective order as to Topic 7 is therefore granted in part.
v. 	Centralized Cash Management and Sweep Accounts (Topic 12)
Topic 12 seeks testimony regarding TEG’s role in centralized cash management, for the
Relevant Period, specifically: any lockbox accounts or sweep accounts; any centralized treasury
functions; how funds flow among affiliated entities including Big Blue; TEG’s access to or control
over funds of the Facility; and any inter-company loans or transfers regarding Big Blue. Doc. 94, at
6-7.
TEG argues that this topic is substantially similar to Topic 11 directed to Big Blue and is
therefore duplicative and cumulative. TEG incorporates by reference Big Blue’s arguments that
such inquiries seek proprietary financial information that is neither relevant nor proportional to the
claims asserted.
Plaintiff argues that testimony regarding centralized cash management systems, including
sweep or lockbox accounts, is not duplicative of testimony sought from Big Blue because the topics
concern different levels of corporate knowledge. Plaintiff contends that Big Blue may testify about
the facility’s experience with these systems, while TEG can explain the corporate policies,
authorization structures, and decision-making processes governing cash transfers. Plaintiff argues
such testimony may demonstrate how corporate financial controls operated and how those controls
affected the facility’s financial resources and operations.
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The Court disagrees with TEG. Although both topics concern centralized cash management
systems, the entities occupy different roles within the alleged corporate structure. Big Blue may
testify regarding the Riverbend facility’s participation in any such systems, but TEG may possess
distinct knowledge concerning the policies, authorization structures, and decision-making processes
governing those systems at the corporate level. Discovery is not cumulative merely because
different entities are asked to testify about related aspects of the same corporate system.
The Court further concludes that testimony regarding centralized cash management
mechanisms is relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations that corporate entities exercised financial control
over the Riverbend facility’s operations and resources. Systems that automatically sweep funds,
control disbursements, or centralize revenue collection may affect the Riverbend facility’s access to
operating capital and therefore bear on the extent of corporate oversight alleged in the complaint.
TEG’s general assertions that the topic implicates proprietary financial information are insufficient
to demonstrate that the discovery sought is disproportionate to the needs of the case, and any
confidentiality concerns may be addressed through the existing protective order. However, to the
extent the topic seeks testimony regarding financing arrangements involving “affiliated entities,” the
Court finds that aspect of the topic to be broader than necessary, as it could encompass entities and
transactions unrelated to the claims at issue. Consistent with the Court’s prior rulings, the topic is
limited to financing arrangements involving Big Blue and, where applicable, Gateway. Accordingly,
TEG’s request for a protective order as to Topic 12 is granted in part.
vi. 	Authority to Bind or Obligate Big Blue Healthcare, LLC (Topic 13)
Topic 13 seeks testimony regarding TEG’s authority to enter into agreements that bind or
obligate Big Blue, for the Relevant Period, specifically: the authority to enter into lease agreements,
loan agreements, or contracts on behalf of Big Blue; the authority to guarantee leases or loans for
Big Blue; the individuals authorized to bind TEG; and any guaranties provided for the benefit of Big
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Blue, Gateway, or ESI. Doc. 94, at 7.
TEG argues that the complaint contains no allegations concerning such agreements or
financing arrangements and that inquiry into these matters exceeds the scope of the pleaded claims.
TEG contends that discovery into contractual authority and guaranties would intrude into
proprietary corporate information without a demonstrated connection to the wound-care allegations
at issue.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding TEG’s authority to enter into agreements
binding Big Blue—including leases, loans, contracts, or guaranties—is relevant to determining the
scope of corporate control over the Riverbend facility’s operations. Plaintiff argues that such
agreements may affect the facility’s financial obligations and operational capacity and therefore bear
on the resources available for staffing and resident care. Plaintiff contends that evidence regarding
the corporate authority to enter into binding agreements may help establish the extent to which
TEG exercised control over the facility.
The Court finds that authority to bind Big Blue to financial obligations—such as leases,
loans, or contractual commitments—may bear on the degree of financial control exercised by TEG
and the obligations imposed on the Riverbend facility. Testimony concerning such authority is
relevant to understanding how corporate decisions affect the facility’s financial resources and
operations.
However, several aspects of the topic extend beyond what is necessary to explore those
issues. In particular, the request for testimony concerning individuals authorized to bind TEG
generally, and guaranties involving entities other than Big Blue or Gateway, would require inquiry
into corporate governance matters unrelated to the facility at issue, and discovery of that breadth
not proportional to the needs of the case. Accordingly, Topic 13 is limited to testimony concerning
TEG’s authority to enter into agreements or guaranties binding or benefiting Big Blue, ESI, and
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Gateway during the relevant period. Subject to this limitation, the topic falls within the scope of
permissible discovery. TEG’s request for a protective order as to Topic 13 is therefore granted in
part.
vii. 	Real Estate Arrangements and Lease Relationships (Topic 14)
Topic 14 seeks testimony regarding TEG’s involvement in real estate arrangements for the
Facility, for the Relevant Period, specifically: any lease guaranties provided by TEG; any real estate
holding companies affiliated with TEG and Big Blue; the relationship between TEG, Little Blue
Health Holdings LLC and Big Blue; and any authority TEG exercises over real estate decisions
involving Big Blue. Doc. 94, at 7.
TEG argues that the complaint contains no allegations relating to real estate, leases, or
property ownership and that such matters bear no relevance to the claims asserted. TEG contends
that broad inquiry into real estate arrangements is not proportional to a case involving alleged
deficiencies in care during a brief period of residency.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding TEG’s involvement in real estate arrangements
for the facility is relevant because lease terms and property-related decisions may influence operating
costs and the facility’s financial resources. Plaintiff argues that corporate authority over leases or
property arrangements may reflect the level of control exercised by TEG over the facility’s
operations and infrastructure, which Plaintiff contends is relevant to the broader allegations of
corporate oversight and decision-making affecting staffing and care.
The Court concludes that this topic falls outside the scope of proportional discovery.
