Jackson Tartt v. USD 475 Geary County

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
MERRIER A. JACKSON TARTT,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 23-2146-EFM
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 475,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Unified School District No. 475’s (“USD 475”) Motion for
Summary Judgment on Remand (Doc. 71). Previously, the Court granted Defendant summary
judgment on Plaintiff Merrier A. Jackson Tartt’s racial discrimination and retaliation claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which Plaintiff subsequently appealed. The
Tenth Circuit largely affirmed the Court’s rulings but reversed the Court’s decision to disregard
select portions of an affidavit provided by Plaintiff and remanded the case for further consideration
of Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim.1 On remand, Defendant argues it is still entitled to
summary judgment on the Title VII discrimination claim—even considering the previously
disregarded portions from the affidavit—because Plaintiff still cannot establish pretext. For the
reasons stated below, the Court agrees and grants Defendant’s Motion.
1 Tartt v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 475, 2025 WL 1779732, at *1 (10th Cir. June 27, 2025).
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I. 	Factual and Procedural Background2
A. 	Factual Background
Plaintiff, an African American woman, first came to USD 475 at Superintendent Dr.
Reginald Eggleston’s invitation to apply for a position. In the Fall of 2020, Plaintiff was hired by
Defendant and served as the interim principal at Junction City High School (“JCHS”) for the
remainder of the 2020–2021 school year. Plaintiff applied for and was hired as the JCHS principal
for the 2021–2022 school year.
In November 2021, Plaintiff expressed concerns to Associate Superintendent Dr. Debra
Gustafson that a USD 475 Board of Education (“Board”) member, Ron Johnson, was “over-
monitoring her.” Gustafson told Plaintiff she had not done anything wrong and that “Ron Johnson
is a racist and he’s going after the only two black administrators we have in the district.” The same
month, Gustafson also texted her friend, Margie Pinaire, “[m]ake no mistake, Hudson and Hatcher
(Johnson and Hayden) are after Dr. E and Ms. Jackson”—to which Pinaire responded, “racist.”3
In late 2021 and early 2022, upper management at USD 475 fielded several complaints
from employees about their ability to work with Plaintiff, leading to a meeting between Gustafson
and Plaintiff. Eventually, the athletic director and three assistant principals who recently started
during the 2021–2022 school year announced they were leaving their positions, in part, because of
Plaintiff. On February 4, 2022, Eggleston submitted a list of administrators recommended for early
2 The Court previously documented uncontroverted facts in this case in its Order granting Defendant’s first
motion for summary judgment. See Tartt v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 475, 2024 WL 3362340, at *1–2 (D. Kan. July 10,
2024). Here, the facts are those uncontroverted and relevant to Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim on remand
only, unless otherwise noted.
3 “Hudson and Hatcher” refers to then-Board candidates, Beth Hudson and Mark Hatcher, while “Johnson
and Hayden” refer to then-incumbent Board members, Ron Johnson and Kristy Haden. All four were members of the
seven-member Board that unanimously voted to not renew Plaintiff’s contract in 2022. “Dr. E’ refers to Eggleston,
and “Ms. Jackson” refers to Plaintiff, who is now Mrs. Tartt.
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contract renewal, which did not include Plaintiff. Complaints about Plaintiff from staff continued.
In early March 2022, Eggleston met with Plaintiff and recommended Plaintiff resign. Plaintiff was
placed on administrative leave after spring break the same month.
On April 19, 2022, a KEEP evaluation4 was submitted for Plaintiff, where she received a
wide range of marks. Plaintiff received highly effective marks in the sections of Student
Performance Rating and Academics but received ineffective marks in the sections of Developing
staff and Making the Organization Work.
Plaintiff’s evaluation was presented to the Board. In addition to Plaintiff’s evaluation,
members of the seven-member Board heard complaints about Plaintiff from staff and others. On
May 3, 2022, the Board met and voted unanimously not to renew Plaintiff’s contract for the
following school year. Each Board member reported various reasons for their decision, but Board
members ultimately “conveyed to Eggleston that they had lost confidence in Tartt’s ability to lead
the building, maintain order in the building, work with staff, communicate and problem solve.”5
Plaintiff filed this suit March 31, 2023, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation claims.
