FITZGERALD v. CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
EVANSVILLE DIVISION
JACOBI QUENTEL FITZGERALD, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:25-cv-00235-RLY-CSW
)
CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, 	)
LEVY & ASSOCIATES, LLC, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER G RANTING D EFENDANT’S MOTION TO C OMPEL A RBITRATION
This matter is before the Court pursuant to an Entry Referring Motion to the
Magistrate Judge. In response to the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8), Defendant
Credit Acceptance Corporation (“Credit Acceptance”) filed its Motion to Compel
Arbitration (Dkt. 19) and supporting brief (Dkt. 20). Self-Represented Plaintiff
Jacob Quentel Fitzgerald filed his Opposition to Defendant Credit Acceptance
Corporation’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (Dkt. 23). Thereafter, Credit
Acceptance filed its Reply in Support of Motion (Dkt. 25).
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Credit Acceptance’s Motion.
(Dkt. 19).
I. 	B ACKGROUND
This case concerns a dispute between Fitzgerald and Credit Acceptance over
Fitzgerald’s purchase of a 2014 Toyota Corolla (“the Vehicle”) on February 14, 2018,
via a retail installment contract (“the Contract”). 	(Dkt. 20 at 1). 	As part of the
transaction, Fitzgerald executed a Declaration Acknowledging Electronic Signature
Process confirming that he had personally affixed his electronic signature to the
Contract. 	(Dkt. 20-3). 	Importantly, for purposes of the pending Motion, Fitzgerald
initialed both the Notice of Arbitration and the Arbitration Clause of the Contract
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thereby acknowledging he “read, [understood], and agree[d] 	to the terms and
conditions of the Arbitration Clause.” (Dkt. 20-2). The Arbitration Clause provides:
Either You or We may require any Dispute to be arbitrated and
may do so before or after a lawsuit has been started over the
Dispute. . . . If You or We elect to arbitrate a Dispute, this
Arbitration Clause applies. A Dispute shall be fully resolved by
binding arbitration. . . . If You or We elect to arbitrate a Dispute,
neither You nor We will have the right to pursue that Dispute
in court or have a jury resolve that dispute.
(Id.)
“We” and “Us” are collectively defined as “Seller and/or Seller’s assignee
(including, without limitation, Credit Acceptance Corporation).” Additionally, the
Arbitration Clause defines the types of “disputes” that the Parties agreed to submit
to binding arbitration:
A “Dispute” is any controversy or claim between You and Us
arising out of or in any way related to this Contract, including,
but not limited to, any default under this Contract, the collection
of amounts due under this Contract, the purchase, sale, delivery,
set-up, quality of the Vehicle, advertising for the Vehicle or its
financing, or any product or service included in this Contract.
“Dispute” 	shall 	have 	the 	broadest 	meaning 	possible, 	and
includes contract claims, and claims based on tort, violations of
laws, statutes, ordinances or regulations or any other legal or
equitable theories.
(Id.)
Although the Arbitration Clause permitted Fitzgerald to revoke his consent
by written rejection within thirty (30) days of the date of the Contract, Fitzgerald
failed to do so. (Dkt. 20 at 4-5).
Fitzgerald’s Amended Complaint, filed on December 1, 2025, alleges Credit
Acceptance failed to comply with an “authentication request” regarding his
Contract, reported “inaccurate information” to the credit bureaus, and rejected his
“tender” of payment for the balance he owed on the Contract. (Dkt. 8 at 2-4). Based
on these allegations, Fitzgerald claims Credit Acceptance violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, the Indiana Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the Texas
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Debt Collection Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. (Id.). Fitzgerald also brings
claims offraudand breach of contract. (Id.).
On February 3, 2026, Credit Acceptance filed its Motion to Compel
Arbitration (Dkt. 19) and supporting brief (Dkt. 20). Credit Acceptance contends
that Fitzgerald’s claims are all subject to a binding arbitration clause. Therefore,
Credit Acceptance seeks an order compelling arbitration and staying the case.
Fitzgerald filed his Opposition on February 18, 2026. (Dkt. 23). Credit Acceptance
filed its Reply on February 20, 2026. (Dkt. 25). Therefore, this matter is ripe for
ruling.
II. 	LEGAL S TANDARD
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in response to
“widespread judicial hostility to arbitration.” Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,
570 U.S. 228, 232 (2013). Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction
involving 	commerce 	to 	settle 	by 	arbitration 	a 	controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2. Thus, arbitration is a matter of contract. Am. Exp., 570 U.S. at 233.
Consistent with this principle, courts must place arbitration agreements “on an
equal footing with other contracts . . . and enforce them according to their terms.”