Plaintiff’s claims focus on alleged deficiencies in care and staffing at the facility and on whether
corporate entities exercised control over the Riverbend facility’s operations and financial resources. 13
13 The Court notes that Topic 14 references “Little Blue Health Holdings LLC,” an entity not otherwise
discussed in the parties’ briefing or clearly tied to the allegations in the Complaint. Because the Court grants a
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Although Plaintiff argues that lease terms or property arrangements may affect operating costs, the
connection between real estate ownership structures and the staffing and care issues alleged in the
complaint is too attenuated to justify the discovery sought. Inquiry into property relationships or
lease arrangements would require a corporate representative to prepare testimony concerning real
estate transactions that are several steps removed from the operational decisions at issue in this case.
This imposes a burden disproportionate to the marginal relevance of the information sought.
TEG’s request for a protective order as to Topic 14 is granted.
viii. 	CMS Cost Reports and “Chain Organization” Designation (Topic 16)
Topic 16 seeks testimony regarding the Facility’s 2540 Medicare cost reports for 2022 and
2023 which identify TEG as the “chain organization” with Chain Number HB1576 (Worksheet S-2,
Part I, Lines 44–47),14 specifically: is the reporting in the 2022 and 2023 cost reports accurate, and, if
so, describe what the “chain organization” designation under Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services’ regulations indicates about TEG’s relationship to the Facility; obligations arising from
chain organization designation; whether TEG completes CMS Form 287 (Home Office Cost
Report) for its chain of facilities; what TEG’s understanding is of the meaning of “controlled” for
purposes of chain designation; and how many facilities are included in Chain #HB1576. Doc. 94, at
9.
TEG advances arguments similar to those made by its co-Defendants, contending that the
terms “chain organization” and “controlled” are undefined in the notice and lack reasonable
particularity under Rule 30(b)(6), leaving unclear whether Plaintiff seeks TEG’s interpretation,
CMS’s interpretation, or some other standard. TEG further argues that inquiry into the number of
protective order as to this topic on proportionality grounds, it does not address the role or relevance of that
entity.
14 The home office address is listed as 29222 Rancho Viejo Rd Suite 127, San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675.
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facilities included in the chain is overbroad, as this case concerns only one facility.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding the CMS cost reports and the “chain
organization” designation is relevant to the complaint’s allegations that TEG exercised centralized
control over the facility. Plaintiff argues that the cost reports identify TEG as the chain home office
responsible for central management and administrative services and that the term “chain
organization” is defined in CMS regulations, making it sufficiently particular.
The Court finds that testimony explaining the entities identified in the cost reports and the
corporate functions reflected in those filings may bear on Plaintiff’s theory of corporate control.
However, the topic also seeks testimony regarding TEG’s understanding of regulatory terms such as
“chain organization” and “controlled.” To the extent those subparts call for legal interpretation of
federal regulatory terminology or speculation about how CMS defines such terms, they exceed the
proper scope of Rule 30(b)(6) testimony. See Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P., 236 F.R.D. at 528–29
(explaining that a Rule 30(b)(6) witness testifies regarding the corporation’s knowledge of facts
reasonably available to the organization and does not provide personal opinions); Nazario, 2026 WL
411823, at *8 (distinguishing between testimony regarding underlying facts bearing on legal issues
and questions calling for legal conclusions).
The Court further finds that inquiry into the number of facilities included within the
identified chain is broader than necessary and disproportionate to the needs of this case, which
concerns a single facility. Accordingly, Topic 16 is limited to testimony concerning the preparation
and contents of the CMS cost reports, the entities identified in those reports, and the corporate
relationships or administrative functions reflected in those filings as they relate to Big Blue. Subject
to this limitation, the topic seeks information within the scope of permissible discovery. TEG’s
request for a protective order as to Topic 16 is granted in part.
ix. 	Medicare Cost Reports For 2022 And 2023 (Topic 17)
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Topic 17 seeks testimony regarding the Riverbend facility’s 2540 Medicare cost reports for
2022 and 2023 which identify TEG as the “chain organization” and report consecutive net operating
losses in 2022 and 2023 (Worksheet G-3, Line 31), specifically: whether the 2022 and 2023 cost
reports are accurate, and, if so, describe how facility operating losses and fund balance were reported
to TEG; whether these metrics appeared in board materials or investor presentations; disclosures in
SEC 10-K or 10-Q filings regarding subsidiary financial condition; actions TEG took in response to
facility financial deterioration; and capital contributions made or considered. Doc. 94, at 9.
TEG argues that the two-year timeframe is overbroad given the limited period of the
decedent’s stay and that the topic intrudes into broad corporate and public-company financial
matters. TEG further contends that the complaint contains no allegations concerning SEC
disclosures, investor communications, or improper financial reporting, and that generalized
undercapitalization allegations do not justify such expansive inquiry.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding Big Blue’s operating losses in 2022 and 2023 and
any related reports, board materials, SEC disclosures, and corporate responses is relevant to
establishing systemic corporate oversight and knowledge of the facility’s deteriorating financial
condition. Plaintiff argues that a multi-year timeframe is necessary to demonstrate patterns of
financial decline and staffing reductions that cannot be captured in a short snapshot surrounding the
decedent’s stay. Plaintiff contends that evidence showing whether TEG monitored the Riverbend
facility’s financial situation and what actions it took—or failed to take—in response bears directly on
the allegations of corporate control, knowledge of operational deficiencies, and the broader claim of
systemic negligence.
The Court concludes that the topic seeks relevant information in part but is overly broad as
drafted. Testimony regarding the Riverbend facility’s reported operating losses, the manner in
which those losses were communicated to TEG, and any corporate actions taken in response may
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bear on whether corporate leadership monitored the facility’s financial condition and how it
responded to financial deterioration. Testimony concerning the financial information reflected in
the CMS cost reports and corporate responses to the Riverbend facility’s financial condition falls
within the scope of permissible discovery.
However, the topic also seeks testimony regarding investor communications, board
materials, and disclosures in SEC Forms 10-K and 10-Q. The complaint does not assert claims
relating to securities disclosures or investor reporting, and inquiry into public-company disclosure
practices would extend discovery into corporate governance and investor relations matters that are
only tangentially connected to the issues in this case. Requiring a corporate representative to
prepare testimony on such matters would impose a burden disproportionate to the needs of the
case.
