Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
CESAR HUAMAN GODOS, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:26-cv-00020-TWP-KMB
)
PAMELA BONDI U.S. Attorney General, 	)
Secretary KRISTI NOEM Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security,
)
)
SAMUEL OLSON Field Office Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations, Chicago
Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
)
)
)
)
SCOTT MAPLES JR. Sheriff of Clark County
Jail,
)
)
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 	)
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW,
)
)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner
Cesar Huaman Godos ("Godos") (Dkt. 1). Godos, a Peruvian citizen, is detained at the Clark
County Jail under the authority of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). Godos
petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking release from
custody or a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. at 7. For the reasons explained below,
the Court grants the petition to the extent that no later than February 5, 2026, Respondents must
either: (1) afford Godos an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations; or (2) release Godos from custody, under reasonable
conditions of supervision.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Godos is a citizen of Peru who entered the United States on March 14, 2024. On March 15,
2024, he was issued a Notice to Appear before an immigration judge on September 25, 2024; to
show why he should not be removed from the United States. (Dkt. 11-3 at 1-2). The 2024 Notice
to Appear charges Godos with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as "an alien
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States
at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General." (Dkt. 11-3 at 1). The
"arriving alien" checkbox is unmarked. Id.
On November 25, 2025, Franklin, Indiana, police officers arrested Godos for driving
without a license. Dkt. 11-1 at 2 (I-213 Form). On November 26, 2025 he was turned over to the
custody of ICE. Id. A U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") warrant for Godos's arrest
was signed and served the same day. (Dkt. 11-2 at 2). He has remained in custody since that time.
Godos does not contend that he has moved for or been given a custody re-determination
hearing.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Godos claims that his current detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") and that he is entitled to release as a member of the class certified in Bautista v. Santacruz,
--- F. Supp. 3d. ---, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3713987, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
2025) judgment entered sub nom. Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM,
2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). Dkt. 1 at 6-7. Respondents argue that Godos's
petition is premature; that he is lawfully detained under the INA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A); that, in the alternative, he is lawfully detained under the INA pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) because he will have the opportunity to receive a hearing; that his detention is
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constitutional; and that the partial final judgment in Bautista is neither binding nor applicable.
(Dkt. 11). Respondents argue that Godos has previously been issued a Notice to Appear—on
September 25, 2024—which initiated removal proceedings against him, that his removal
proceedings remain pending as evidenced by the fact that he has a hearing scheduled with an
Immigration Judge on February 5, 2026. Id. at 6.
For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Godos's detention is governed by §
1226(a) and that it is unlawful because he has not been afforded a bond hearing.
A. Exhaustion
Respondents first argue that Godos's claims are premature because he has not pursued relief
through the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") or the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (Dkt.
11 at 6). Godos argues that it is futile to attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies because
the BIA has already directly addressed the issue of his statutory qualification for bond in Matter
of Yajure Hurtado. (Dkt. 13 at 2–3).
Respondents do not cite a statute requiring Godos to request a bond hearing before seeking
habeas relief. In the absence of a statutory mandate, the Seventh Circuit holds that "sound judicial
discretion governs" whether courts should require exhaustion. Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d
1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004). In similar circumstances, other district courts determined that the
petitioner was not required to exhaust administrative remedies by seeking a bond hearing before
an immigration judge because doing so would be futile given Matter of Yajure Hurtado's holding.
Valencia v. Noem, No. 25-CV-12829, 2025 WL 3042520, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2025)
("Requiring 	Petitioner 	to 	exhaust 	his 	administrative 	remedies 	would 	be 	futile 	because
Respondents' position is that he is statutorily precluded from obtaining the relief he seeks. The
Court declines to require exhaustion because [t]here is nothing to indicate the BIA would change
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its position [once] the BIA has predetermined the statutory issue.") (internal quotes and citations
omitted); see also Ceballos Ortiz v. Olson, et al., 2:25-cv-00548-MPB-MJD, dkt. 18 at 2-3, 6-9
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 2025) (finding exhaustion would be futile, proceeding to merits, and ordering
that petitioner be provided a bond hearing).
The Court finds the reasoning applied in these cases persuasive and concludes that Godos
is not required to exhaust administrative remedies because doing so would be futile.
B. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1225
Godos requests immediate release in his petition, asserting that he is a member of the class
in Bautista v. Santacruz and is entitled to the relief issued in that case. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 10).
Because claims that "necessarily imply the invalidity of . . . confinement" are habeas claims for
which "jurisdiction lies only in one district: the district of confinement," Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S.
670, 672 (2025), the Court finds that Bautista and the declaratory judgment issued in that case are
not binding here, so the Court's analysis must continue on the merits.
At issue here are 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225. While "§ 1226 applies to aliens already
present in the United States," U.S. immigration law also "authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)." Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Section 1226 governs the "usual" removal process, which
involves an evidentiary hearing before an IJ. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
103, 108 (2020). Proceedings are initiated under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), also known as "full removal,"
by filing a Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court. Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N.
Dec. 520, 520 (BIA 2011).
Section 1226(a) provides:
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On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending
a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States .... [T]he Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond . . . ; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). An immigration officer makes the initial determination to either detain or
release the noncitizen. After that initial decision has been made, "[f]ederal regulations provide that
aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention." Jennings, 583
U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). At that hearing, the
noncitizen "may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he
poses no flight risk and no danger to the community." Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98
(2019) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)); see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,
982 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he burden is on the non-citizen to 'establish to the satisfaction of the
Immigration Judge . . . that he or she does not present a danger to persons or property, is not a
threat to the national security, and does not pose a risk of flight.'") (citing In re Guerra, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006)).
