Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Genesh, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GENESH, INC.,
Defendant.
Copy of ECF 320
redacted for public filing
Case No. 24-2445-DDC-ADM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In this action, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleges that
I
Genesh, Inc. ("Genesh"), the owner and operator of more than 50 Burger King restaurant
franchises, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 by, among other things, subjecting a class of female employees to sexual harassment. (ECF
1.) 	This matter is now before the court on Genesh's Motion to Compel the Production of
Documents Responsive to Genesh's Fourth Request for Production of Documents. 	(ECF 279.)
By way of the motion, Genesh seeks an order compelling the EEOC to produce (1) medical and
therapy records for each claimant on whose behalf it seeks relief, and (2) for intervenor-plaintiff
LZ, mobile phone content that references an individual with whom LZ is alleged to have had a
sexual relationship. For the reasons explained further below, the court grants the motion to compel
as modified by the court to include temporal limits.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On September 30, 2024, the EEOC brought this public-enforcement action against Genesh
based on alleged sexual harassment of employees at particular Burger King restaurants. (ECF 1.)
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To date, three former employees have intervened as plaintiffs in the action, including LZ (as
particularly relevant to issues raised in the current motion). When Genesh hired LZ in May 2022
to work at a Burger King restaurant managed by Stephen Wampler, LZ was 15 years old. 	LZ
alleges that Wampler sexually molested and statutorily raped her multiple times between May and
October 2022. (ECF 17, at 5.) The EEOC's complaint seeks pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses,
including emotional distress damages, for the employee class. 	(ECF 1, at 7.) 	LZ's complaint
similarly seeks "pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, including . . . emotional distress . . .
anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, and inconvenience." (ECF 17, at
6.)
Genesh served requests for production seeking documents that it asserts are relevant to
claimants' emotional distress claims. At issue in the present motion are three document requests
in Genesh's Fourth Request for the Production of Documents: Requests No. 2, 6, and 7. 	(ECF
279-1.)
Request No. 2 seeks: "Documents Relating To or supporting the alleged emotional distress
or other non-economic harm ... including but not limited to medical records, therapy or counseling
records, affidavits, declarations, witness statements, and notes of interviews." 	(Id. at 4.) 	The ..
EEOC objected to providing information predating any claimant's Genesh employment and
responded that, as to therapy sought as a result of such employment, no records existed except as
to LZ. 	(Id.) 	The EEOC has withheld responsive documents on the ground that only "garden
variety" emotional distress is alleged.
Request No. 6 seeks: "Documents referring or Relating To any medical treatment,
psychological therapy, counseling, or medication that was sought, recommended, or received ...
for symptoms of emotional distress, mental anguish, anxiety, depression, or any similar emotional
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or psychological condition." (Id. at 6.) The EEOC again objected to providing information that
predates any claimant's Genesh employment, but, as to information about medical providers a
claimant saw as a result of employment with Genesh, the EEOC referred to its response to Request
No. 2. (Id.) The EEOC produced post-employment therapy records for LZ and one other claimant.
Finally, Request No. 7 seeks: "Documents, text messages, social media messages, emails,
multimedia 	content (including photos 	and 	videos), 	call 	logs, 	voicemails, 	and 	any 	other
communications retrieved from or stored on LZ's mobile phone ... that: (a) reference, mention,
or relate to any individual named -; (b) reflect or document communications between LZ
and any individual named-; or (c) describe, imply, or suggest the nature of her relationship
with such person, including any romantic, sexual, or personal involvement." 	(Id. at 6-7.) 	The
EEOC objected to the request as irrelevant and not proportional to the needs of the case in that
answering would require searching the entirety of LZ's photo library. (Id. at 7.)
II. 	LEGALSTANDARDS
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l). When
a responding party fails to make a disclosure or permit discovery, the discovering party may file a
motion to compel. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). In response to a motion to compel, the responding party
has an opportunity to re-assert and offer support for objections made in the discovery responses
themselves. Any objection the responding party does not re-assert in its response to a motion to
compel is deemed abandoned. See Kannaday v. Ball, 292 F.R.D. 640, 644 (D. Kan. 2013). "A
district court has substantial discretion in handling discovery requests under Rule 26(b)." Murphy
v. Deloitte & Touche Grp. Ins. Plan, 619 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 2010).
