TAYLOR v. ALLEN et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
QUENTIN L. TAYLOR, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-01553-JPH-CSW
)
ALLEN, 	)
ARNOLD, 	)
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
)
)
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, 	)
COOPER, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Quentin Taylor is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Pendleton
Correctional Facility ("Pendleton"). He filed this civil action alleging constitutional
violations. Because the plaintiff is a "prisoner," this Court must screen the
complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).
I. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
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Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720
(7th Cir. 2017).
II. The Complaint
Mr. Taylor names five defendants in his complaint: (1) Warden Allen; (2)
Commissioner 	Arnold; 	(3) 	Indiana 	Department 	of 	Corrections 	("IDOC"); 	(4)
Pendleton 	Correctional 	Facility; 	and 	(5) 	Sgt. 	Cooper. 	Mr. 	Taylor's 	factual
allegations are accepted as true at the pleading stage. See Lisby v. Henderson,
74 F.4th 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023).
On 	April 	9, 	2025, 	Mr. 	Taylor 	had 	a 	mental 	health 	breakdown 	and
requested medical assistance. Dkt. 1 at 7. Sgt. Cooper was radioed to address
the situation but arrived agitated and aggressive. Id. Mr. Taylor explained his
extensive history with mental health issues and suicidal thoughts to Sgt. Cooper,
who responded "I don't have time for this shit tonigh[t.] If you want to be suicidal,
then I'm going to lock your ass in the shakedown booth for the rest of my shift
so I don't have to deal with your bullshit." Id. Sgt. Cooper ordered another officer
to handcuff Mr. Taylor and escort him to the shakedown booth. Id.
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Once secured in the shakedown booth, Mr. Taylor requested that his
handcuffs be removed or placed in front because he was safely secured, and the
handcuffs were extremely tight. Id. at 8. Anytime Mr. Taylor tried to move or sit
down, the handcuffs would become tighter. Id. Sgt. Cooper denied this request.
Id. Two hours later, Mr. Taylor's hands became numb, and his shoulder began
to hurt. Id. He once again pleaded with Sgt. Cooper to remove or readjust the
handcuffs, and additionally requested his inhaler and water. Id. Sgt. Cooper
responded 	stating 	"you 	should 	[have] 	thought 	about 	that 	before 	you 	were
suicidal" once again denying his request. Id.
An additional two hours passed, and Mr. Taylor began experiencing severe
pain in his left wrist and major discomfort in his shoulder. Id. at 9. He once again
told Sgt. Cooper that he was asthmatic and needed his inhaler and also showed
him how tight the handcuffs were. Id. Mr. Taylor's fingers had gone numb, and
his range of motion was extremely limited. Id. Sgt. Cooper responded stating, "I
bet you will think about this the next time you want to be suicidal, you will be
alright." Id. He also said that he had just tried contacting medical but was met
with no answer, so Mr. Taylor would have to wait until med pass to be seen. Id.
at 10. When Mr. Taylor asked why he waited five hours to contact medical staff,
Sgt. Cooper responded stating, "It was not an emergency situation, you[']r[e]
locked in the shakedown booth, you[']r[e] alright." Id.
When a nurse entered the cellhouse, Mr. Taylor yelled for her help, asking
her for water and his inhaler, and showing her the severe pain he was in due to
the tightness of his handcuffs. Id. The nurse told Mr. Taylor that nobody had
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contacted medical and informed them of his situation. Id. at 11. The nurse then
requested that Sgt. Cooper provide Mr. Taylor with his inhaler, and water, and
remove 	his 	handcuffs 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	health 	and 	safety. 	Id. 	Sgt. 	Cooper
disregarded her request and responded "soon as breakfast lines are complete we
will escort him to medical to be assessed. No need to uncuff him . . . just to re-
cuff him up." Id. The nurse once again requested the removal of the handcuffs
so that she could take his vital signs. Id. They were not removed. Id. Mr. Taylor
was in the shakedown booth with the handcuffs on from about 9:00 pm to 5:30
am. Id. at 12. Since this incident, Mr. Taylor fears requesting mental health
treatment and reporting suicidal thoughts. Id. at 14.
Mr. Taylor seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief in the form of
requiring defendants to ensure that he is seen by a specialist to evaluate his
injury, and to adjust policies so that they are constitutional. Id. at 16.
III. Discussion of Claims
Although a plaintiff need not plead legal theories in a complaint, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a), Mr. Taylor has identified the theories he wishes to use—Eighth
Amendment conditions-of-confinement, excessive force, deliberate indifference,
failure to protect; First Amendment retaliation; Monell liability; Americans with
Disabilities Act; and the Rehabilitation Act. Where a pro se litigant has expressly
stated the legal theories he wishes to pursue, the district court is not required to
analyze whether the allegations in the complaint might state a claim under a
different legal theory. See Larry v. Goldsmith, 799 F. Apex 413, 416 (7th Cir.