Section 1225(b)(1) deals with "inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain
other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled" and provides that immigration officers shall
order certain noncitizens removed without further hearing or review unless the noncitizen indicates
an intention to apply for asylum. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This applies to noncitizens who have engaged
in misrepresentation or have failed to meet document requirements under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) or
1182(a)(7). Id.
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Section 1225(b)(2) pertains to "[i]nspection of other aliens." Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). An "applicant for admission" is "[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether
or not at a designated port of arrival . . .)." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). In other words, noncitizens
subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited removal but are subject to mandatory detention
while their removal proceedings are pending.
C. Godos Is Eligible for a Bond Hearing Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
The record reflects that Godos is eligible for a bond hearing under § 1226(a).
Respondents argue that Godos is subject to the broader "catchall provision" in § 1225(b)(2)
because he is an "applicant for admission" according to § 1225(a)(1), who is not covered by the
narrower provisions for "arriving aliens" in § 1225(b)(1), and who is "not clearly and beyond doubt
entitled to be admitted." Dkt.11 at 9.
The Court has previously determined that considering § 1225 as a whole, the most natural
meaning is that it applies to "arriving" noncitizens attempting to enter the United States rather than
undocumented aliens like Godos who have lived in the interior of the United States for years. See
Calderon v. Olson, No. 4:25-cv-254-TWP-KMB, 2025 WL 2896348, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 14,
2026); Mohammed v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-2404-TWP-MKK, 2025 WL 3541819, at *4 (S.D. Ind.
Dec. 10, 2025). The Court incorporates by reference the reasoning in these previous orders. As the
Court has previously explained, Respondents' interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain
meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between §§ 1225 and 1226; (3) would
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render a recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior
statutory interpretation and practice. Calderon, 2026 WL 105026, at *3-5. Respondents have cited
no binding precedent to the contrary. The Court has previously found that the few district court
decisions adopting the Respondents' interpretation of § 1225 were distinguishable or otherwise
unpersuasive.1 Diaz v. Olson, No. 2:25-CV-00631-JRS-MKK, 2025 WL 3765960, at *3 (S.D. Ind.
Dec. 30, 2025).
The Court concludes that Godos is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226, and it declines
to reach his other arguments.
D. Opportunity for Bond Hearing
In the alternative, Respondents argue that Godos is being lawfully detained under § 1226a
"because he will have the opportunity to receive a hearing before an Immigration Judge." (Dkt. 11
at 13). Respondents concede that should this Court grant this petitioner, the proper remedy would
be to order a bond hearing, though it states that the bond hearing would be appropriate at Godos
next immigration hearing. Godos agrees with this remedy but disagrees with the contention that it
should be at his next immigration hearing, instead, Godos argues he should be afforded a bond
hearing at the court’s earliest available court date as a post-deprivation review is wholly inadequate
to remedy an unlawful detention (Dkt. 13 at 2).
1 The government offers a passing reference to Cruz Rodriguez v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-12961, 2025 WL 3672856 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 17, 2025), withdrawn & superseded, 2026 WL 63613 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2026), which the Court addresses
specifically due to its recency and its issuance from within the Seventh Circuit. Cruz Rodriguez offers a thorough and
thoughtful analysis of §§ 1225 and 1226 and concludes that both provisions apply to certain aliens apprehended inside
the United States. See Cruz Rodriguez, 2025 WL 3672856, at *7 ("Sections 1225(b)(2) and 1226 have different, but
overlapping, scopes."). This Court finds that logic problematic for reasons expressed in previous decisions and
discussed further below. Regardless, this Court joins another jurist from the Northern District of Illinois in deferring
to Castañon-Nava as highly persuasive, directly applicable authority from a superior tribunal on a pure question of
law. See Morales Perez, No. 1:25-CV-14995, 2026 WL 44777, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2026).
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Regardless, Respondents argue that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter
due to § 1226(e), which states:
The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section
shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney
General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial
of bond or parole.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)).
There is no evidence, however, that Godos will have a bond hearing. In fact, Respondents
contend that Godos is ineligible for a bond hearing. Because an immigration judge has not "denied"
or "revoked" bond, § 1226(e) does not have any bearing on this petition.
Godos has not had an opportunity to meaningfully request and receive an individualized
bond hearing. Thus, his detention pursuant to § 1226(a) is currently unlawful.
III. 	Scope of Relief
Godos is entitled to habeas relief because his continued detention without a bond hearing
violates ". . . the laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The remaining
question is the remedy, which should be "appropriate to the violation." Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
39, 50 (1984). Godos requests immediate release from custody or, in the alternative, an
individualized bond hearing. Dkt. 1 at 7. Immediate release is the customary remedy in habeas
proceedings. See Dep't of Homeland Security v. Thursaissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020)
("Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful detention."); Munaf v.
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 698 (2008) (explaining that "the quintessential habeas remedy" is release
from custody). However, the Court finds that it would not be in the interests of justice to order
Godos's immediate release and instead orders Respondents to provide him an individualized bond
hearing as required by § 1226(a) and its regulations.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court grants the petition to the extent that no later than February 5, 20262,
Respondents must either: (1) provide Godos with an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its regulations; or (2) release Godos from
custody, under reasonable conditions of supervision. No later than February 9, 2026, Respondents
must file documentation certifying that they have provided Godos with a bond hearing, including
apprising the Court of the results of the hearing. If Respondents release Godos, then they must file
documentation certifying his release. The clerk is directed to enter final judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 1/29/2026
Distribution:
All Electronically Registered Counsel
2 Ironically, February 5, 2026 is the date that Respondents contend Godos is already scheduled for a hearing before an
Immigration Judge. (See Dkt. 11 at 6).
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