The Court also agrees that the two-year timeframe, as drafted, is broader than necessary.
The Court limits the topic to the year 2023, which provides sufficient context to evaluate the
facility’s financial condition without imposing undue burden.
Accordingly, Topic 17 is limited to testimony concerning the financial condition of Big Blue
as reflected in the 2023 CMS cost report, the reporting of that financial condition within the
corporate structure, and any actions taken by TEG in response to the facility’s financial
performance. Subject to these limitations, TEG’s request for a protective order as to Topic 17 is
granted in part.
It is therefore ordered that TEG’s motion for protective order (Doc. 101) is granted in
part and denied in part as set forth above.
e. 	Ignite Medical Resort Rainbow Boulevard, LLC’s Motion for Protective
Order 15
15 The Court notes that multiple Rule 30(b)(6) topics directed to the Ignite Defendants reference “the time
period of the sixty days prior to Resident’s stay at the Facility through the duration of her stay.” As discussed
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The Court next addresses Ignite Medical Resort Rainbow Boulevard, LLC (“Ignite
Medical”). The decedent was admitted to Ignite Medical, a skilled nursing facility, on August 29,
2023. She remained there until September 7, 2023, when she was transferred to KU. Ignite Medical
challenges certain topics in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Rule 30(b)(6) Notice (Doc. 95), which
concern staffing oversight, financial performance, corporate relationships, and operational decision-
making during the Relevant Period. The specific topics at issue are Topic Nos. 4, 14, 16, 17, and 18.
The Court addresses each disputed topic below.
i. 	HPPD Targets and Staffing Performance Metrics (Topic 4)
Topic 4 seeks testimony regarding the exact HPPD (hours per patient day) target or range the
Facility was required or expected to maintain, during the Relevant Period, specifically: who
established this target; and; how actual HPPD compared to the target during Resident’s stay. Doc.
95, at 3.
Ignite Medical contends that the topic extends beyond the proper scope of a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition and would require preparation of a corporate representative to testify regarding detailed
hours-per-patient-day metrics established by Ignite Medical. According to Ignite Medical, such
testimony would require highly particularized operational knowledge more appropriately addressed
by a fact witness, such as the Director of Nursing, rather than a corporate representative.
Plaintiff responds that Ignite Medical’s objection misunderstands the role of a Rule 30(b)(6)
corporate representative and that the requested testimony is central to Plaintiff’s theory that the
facility was inadequately staffed in a manner that contributed to the decedent’s deterioration during
above, the decedent’s residency at the Ignite facility occurred after her discharge from Riverbend and is
reflected in the record as August 29, 2023, through September 7, 2023. See, e.g., Doc. 97, at 1. For purposes
of this Order, the Court construes this phrase, as applied to the Ignite Defendants, to mean the sixty-day
period preceding August 29, 2023—i.e., June 30, 2023—through September 7, 2023. Unless otherwise noted,
this period of time will be referenced as the “Relevant Period” with respect to the Ignite Defendants.
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her stay. Plaintiff contends that Topic 4 seeks testimony regarding Ignite Medical’s hours-per-
patient-per-day (HPPD) staffing targets or benchmarks—matters that concern the facility’s
institutional knowledge, policies, and decision-making rather than the observations of an individual
fact witness. Plaintiff argues that while a director of nursing may testify regarding day-to-day
staffing implementation, a corporate representative must testify regarding why particular staffing
targets existed, how those targets were established, and whether they were influenced or constrained
by corporate policies or directives.
Plaintiff further asserts that the record contains evidence supporting these allegations,
including the Ignite Facility Assessment, signed by the CEO of Ignite Team Partners, which
identifies specific staffing-hour targets based on projected census levels, and internal
communications indicating that corporate personnel were involved in recruiting staff for the facility.
According to Plaintiff, these materials demonstrate that staffing levels were not determined solely at
the facility level, but were instead shaped by corporate-level policies and oversight, and therefore
support the need for Rule 30(b)(6) testimony regarding how HPPD targets were established and
implemented during the relevant period.
Plaintiff also points to financial information reflected in the Facility’s CMS cost reports,
which Plaintiff contends further demonstrates that Ignite Medical’s operations were influenced or
constrained by corporate-level financial decisions, such as those from Ignite Team. Specifically,
Plaintiff notes that the Ignite facility reported paying substantial management fees to its corporate
parent—approximately $624,800 in 2022 and $605,000 in 2023—while CMS disallowed significant
portions of those amounts as excessive or unallowable—approximately $250,715 in 2022 and
$252,609 in 2023. Plaintiff argues that these figures support its allegation that corporate financial
arrangements affected the resources available to the Ignite facility and, in turn, its ability to maintain
adequate staffing levels.
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The Court disagrees with Ignite Medical. Rule 30(b)(6) requires a corporate entity to
designate a representative prepared to testify regarding matters known or reasonably available to the
organization, including the entity’s policies, decision-making processes, and institutional knowledge.
In this case, staffing benchmarks such as HPPD targets fall within that category. Although
individual employees may possess personal knowledge regarding day-to-day staffing decisions, the
purpose of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is to obtain testimony regarding the entity’s understanding of
its own policies and operational standards. Ignite Medical cannot avoid that obligation by
characterizing the subject matter as operational detail more suited to a fact witness.
The Court further concludes that testimony regarding HPPD targets is relevant to Plaintiff’s
claims concerning staffing adequacy at the Ignite facility. Evidence regarding the staffing
benchmarks Ignite Medical is expected to maintain, the individuals or entities responsible for
establishing those benchmarks, and the relationship between those targets and actual staffing levels
may bear directly on whether the facility operated with adequate staffing during the relevant period.
Although the decedent’s stay lasted approximately ten days, the defined time frame extending sixty
days prior to admission through the duration of the stay is reasonably necessary to establish the
staffing framework in place at the time of decedent’s residency and whether any departures from
establish benchmarks occurred during her stay. Because the topic is limited to that defined period
and seeks information within the scope of Rule 26, Ignite Medical has not demonstrated that
preparing a corporate representative to address these matters would impose an undue burden.
