TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 135 v. CITY OF SHELBYVILLE, INDIANA et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 135, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-02278-JPH-TAB
)
CITY OF SHELBYVILLE, INDIANA, 	)
CHIEF BILL DWENGER, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Teamsters Local Union 135 began picketing on October 17, 2025 in front
of the Horseshoe Indianapolis Casino at 4300 N. Michigan Road in Shelbyville.
On November 5, Shelbyville Police Department officers ordered the Teamsters
to disperse because they were trespassing. 	The Teamsters seek a preliminary
injunction that would prevent the City of Shelbyville, its Police Chief Bill
Dwenger, and their agents from interfering with their picketing activity in
designated areas in front of the Horseshoe Casino. 	Dkt. [21]. 	Because the
Teamsters have not shown a likelihood of success justifying a preliminary
injunction on their First Amendment and National Labor Relations Act claims,
that motion is DENIED.
I.
Facts and Background
The parties have filed affidavits and other documentary evidence, the
relevant parts of which are uncontested, so these facts are based on that
designated evidence. 	See dkt. 21; dkt. 24.
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The Teamsters have been organizing workers employed at the Horseshoe
Casino in Shelbyville. 	Dkt. 21-1 at 1 (Roach decl.). 	A union election through
the National Labor Relations Board was scheduled for October 17, 2025, but it
was postponed because of the government shutdown and Horseshoe Casino
refused to let a third party conduct the election. 	Id. at 2. 	The Teamsters
therefore organized a strike and began picketing in front of Horseshoe Casino,
"outside its entrances located at or around 4300 N. Michigan Rd., Shelbyville,
Indiana" ("the Picketing Site"). Id. The Picketing Site is depicted in
photographs included in the Teamsters' complaint and brief. 	Dkt. 1 at 5-8;
dkt. 22 at 3–6.
On October 17, 2025, the president of the Teamsters local union, Dustin
Roach, spoke with Shelbyville Police Department officers about the lawful
parameters of the protest. 	Dkt. 21-1 at 2. The Teamsters then picketed
"peacefully, and strikers did not violate the officers' instructions, or impede the
ingress or egress of traffic through any of Horseshoe's entrances, or on the
public street." 	Id. However, on November 5, 2025, Shelbyville Police
Department officers told the Teamsters "to immediately disperse, and told them
that they could not picket along the public road." 	Id. 	Since then, "[m]uch of
the Teamsters picket line has dispersed." 	Id. at 3.1 A union election has now
been held and "the Teamsters won their recognition vote," but the National
1 The Teamsters argue in reply that Defendants "preface their responding papers by
insinuating that the Teamsters have engaged in various acts of lawlessness since the
picketing began." 	Dkt. 25 at 2. The Court agrees that these allegations are not
relevant to the legal issues here and therefore does not consider them. See id. at 4.
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Labor Relations Board has not certified the results and the Teamsters' need to
picket "remain[s] acute in the foreseeable future." 	Dkt. 27 at 1–2.
The Teamsters filed this case against the City of Shelbyville and its Police
Chief Bill Dwenger alleging violations of the First Amendment, the National
Labor Relations Act, and Indiana state law. 	Dkt. 1. 	The Court denied the
Teamsters' motion for a temporary restraining order because the Teamsters had
not shown that the Picketing Site is public property or private property
historically dedicated to public expression. 	Dkt. 14. 	The Teamsters have filed
a renewed motion for preliminary injunction that would prevent Defendants
and their agents from interfering with the picketing activity at the Picketing
Site. 	Dkt. 21; see dkt. 3.
II.
Preliminary Injunction Standard
Injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is "an exercise
of very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly
demanding it." Cassell v. Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021). 	To
obtain such extraordinary relief, the party seeking the preliminary injunction
carries the burden of persuasion by a clear showing. 	See id.; Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
Determining whether a plaintiff "is entitled to a preliminary injunction
involves a multi-step inquiry." 	Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of E.
Chi., 56 F.4th 437, 446 (7th Cir. 2022). 	"As a threshold matter, a party seeking
a preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) some likelihood of succeeding
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on the merits, and (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer
irreparable harm if preliminary relief is denied." 	Id. 	"If these threshold factors
are met, the court proceeds to a balancing phase, where it must then consider:
(3) the irreparable harm the non-moving party will suffer if preliminary relief is
granted, balancing that harm against the irreparable harm to the moving party
if relief is denied; and (4) the public interest, meaning the consequences of
granting or denying the injunction to non-parties." 	Cassell, 990 F.3d at 545.
This "involves a 'sliding scale' approach: the more likely the plaintiff is to win
on the merits, the less the balance of harms needs to weigh in his favor, and
vice versa." 	Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020). 	"In the final
analysis, the district court equitably weighs these factors together, seeking at
all times to minimize the costs of being mistaken." 	Cassell, 990 F.3d at 545.
III
Analysis
The Teamsters seek a preliminary injunction under the First Amendment
and the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 	Dkt. 22.