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
A party moving to compel arbitration must show (1) a valid agreement to
arbitrate, (2) that the dispute is within the scope of arbitration, and (3) that the
opposing party refuses to proceed to arbitration. Kass v. PayPal Inc., 75 F.4th 693,
700 (7th Cir. 2023). Arbitration can only be compelled when the court is “satisfied
that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.” Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 297 (2010) (emphasis in original); see also United Nat.
Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters Loc. 414, 58 F.4th 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2023). Whether a
valid arbitration agreement exists is a matter of state contract law. Tinder v.
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Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 2002). Under Indiana law, an
arbitration agreement — like any enforceable contract — requires an offer,
acceptance, consideration. Land v. IU Credit Union, 218 N.E.3d 1282, 1287 (Ind.
2023).
If the movant establishes there is a valid arbitration agreement, the FAA
provides a strong presumption that arbitration “should not be denied unless it may
be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’n
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). Any doubt
concerning the arbitration “should be resolved in favor of coverage.” Id.
A motion to compel arbitration is decided according to the standard used to
resolve summary judgment motions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Tinder, 305
F.3d at 735. “Just as in summary judgment proceedings, a party cannot avoid
compelled arbitration by generally denying the facts upon which the right to
arbitration rests; the party must identify specific evidence in the record
demonstrating a material factual dispute for trial.” Id. (citing Oppenheimer & Co.,
Inc. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 1995)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Credit Acceptance argues that this dispute falls squarely within the ambit of
the Arbitration Clause. (Dkts. 19, 20 at 3). Credit Acceptance further contends
Fitzgerald is bound by the provision of the Arbitration Clause to arbitrate “any
controversy or claim” he has with Credit Acceptance related to the Contract or
Vehicle. (Dkt. 20 at 5). In response, Fitzgerald concedes that he is bound by the
Arbitration Clause, that the Arbitration Clause is valid and enforceable, and that
his claims fall within the scope of the disputes he agreed to arbitrate. (Dkt. 23 at 1).
Fitzgerald contends, however, that Credit Acceptance has waived its right to
arbitration by previously initiating a state-court collection action and filing
appearances, a Rule 7.1 disclosure statement, and its Motion to Compel Arbitration
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in the instant case. (Id. at 1-3). On reply, Credit Acceptance argues that none of
those actions constitute a waiver of its right to arbitration. (Dkt. 25 at 1-4).
A. V ALIDITY OF THE A RBITRATION A GREEMENT
The Arbitration Clause is a valid agreement to arbitrate. Whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists is a matter of state contract law. Tinder, 305 F.3d at
733. “An agreement to arbitrate must be in writing and evince an intention to
resolve some controversy through arbitration.” Novotny v. Renewal by Andersen
Corp., 861 N.E.2d 15, 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). As with all contract interpretation,
courts give the language of the arbitration agreement “its plain and ordinary
meaning.” Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Brough, 930 N.E.2d 1238, 1241–42 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010). To “determine the intent of the parties at the time the contract was
made,” a court should examine “the language used to express their rights and
duties.” Id. When construing an arbitration agreement, “every doubt is to be
resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id.
Credit Acceptance presented a sworn declaration and exhibits demonstrating
that both the Notice of Arbitration and the Arbitration Clause were in writing and
initialed by Fitzgerald. (Dkt. 20-2). Credit Acceptance has also provided evidence
that Fitzgerald executed a Declaration Acknowledging Electronic Signature
Process, which confirmed that he had personally affixed his electronic signature to
the Contract. (Dkt. 20-3). Additionally, Fitzgerald had the opportunity to reject the
Arbitration Clause within thirty (30) days of the date of the Contract and failed to
do so. (Dkt. 20-1). Fitzgerald admits both the existence and validity of the
Arbitration Clause in his Response. (Dkt. 23 at 1).
The Arbitration Clause is written broadly to encompass all disputes and
explicitly contains the Parties’ agreement to submit all disputes related to the
Contract to arbitration; therefore, the Arbitration Clause is valid.
B. S COPE OF THE A RBITRATION A GREEMENT
Fitzgerald’s claims indeed fall within the scope of the Arbitration Clause. In
addition to showing a valid agreement to arbitrate, a party seeking arbitration must
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also show that the dispute is within the scope of arbitration. Kass, 75 F.4th at 700.
This Court has held “[i]f an ‘arbitration clause is broad enough, by its own terms, to
encompass disputes,’ then arbitration of those disputes is required. Edmondson v.
German Am. Bank, 748 F. Supp. 3d 621, 628 (S.D. Ind. 2024); quoting Rosenblum v.
Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 662 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “any doubt
concerning the scope of the arbitration clause is resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id.
at 629. Credit Acceptance contends that the Arbitration Clause encompasses all of
Fitzgerald’s claims. (Dkt. 20 at 3). Fitzgerald concedes that his claims are the type
of claims that fall within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. (Dkt. 23 at 1).