Ignite Medical’s request for a protective order as to Topic 4 is therefore denied.
ii. 	Incident Reports and Risk Reports Concerning Resident (Topic 14)
Topic 14 seeks for a corporate representative to describe all incident reports, risk reports, or
RYTES reports completed regarding the decedent during her stay, specifically: what triggered each
report; the factual findings contained in each report(s); and who completed each report. Doc. 95, at
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5.
Ignite Medical asserts that follow-up actions documented in such reports constitute peer
review or quality assurance materials protected from disclosure. Ignite Medical objects to producing
a corporate representative to testify regarding those aspects of the topic but represents that it does
not object to providing testimony regarding the existence of incident or RYTES reports completed
during the decedent’s stay, including what triggered each report and who completed it.
Plaintiff argues that the Ignite facility’s reliance on Kansas peer review privilege is misplaced.
Plaintiff contends that the privilege protects only deliberative peer review materials, not factual
documents such as incident reports that record what occurred and what actions were taken.
Plaintiff further argues that the privilege assertion is procedurally deficient because Ignite Medical
failed to provide a privilege log or identify specific documents supporting the claim. Plaintiff
maintains that blanket assertions of privilege directed at a Rule 30(b)(6) topic are improper and
premature, and that any legitimate privilege concerns are more appropriately addressed through
contemporaneous objections to specific questions during the deposition.
The Court concludes that the objection is overbroad. The Kansas peer review privilege
protects the deliberative processes of peer review committees but does not shield the underlying
factual information concerning an incident. See K.S.A. § 65-4915; Adams v. St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
264 Kan. 144, 156–59, 955 P.2d 1169 (1998). Testimony regarding the existence of incident reports,
the circumstances that triggered their creation, the identity of the individuals who prepared them,
and the factual events recorded in those reports concern factual matters rather than protected peer
review deliberations, and such information falls within the scope of discoverable facts that may be
addressed through Rule 30(b)(6) testimony. The Court construes the Topic’s references to “factual
findings,” to include objective factual information reflected in the reports, but not evaluative
conclusions, assessments, or determinations generated through the peer review process.
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Ignite Medical likewise cannot avoid preparing a corporate representative by asserting a
blanket privilege objection to the topic as a whole. Privilege must be asserted in response to specific
questions that seek protected information, and the propriety of such objections can be addressed
during the deposition if necessary. McBride v. Medicalodges, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 581, 587 (D. Kan. 2008)
(holding that blanket privilege objections to Rule 30(b)(6) topics are premature and that privilege
objections should be raised to specific questions during the deposition). To the extent the topic
seeks testimony regarding internal peer review committee deliberations, evaluations, or
recommendations generated through a protected quality assurance process, Ignite Medical may
assert appropriate objections at that time.16
Accordingly, the corporate representative must be prepared to testify regarding the factual
circumstances surrounding the incident or RYTES reports concerning the decedent, but need not
disclose privileged peer review deliberations or recommendations. Ignite Medical’s request for a
protective order as to Topic 14 is granted in part.
iii. 	Management Fees Paid to Ignite Team Partners (Topic 16)
Topic 16 seeks testimony from a corporate representative regarding (1) whether
management fees were paid to Ignite Team Partners in 2022 and 2023, and if not, explain; and (2)
whether the Facility Administrator had any input into or ability to negotiate the management fee
amount. Doc. 95, at 6.
Ignite Medical objects to the form of Topic 16.17 Subject to and without waiving that
16 If a dispute arises regarding the propriety of an objection, the parties shall proceed with the deposition and
preserve the issue for later review. The Court will address any such disputes, if necessary, after the deposition
based on the transcript.
17 Ignite Medical’s “form” objection to a Rule 30(b)(6) topic is not a recognized basis to refuse or limit
preparation of a corporate representative. Objections to the form of questioning or the responsiveness of the
answer are properly raised during the deposition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(c)(2). See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2) (requiring objections to be stated concisely and in a nonargumentative manner); see
also D. Kan. Deposition Guidelines. To the extent Ignite Medical seeks to narrow or reframe the scope of
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objection, Ignite Medical represents that it will prepare a corporate representative to testify regarding
how, if at all, management fees paid to Ignite Team Partners in 2022 and 2023 affected funds
available for nursing staff wages or additional staffing, and whether the Facility Administrator had
any input into or ability to negotiate the management fee amount.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding the structure and operation of management fees
and related-party arrangements is necessary to understand how those fees affected the Ignite
facility’s financial resources and staffing levels. Plaintiff argues that the Ignite facility cannot
meaningfully testify about the “impact” of management fees while refusing to address their form or
structure, because the structure of those arrangements determines how funds are allocated and what
incentives exist regarding operational costs such as staffing.
Plaintiff further contends that Ignite Medical operated within a corporate structure in which
Ignite Team Partners provided management and administrative services, and that payments between
those entities reflect that relationship. Plaintiff further points to Ignite Medical’s cost reports and
related-party transactions as evidence that management fees and payments to affiliated entities were
substantial and partially disallowed by federal regulators, which Plaintiff contends supports discovery
into how those financial arrangements were structured and how they affected the facility’s
operations.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Testimony concerning the existence and operation of
management fees paid to an affiliated entity may provide relevant context for evaluating the facility’s
financial condition and staffing resources during the period at issue. Ignite Medical’s attempt to
limit testimony to the impact of management fees while excluding inquiry into the structure of those
arrangements is unpersuasive. The effect of a financial obligation on a facility’s resources cannot be
Topic 16 through a “form” objection, that approach is improper.
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meaningfully assessed without understanding how that obligation was structured and administered.
Because the topic is limited to a defined category of payments during a discrete timeframe, the
burden of preparing a corporate representative to address these matters is not disproportionate to
the needs of the case. Ignite Medical’s request for a protective order as to Topic 16 is therefore
denied.
iv. 	“Notes & Loans Payable (Short Term)” Reflected on CMS Forms 2540
(Topic 17)
Other Long-Term Liabilities” Reflected on CMS Forms 2540 (Topic
18)
Topics 17 and 18 each seek testimony regarding information contained within the Ignite
facility's CMS Forms. Ignite Medical raises substantially similar objections to each — that the topic
seeks a detailed breakdown of short-term debts reflected in financial records that fall outside the
proper scope of a 30(b)(6) deposition and that the request for testimony regarding long-term
liabilities recorded in financial documents exceeds the scope of the claims asserted.