A. First Amendment
"The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits States from enforcing laws 'abridging the freedom of
speech.'" 	Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 858 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting U.S.
CONST . amend. I). 	Public ways and sidewalks "occupy a special position in
terms of First Amendment protection because of their historic role as sites for
discussion and debate." 	McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014). 	These
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traditional public fora are typically "public property—for instance, streets and
parks—that has immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public."
Krasno v. Mnookin, 148 F.4th 465, 483 (7th Cir. 2025). 	Privately owned streets
and sidewalks, however, are not "the equivalent, for First Amendment
purposes, of municipally owned streets and sidewalks." 	Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563 (1972); accord Reform America v. City of Detroit, 37
F.4th 1138, 1153 (6th Cir. 2022) (That a property at issue is privately owned
"is problematic for [plaintiff's] First Amendment claim, because the First
Amendment confers no general right for uninvited members of the public to
speak on private property contrary to the proprietor's wishes.").
Here, the Teamsters do not plan to picket in North Michigan Road, the
public street on which Horseshoe Casino is located. 	Dkt. 22 at 9, 25; dkt. 24
at 6. 	Instead, they intend to picket "along" North Michigan Road, at the
Picketing Site that is on Horseshoe Casino's private property. 	Dkt. 22 at 13,
23–25 (Teamsters' agreeing that "in this case . . . the sidewalks [a]re on private
property"). 	The Teamsters therefore argue that "since North Michigan Road is a
public thoroughfare, that means the land next to it falls within the category of
private property" that is dedicated to public use under the First Amendment.
Dkt. 25 at 7 (emphasis added). 	Defendants respond that the Picketing Site is
Horseshoe Casino's private property that has not been dedicated to public
expressive use. 	Dkt. 24 at 6–8.
Given that it's undisputed that the Picketing Site is on Horseshoe
Casino's private property, "[t]he question is, [u]nder what circumstances can
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private property be treated as though it were public?" 	Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424
U.S. 507, 516 (1976). 	Under the Teamsters' argument, courts would routinely
treat private property that is adjacent to a public road as though it were public.
Dkt. 22 at 24 ("All in all, since the Picketing Site is along a road that is
physically indistinguishable from a public street and functions like a public
street, it is subject to traditional public forum analysis."). 	This ignores the
fundamental principle that "[t]he Constitution does not disable private property
owners and private lessees from exercising editorial discretion over speech and
speakers on their property." 	Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587
U.S. 802, 812–13 (2019); see Tanner, 407 U.S. at 569 ("The Constitution by no
means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of private property to
public use."). 	Applied here, "[t]o hold that [Horseshoe is] compelled by law to
supply picketing areas for pickets to drive [its] customers away is to create a
court-made law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which private
ownership of property rests in this country." 	Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 517 (quoted
in Halleck, 587 U.S. at 813).
Seventh Circuit precedent demonstrates that treating private property as
a traditional public forum is the exception to the rule. 	Freedom from Religion
Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 494 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
section of a city park sold to a private organization remained a traditional
public forum because it was not differentiated from the rest of the park and
continued to be dedicated to public use); see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 507–08 (1946) (holding that First Amendment protections applied when a
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private company owned the entire town). 	The Court's holding in City of
Marshfield was based on exceptional facts that do not exist here and therefore
does not support the Teamsters' argument that proximity to a public street
alone is sufficient to justify treating private property as a traditional public
forum. 	See dkt. 22 at 20–22.2 Instead, to be treated as a public forum, the
private property must be open to the public and closely "historically associated
with the exercise of First Amendment rights." 	Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 515; see
City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 494 ("Whether a property has historically been
used for public expression plays an important role in determining if the
property will be considered a public forum.").
Here, the Teamsters have not provided evidence of any historical exercise
of expressive activity at the Picketing Site. 	See dkt. 22; dkt. 24. 	While the
Teamsters provide several examples to show that North Michigan Road is used
by the public to reach restaurants, gas stations, and a church, they don't
explain why that's relevant to the public forum analysis or how it demonstrates
the Teamsters right to picket on adjacent private property. 	Dkt. 22 at 24.
Instead, Defendants' uncontested evidence is that the sidewalks in and near
the Picketing Site "run only along and in the property of [Horseshoe] and do not
connect to any other public sidewalk, and their sole purpose is to access" the
2 The Teamsters do not contest that the Picketing Site is private property and rely on
only its proximity to Michigan Road, without arguing that there's a public easement or
right-of-way extending into the Picketing Site that could affect the First Amendment
analysis. See dkt. 22 at 24; dkt. 25 at 7–8. The Court therefore does not delve into
the parties' arguments about Indiana property law or Shelby County's property
records. See dkt. 25 at 5–7.