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III. 	ANALYSIS
As discussed above, Genesh moves to compel the EEOC's responses to Requests No. 2, 6,
and 7.
A. 	Requests No. 2 and 6: Medical and Psychological Treatment Records
Requests No. 2 and 6, set forth above, are similar. 	In Request No. 2, Genesh seeks any
document that might support or undermine a claimant's claim of emotional distress. In Request
No. 6, Genesh seeks medical or psychological treatment records, whether or not the treatment was
related to the alleged harassment. The parties address the two requests together, so the court will
do the same. The EEOC re-asserts several objections to producing claimants' medical and mental
health records.
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
First, the EEOC asserts the psychotherapist-patient privilege over the mental-health
records of Tauna Frederick, Veronica Garcia, Emely Alvarado-Arenas, and Jane Doe 1.1 The
Supreme Court recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S.
1 (1996), ruling that "confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her
patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected." Like other privileges, however,
"the patient may of course waive the protection." 	Id. at 15 n.14. 	The Tenth Circuit has
determined that "a plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing his or her
medical condition at issue." Fisher v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 361 F. App'x 974,978 (10th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000)).
1 The EEOC does not assert privilege over the mental-health records of LZ, Karla Lassen,
or Christy Rodriguez, all of whom allege that they sought treatment related to the emotional
distress arising from their employment at Genesh. (ECF 287, at 2.)
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Genesh argues the EEOC has placed claimants' mental-health records "at issue" by
seeking "damages for serious emotional or psychological harm." (ECF 279, at 7.) The EEOC
responds that, unlike plaintiffs or claimants who seek emotional-distress damages specifically
related to their employment, Frederick, Garcia, Alvarado-Arenas, and Doe 1 seek damages only
related to "garden variety" emotional distress. 	(ECF 287, at 3.) Based on this distinction, the
EEOC suggests these four claimants did not waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege by
placing their condition at issue in the case.
The Tenth Circuit has not directly defined the contours of when a plaintiff places her
protected psychotherapist communications "at issue." 	This void has led lower courts to take
varying approaches in determining whether a plaintiff has placed protected information at issue
in asserting an emotional-distress claim.
Courts employing the "narrow" approach will only find a waiver of the
psychotherapist privilege where the emotional distress claims are "severe," where
the plaintiff relies on communications with a therapist, or where the plaintiff
intends to offer expert testimony on the claim of emotional distress. Under the
"broad approach," courts find a waiver when a plaintiff places his or her mental
condition at issue by making a claim for emotional distress damages.
Alsaadiv. Saulsbury Indus., Inc., No. 2:23-cv-291, 2024 WL 584631, at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 13, 2024)
(internal modifications and citations omitted). 	"[T]he 'garden variety' concept represents a
compromise between the 'narrow approach' and the 'broad approach."' Id.
The court has reviewed the case law and agrees with a number of cases out of the District
of New Mexico holding that the Tenth Circuit seems to have taken the "broad approach" to waiver
and would not adopt the "garden variety"/"middle ground" approach if presented with the issue.
As a starting point, the court notes that the Tenth Circuit in Fisher held that plaintifrs "request for
emotional-distress damages placed her psychological state in issue and entitled [defendant] to
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records sought in Requests No. 2 and 6 are relevant to the scope of plaintiffs' damages because
they bear on (1) whether each claimant's emotional distress stems from the alleged harassment at
Genesh or, instead, a preexisting condition or alternate cause, and (2) the severity of any alleged
harm.
When a party seeks emotional-distress damages in an employment action, no bright-line
rule exists regarding whether the party must produce mental-health records. 	See Imel v. Forte
Prods., No. 19-4107-JWB-ADM, 2020 WL 3545627, at *4 (D. Kan. June 30, 2020); Sweeney v.