2016) (citing Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control of U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
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559 F.3d 595, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2009)). Mr. Taylor asks that the Court "identify
any additional claims that [he] has not identified." Dkt. 1 at 15. The Court
analyzes Mr. Taylor's claims only under the theories he has identified, as it has
not identified any other claims upon review.
Applying 	the 	screening 	standard 	to 	the 	factual 	allegations 	in 	the
complaint, certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as
submitted.
First, any claim against Pendleton Correctional Facility is dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because it is a building,
not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. White v. Knight, 710 F. App'x 260,
262 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 107 (2018); Looney v. Miami Corr.
Facility, No. 3:18CV18-PPS/MGG, 2018 WL 1992197, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 27,
2018) (dismissing Miami Correctional Facility).
Second, any Monell claim against the Indiana Department of Correction is
dismissed because the IDOC, as a state agency, is not a "person" subject to suit
under § 1983. See Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012).
Similarly, any Monell claim against Warden Allen and Commissioner Arnold
must also be dismissed. Monell applies to municipalities and private entities
that perform government services—not state agencies or their employees, like
the defendants here.
Third, 	any 	claim 	under 	the 	Americans 	with 	Disabilities 	Act 	or
Rehabilitation 	Act 	is 	dismissed. 	Those 	claims 	are 	based 	on 	Mr. 	Taylor's
allegations that he was denied mental health care. But the "ADA and the
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Rehabilitation Act do not apply when a prisoner simply disagrees with his course
of medical treatment." McDaniel v. Syed, 115 F.4th 805, 828 (7th Cir. 2024); see
also Underhill v. Lawrence Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 420CV00125SEBDML, 2021
WL 2312813, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 7, 2021) (inadequate medical care cannot
serve as the basis for a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act) (citing
cases).
Next, the failure to protect claim against Sgt. Cooper must be dismissed.
Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violent assaults by other
inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). They may be liable for
breaching that duty when they were "aware of a substantial risk of serious injury
to [an inmate] but nevertheless failed to take appropriate steps to protect him
from a known danger." Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Santiago
v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2010). To state a claim for failure to
protect, Mr. Taylor must allege that he was at a substantial risk of harm from
assault and the defendants were aware of that risk but disregarded it. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837; Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008).
Damages for "a deliberate indifference claim cannot be predicated merely on
knowledge of general risks of violence," Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032
(7th Cir. 2000). Here, Mr. Taylor has not alleged facts that he was at a substantial
risk of harm from assault that defendants were aware of.
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim
against Sgt. Cooper must be dismissed. When a prisoner alleges an Eighth
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Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, he must show that the conditions
were objectively serious and created "an excessive risk to his health and safety."
Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 720 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Because Mr. Taylor's claims are based on Sgt.
Cooper's treatment of him, not the conditions in which he was confined, he has
not stated a conditions-of-confinement claim.
The claims which shall proceed are the following:
Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference
based on the allegations that Sgt. Cooper failed to help Mr. Taylor receive medical
care for his asthma and handcuffed him tightly, causing him pain, shall proceed
against Sgt. Cooper.
A First Amendment claim for retaliation, based on the allegation that Sgt.
Cooper retaliated against Mr. Taylor for asking for mental health treatment also
shall proceed against Sgt. Cooper.
This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the
Court. 	All 	other 	claims 	have 	been 	dismissed. 	If 	the 	plaintiff 	believes 	that
additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court,
he shall have through February 16, 2026, in which to file a motion to reconsider
the screening order.
The clerk is directed to terminate Warden Allen, Commissioner Arnold,
Indiana 	Department 	of 	Corrections, 	and 	Pendleton 	Correctional 	Facility 	as
defendants on the docket.
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IV. Conclusion and Service of Process
The following claims are proceeding in this action: Eighth Amendment
claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference against Sgt. Cooper. A First
Amendment claim for retaliation against Sgt. Cooper. All other claims have been
dismissed.
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process
to defendant Sgt. Cooper in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall
consist of the complaint filed on August 4, 2025, dkt. [1], applicable forms (Notice
of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service
of Summons), and this Order.
The clerk is directed to serve the Indiana Department of Correction
employee electronically.
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
QUENTIN L. TAYLOR
178973
PENDLETON - CF
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
4490 West Reformatory Road
PENDLETON, IN 46064
Date: 1/23/2026
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Electronic service to Indiana Department of Correction:
Sgt. Cooper
(At Pendleton Correctional Facility)
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