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casino. 	Dkt. 24-7 at 2 (Comstock decl.).3 The Teamsters also have not
contested Horseshoe employees' declarations that other than the Teamsters'
picketing beginning on October 17, 2025, they have no memory of "anyone
using the sidewalk along Michigan Road for demonstrations or protests" since
they started working for Horseshoe in 2009 and 2010. 	Dkt. 24-1 at 2 (Vassar
decl.); dkt. 24-4 at 2 (Evans decl.). 	In fact, there were no sidewalks at all along
this stretch of Michigan Road until 2008. 	See dkt. 24-7 at 2.
Cases from this district and the courts of appeals confirm that more is
required for private property to be subject to the traditional public forum
analysis for First Amendment purposes. 	See Lewis v. McCracken, 782 F. Supp.
2d 702, 712 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that a private sidewalk was a traditional
public forum because it ran adjacent to a public road, had crosswalks and
traffic signals, and had "long been used by pedestrians as a means of traveling
. . . to various parts of French Lick"); United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ.
Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland, Inc., 383 F.3d 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding
a public forum because the sidewalk "blends into the urban grid, borders the
road, and looks just like any public sidewalk" and serves as "a public
thoroughfare"); Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las
Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he sidewalk . . . adjacent to Las
Vegas Boulevard had been historically a public forum" used "to facilitate
3 While the Teamsters allege in reply that Horseshoe's sidewalk is "a thoroughfare
sidewalk seamlessly connected to public sidewalks at either end," id. at 8, that
allegation is unsupported by any evidence in the record and they later admit that the
sidewalks "extend no further" than Horseshoe's property, id. at 13.
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pedestrian traffic in daily commercial life along the Las Vegas Strip generally.").
The throughline is that the sidewalks at issue in those cases were not merely
along a public road, but traditionally used by the public.
In short, the Teamsters do not dispute that the Picketing Site is on
Horseshoe's private property and that the sidewalks in the Picketing Site serve
only as means to access Horseshoe's facilities. 	See dkt. 25; United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 723, 729–30 (1990) (plurality opinion) (explaining that
a public sidewalk used to "travel from the parking lot to the post office building"
was not a traditional public forum because it did not "facilitate the daily
commerce and life of the neighborhood or city"); see Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier
& Expo. Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 702 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that publicly-owned
sidewalks within Chicago's Navy Pier were not traditional public fora because
they were internal to the pier, which is "an amusement park and a meeting and
entertainment center" rather than a "right of way"). 	Without "historical
association . . . with a public forum," or "dedication of the property to public
use," Horseshoe's private property is not a traditional public forum. 	See City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 494–95.
The Teamsters therefore have not shown a substantial likelihood of
success on their First Amendment free speech claim that can support a
preliminary injunction.4
4 While the Teamsters mention a First Amendment freedom of assembly claim in their
brief, the argument relies on the free-speech claim, dkt. 22 at 26, and the Teamsters
did not address freedom of assembly in their reply brief, dkt. 25. This claim therefore
does not support a preliminary injunction for the same reasons.
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B. NLRA Preemption
The Teamsters also briefly argue that the National Labor Relations Act
prevents Defendants from removing them from the picketing areas. 	Dkt. 22 at
27–28. 	Defendants respond that the NLRA does not prevent them from
enforcing local trespass law. 	Dkt. 24 at 13. 	The NLRA comprehensively
regulates labor relations, so it preempts some "state and local regulation of
activities that the NLRA protects or prohibits or arguably protects or prohibits."
Cannon v. Edgar, 33 F.3d 880 883–84 (7th Cir. 1994). 	NLRA preemption "is
not, however, absolute," id., and the Teamsters have not identified authority
showing that the NLRA preempts a local government's ability to enforce
trespass law on private property. 	See dkt. 22 at 27–28.
The NLRA does not provide "immunity from discharge for acts of
trespass" committed by an employee. Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local Union No. 174, 598 U.S. 771, 788 (2023) (Alito, J., concurring)
(quoting NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939)); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205
(1978) ("For while there are unquestionably examples of trespassory union
activity in which the question whether it is protected is fairly debatable,
experience under the [NLRA] teaches that such situations are rare and that a
trespass is far more likely to be unprotected than protected."). 	So the
Teamsters are unlikely to succeed on their claim that the NLRA preempts
enforcement of state trespass law.
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Indeed, the Court denied the Teamsters' motion for temporary restraining
order under these authorities, dkt. 14 at 8–9, yet the Teamsters do not address
them in their preliminary injunction brief, see dkt. 22, and do not address
NLRA preemption at all in their reply brief, see dkt. 25. 	The Teamsters
therefore have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits based on NLRA
preemption.5
IV.
Conclusion
The Teamsters' motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. 	Dkt. [21];
dkt. [3].
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
All electronically registered counsel
5 While the Teamsters briefly request an evidentiary hearing, they have not identified
any material factual dispute or the evidence they would intend to present. Dkt. 21 at
2; see Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 602 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2010) (A hearing is
required only if "one is called for as a result of a fact issue created by" the preliminary-
injunction filings.); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir.
2002) ("[T]he party seeking the evidentiary hearing must demonstrate that it has and
intends to introduce" relevant evidence.).
Date: 1/6/2026
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