Ivanti, Inc., No. 21-cv-2540-JAR-TJJ, 2022 WL 3444784, at *7 (D. Kan. Aug. 17, 2022). Rather,
the court must consider the facts of the particular case to determine whether "the requested
discovery appears relevant to the claims or defenses in this case." Imel, 2020 WL 3545627, at *4
(emphasis in original); Sweeney, 2022 WL 3444784, at *7 ("[T]he Court, evaluating the specific
facts, allegations, and claims in the case before it, decides whether the particular medical records
sough1
t by the discovery request should be discoverable under the standards set forth in Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(l)."). The party seeking discovery bears the initial burden to establish its relevance.
See Sperry v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. 18-3119-EFM-ADM, 2020 WL 5642343, at *2 (D. Kan.
Sept. 22, 2020); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637,640 (D. Kan. 2003). At
the discovery stage, relevance is "construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case."
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,351 (1978); see also Rowan v. Sunflower Elec.
Power Corp., No. 15-9227-JWL-TJJ, 2016 WL 3745680, at *2 (D. Kan. July 13, 2016) ("[A]ny
matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that
is or may be in the case will be deemed relevant."); Waters v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., No. 15-
1287-EFM-KGG, 2016 WL 3405173, at *1 (D. Kan. June 21, 2016) ("Relevance is broadly
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construed at the discovery stage of the litigation and a request for discovery should be considered
relevant if there is any possibility the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of
the action." (internal quotations and citation omitted)). "Relevance is often apparent on the face
of the request." Imel, 2020 WL 3545627, at *3 (citing Johnson v. Kraft Foods N Am., Inc., 238
F.R.D. 648, 652-53 (D. Kan. 2006)). 	And when that is the case, or when the discovering party
has met the low bar of establishing relevance, then the burden shifts to the party resisting discovery
to support its objections. Id. (citing Ehrlich v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 302 F.R.D. 620,624 (D. Kan.
2014)).
Under the liberal relevance standards applicable at this stage in the proceeding, the court
finds the treatment records sought in Requests No. 2 and 6 relevant on their face to the scope of
claimants' damages. 	And the EEOC has not met its burden of demonstrating the records of
Frederick, Garcia, Alvarado-Arenas, and Doe 1 are not relevant. The EEOC argues that the records
are not relevant because it will only seek emotional distress damages for these individuals based
on their testimony "of how the harassment affected them, without any relationship or reference to
past experiences or mental health issues." (ECF 287, at 5.) But the court agrees with Genesh that
the records nonetheless could bear on (1) whether each claimant's alleged emotional distress stems
from the alleged harassment at Genesh or, instead, a preexisting condition or alternate cause, and
(2) the severity of any alleged harm. See Imel, 2020 WL 3545627, at *5 (holding ex-employee's
mental health records were "relevant to both causation and the extent of his emotional distress"
where he sought "garden variety" emotional-distress damages)); Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 659-60
(holding treatment and counseling records were relevant to claims for "garden variety" emotional
damages under Title VII because they "may reveal stressors unrelated to Defendant that may have
affected Plaintiffs emotional well being"). 	But see Ramsey v. Snorkel Int'!, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-
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2468-EFM-TJJ, 2024 WL 1834365, at *5 (D. Kan. Apr. 26, 2024) (finding medical records not
relevant where plaintiff represented that he would only use his own testimony to support his
emotional distress claim and would not present expert or treating physician testimony). 	The
EEOC's relevance objections are overruled.
Vague. Ambiguous, and Overly Broad
Third, the EEOC objects that Requests No. 2 and 6 are "vague, ambiguous, and overly
broad." 	(ECF 287, at 3.) 	The EEOC takes specific issue with the requests' use of the phrase
"relating to," asserting that this could "require every text message confirmation and calendar
notation 'relating to' therapy appointments." (Id.) The EEOC further notes that the requests have
no temporal limit, making them overly broad.
Once relevance has been established, the party resisting discovery bears the burden to
support its other objections. See Ehrlich, 302 F.R.D. at 624 (ruling the party resisting discovery
bears the burden to show why a discovery request is improper); Martin K. Eby Const. Co. v.
