Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
GILBERTO ROJAS PEDROZA, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:26-cv-00203-SEB-TAB
)
SAMUEL OLSEN Director of Chicago Field
Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, et al.,
)
)
)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING RESPONDENTS' COUNSEL TO SHOW CAUSE
Gilberto Rojas Pedroza alleges that he was unlawfully arrested and detained by the Indiana
State Police and then by federal immigration authorities. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus from
the Court directing that he be immediately released from immigration detention.
Mr. Rojas Pedroza sought relief based on his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures, his Fifth Amendment right to due process, and the statutes and regulations
governing immigration officers' interrogation, arrest, and detention powers. Respondents initially
ignored those arguments in responding only that Mr. Rojas Pedroza must be detained without bond
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). When directed to supplement their response and address Mr. Rojas
Pedroza's specific claims, respondents addressed only Mr. Rojas Pedroza's due process argument,
without mentioning his Fourth Amendment, statutory, and regulatory arguments. Mr. Rojas
Pedroza has replied that his detention was not authorized by § 1225(b)(2) and, in any event, no
legal authority authorizing his detention cures the constitutional violations that he suffered when
he was unlawfully seized and detained without due process.
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This order addresses three specific issues. First, notwithstanding Respondents' failure to
address Mr. Rojas Pedroza's unlawful seizure arguments, we conclude that his release by court
order is not an available remedy. Second, we find that the government's authority to detain
Mr. Rojas Pedroza did not arise under§ 1225(b)(2), which makes him entitled to a bond hearing.
Third, because counsel for Respondents has given short shrift to the issues raised in Mr. Pedroza's
petition, despite having been given two opportunities and an unambiguous directive to respond,
the Court directs counsel to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for their repeated
failures.
I. Facts
Mr. Rojas Pedroza entered the United States in 2022 near Nogales, Arizona. He did not
enter through a port of entry. He had no interaction with U.S. immigration officers until this year
(2026). Dkt. 6-1 at 5.
On January 23, 2026, Mr. Rojas Pedroza was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by Indiana
State Police (ISP) troopers. Dkt. 1 ¶ 16. The basis for the traffic stop has not been provided. The
troopers demanded that Mr. Rojas Pedroza present his identification documents, specifically, his
passport. Id. ¶ 18. When Mr. Rojas Pedroza produced an identification card issued by the Mexican
government, the troopers detained him along with the other occupants of the vehicle for a period
of approximately 30 minutes. Id. ¶ 20.
A U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) report indentifies the troopers as
being part of a "287g task force." Dkt. 6-1 at 5. The Court understands that notation to reference
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), which authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to deputize state and local law
enforcement agencies to perform various immigration officers' functions, including investigations,
arrests, detentions, and transportation.
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During Mr. Rojas Pedroza's detention, the troopers apparently contacted ICE officials, who
determined that Mr. Rojas Pedroza was not lawfully in the United States. Dkt. 6-1 at 5. An
"Authorized Immigration Officer" therefore issued an administrative warrant addressed to: "Any
immigration officer authorized pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and part 287 of Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, to serve warrants of arrest
for immigration violations." Id. at 3. The administrative warrant incorporates statements allegedly
made by Mr. Rojas Pedroza and "other reliable evidence" establishing him as a removable alien,
and it "command[s]" that he be taken into custody for removal proceedings. Id. The warrant also
references the fact that an officer presented that document to Mr. Rojas Pedroza and read it to him
in Spanish on January 23, the day of the traffic stop. Id.
The troopers transported Mr. Rojas Pedroza for detention in a Kentucky jail. Dkt. 6-1 at 5.
He was eventually moved to the Clay County (IN) Jail, where he remains detained. On January
28—five days after his arrest—officers presented Mr. Rojas Pedroza with the option to elect
voluntarily departure from the United States or to submit to a removal proceeding. Dkt. 6-1 at 1–
2. Mr. Rojas Pedroza chose to voluntarily depart. However, two days later officers issued to him a
notice to appear, charging him with being a removable alien and initiating a removal proceeding
against him. Id.
There is no indication that Mr. Rojas Pedroza requested or has ever received a bond
hearing.
