USA v. Dahda et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROOSEVELT RICO DAHDA (02),
Defendant.
Case No. 12-20083-02-DDC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant Roosevelt Rico Dahda has filed a pro se Motion for Early Termination of
Supervised Release (Doc. 3095). As its title implies, this pro se filing asks the court to end Mr.
Dahda’s term of supervised release (TSR) early. The court construes this pro se filing liberally.1
The government responded (Doc. 3097) in opposition and then, the Federal Public Defender
entered the fray. The FPD supported Mr. Dahda’s request, filing a Reply (Doc. 3100).
Naturally, this Reply doesn’t get the same liberal construction as defendant’s pro se filing.
As one might anticipate in a case with more than 3,000 docket entries, summarizing Mr.
Dahda’s case is more challenging than normal. But the Circuit’s latest merits opinion—one
stemming from defendant’s appeal from the second of the three iterations of Mr. Dahda’s
sentence—captures the case’s procedural essence:
1 	Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court construes his filings liberally. Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a
less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). But plaintiff’s pro se status doesn’t
excuse him from complying with the court’s rules or facing the consequences of noncompliance. Ogden
v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).
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Roosevelt Dahda and 42 others faced criminal charges related to a marijuana-
distribution network between California and Kansas. A jury convicted Roosevelt
on ten counts arising out of this operation. The district court sentenced him to a
total of 201 months’ imprisonment as follows: 	201 months on Counts 1 and 56;
120 months on Counts 43, 49, and 73; and 48 months on Counts 42, 45, 53, 55, and
70, all to be served concurrently. The court also ordered forfeiture in the amount
of $16,985,250.00. Roosevelt appealed both his conviction and sentence to this
court. See [United States v.] Dahda, 852 F.3d [1282,] 1287 [(10th Cir. 2017)]. We
affirmed his conviction but remanded for resentencing “based on the error in
calculating the amount of marijuana attributable to Roosevelt.” Id. at 1298.
On remand, the district court resentenced Roosevelt to a total of 141 months’
imprisonment as follows: 141 months on Counts 1 and 56; 120 months on Counts
43, 49, and 73; and 96 months on Counts 42, 45, 53, 55, and 70, all to run
concurrently. 	To reach this revised sentence, the district court adopted the
presentence report, which provided the following explanation. 	First, the PSR
grouped the counts of conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). It then attributed
505.8 kilograms of marijuana to Roosevelt, corresponding with a base offense level
of 26. The PSR added three levels because Roosevelt was a manager or supervisor
in the criminal venture, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). Based on a total offense
level of 29 and a criminal history category of 3, the PSR calculated an advisory
guideline range of 108 to 135 months’ imprisonment. 	The district court varied
upward from the low end of the guideline range by 33 months. 	Thus, the court
imposed a 141-month sentence on Counts 1 and 56, and the lower statutory
maximum sentences on the remaining counts, all to run concurrently.
United States. v. Dahda, 854 F. App’x, 267, 267–68 (10th Cir. 2021) (footnote omitted).2 Each
version of Mr. Dahda’s sentence included a TSR with a controlling term lasting six years or
more. See Doc. 2087 (Judgment); Doc. 2192 (Amended Judgment); Doc. 2714 (Amended
Judgment). See also Doc. 3072 (granting motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), reducing custody component of sentence but not disturbing TSR). In sum, when
Mr. Dahda’s TSR began in February 2024, it was scheduled to end in early 2030.
But one year and four days into his TSR, Mr. Dahda filed the current motion. See Doc.
3095 (filed February 5, 2025). This motion arrived four days after the earliest date when the
governing statute permitted him to file a motion to terminate early. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).
2 	The court infers that the Circuit’s opinion referred to Mr. Dahda by his first name because his
brother, Los Rovell Dahda, also was charged as a co-defendant.
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The United States opposes this request. Doc. 3097 at 2. Mr. Dahda’s counsel reports that the
United States Probation Office supports his request, Doc. 3100 at 1, and the court has confirmed
that report with his supervising officer.