Plaintiff collectively responds that Topics 17 and 18 seek related categories of financial
information that are central to his allegation that Ignite Medical was undercapitalized and unable to
maintain adequate staffing during the relevant period. With respect to Topic 17, Plaintiff argues that
testimony regarding Ignite Medical’s debts and liabilities may reveal whether the facility lacked
sufficient operating capital and whether corporate financial decisions or related-party transactions
contributed to that condition. Plaintiff contends that such information bears directly on whether
the facility’s financial structure limited its ability to support adequate staffing levels.
With respect to Topic 18, Plaintiff argues that CMS cost report data reflects the facility’s
financial condition, staffing metrics, and operational resources, and that testimony is necessary to
explain how those reports were prepared, what information they contain, and how the reported
figures relate to the facility’s ability to provide care. Plaintiff contends that cost reports are routinely
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relied upon in nursing home litigation and may be explored through deposition testimony for that
purpose. The Court addresses each topic in turn.
Topic 17 seeks testimony from a corporate representative regarding Ignite Medical reporting
of “Notes & loans payable (short term)” on CMS Form 2540 as of December 31, 2022, and
December 31, 2023, including: whether the reporting is accurate; whether any of these obligations
were owed to Ignite Team Partners or affiliated entities; and the circumstances giving rise to the loan
and the terms of any related notes. Doc. 95, at 6.
The Court disagrees with Ignite Medical’s argument that Ignite Medical’s debts and liabilities
are unrelated to the issues in this case. Plaintiff alleges that Ignite Medical was undercapitalized and
unable to maintain adequate staffing as a result of corporate financial decisions. Plaintiff also points
to specific figures that show a significant decline in the Ignite facility’s staffing metrics (9.3% FTE
decline, 25.7% admission decline, 89% collapse in the facility’s permanent contract RN hiring).
Financial obligations reflected in the facility’s CMS cost reports are relevant to that theory and may
bear on whether the facility carried significant liabilities, whether those obligations ran to affiliated
entities, and how such financial arrangements affected available operating capital. Testimony
explaining the financial entries may therefore provide relevant context regarding Ignite Medical’s
financial condition during the period surrounding the decedent’s stay.
The topic is also appropriately narrow. It is tied to specific line items in Ignite Medical’s
own regulatory filings rather than a broad inquiry into the facility’s finances. Preparing a corporate
representative to explain those entries and the circumstances surrounding any related loans does not
impose a burden disproportionate to the needs of the case. Accordingly, Ignite Medical’s request
for a protective order as to Topic 17 is denied.
Topic 18 seeks testimony from a corporate representative regarding Ignite Medical reporting
of “Other long-term liabilities” on CMS Form 2540 as of December 31, 2022, and December 31,
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2023, including: whether the reporting is accurate; whether any obligations were owed to Ignite
Team Partners or affiliated entities; and the circumstances requiring the loan and the terms of the
note. Doc. 95, at 6.
The Court finds that testimony explaining the nature of the liabilities reported in the Ignite
facility’s CMS cost reports may therefore provide relevant context regarding the facility’s financial
condition during the period surrounding the decedent’s stay. The topic is also narrowly tied to
specific financial entries in the Ignite facility’s own regulatory filings rather than a broad exploration
of the facility’s finances. Preparing a corporate representative to explain the liabilities reflected in
those reports and the circumstances surrounding them does not impose a burden disproportionate
to the needs of the case. Accordingly, Ignite Medical’s request for a protective order as to Topic 18
is denied.
Ignite Medical’s motion for protective order (Doc. 98) is granted in part and denied
in part as set forth above.
f. 	Ignite Team Partners, LLC’s Motion for Protective Order
The Court next addresses Ignite Team Partners, LLC (“Ignite Team”). Ignite Team is the
corporate parent and management company that is alleged to have exercised centralized control over
the operations of Ignite Medical, including staffing and financial decisions. Ignite Team challenges
Topics 7, 9, 15, 17, 18, 19, and 21 in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Rule 30(b)(6) Notice (Doc. 96).
These topics concern Ignite Team’s access to operational dashboards and reports, management fees,
contractual relationships with Ignite Medical, affiliated vendor relationships, CMS cost report
entries, and staffing levels. The Court addresses each disputed topic below.
i. 	Dashboards, Reports, and Operational Monitoring Systems (Topic 7)
Topic 7 seeks testimony, for the Relevant period, describing dashboards, reports, or systems
through which Ignite Team could access Ignite Medical’s census, revenue, PPD, SBT%, staffing
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levels, or agency utilization; and to identify all personnel from Ignite Team with access to such
systems. Doc. 96, at 5.
Ignite Team does not object to providing testimony regarding how staffing levels are
determined. It contends, however, that the topic improperly seeks detailed information about all
dashboards, reports, or systems through which data may be accessed, and that identifying all
personnel with system access goes beyond what the claims require. Ignite Team argues that the
manner in which information is accessed and the identities of individuals with system access are not
relevant to the claims asserted and render the topic overly broad.
Plaintiff responds that Topic 7 seeks relevant testimony regarding the platforms, dashboards,
and reporting systems Ignite Team used to monitor staffing levels at the Ignite facility. Plaintiff
further contends that existing documents indicate corporate personnel actively received and
monitored staffing reports and performance metrics, including daily staffing reports emailed to
Ignite Team personnel such as Brandy Chuku and Stephen Smith, labor reports reflecting tracking
of hours-per-patient-day (HPPD) metrics, and internal communications referencing performance
benchmarks such as “SBT” percentages. According to Plaintiff, this evidence demonstrates that
staffing data was monitored at the corporate level through defined reporting mechanisms.