II. Claims for Immediate Relief
A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner "is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Mr. Rojas Pedroza contends that his custody is unlawful because he was originally questioned and
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detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the laws and regulations governing
immigration officers. He also contends that his custody is unlawful because he did not receive
prompt notice of the basis for his detention or any opportunity to oppose his detention. Dkt. 1
¶¶ 56–63.
In their initial response to Mr. Rojas Pedroza's arguments set forth in his petition,
Respondents provided no response. Dkt. 6. Thus, the Court ordered Respondents to supplement
their filing to address "the arguments presented in the habeas petition." Dkt. 7 at 2. Respondents
thereafter filed what purported to be a supplement which was, at most, a bare bones rejoinder
limited to Mr. Rojas Pedroza's "notice" argument, but lacking in any citations to controlling legal
authorities. Dkt. 8 at 1–2. Respondents thus entirely failed to address Mr. Rojas Pedroza's claims
regarding the lawfulness of his arrest or the officers' compliance with the statutory and regulatory
requirements.
In any other context, Respondents' failure to address Mr. Rojas Pedroza's claims, while
frustrating, 	would 	likely 	end 	the 	Court's 	immediate 	concerns 	because 	"perfunctory 	and
undeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsupported by legal authority." M.G.
Skinner & Assocs. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Norman-Spencer Agency, Inc., 845 F.3d 313, 321 (7th Cir.
2017); see also Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Failure to respond to
an argument 	. . . results in waiver."). 	Such a waiver would leave Mr. Rojas Pedroza's request
unopposed and open the door to an order granting the requested relief.
However, the Seventh Circuit makes clear that "default judgments are disfavored in habeas
corpus cases," directing that a court "ordinarily should proceed to the merits of the petition," even
where respondents fail to timely respond. Bleitner v. Welborn, 15 F.3d 652, 653 (7th Cir. 1994).
Resolving the merits of Mr. Rojas Pedroza's claims without a response from the government—
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thereby imposing the obligation on the Court to come up with a justification for Mr. Rojas
Pedroza's continued detention—is truly burdensome and unfair, but we shall do what is required
of us. We begin by addressing the merits of Mr. Rojas Pedroza's claim for immediate release.
A. 	Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims
Mr. Rojas Pedroza's Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims are relatively straightforward. He
contends that his initial questioning and arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because they were
not justified by a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 45–46, 56–57
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015) ("A seizure justified only by a police-
observed traffic violation" becomes "unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to" issue a ticket.) (internal quotation omitted); see also Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387, 407 (2012) ("If the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible
removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent."); Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1000
(9th Cir. 2012) ("[A] detention beyond the duration of the initial traffic stop must be supported
independently by reasonable suspicion of criminality. . . . We have long made clear that, unlike
illegal entry, mere unauthorized presence in the United States is not a crime."). Mr. Rojas Pedroza
contends that, once he was arrested, he had a Constitutional right to prompt notice of the legal and
factual basis for his arrest and an opportunity to challenge his detention. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 47, 51–57 (citing
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003)).
We assume, in the absence of any argument by the government to the contrary, that
Mr. Rojas Pedroza's Constitutional rights were violated, as he has alleged. However, even if true,
his immediate release is not a legally available judicial remedy.
"[O]nce deportation proceedings have begun the legality of the alien's detention"—or, more
precisely on the facts of that case, the legality of the alien's arrest—"can no longer be tested by
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way of a habeas corpus proceeding." Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, 1143–44 (7th Cir. 1982). The
Court knows of no authority applying a different rule to violations of the constitutional right to
notice. Indeed, in the analogous context of pretrial criminal confinement, once probable cause is
established and the prosecution has commenced, the defendant's remedies are available only in the
context of the criminal proceeding. Bridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2013)
("Bridewell . . . cannot show injury. The state judge concluded that probable cause existed to find
that she had shot Chandler and ordered her to be held—and also revoked her bail on the drug-
distribution charge. 	. . . Events showed that Bridewell had been arrested properly and was not
entitled to release on bail. If the police had complied with [County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 111 (1991)], she would have learned these things a little sooner but would have
remained in jail. This means that she was not injured by the delay.).
As we further discuss below, Mr. Rojas Pedroza has available to him certain statutory
avenues to challenge his detention during his removal proceeding. Whatever violations of his
Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights he suffered, his recourse exists only in the context of his removal
process.