B. 	Defendant’s First Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike
At the conclusion of discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims and moved to strike portions of three affidavits Plaintiff provided in response. Dawn
Toomey provided one of Plaintiff’s affidavits, whose employment for two years until June 30,
2021, as the Human Resources Director of USD 475 partially overlapped with Plaintiff’s
employment. The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to strike,
4 The KEEP process was the standard evaluation process used by USD 475.
5 Plaintiff attempts to controvert this fact but only asserts that the reasons given are pretextual. This is a legal
argument, not a contrary factual allegation.
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disregarding from Toomey’s affidavit sentences 6–8 of paragraph 11, paragraph 12, sentences 1–
2 of paragraph 13, sentence 4 of paragraph 14, and paragraph 17 for noncompliance with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4).6
The Court then addressed Defendant’s motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(a).7
The Court analyzed Plaintiff’s discrimination claims under the three-part, burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green.8 The Court determined that Plaintiff
successfully established a prima facie case of discrimination.9 Defendant provided legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff, including “her failure to establish positive
relationships with her fellow administrators, teachers, and staff; her creation of a tensile and
negative workplace atmosphere; and her abusive supervision techniques.”10 Plaintiff, however,
failed to meet her burden to demonstrate pretext in Defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating
her.11 Thus, the Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claims.12 Plaintiff
subsequently appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
C. 	The Tenth Circuit’s Ruling
The Tenth Circuit ruled narrowly on appeal, reversing only the Court’s decision to
disregard select portions of Ms. Toomey’s affidavit and, accordingly, remanding the case for
6 Tartt v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 475, 2024 WL 3328576, at *4 (D. Kan. July 8, 2024).
7 Tartt, 2024 WL 3362340, at *3–7.
8 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9 Tartt, 2024 WL 3362340, at *4–5.
10 Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
11 Id. at *6.
12 Id.
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further consideration of Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim.13 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit
directed this Court “to reassess the discrimination claim without disregarding any of paragraphs
11 and 12 of Ms. Toomey’s affidavit.” 14 The provisions the Court must consider on remand read:
It is my understanding that Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Gustafson are stating that the[y]
were not aware of the requirement of evaluations. I also understand they are now
trying to say that no school administrators were being evaluated. This is not
accurate.
. . .
If Mrs. Tarrt was not evaluated it was a conscious decision on the part of the
administration. KSDE - KEEP maintains a record of all evaluations performed.
They are set on a “cycle[.”] The system sends reminders and I did as well. I would
send out email reminders to the administrators (including Dr. Eggleston and Dr.
Gustafson) advising them of their evaluations due out.15
The Tenth Circuit also instructed that this Court “should also consider specific allegations of
racism by Board members other than Mr. Johnson, if any are made” when reassessing Plaintiff’s
discrimination claim.16
Pursuant to these instructions, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim
on remand.
II. 	Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.17 A fact is
“material” when it is essential to the claim, and issues of fact are “genuine” if the proffered
13 Tartt, 2025 WL 1779732, at *11.
14 Id. at *8.
15 Id. at *7–8; Doc. 46-6 at 4.
16 Tartt, 2025 WL 1779732, at *8 n.17.
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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evidence permits a reasonable jury to decide the issue in either party’s favor.18 The movant bears
the initial burden of proof and must show the lack of evidence on an essential element of the
claim.19 The nonmovant must then bring forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.20
These facts must be clearly identified through affidavits, deposition transcripts, or incorporated
exhibits—conclusory allegations alone cannot survive a motion for summary judgment.21 The
court views all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.22
III. 	Analysis
The Court evaluates Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim on remand under the three-
part, burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. First, Plaintiff bears the initial burden to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.23 Second, if Plaintiff successfully makes a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its conduct.24 Third, if Defendant does so, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show that
Defendant’s justification is merely a pretext designed to mask discrimination.25 Because the
18 Haynes v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Bennett v. Quark, Inc.,
258 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2001)).
19 Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
20 Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
21 Mitchell v. City of Moore, 218 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
144 F.3d 664, 670–71 (10th Cir. 1998)).
22 LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 927 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
23 Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–04).
24 Id.
25 Id.
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Court’s prior analysis ended at the third part of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Court
proceeds directly to whether Plaintiff successfully demonstrates pretext on remand.