OneBeacon Ins. Co., No. 08-cv-1250-MLB-KGG, 2012 WL 1080801, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 29,
2012) ("Once this low burden of relevance is established, the legal burden regarding the defense
of a motion to compel resides with the party opposing the discovery request."). The party resisting
discovery does not carry this burden by asserting "conclusory or boilerplate objections that
discovery requests are irrelevant, immaterial, unduly burdensome, or overly broad." Sonnino v.
Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661,670 (D. Kan. 2004). Rather, an objecting party "must
specifically show in its response to the motion to compel, despite the broad and liberal construction
afforded by the federal discovery rules, how each request for production or interrogatory is
objectionable." Id. at 670-71.
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Here, the EEOC's attempt to meet its burden of demonstrating that Requests No. 2 and 6
are "vague and ambiguous" consists of giving a single example. The EEOC states, "[A]s worded,
Request 6 would require production of every text message confirmation and calendar notation
'relating to' therapy appointments." (ECF 287, at 3.) Genesh states, however, that Request No. 6
only seeks "medical and psychological treatment records." (ECF 279 at 6.) With this clarification,
the court overrules the EEOC's "vague and ambiguous" objection.
The court is more sympathetic to the EEOC's objection that Requests No. 2 and 6 are
overly broad because they include no temporal limit. "[E]mployment discrimination cases have
held that discovery of information both before and after the liability period may be relevant and/or
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and courts commonly extend
the scope of discovery to a reasonable number of years both prior to and following such period."
Garrettv. Sprint PCS, No. 00-2583-KHV, 2002 WL 181364, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2002) (citing
cases). The court therefore exercises its discretion to modify the requests to include a temporal
limit. The court finds that limiting the scope of these requests to a period of three years prior to
each claimant's employment with Genesh to the present is a reasonable limit. 	See id (limiting
discovery request for medical and psychological information to three years prior to the time of
alleged discriminatory 	conduct); 	Wright, 	2019 	WL 4932849, 	at *3 	(limiting request for
psychological treatment records to five years); Alsaadi, 2024 WL 584631, at *4 (limiting request
to records of mental health treatment "sought or received from the two years prior to the start of
her employment to the present"). 	The court sustains the EEOC's overbreadth objection to
Requests No. 2 and 6 but compels the EEOC to answer the requests as herein limited.
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B. 	iiliiiit 7: Documents and Content on LZ's Mobile Phone Referencing
In Request No. 7, Genesh seeks data and communications from LZ's mobile phone
(including text messages, social media message, emails, photos, and voicemails) that reference an
individual identified as "Michael." The EEOC re-asserts several objections to Request No. 7, and
LZ has submitted a separate brief adding to the EEOC's arguments.
Relevance
The EEOC and LZ first assert that information on LZ's mobile phone about- has
no relevance to the workplace sexual-harassment claims and defenses in this case. As discussed
above, Genesh, as the party seeking discovery via Request No. 7, bears the initial burden to
establish its relevance. Sperry, 2020 WL 5642343, at *2. Genesh may meet this low burden by
demonstrating that the request could encompass information that could bear on an issue in this
case. See Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351; Rowan, 2016 WL 3745680, at *2. Thereafter, the
burden shifts to the EEOC and LZ to support their relevance objections. Imel, 2020 WL 3545627,
at *3.
To demonstrate relevance, Genesh has submitted copies of text messages sent by LZ that
reveal 	(shortly after she began
employment at Burger King, but before any sexual contact with Wampler). 	(ECF 281 at 3, 11-
12.) Genesh asserts that any such relationship 	is inconsistent with information that
LZ provided in a March 2025 psychiatric interview with her retained expert psychologist, Stephen
E. Peterson, M.D., the purpose of which was "to address [the] presence or absence of emotional
damages caused by" claims in this action-specifically, "the sexual grooming and an extensive
secret sexual relationship with [Wampler]." (ECF 280, at 2.) As documented in Dr. Peterson's
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expert report, LZ informed him that, "[b]efore meeting Stephen Wampler,
." (ECF 280 at 10.) Dr. Peterson concluded
that at the time of the sexual abuse by Wampler, LZ"
." (ECF 280, at 13.) Genesh's rebuttal expert,
Sanya Virani, M.D., opines in her report that the text messages about-"
predates the alleged workplace victimization by over a month," and "-
individual portrayed in Dr. Peterson's assessment." (ECF 282, at
7.) Dr. Virani concludes that the text messages showing LZ's"
, demonstrate[] 	unreliability 	of self-reported
information that formed the basis of Dr. Peterson's assessment." (ECF 282, at 14.) She further
opines that, based in part on "inadequate investigation of contradictory evidence," Dr. Peterson's
evaluation fails to meet "legal requirements for expert testimony." 	(ECF 282, at 14.) 	Genesh
asserts that additional information on LZ's mobile phone about - 	could bear on the
credibility of Dr. Peterson's diagnosis and damages opinion by providing a more complete picture
of LZ's 	. 	And further, that this information could allow Genesh to "test
whether Dr. Peterson's opinions rest on a reliable foundation" and "probe the accuracy of the very
assumptions that underpin the EEOC's expert testimony." (ECF 279, at 9.)