B. 	Statutory and Regulatory Claims
Mr. Rojas Pedroza contends that his arrest and his detention without his receipt of any
notice of his rights violates 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and related regulations. Federal agencies are required
to comply with federal statutes and their own regulations. United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1954). "Accardi and its progeny teach generally that federal
agencies are required to follow their own regulations and some other formally adopted procedures,
including those that govern exercises of an agency's discretion." Zelaya Diaz v. Rosen, 986 F.3d
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687, 690 (7th Cir. 2021). Agency actions that do not comply with federal law and regulations may
be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
However, as a habeas petitioner, Mr. Rojas Pedroza's claim that he was unlawfully arrested
and detained does not entitle him to having his detention set aside or to being released.
Title 8, U.S.C. § 1357 sets out certain enforcement and standards for "immigration
officers," including Section 1357(g), which authorize the Attorney General to deputize state and
local law enforcement officers to exercise certain of those authorities. Title 8 C.F.R. § 287.3
addresses warrantless arrests by immigration officers, and §§ 287.5 and 287.8 further regulate
enforcement activities. Mr. Rojas Pedroza contends that his arrest was unlawful because ISP
troopers questioned him and detained him without legal justification. Importantly, Title 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357 and the related regulations set out in 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.3, 287.5, and 287.8 apply specifically
to "immigration officers," not to state officers deputized under § 1357(g). Moreover, the
regulations refer to immigration officers authorized to take certain actions under various parts of
§ 1357, and § 1357(g) is not included in that list. In short, Mr. Rojas Pedroza's arguments fail to
persuade us that he is entitled to an order releasing him from custody based on the ISP troopers'
conduct in arresting and detaining him.
Regarding his entitlement to notice and an opportunity to challenge his detention, it is true
that § 287.3(d) requires that "a determination . . . be made within 48 hours of the arrest . . . whether
the alien will be continued in custody or released on bond or recognizance and whether a notice to
appear and warrant of arrest as prescribed in 8 CFR parts 236 and 239 will be issued." To the extent
Respondents violated that requirement by delaying the issuance of the notice and placing him in
custody, it is clear that he has at this point received the required notice. His legal claim challenges
that delay, not his detention as such. Accordingly, we lack a legal basis on which to release him
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from detention. Mr. Rojas Pedroza has not established that the government's denials of his right
to prompt notice and an opportunity to challenge his detention provide a basis for this Court to set
aside his detention, since he has clearly now received both notice and an administrative opportunity
to challenge his custody. This request must therefore be denied.
III. Claims for a Bond Hearing
Respondents maintain that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) not only allows for
but requires Mr. Rojas Pedroza to be detained without bond and that this Court lacks jurisdiction
to review or change the government's decision to withhold his bond. Mr. Rojas Pedroza argues that
his detention is governed by a different part of the INA that makes him eligible for discretionary
release on bond. We agree here with Mr. Rojas Pedroza.
A. 	Detention Authority and Bond Eligibility
According to Mr. Rojas Pedroza, his arrest and detention we authorized under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a):
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
[T]he Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole[.]
In rebuttal, Respondents argue that Mr. Rojas Pedroza's detention was both authorized and
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which directs that "an alien who is an applicant for
admission . . . shall be detained" for the pendency of removal proceedings. Because Mr. Rojas
Pedroza has not been admitted to the United States by action of immigration officials, and because
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he opposed his removal, he was an "alien who is an applicant for admission" and therefore subject
to compulsory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt. 6 at 3–14. We reject Respondents' analysis
on two grounds.
