SNOVER v. WARDEN

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION
DONALD W. SNOVER, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-00525-JPH-MJD
)
WARDEN W.V.C.F., 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND ADDRESSING FILING FEE
Petitioner Donald Snover is incarcerated by the Indiana Department of
Correction, currently at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. On October 23,
2025, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
challenging his convictions in state court cause number 20C01-0311-FA-199.
Mr. Snover did not pay the required filing fee of $5.00. Also, Mr. Snover will be
directed to show cause why this action should not be dismissed as untimely.
I. Filing Fee
The filing fee for an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is $5.00. Mr. Snover
shall have through December 19, 2025, to either pay the fee for this action or
demonstrate his financial inability to do so.
II. Order to Petitioner to Show Cause
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts directs the Court to conduct a preliminary review of every habeas
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corpus petition, and, if from the face of the petition it appears the petitioner is
not entitled to relief, to dismiss the petition.
In an attempt to "curb delays, to prevent 'retrials' on federal habeas, and
to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law," Congress, as
part of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),
revised several of the statutes governing federal habeas relief. Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). Generally, there is a one-year limitation period for
filing a habeas corpus action, which is triggered by the latest of four events:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time
for seeking such review;
(B) 	the 	date 	on 	which 	the 	impediment 	to 	filing 	an
application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if
the applicant was prevented from filing by such State
action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the
right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim
or claims presented could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This time period is tolled while a "petitioner's 'properly
filed' application for state postconviction relief 'is pending.'" Day v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 198, 201 (2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).
Mr. Snover does not appear to dispute that the one-year time period for
bringing this action expired long ago. Specifically, he was sentenced in the state
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case he challenges on February 11, 2005. He pursued a direct appeal in the
Indiana Court of Appeals, which affirmed the convictions and sentence on
November 30, 2005. See Snover v. State, No. 20A03-0506-CR-254. On February
2, 2006, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed Mr. Snover's petition to transfer
as untimely, thus concluding the direct appeal process. Thereafter, Mr. Snover
filed a petition for post-conviction relief on December 5, 2006, but he withdrew
that petition on February 12, 2008. Mr. Snover did not attempt to file another
PCR petition until April 3, 2014. Clearly, the one-year limitations period to file a
habeas corpus action expired between the dismissal of the first and the filing of
the 	second 	PCR 	actions.1 	Mr. 	Snover 	does 	not 	allege 	that 	there 	was 	an
"impediment" to filing this action sooner, or that the United States Supreme
Court recently recognized a new right, or that new facts had recently been
discovered.
Seemingly acknowledging the untimeliness of this action. Mr. Snover
contends in the "Timeliness of Petition" section of his filing that "extraordinary
circumstances" prevented a timely filing. Dkt. 2 at 14. Specifically, Mr. Snover
contends that he "just discovered" a district court case that would support his
claims. Id. (citing Harris v. Hoffman, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197908 (E.D. Wis.
1 The second PCR petition was denied on the merits, the Indiana Court of Appeals
affirmed that denial, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer. See Snover v.
State, No. 20A03-1505-PC-320. Mr. Snover has twice since then sought permission to
file a successive PCR petition, but the Indiana Court of Appeals has denied both
requests. See Snover v. State, No. 20A04-1607-SP-1570; Snover v. State, No. 25A-SP-
2158.
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Oct. 31, 2024)). He also generally argues that his lack of legal training has
impacted his ability to timely file this action.
"Equitable tolling—a court's decision to toll some period of time to allow a
petitioner 	to 	overcome 	an 	otherwise 	breached 	limitations 	period—is 	an
exceptional remedy available to a habeas petitioner who shows: '(1) that he has
been 	pursuing 	his 	rights 	diligently, 	and 	(2) 	that 	some 	extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.'" Taylor v. Michael,
724 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649
(2010)) (cleaned up). A habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that he or
she qualifies for equitable tolling. Id. "Lack of familiarity with the law, however,
is 	not 	a 	circumstance 	that 	justifies 	equitable 	tolling." 	Id. 	(citing 	Tucker v.
Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2008)). See also United States v. Petty, 530
F.3d 361, 365-66 (5th Cir. 2008) ("lack of legal training, ignorance of the law,
and unfamiliarity with the legal process are insufficient reasons to equitably toll
the AEDPA statute of limitations").
Mr. Snover's claim that he lacked adequate legal training to bring this
action sooner does not excuse the untimeliness of its filing. Therefore, Mr.
Snover's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is subject to dismissal with
prejudice. See Altman v. Benik, 337 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
The Court may sua sponte consider the timeliness of a habeas petition but
must afford the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard before acting on
its own initiative to dismiss a petition as untimely. See Day v. McDonough, 547
U.S. 198 (2006). It appears that Mr. Snover's § 2254 petition is untimely, and it
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does not identify any proper basis for equitable tolling. Mr. Snover will have
through December 19, 2025, to show cause why his petition should not be
summarily dismissed as untimely.
III. Conclusion
Mr. Snover must both resolve the filing fee issue for this case and show
cause why it should not be dismissed as untimely no later than December 19,
2025. Failure to respond to this order to show cause will result in dismissal of
this action without further notice.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
DONALD W. SNOVER
147279
WABASH VALLEY - CF
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only
Date: 11/18/2025
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