Plaintiff argues that because Ignite Team exercised centralized oversight as the management
company, the systems through which it tracked staffing data—and the personnel who had access to
those systems—are directly relevant to demonstrating how corporate oversight operated in practice.
Plaintiff contends that Rule 30(b)(6) testimony is therefore appropriate to explain what systems were
used, what data was tracked, how those metrics were generated, and how the information was
reviewed or utilized by corporate management in overseeing facility staffing.
The Court concludes that testimony regarding the systems through which Ignite Team
monitored facility performance metrics is within the scope of permissible discovery. Plaintiff alleges
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that Ignite Team exercised centralized oversight of staffing and operational performance at Ignite
Medical. If Ignite Team tracked metrics such as census levels, staffing hours, or agency utilization
through centralized reporting platforms, testimony describing those systems and the data they
provided may bear on the extent of corporate oversight and monitoring. A Rule 30(b)(6) deposition
is an appropriate mechanism for obtaining testimony regarding systems used, the metrics they
tracked, and how information was made available to and utilized by corporate personnel.
The Court agrees, however, that requiring Ignite Team to identify every individual with
potential access to such systems would extend beyond what is reasonably necessary to explore the
relevant issues. Corporate reporting systems may be accessible to numerous personnel whose access
has little connection to operational decision-making or staffing oversight. Accordingly, Topic 7 is
limited to testimony describing the dashboards, reports, or systems used to monitor facility
performance metrics and the roles or positions of Ignite Team personnel (such as corporate
leadership, cluster management, or finance and operations personnel) responsible for reviewing or
utilizing that information. Ignite Team’s request for a protective order as to Topic 7 is therefore
granted in part consistent with this limitation.
ii. 	Management Fees Paid by the Facility (Topic 9)
Contracts and Management Agreement Terms (Topic 15)
Topic 9 seeks testimony describing all management fees Ignite Medical paid to Ignite Team,
for the Relevant Period, and how these amounts were calculated. Doc. 96, at 5. Topic 15 requests
that, during the Relevant Period, a corporate representative identify all contracts between Ignite
Team and the Ignite facility and describe the terms of the management agreement and between
Ignite Team and the facility, specifically: (i) the method for calculating the management fee; and (ii)
the services included in the management fee. Doc. 96, at 7.
Ignite Team objects to both Topics 9 and 15 as written on the grounds that it is irrelevant,
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overbroad, and unduly burdensome. Ignite Team represents that it will prepare a corporate
representative to testify regarding the terms of the management agreement, including the services
provided in exchange for the management fee and whether payment of management fees affected
funds available for staffing. Ignite Team contends that it should not be required to provide
testimony detailing all management, consulting, administrative, royalty, other fees, or the precise
amounts paid monthly, because such information is not relevant to the claims asserted.
Plaintiff collectively responds to both topics arguing that testimony regarding the
management agreement between Ignite Team and Ignite Medical, including the services provided
and the fees charged, is directly relevant to the complaint’s allegations that corporate financial
arrangements affected Ignite Medical’s ability to maintain adequate staffing. Plaintiff argues that
Ignite Team, as the entity that structured and received the management fees, must be prepared to
testify not only about the existence of those fees but also about their amounts and calculation
methods, because those details are necessary to evaluate how the agreement operated and how the
payments may have affected the facility’s financial resources.
Plaintiff further points to financial information reflected in the Facility’s CMS cost reports,
which Plaintiff contends demonstrates that Ignite Team imposed substantial management fees on
the facility during the relevant period. Specifically, Plaintiff notes that the facility reported paying
management fees of approximately $624,800 in 2022 and $605,000 in 2023, and that CMS
disallowed approximately $250,715 in 2022 and $252,609 in 2023—representing a disallowance rate
of roughly 40% to 42%. Plaintiff argues that these figures support its contention that the fee
structure may have been excessive and that testimony is necessary to explain how the fees were
calculated, what services were provided, and how those payments affected the Facility’s available
operating resources.
The Court is not persuaded by Ignite Team’s arguments. Plaintiff alleges that corporate
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financial arrangements affected the Ignite facility’s operational resources and its ability to maintain
adequate staffing levels. Management fees paid to an affiliated entity may bear directly on that
allegation because such payments could influence the funds available for staffing and other
operational expenses. Plaintiff’s response reflects that the facility paid substantial management fees,
a significant portion of which was disallowed by CMS as excessive, which further supports inquiry
into how those fees were calculated and what funds were transferred. For similar reasons, testimony
regarding the terms of the management agreement, including the services provided in exchange for
those fees, may provide necessary context to evaluate the nature and purpose of the payments.
Testimony limited to the existence of a management agreement, without inquiry into how the fees
were calculated or the magnitude of the payments, would provide little meaningful context for
evaluating those allegations.
Ignite Team’s proposal to permit testimony regarding only the “terms” of management fees
while excluding inquiry into the amount or calculation of those fees is not workable. The effect of a
financial obligation on a facility’s resources cannot be meaningfully assessed without understanding
how the obligation was structured and the amount of funds transferred pursuant to it. Accordingly,
Topics 9 and 15 seek relevant discovery concerning the structure, calculation, and implementation of
management fees. Ignite Team’s request for a protective order as to Topics 9 and 15 are therefore
denied.
iii. 	Affiliated Vendor Relationships – Spark Therapy LLC (Topic 17)
Topic 17 seeks testimony regarding Ignite Team’s ownership interest in, control over, or
common ownership with Spark Therapy LLC, for the Relevant Period, specifically: when this
relationship was established; and the business purpose for requiring the Facility to obtain all physical
therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy services exclusively from Spark Therapy LLC, if
any. Doc. 96, at 6-8.
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Ignite Team objects to Topic 17 as irrelevant, overbroad, and unduly burdensome. Ignite
Team contends that this case concerns the treatment and monitoring of a wound allegedly present
prior to the decedent’s admission and does not involve occupational, physical, or speech therapy
services and that inquiry into matters related to those services is not relevant to the claims asserted
and exceeds the scope of proportional discovery.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding therapy service arrangements is relevant because
payments to related entities for therapy services may have affected the Ignite facility’s financial
resources and overall staffing capacity. Plaintiff points to payments reflected in the Facility’s CMS
cost reports showing that Ignite facility paid Spark Therapy LLC approximately $2,100,979 in 2022
and $1,862,943 in 2023, and that CMS disallowed approximately $337,606 in 2022 and $307,279 in
2023 of those charges as excessive. Plaintiff contends that these figures support an inference that
the therapy service fees may have been excessive and that corporate financial arrangements reduced
the facility’s available resources, contributing to understaffing.