First, we reject Respondents' interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) that holds that every
unadmitted alien arrested inside the United States who seeks to remain here, no matter how long
after arriving, is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention. The Seventh Circuit
recently shared our skepticism of Respondents' argument. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of
Homeland 	Sec., 	161 	F.4th 	1048, 	1060–61 	(7th 	Cir. 	2025) 	("The 	question 	is 	whether
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) covers any noncitizen who is unlawfully already in the United States as well as
those who present themselves at its borders. . . . Based upon the text and structure of the two
provisions, we believe that Plaintiffs have the better argument on the current record."). Both before
and after that Seventh Circuit opinion, our court and the vast majority of other district courts have
rejected Respondents' interpretation. See, e.g., Perez Reyes v. Bondi, No. 4:25-cv-00239-SEB-
KMB, 2025 WL 3755928, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 29, 2025) ("The Court has previously determined
that, considering § 1225 as a whole, the most natural meaning is that it applies to 'arriving'
noncitizens attempting to enter the United States rather than undocumented aliens like Ms. Perez
Reyes who have lived in the interior of the United States for years."). "As the Court has previously
explained, Respondents' interpretation of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between §§ 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a
recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory
interpretation and practice." Perez Reyes, 2025 WL 3755928, at *3 (citing Alejandro v. Olson, No.
1:25-cv-02027-JPH-MKK, 2025 WL 2896348, at *14–19 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025)).
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Respondents, after citing a smattering of contrary decisions, do concede that our prior
analysis "control[s] the result in this case should the Court adhere to the legal reasoning in those
prior decisions." Dkt. 6 at 10. 	Respondents offer no binding authorities or arguments to the
contrary. We decline, therefore, to depart from our previous holdings.1
Second, even if Respondents' legal theory were persuasive, it can not be reconciled with
the manner in which the government itself actually treated Mr. Rojas Pedroza. When immigration
officials arrested Mr. Rojas Pedroza and placed him in custody, an "Authorized Immigration
Officer" directed through an administrative warrant that he be detained for the pendency of
removal proceedings, pursuant to § 1226. Dkt. 6-1 at 3 (citing INA § 236). This action reflects that
Mr. Rojas Pedroza was not subject to compulsory detention and that his detention was imposed
pursuant to § 1226, not by § 1225.
1 Respondents make passing reference to two district court decisions that we briefly address here based on
their timeliness and their origins within the Seventh Circuit. In Hernandez v. Olson, a judge from the Eastern
District of Wisconsin accepted the government's interpretation of the statutory text and found that an alien
who had previously been apprehended and released multiple times and was later arrested by ICE agents
while working at a Wisconsin farm was an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2). No. 25-cv-1670-bhl, 2026 WL 161509, at *3–7 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 21, 2026). And, in Cruz
Rodriguez v. Olson, a Northen District of Illinois judge found that §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a) both apply to
certain aliens apprehended inside the United States. See No. 1:25-cv-12961, 2025 WL 3672856, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 17, 2025), withdrawn & superseded, 2026 WL 63613 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2026) ("Sections 1225(b)(2)
and 1226 have different, but overlapping, scopes."). Both decisions dismiss Castañon-Nava as persuasive
authority. Hernandez, 2026 WL 161509 at *6; Cruz Rodriguez, 2025 3672856 at 5, n.6. We view this
reasoning to be problematic for the reasons elucidated in prior cases as further discussed below. Regardless,
we are drawn by the logic of another decision handed down by the Northern District of Illinois viewing
Castañon-Nava as highly persuasive and directly applicable authority from a superior tribunal on a pure
question of law. See Morales Perez, No. 1:25-CV-14995, 2026 WL 44777, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2026).
Respondents also cite Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, which the Fifth Circuit decided a few days after the
Respondents filed their response brief in our case. Dkt. 6 at 13, n.1. Buenrostro-Mendez concludes that
"seeking admission" is not limited to "arriving" noncitizens and therefore supports the respondents' position
in this case. No. 25-20496, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 323330, at *4 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). The Fifth Circuit's
decision is not binding here and in any event, we do not share the view explicated there. We instead defer
to the Seventh Circuit's more persuasive rationale in Castañon-Nava.
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As we have previously held, mandatory detention and discretionary release are mutually
exclusive concepts. An alien cannot be subject both to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)
and eligible for discretionary release under § 1226(a)(2); the provisions exist harmoniously only
if they apply to separate classes or categories of aliens. Singh v. Bondi, No. 1:25-cv-02101-SEB-
TAB, 2025 WL 3029524, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 30, 2025). The government detained Mr. Rojas
Pedroza in January pursuant to § 1226(a). It cannot thereafter assert that he is being detained based
on § 1225(b)(2), which makes him ineligible for discretionary release. Id. (citing Patel v. Crowley,
No. 25 C 11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2025); Kennedy v. Kijakazi, No. 22-
2258, 2023 WL 1990303, at *3 (7th Cir. 2023)); Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-07492-
RFL, 2025 WL 2741654, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) ("[T]he government cannot switch tracks
and subject Petitioners to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2) when the government has
instead placed Petitioners in removal proceedings under section 1229a and released them on their
own recognizance under section 1226(a)."); Fornalik v. Perryman, 223 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir.