The court finds that Genesh has met its burden of demonstrating the relevance of Request
No. 7 given the dependence on LZ's 	iscussed her own
expert reports in this case. With the burden then shifted, the EEOC and LZ have not demonstrated
that information about- is not relevant. Through the EEOC and LZ's complaints seeking
damages for LZ's emotional distress, the EEOC and LZ have put at issue the causes and extent of
those damages. Through Dr. Peterson's report, they have alleged that those damages were caused
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by the sexual abuse LZ suffered because of her employment with Genesh and that those damages
are significant. Thus, information that could call into question Dr. Peterson's conclusions, and the
basis for those conclusions, bears on the claims in this action. LZ argues that information about
is not relevant because it was not necessary for Dr.
Peterson or LZ's treating mental health providers to form their opinions. 	(ECF 286, at 4.) But
whether or not the information should bear weight on expert opinions is exactly what makes it
relevant. After all, Genesh's expert says that Dr. Peterson is wrong in not wishing to consider the
full picture, thereby making his opinion less than credible. LZ and the EEOC assert that Genesh's
expert's opinion is also flawed and not based on all relevant information, but this is a non sequitur.
The question is whether information about LZ's relationship with-bears on an issue in this
case, and it unquestionably does bear on the cause and extent of LZ's alleged emotional-distress
damages. 2
The EEOC and LZ also suggest that Federal Rule of Evidence 412 should lead the court to
bar discovery about-· 	Rule 412 probits the admission of evidence of a victim's "other
sexual behavior" or "sexual predisposition" in proceedings involving alleged sexual misconduct.
Rule 412 governs admissibility, not discoverability. See FED. R. Evrn. 412 advisory committee's
notes to 1994 amendments (directing "discovery of a victim's past sexual conduct or predisposition
in civil cases ... will continue to be governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26"). Nonetheless, "the Court
must consider it 'in order not to undermine [its] rationale."' Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home Health
Care, Inc., 	189 F.R.D. 620, 627 (D. Kan. 1999) (quoting Burger v. Litton Indus., 91 Civ.
2 The court is less convinced by Genesh's alternate argument that documents sought by
Request No. 7 are relevant "to an assessment of L.Z.'s credibility." (ECF 279, at 6.) The record
does not indicate whether Dr. Peterson asked LZ a question in which she would have been required
to have mentioned-in a truthful answer.
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0918(WK)(AJP), 1995 WL 476712, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995) and FED. R. Evrn. 412
advisory committee's notes to 1994 amendments). The Advisory Committee's Notes provide that
"Courts should presumptively issue protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking
discovery makes a showing that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the
facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except through discovery." FED.
R. Evrn. 412 advisory committee's notes to 1994 amendments (emphasis added).
As the court found above, discovery related to - 	is relevant to the facts and theories
in this case. LZ's argument that, in considering Rule 412, the discovery is not relevant "[b]ecause
L.Z. has not placed her relationships with third parties at issue in this case" (ECF 286, at 7) rests
on a faulty premise. 	As explained, LZ has placed
through the expert report of Dr. Peterson who considered LZ's
at issue
in reaching his
conclusions of emotional distress. See Hertenstein, 189 F.R.D at 628-29 (permitting examiner to
inquire about private sexual activities in sexual-harassment case and concluding that such inquiry
did not run afoul of Rule 412 because it bore on the cause and extent of claimed psychological
injuries); Greenhorn v. Marriott Int'!, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 649, 654 (D. Kan. 2003) (permitting
examiner to inquire about non-work-related sexual matters where plaintiff in sexual-harassment
case asserted defendant's conduct "caused her mental state and several specific injuries" and
finding the inquiry necessary to "validly assess her mental state and her injuries"); Hobbs v. Bd.