The Court concludes that limited testimony regarding the corporate relationship between
Ignite Team and Spark Therapy is within the scope of permissible discovery subject to a limitation
described below. Plaintiff alleges that Spark Therapy’s financial arrangement affected Ignite
Medical’s operational resources during the relevant period. If Ignite Team possessed an ownership
interest in Spark Therapy and required Ignite Medical to utilize that entity for therapy services, such
an arrangement could bear on whether payments to affiliated entities affected the facility’s financial
resources. The cost reports reflect that the facility made substantial payments to Spark Therapy, a
portion of which was disallowed by CMS as excessive, which supports inquiry into whether those
payments affected the resources available for facility operations. Testimony concerning the
existence and structure of that relationship may therefore provide relevant context regarding the
financial arrangements between the entities and their effect on the facility’s resources.
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The Court agrees, however, that the topic should not extend to the details of therapy
services provided to residents. The allegations in this case concern wound care and monitoring
rather than the provision of therapy services, and discovery into the clinical aspects of those services
would exceed the scope of proportional discovery. Accordingly, testimony under Topic 17 is limited
to (1) nature and structure of Ignite Team’s ownership interest in or control over Spark Therapy; (2)
what that relationship was established; (3) the contractual or financial arrangements governing Ignite
Medical’s use of Spark Therapy; and (4) the business purpose for any exclusive-provider
requirement. Ignite Team’s request for a protective order as to Topic 17 is therefore granted in
part.
iv. 	CMS Cost Report – “Due from Other Funds” (Topic 18)
Topic 18 seeks testimony regarding the Ignite facility’s report of “Due from Other Funds”
on its 2022 and 2023 CMS Forms 2540, including: whether the reporting is accurate; which affiliated
entities owed funds; when the receivables arose; whether they were collected; and how this
intercompany receivable position affected the Facility’s cash available for staffing and operations
during the decedent’s stay. Doc. 96, at 9.
Ignite Team contends that the topic extends beyond the proper scope of a corporate
representative deposition and seeks detailed financial information unrelated to the claims at issue.
Ignite Team maintains that the only relevant inquiry is whether any “due from other funds” or
intercompany receivable position affected staffing or operations, and that such testimony can be
provided without requiring explanation of the nature and source of the funds, the identity of entities
involved, or the timing of receivables.
Plaintiff responds that testimony regarding intercompany receivables and “due from other
funds” entries is necessary to evaluate whether intercompany financial arrangements affected Ignite
Medical’s operations and staffing. Plaintiff argues that Ignite Team cannot meaningfully address the
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impact of such receivables without explaining their underlying details, including the nature and
source of the funds, which entities owed them, and when the receivables arose or were collected.
Although Plaintiff does not identify specific dollar amounts associated with these entries, Plaintiff
contends that the amounts reflected in the facility’s cost reports and financial statements represent
intercompany balances that could have affected available operating capital. Plaintiff contends these
facts are necessary to determine whether intercompany financial flows reduced the facility’s available
operating capital and therefore bear directly on the allegation that corporate financial practices
contributed to understaffing.
The Court is not persuaded by Ignite Team’s proposed limitation. On CMS cost reports,
“due from other funds” entries reflect amounts owed to the facility that may not yet be available for
operational use. Plaintiff alleges that corporate financial practices and intercompany financial
arrangements affected Ignite Medical’s operational resources and staffing levels. A facility carrying a
significant intercompany receivable may have had less cash available for operational expenses,
including staffing. 	Testimony explaining the nature of those receivables, the entities involved, and
the circumstances under which they arose may therefore provide relevant context regarding Ignite
Medical’s financial condition.
The topic is narrowly tied to specific financial entries appearing in Ignite Medical’s CMS cost
reports rather than a broad exploration of the facility’s finances. Preparing a corporate
representative to explain those entries and the circumstances surrounding them does not impose a
burden disproportionate to the needs of the case. Ignite Team’s request for a protective order as to
Topic 18 is therefore denied.
v. 	CMS Cost Report – Net Loss and Management Fees (Topic 19)
Topic 19 seeks testimony regarding whether Ignite Medical reported and sustained net losses
on patient care operations in 2022 and 2023 while simultaneously paying management fees to Ignite
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Team, and whether Ignite Team considered reducing management fees to allow the facility to
increase staffing or improve patient care. Doc. 96, at 9.
Ignite Team objects to Topic 19 as irrelevant, overbroad, and unduly burdensome. Plaintiff
responds that Ignite Team’s objection is unsupported and conclusory. Plaintiff argues that Ignite
Team provides no factual explanation, legal authority, or evidence demonstrating that the topic is
irrelevant or unduly burdensome. Plaintiff contends that because the party seeking a protective
order bears the burden of showing that discovery is improper, Ignite Team’s failure to substantiate
its objection means the request should not be limited and the topic should proceed.
Substantively, the Court finds that Topic 19 seeks relevant discovery. Plaintiff alleges that
corporate financial arrangements, including management fees paid to Ignite Team, affected Ignite
Medical’s operational resources and contributed to inadequate staffing. The topic bears on
Plaintiff’s theory that corporate financial decisions affected the resources available for staffing and
resident care. Testimony concerning whether Ignite Team considered modifying those fees in
response to Ignite Medical’s financial condition may shed light on the degree of financial oversight
exercised by the management entity.
Procedurally, the Court concludes that Ignite Team has not met its burden to justify a
protective order. See Layne Christensen Co., 271 F.R.D. at 244 (stating the burden is on the party
seeking a protective order). Ignite Team’s objections that the topic is irrelevant and unduly
burdensome are conclusory and unsupported. Ignite Team has not identified any specific burden
associated with preparing a corporate representative to address the Ignite facility’s financial
performance and the management fees it received.