2000)).
By detaining Mr. Rojas Pedroza and depriving him of any opportunity for release on bond,
his continued detention violates the INA. Accordingly, he is entitled to the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.
B. 	Jurisdiction Under § 1226(e)
Respondents further maintain that, even if Mr. Rojas Pedroza's detention was authorized
by § 1226, Section § 1226(e) removes our jurisdiction over his claim. Dkt. 6 at 9. The strength of
this argument collapses under its own weight. Section 1226(e) precludes review of the "Attorney
General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of" § 1226 to detain an alien or revoke
or deny bond or parole. Here, the Attorney General has not rendered a discretionary judgment
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under § 1226. She has rendered no judgment at all. She has neither considered the possibility of
bond or parole, nor has she revoked or denied them.2
Had Mr. Rojas Pedroza requested bond and an immigration judge denied his request for
release after considering the issue of release on the merits, and had Mr. Pedroza petitioned this
Court for a different result, Section 1226(e) would likely preclude our intervention. But the record
reveals that Mr. Rojas Pedroza has never appeared before an immigration judge and that the
government has made no discretionary decision to detain him, based on its insistence that it has no
discretion to do so. We find that Section 1226(e) does not apply to this case and thus does not
foreclose the requested bond hearing.
C. 	Relief Available
Any relief afforded through a grant of habeas corpus must be "appropriate to the violation."
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984). Mr. Rojas Pedroza maintains—and we agree—that
because his detention is based on § 1226(a), while the government is authorized to "continue to
detain" him, he is eligible for consideration for discretionary release. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1). Mr.
Rojas Pedroza's continued custody is not unlawful as such. Rather, his custody is unlawful only to
the extent that the government continues to refuse to consider whether he is entitled to be released
on bond. In brief, he is entitled to a bond hearing; we do not address any other rights he may have.
IV. Government's Failure to Respond
Following the filing of Mr. Rojas Pedroza's complaint, the Court ordered Respondents to
"answer the allegations of the habeas petition." Dkt. 3 ¶ 2. Technically, the government filed a
response, but it was wholly inadequate because it did not address any of Mr. Rojas Pedroza's
2 There is no indication that Mr. Rojas Pedroza has formally requested bond from his immigration judge,
but Respondents do not contend that this acts as a bar to his habeas petition from proceeding.
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allegations. Instead, Respondents simply presented a random legal argument as justification for
Mr. Rojas Pedroza's detention. Dkt. 6.
Respondents were granted a second opportunity to respond by the Court, with this specific
directive: Respondents were to "specifically address . . . the arguments presented in the habeas
petition." Dkt. 7. Respondents again completely and entirely failed to address the claims asserted
by Mr. Rojas Pedroza.
These refusals by Respondents to respond to the issues pending before the Court are
problematic on several levels.
First, Respondents' failure to address the dispositive issues before the Court frustrates the
Court's ability to undertake a full and correct analysis of the merits of the claims. We are legally
obligated to adjudicate habeas claims on their merits, even when the Respondents choose not to
participate in the process. When the government withholds its expertise, especially in a critical
legal context involving determinations of the legal basis for the detention of aliens, it invites flawed
or superficial decision-making.
Second, Respondents' failure to respond in this instance delayed justice for Mr. Rojas
Pedroza, which especially in a habeas case where Petitioner is detained, is no small consequence.
Though Mr. Rojas Pedroza did not prevail on his original claims, we have determined that he is
entitled to a bond hearing. Had Respondents responded to his filings on the merits in a timely
fashion, as the Court explicitly directed, he would likely have been afforded the legal process he
was due in an expeditious manner. 	Because of Respondents' dilatoriness, he has languished in
custody and his legal status has been in limbo. Every delay is significant when its consequence is
an unlawful or unnecessary confinement in jail.