A 	plaintiff 	may 	show 	pretext 	by 	identifying 	“such 	weaknesses, 	implausibilities,
inconsistencies, 	incoherencies, 	or 	contradictions” 	in 	a 	defendant’s 	proffered 	reasons 	for
termination such “that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and
hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons.”26 In assessing
an employer’s reason, the court must assess the facts from the employer’s perspective—not the
aggrieved employee’s.27 Accordingly, “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s
proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and
acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”28
Plaintiff’s arguments for pretext on remand largely lie outside of the seven sentences in
Ms. Toomey’s affidavit that the Tenth Circuit instructed the Court to consider. Instead, Plaintiff
raises new arguments not raised in her response to Defendant’s first summary judgment motion.
Nonetheless, one way a plaintiff can demonstrate pretext “is to show that the employer treated
similarly situated employees more favorably.”29 Plaintiff’s primary argument for pretext on
26 Lobato v. N.M. Env’t Dept., 733 F.3d 1283, 1289 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d
1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)).
27 Id. (citing Luster v. Vilsack, 667 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 2011)).
28 Id. (citing Luster, 667 F.3d at 1094).
29 Luster, 667 F.3d at 1095.
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remand falls into this category.30 Specifically, Plaintiff argues Ms. Toomey’s affidavit shows that
Plaintiff did not get the same number of evaluations as similarly situated, white administrators at
USD 475 in the 2020–2021 school year.31
Plaintiff’s argument compares apples to oranges. True, Plaintiff did not receive an
evaluation during the 2020–2021 school year, but that is when she was serving as an interim
principal. There is no evidence that any other interim administrator—regardless of their race—
received an evaluation during the 2020–2021 school year. Conversely, the white administrators
Ms. Toomey’s affidavit identifies as receiving an evaluation during the 2020–2021 school year
were not in interim positions. Put simply, Plaintiff and these administrators were not similarly
situated, and difference in treatment based on interim status does not constitute discrimination
under Title VII.32 Indeed, once Plaintiff became similarly situated when she was hired as the JCHS
principal for 2021–2022 school year, she received one evaluation, just as all the other principals
within the district had. The fact that Plaintiff did not receive an evaluation in the 2020–2021 does
not establish pretext.
30 Plaintiff begins arguing pretext by citing Kansas law requiring “that every employee in the first two
consecutive school years of employment shall be evaluated at least one time per semester by not later than the 60th
school day of the semester.” K.S.A. 72-2409(d). It is uncontroverted that Plaintiff received only one evaluation during
her employment at USD 475. But “[t]he evaluations’ failure to conform with Kansas law is not evidence of
discrimination” because “all principals were treated equally in this regard.” Tartt, 2024 WL 3362340, at *5. Similarly,
to the extent Defendant’s noncompliance with Kansas law underlies Plaintiff’s argument for pretext, it is also not
evidence of pretext.
31 Plaintiff cites a portion of paragraph 11 for support, where Ms. Toomey states “Alicia Schofield definitely
got one. She was in her 2nd year as principal of Ware and is now the Director of Student Support Services. Veronica
Wait got one as Vice Principal at Seitz. So did Jodi Testa. Kim Dressman got one. Melanie Laster would have had
one prior to her retirement.” Doc. 46-6 at 4.
32 “Not every difference in treatment, of course, will establish a discriminatory intent. Title VII does not make
unexplained differences in treatment per se illegal nor does it make inconsistent or irrational employment practices
illegal. It prohibits only intentional discrimination based upon an employee’s protected class characteristics.”
Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphases in original) (internal
quotation omitted).
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Turning to Plaintiff’s other arguments, Plaintiff next suggests that the evaluation she did
receive in 2021–2022 is a pretext in and of itself. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the evaluation
is “phony” and “back-dated,” and occurred only after the school board advertised for a new
principal. For support that the evaluation involves racial animus, Plaintiff cites portions of Ms.
Toomey’s affidavit that remain inadmissible, even after the Tenth Circuit’s ruling.33 Plaintiff also
cites her own response to her evaluation that she was targeted “by a specific Board member,” but
her response does not specify which Board member targeted her or suggest she was targeted
because of her race.34 Plaintiff’s contention that the evaluation itself establishes pretext lacks
evidentiary support.
Plaintiff’s argument based on the evaluation continues into her argument that the Board’s
proffered reasons for termination are pretextual because each individual Board member’s decision
was not based on the exact same reasoning. Specifically, Plaintiff compares deposition testimony
by Board members Haden and Johnson. Haden testified that the Board did not rely on Plaintiff’s
evaluation when voting to not renew her contract, whereas Johnson testified that 51 percent of the
Board decisions for nonrenewal are based on evaluations generally, but could not recall specifics
as to Plaintiff. Arguing for pretext based on this testimony, Plaintiff quips “[t]his is classic gang
that couldn’t shoot straight stuff.”