Because the topic concerns a discrete financial issue during a defined time period, the Court
finds that preparing a corporate representative to address these matters does not impose a burden
disproportionate to the needs of the case. Ignite Team’s request for a protective order as to Topic
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19 is therefore denied.
vi. 	Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Staffing Levels (Topic 21)
Topic 21 seeks testimony regarding the Facility’s reported Full-Time Equivalent (FTE)
staffing levels for 2022 (72.21 FTE) and 2023 (65.49 FTE), including: whether the reporting is
accurate; Ignite Team’s role in determining FTE levels; how those levels were calculated relative to
certified beds and census; and whether Ignite Team established FTE targets or limits. Doc. 96, at 9.
Ignite Team objects to Topic 21 as irrelevant, overbroad, and unduly burdensome. Ignite
Team contends that the case concerns the treatment and monitoring of an existing wound during
the decedent’s August 29 through September 7, 2023 stay, and that inquiry into facility-wide FTE
staffing levels for 2022 and much of 2023 is not relevant to the period stated. Ignite Team further
states it has agreed to produce a corporate representative to describe the method used to determine
required nursing staff levels during the decedent’s stay, including whether staffing decisions were
based on census, resident acuity, two-person assists, budget constraints, and how the decedent’s
specific care needs were incorporated. Ignite Team argues that broader inquiry into historical FTE
calculations is unnecessary and should be limited.
Plaintiff responds that discovery regarding FTE staffing levels beyond the dates of the
decedent’s stay is relevant because the complaint alleges systemic understaffing rather than isolated
negligence during a brief period. Plaintiff argues that examining staffing levels over a broader
timeframe is necessary to determine whether staffing deficiencies reflected an ongoing pattern tied
to corporate financial decisions and management practices. Plaintiff further contends that courts in
similar nursing home negligence cases have permitted discovery spanning months surrounding the
relevant events to evaluate staffing trends and corporate oversight, and that such longitudinal
staffing data is necessary to assess whether staffing conditions deteriorated over time.
The Court concludes that the requested testimony falls within the scope of discovery
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provided there is a narrower temporal limitation. Plaintiff alleges that the Ignite facility suffered
from systemic understaffing tied to corporate financial and management decisions. Where such
allegations are asserted, discovery limited solely to the precise dates of the decedent’s stay would
provide little insight into whether staffing levels reflected an isolated circumstance or part of a
broader pattern. See Murray, LLC, 2020 WL 1819884, at *5-6 (approving a six-month temporal
scope as “not facially objectionable” and “quite conservative” where plaintiff alleged systemic
understaffing). Information regarding staffing levels over a reasonable period surrounding the
decedent’s stay may therefore be relevant to evaluating whether staffing conditions were chronically
inadequate. However, the Court agrees that a multi-year timeframe exceeds what is reasonably
necessary to explore these issues, particularly given the limited duration of the decedent’s stay.
Consistent with Murray, the appropriate scope is a defined period reasonably proximate to the
decedent’s residency rather than multiple reporting years.
The topic also concerns staffing metrics reflected in the Ignite facility’s regulatory cost
reports rather than day-to-day staffing decisions for individual residents. Testimony explaining how
those Full-Time Equivalent figures were calculated, whether the reporting was accurate, and whether
Ignite Team established staffing targets or limits may shed light on the Ignite facility’s overall
staffing framework and the role corporate management played in determining staffing levels.
However, the Topic is limited to the six months prior to the decedent’s residency. With this
limitation, preparing a corporate representative to address these matters does not impose a burden
disproportionate to the needs of the case. Ignite Team’s request for a protective order as to Topic
21 is therefore granted in part.
It is therefore ordered that Ignite Team’s motion for protective order (Doc. 97) is
granted in part and denied in part.
IV. 	The Case Schedule
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The Court is now in the position to move this case back on track. In a prior order, the
Court suspended the existing case deadlines, pending resolution of the parties’ discovery disputes.
See Doc. 81. The motions addressed herein represent the final discovery-related matters requiring
resolution before the case may proceed under a revised schedule. Given the posture of the case and
that the parties have not conferred on any case schedule, the Court will not make any final
scheduling determinations at this time.
Under the circumstances, the Court orders the parties to confer and submit a proposed
scheduling order and joint status report by April 24, 2026. The joint status report shall identify any
outstanding issues and summarize all remaining discovery to be completed. The parties may note
any points of disagreement in the proposed scheduling order and include a brief explanation of their
respective positions. They should also provide proposed dates for the corporate representatives to
be designated and the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions to be completed. Given the length of time this case
has been pending and the amount of discovery already conducted, the Court is not inclined to enter
a lengthy schedule. The parties should take this guidance into account when drafting their proposed
schedule. Upon review of the joint status report and proposed scheduling order, the Court will
either enter an amended schedule or set a scheduling conference.
V. 	Conclusion
To summarize, the Court has carefully reviewed each challenged Rule 30(b)(6) topic and the
parties’ respective arguments regarding relevance, proportionality, and reasonable particularity. In
the end, the Court found persuasive arguments from all parties and ruled as set forth above.
Additionally, the Court set deadlines for the parties to submit a joint status report and proposed
scheduling in anticipation of the scheduling conference. The Court hopes the parties will be able to
move this case forward in an efficient and amicable manner.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motions for a protective order (Docs. 97-102)
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are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties confer and submit a proposed scheduling
order and joint status report by April 24, 2026. The joint status report shall identify any outstanding
issues and summarize all remaining discovery to be completed. The parties should also provide
proposed dates for the corporate representatives to be designated and the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions
to be completed. Given the length of time this case has been pending and the amount of discovery
already conducted, the Court is not inclined to enter a lengthy schedule. The parties should take this
guidance into account when drafting their proposed schedule. Upon review of the joint status
report and proposed scheduling order, the Court will either enter an amended schedule or set a
scheduling conference.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated April 9, 2026, at Wichita, Kansas.
/s/ BROOKS S EVERSON
Brooks G. Severson
United States Magistrate Judge
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