Legal Standard and the Parties’ Arguments
The court enjoys substantial discretion when it decides whether to terminate a TSR ahead
of its natural expiration. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). The controlling statute directs the
sentencing court to decide whether early termination “‘is warranted by the conduct of the
defendant released and the interest of justice.’” See Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933 (10th
Cir. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)). The Sentencing Guidelines echo this theme,
directing courts to conduct an “individualized assessment of the need for ongoing supervision”
and decide whether “termination is warranted by the conduct of the defendant and [is] in the
interest of justice.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.4(b). But this discretion isn’t boundless.
To the contrary, § 3583(e)(1) provides that the court may terminate a motion “after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4),
(a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” The specified factors are: “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;” the need “to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct;” the need to “protect the public from” defendant’s “further
crimes;” the need to provide “defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective” fashion; the “kinds of sentence and the
sentencing range established” for defendant under the Guidelines in effect when the defendant is
sentenced; “any pertinent policy statement” in effect when defendant is sentenced; “the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities;” and the “need to provide restitution” to the offense’s
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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Commentary to the recently revised Guidelines supplements this statutory list of
considerations. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.4 cmt. n. 1(B). It provides the following factors for the
court to consider: any history of court-reported violations during the TSR; defendant’s ability to
self-manage lawfully; defendant’s substantial compliance with his conditions; defendant’s
engagement in prosocial activities and any prosocial support supporting lawfulness beyond the
TSR; a demonstrated reduction in risk level during the TSR; and whether termination, when
considering a variety of circumstances, will jeopardize public safety. Id.
The parties hold different perspectives about how these factors cut here. For instance,
defendant argues that he has performed splendidly on supervision—he “has consistently held
employment since he was furloughed to the Residential Reentry Center in Leavenworth in
September of 2023.” Doc. 3095 at 3. Thus, he contends, his history and characteristics favor
early termination.
The government sees Mr. Dahda quite differently. It doesn’t quarrel with his conduct
lately. But it points out that this version of Mr. Dahda unfairly truncates his larger history and
characteristics, as well as the nature and circumstances of his offenses. Also, it argues that the
defendant remains the same person who violated the conditions that applied to him during an
earlier TSR in one of his earlier criminal cases—one that once pended before our court, United
States v. Dahda, No. 04-20060. And indeed, he did. See Revocation Judgment, United States v.
Dahda, No. 04-20060 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 2015), Doc. 93 (sentencing Mr. Dahda to 30 months in
prison for his TSR violations consecutive to his sentence in this 2012 case). The government
also highlights Mr. Dahda’s obstruction of justice in this case and his misleading statements in a
2022 compassionate-release motion. Doc. 3097 at 3–4.
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Analysis
After considering all eight of the pertinent factors in § 3553(a) and the newly adopted
factors in § 5D1.4, the court concludes that those factors, weighed together and on balance,
support termination. It’s a relatively close question because, as Mr. Dahda argues persuasively,
several favor a finding that he has demonstrated he can live life in a law-abiding community. Let
there be no doubt. Mr. Dahda has progressed. His consistent employment and dedication to
educational programs and vocational training impress the court. These accomplishments provide
just enough of a track record for the court to conclude that he needs supervision no longer. The
same goes for timing. As noted earlier, Mr. Dahda filed his motion to terminate about four days
after he first was eligible. That was too soon. But now that he is quickly approaching the one-
third mark of his TSR, Mr. Dahda has accumulated a sufficient track record. And in that interim
period, Mr. Dahda has continued to comply with his conditions. The court understands the
government’s concerns (and it shares them in part). But most of the government’s concerns
center on conduct for which Mr. Dahda already has received punishment—i.e. revocation of his
TSR in his earlier case and an upward variance at sentencing for obstructing justice in this case.
The court thus concludes that the balance of factors favors Mr. Dahda.
A final thought for Mr. Dahda: The court grants this motion even though the defendant’s
criminal history has concerned the court. Will he continue to live a prosocial, lawful existence
after his TSR ends? Certainly, his performance during his TSR shows that Mr. Dahda can live
lawfully. But will he? Mr. Dahda—and Mr. Dahda alone—now must answer that question.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant Roosevelt Rico
Dahda’s Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release (Doc. 3095) is granted for reasons
explained in this Order.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 10th day of December, 2025, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree______
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge
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