of Cnty. Commissioners of Grant Cnty., No. CV 05-237 MCA/RLP, 2005 WL 8163567, at *4
(D.N.M. Aug. 16, 2005) (considering Rule 412 and finding discovery of past sexual relationship
relevant to the cause of sexual-harassment plaintiffs alleged emotional-distress damages).
Notably, Genesh is not pursuing a fishing expedition for any and all of
(LZ's contrary argument is unavailing) but instead has limited its request to information about a
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during her employment with Genesh and around the time of
her supervisor's sexual abuse. Moreover, LZ has not identified a specific harm that could befall
her if the court compels a response to Request No. 7. Any potential harm would presumably be
minimalized by the facts that LZ's identity is not public and the discovery could be designated as
"confidential" under the protective order. See Christal L. v. New Mexico Child., Youth & Fams.
Dep't, No. CV 04-574 RB/RLP, 2005 WL 8163964, at *2 (D.N.M. May 9, 2005) (allowing
discovery of minor plaintiffs sexual past but requiring it be governed by a confidentiality order).
The court therefore overrules the EEOC's relevance objection.
Proportionality
The EEOC and LZ next assert that Request No. 7 is not proportional to the needs of the
case because a "search of years of data on L.Z.'s phone of all media types would have to be
conducted and individually analyzed to ascertain if that hit was responsive to this request for the
subject Michael." (ECF 286, at 4.) But neither the EEOC nor LZ address, other than in conclusory
terms, the burden or resource expenditure that could accompany such a search and analysis. Thus,
the court has no ability to weight such a search in performing a proportionality analysis.
Next, the EEOC and LZ argue that Genesh has already conducted, and has had additional
opportunities to conduct, discovery into LZ's claims and personal relationships. LZ suggests that
Genesh could have asked LZ about her personal relationships during LZ's deposition, but LZ does
not state whether and how Genesh would have known of the existence of - 	prior to the
deposition. LZ suggests that Genesh could have asked LZ's parents and mental-health providers
about LZ's relationship with-• but this ignores the undisputed facts suggesting that LZ did
not inform her parents, nor at least one psychiatrist, about 	. LZ also
asserts that the EEOC has already provided Genesh with "a substantial amount of data contained"
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on LZ's mobile phone. (ECF 286, at 5.) 	But again, this conclusory statement does not define
"substantial" or in any way place in context the information that was previously provided as
compared to the information Request No. 7 seeks. The proportionality objection is overruled.
Breadth
Finally, the EEOC and LZ assert that Request No. 7 is overly broad on its face because it
is not limited in time or subject matter. But it is disingenuous for plaintiffs to suggest that they do
not understand that the request is limited to the specific"-" referenced in LZ's June 2022
text messages, rather than all persons named"-·" To the extent Request No. 7 is temporally
limited only to the "relevant period," the court will define that period as 2022. The overbreadth
objection is overruled in part and granted in part. 	The court limits Request No. 7 to content on
LZ's mobile phone that was generated in 2022.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Genesh's Motion to Compel the Production of
Documents Responsive to Genesh's Fourth Request for Production of Documents (ECF 279) is
granted, but the document requests are temporally modified as set forth above. The EEOC must
supplement its discovery responses within 14 days of the end of the U.S. Government
shutdown.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Memorandum and Order will be sealed until 14
days after the end of the U.S. Government shutdown, at which time the court will direct the
clerk's office to unseal it. The EEOC and/or LZ may move to have portions of the Memorandum
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and Order maintained under seal (through specific redactions) for a longer period, but any such
motion must be filed in advance of the above date.
Dated October 20, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
17
s/ Angel D. Mitchell
Angel D. Mitchell
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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