Plaintiff is the one who misses the mark. For one, Haden and Johnson do not blatantly
contradict one another as Plaintiff suggests. It is possible that Plaintiff simply did not fall into the
51 percent of Board decisions for nonrenewal based on evaluations that Johnson testified about,
33 Tartt, 2025 WL 1779732, at *7 n.14 (finding no abuse of discretion in the Court’s striking of paragraphs
13 and 17 of Ms. Toomey’s affidavit for lack of personal knowledge).
34 See Doc. 72-3.
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which is consistent with Haden’s testimony. Indeed, the record supports this outcome, as the seven
Board members testified to various other reasons for deciding not to renew Plaintiff’s contract,
such as her failure to establish positive relationships, her creation of a negative workplace
atmosphere, and her abusive supervision techniques. Even if a Board member relied on Plaintiff’s
evaluation, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that the evaluation itself involved racial animus
against her, as explained above, or that relying on it transforms a non-discriminatory reason into a
discriminatory one. Frankly, it would be more concerning to this Court if seven individuals had
the same, carbon-copy story underlying their decision, as Plaintiff suggests they should. Plaintiff’s
attempt to establish pretext in this way lacks merit.
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to establish pretext in the Board’s decision through the
November 2021 text exchange between Gustafson and Pinaire,35 where Pinaire responded “racist”
to a text about four board members, and Gustafson’s comment to Plaintiff calling Johnson a
racist.36 To meet her pretextual burden through such circumstantial evidence, Plaintiff “must show
some nexus between the circumstantial evidence and [the] decision to terminate.”37
Here, Plaintiff does not show a nexus between the cited circumstantial evidence and the
Board’s unanimous decision to terminate her. There is no evidence that Gustafson or Pinaire were
involved in the decision to terminate Plaintiff. Their comments that certain Board members were
racist are akin to rumor and gossip, which is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material
35 The text exchange between Gustafson and Ms. Pinaire prompted the Tenth Circuit’s instruction to the
Court to “consider specific allegations of racism by Board members other than Johnson, if any are made” on remand.
See Tartt, 2025 WL 1779732, at *8 n.17. Plaintiff does not identify any specific allegations of racism by other Board
members for the Court to consider, and the Court finds none in the record.
36 Plaintiff also cites Ms. Toomey’s statement that racial animus was involved in the decision to terminate
Plaintiff as circumstantial evidence of pretext, despite its inadmissibility. See id. at *7 n.14. Thus, the Court does not
consider it here.
37 English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1010 (10th Cir. 2001).
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fact regarding pretext.38 Assuming arguendo that all four board members referenced in Plaintiff’s
circumstantial evidence were, in fact, racist, this “general bias” alone does not evince “specific
discrimination” in the Board’s decision against Plaintiff.39 Plaintiff’s proffered circumstantial
evidence falls short of her burden to establish pretext.
Ultimately, Plaintiff fails to meet her pretextual burden to show that race was a criterion or
a motivating factor in the Board’s decision to not renew her contract. Plaintiff’s contention that
her termination “never has made sense” may demonstrate the Board’s decision was not “wise, fair,
or 	correct,” 	but 	it 	does 	not 	establish 	the 	“weaknesses, 	implausibilities, 	inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions” that McDonnell Douglas requires to undercut the decision.
Further, the seven sentences the Tenth Circuit remanded this case on do not establish pretext in
the Board’s decision, nor does Plaintiff make any direct argument for pretext based on these
sentences. Accordingly, Defendant remains entitled to summary judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
Remand (Doc. 71) is GRANTED.
38 See Smith v. Potter, 252 F. App’x 224, 228 (10th Cir. 2007) (“This brief, general reference to a rumor is
insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”) (citing Harrison v. Wahatoyas, L.L.C., 253 F.3d 552, 558 (10th Cir.
2001) (“To withstand summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” (quotations omitted))).
39 See Sasser v. Salt Lake City Corp., 772 F. App’x 651, 662 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[Plaintiff]’s attempt to
extrapolate from evidence of general bias to specific discrimination rests on speculation alone.”) (citing Bones v.
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004)).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
This case is closed.
Dated this 12th day of February, 2026.
ERIC F. MELGREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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