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Third, Respondents' failure to respond in a timely fashion or in a substantively helpful way
consumed (unfairly) precious judicial resources by diverting the Court's attentions from attending
to the claims of other litigants. As of February 23, 2026, forty-one open habeas corpus actions
brought by ICE detainees repose on our court docket—along with literally thousands of other
pending civil and criminal matters. The Court is pressed to allocate the necessary time and
resources to respond to the needs of every litigant. When attorneys fail to perform their role, the
pressures mount up and the judicial process buckles.
Respondents' unresponsiveness has imposed an added burden on the Court. If their failure
to address Mr. Rojas Pedroza's arguments and to comply with clear judicial instructions were only
a one-time slip-up, we would likely quell our frustrations and simply move on. 	Unfortunately,
Respondents' derelictions have become a frequent and increasingly troublesome pattern, finally
necessitating a firm response by the Court. See Mares Villagomez, No. 1:26-cv-00089-SEB-KMB,
dkt. 13, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 20, 2026) ("Regarding the failure to apprise the Court of bond hearing
results, the Court takes judicial notice that the Government has routinely been ignoring this part
of the Court's order."); Barry v. Swearingen, No. 2:26-cv-00066-JRS-MKK, dkt. 14, at *6 (S.D.
Ind. Feb. 19, 2026) ("Before concluding, the Court notes that it expects respondents to respond to
dispositive arguments in a habeas corpus case seeking relief from immigration detention. . . . To
simply state the government's preferred vision of the law without regard for the specific basis on
which the petitioner seeks relief is unacceptable."); Fuentes Gomez v. Olsen, No. 4:26-cv-00021-
TWP-KMB, dkt. 10, at *9–10 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 13, 2026) ("[T]he government responds entirely to
an argument that Gomez does not make . . . . [N]on-responsiveness is unacceptable."); N.A.L.R. v.
Bondi, 	No. 	4:25-cv-00192-SEB-KMB, 	dkt. 	17, 	at 	*4–5 	n.1 	(S.D. 	Ind. 	Oct. 	23, 	2025)
("Respondents have entirely failed to address in their response brief what is the dispositive issue
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before us, arguing merely that NALR's detention is authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), a point that
is not in dispute. . . . The Court cannot and will not perform the tasks properly required of the
attorneys in terms of supplying arguments and legal authorities.").
We are not insensitive to the fact that the recent flood of immigration cases filed in our
district and around the country impose similar challenges on government attorneys who must
respond. It is, however, largely a problem of the government's own making. Nonetheless, when
litigation is filed in courts to challenge government action and/or policies, government attorneys
do not have the prerogative to simply opt out of the process. When "an attorney's 'contumacious
conduct threatens a court's ability to control its own proceedings,' the district court's inherent
authority to impose sanctions is 'at its pinnacle.'" Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C., 950 F.3d 939,
958 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fuery v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 450, 464 (7th Cir. 2018)).
Accordingly, Respondents are ordered to show cause on or before March 2, 2026, why
sanctions should not be imposed against them, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and/or the Court's
inherent authority to sanction misconduct, to address government counsels' failure to timely
respond by submitting briefs and or motions that address the merits of the issues and to comply
with the Court's orders. Counsel may include in its response a suggestion as to an appropriate
sanction under the circumstances .
V. Conclusion
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied to the extent it seeks an order requiring
the petitioner's immediate release. The petition is granted insofar as Respondents are granted
seven days within which to certify that the petitioner has (1) appeared for a bond hearing before
an immigration judge consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and pertinent regulations, or (2) been
released from detention.
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The pending motion for preliminary injunction, dkt. [2], is denied to the extent it seeks
relief not otherwise covered by this order.
Counsel for Respondents is granted through March 2, 2026, within which to show cause
why sanctions should not be imposed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and/or the Court's inherent
authority to sanction misconduct, for the reasons cited above.
The clerk is directed to enter final judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
Kristen Maree Barrow
Law Office of Kristen Barrow
kristenmbarrow@gmail.com
Shelese M. Woods
DOJ-USAO
shelese.woods@usdoj.gov
Date: __________________	2/26/2026_______________________________
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
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