Based on a plain reading of the Clause along with the claims Fitzgerald
asserts, the Court finds the Arbitration Clause encompasses all claims at bar.
Accordingly, Fitzgerald’s claims, as pled in his Amended Complaint, are within the
scope of the Arbitration Clause and must be arbitrated.
C. WAIVER
Credit Acceptance has not waived its right to arbitration. There is a “strong
federal policy” favoring arbitration. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco
Aluminum Prod. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1992). As such, parties asserting
waiver of a right to arbitrate “bear a ‘heavy burden’ and courts should not ‘lightly
infer’ waiver.” Id. To establish waiver, a party must show that the party seeking
arbitration “acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate.” Kawasaki Heavy
Indus., Ltd. v. Bombardier Recreational Prod., Inc., 660 F.3d 988, 994 (7th Cir.
2011).
To analyze whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate, several factors
are weighed including “whether the allegedly defaulting party participated in
litigation, substantially delayed its request for arbitration, or participated in
discovery.” Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 660 F. 3d at 994. Additionally, the Court
attributes more weight to the “diligence or the lack thereof of the party seeking
arbitration,” and considers whether the party did “all it could reasonably have been
expected to do to make the earliest feasible determination of whether to proceed
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judicially or by arbitration.” Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry,
Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995).
Fitzgerald contends Credit Acceptance waived its right to arbitration by
previously initiating a state-court collection action and filing appearances, a Rule
7.1 disclosure statement, and its Motion to Compel Arbitration in the instant case.
(Dkt. 23 at 1-3). Credit Acceptance argues that its earlier collection action does not
amount to a waiver of its right to arbitrate Fitzgerald’s present claims. (Dkt. 25 at
3).
Credit Acceptance’s position is supported by the law of this circuit. The
Seventh Circuit has previously found that litigating a separate, yet related case,
does not result in waiver of a party’s right to compel arbitration in another later.
See Kawasaki, 660 F.3d at 996; see also Ramirez v. Midland Funding, LLC, 2019
WL 2568478, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2019) (“Defendant did not waive its right to
arbitrate the FDCPA claim in this case merely by filing an earlier, separate claim to
collect the debt on the account.”). Accordingly, Credit Acceptance’s earlier state-
court collection action does not result in a waiver of its right to arbitrate
Fitzgerald’s present claims.
Further, Credit Acceptance’s filing of appearances, a Rule 7.1 disclosure
statement, and its Motion to Compel Arbitration similarly do not result in waiver.
Credit Acceptance argues that it demanded that Fitzgerald arbitrate his claims
from the outset of this case; it has not filed any motions regarding the merits of the
claims; and no discovery has occurred. (Dkt. 25 at 3). These circumstances
demonstrate that Credit Acceptance appropriately and as soon as practicable
pursued arbitration.
Courts have found waiver where a defendant seeking to compel arbitration
not only removed the case to federal court but also participated in discovery.
Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc., 50 F.3d at 391. In Cabinetree, the Court found a
party waived the right to pursue the matter in arbitration when it filed a lawsuit,
litigated for nine months, and propounded discovery requests requiring the other
party to produce nearly two-thousand documents before seeking to compel
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arbitration. Id. at 389. The instant case is distinguishable. Credit Acceptance has
not filed any motions regarding the merits of the claims and discovery has not
begun. Credit Acceptance timely and properly sought arbitration only two months
after the screening of Fitzgerald’s Amended Complaint. (See Dkts. 9, 19.).
Fitzgerald has not shown that Credit Acceptance has acted inconsistently with its
right to arbitrate, and therefore, Credit Acceptance has not waived its right to seek
arbitration.
//
//
//
IV. 	C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Credit Acceptance’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
(Dkt. 19) is GRANTED. If Fitzgerald intends to pursue his claims, he must
proceed as set forth in the Arbitration Agreement.
Credit Acceptance has requested a stay of the action pending arbitration.
Section 3 of the FAA provides that “upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration,” the Court “shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 3; see also Halim v. Great
Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he proper
course of action when a party seeks to invoke an arbitration clause is to stay the
proceedings rather to dismiss outright.”).
IT IS THERFORE ORDERED that pending further order of the Court, all
proceedings in this action are hereby STAYED.
Further, Credit Acceptance is ORDERED to file a status report on or before
April 1, 2026, indicating whether Plaintiff has initiated arbitration. If arbitration is
not pursued by April 1, 2026, the Undersigned will recommend to the district court
judge that this action be dismissed with prejudice. If arbitration is pursued, Credit
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Acceptance is ordered to file reports on the status of the arbitration, starting every
60 days from the date of the first status report.
SO ORDERED.
Date: February 25, 2026
Distributed via CM/ECF to counsel of record and via U.S. mail to:
JACOBI QUENTEL FITZGERALD
2301 West White Ave
Apt 817
McKinney, TX 75071
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