SEDGWICK v. CENTER GROVE COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
DENISE SEDGWICK, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:24-cv-00543-JRS-CSW
)
CENTER GROVE COMMUNITY SCHOOL
CORPORATION,
)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
Order Granting Summary Judgment
Denise Sedgwick sued her former employer Center Grove Community School
Corporation ("Center Grove") for sex and age discrimination. Sedgwick alleges that
Center Grove subjected her to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634. Center Grove moves for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 31.)
I. 	Background
Denise Sedgwick is a fifty-eight-year-old female teacher. 	(Pl.'s Resp. at 1, ECF
No. 33.) 	In mid-2018, she started teaching sixth grade full-time at Center Grove
Middle School North. 	(Id.) 	Her allegations of a hostile work environment relate to
Davin Harpe, who at all relevant times was the school's principal, her supervisor.
(Sedgwick Dep. 20:9–12, ECF No. 33-1.) According to Sedgwick, Harpe disliked the
sixth-grade teachers, and he "made comments to [them] frequently that [they] were
constantly 'all on red'" meaning that "everybody was uptight" and "difficult to deal
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with." 	(Id. at 57:22–58:7.) 	Sedgwick heard Harpe say that when he was hired, he
was tasked with "squelch[ing]" the sixth-grade teachers. 	(Id. at 73:9–19.) 	At that
time, all of the sixth-grade teachers were female. 	(Id. at 71:1–2.) 	Sedgwick
understood Harpe to mean that he felt the teachers were always "on red," "always
challenging him," and he was "going to get [them] in line." (Id. at 73:9–19.)
In 2019, in order to avoid Harpe's negative interactions with the sixth-grade
faculty, Sedgwick transitioned to teaching eighth graders in computer applications.
(Id. at 58:8–19; Pl.'s Resp. at 1, ECF No. 33.) At the time, Sedgwick did not feel that
Harpe was targeting her, but was targeting the sixth-grade team. (Sedgwick Dep. at
58:8–19, ECF No. 33-1.) When Sedgwick became the union's building representative,
serving 	as 	a 	liaison 	between 	the 	union 	members 	in 	the 	building 	and 	the
administration, (id. at 18:2–17, 57:11–18; Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 1; Answer ¶ 9, ECF
No. 12), tensions developed between Sedgwick and Harpe, (Sedgwick Dep. 32:19–23,
ECF No. 33-1 ("Prior to my becoming a building rep, my relationship with [Harpe], it
seemed fine. 	But after becoming a building rep, that's when I feel that there was a
kind of a shift.")).
Sedgwick and Beth Heavin, the other building representative and a sixth-grade
teacher, had monthly meetings with Harpe and the assistant principal. (Heavin Decl.
¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 33-2; Sedgwick Dep. 20:8–21:3, ECF No. 33-1; Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No.
1; Answer ¶ 9, ECF No. 12.) According to Sedgwick, the monthly meetings were often
contentious and became "hostile." (Sedgwick Dep. 23:10–19, 81:15–25, ECF No. 33-
1.) 	The meetings with Harpe were "so contentious" that the director of HR and the
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union president sat in on them for several months, and Harpe was asked to attend
other building discussion meetings to see how they were run. 	(S edgwick Dep. 81:24–
82:13, ECF No. 32-5. )
On multiple occasions in the meetings Sedgwick brought up the same issue—that
the unified arts teachers wanted "more equal prep time." (Id. at 21:20–24, 22:11–19.)
Because the issue had been raised multiple times, Harpe would "get very angry,"
raise his voice," and said, ''This has been brought up. This has been discussed. I don't
want to hear about this again. 	Don't bring up again.'" 	(Id. at 23:10–17, 24:13–14
("This has been brought up every year I have been principal.").) 	According to
Sedgwick, any time she brought a complaint to Harpe, he took it "as a personal attack
on his leadership" and "rais[ed] his voice," (id. at 26:4–8); and any meeting or
conversation with Harpe was "very strained," (id. at 34:19–24). 	In May 2023,
Sedgwick stepped down from the union building representative position because she
did not believe she was being an effective representative and could not communicate
with Harpe. (Id. at 25:24–26:8.)
When Sedgwick raised issues in meetings, Harpe would "minimize" her concerns.
(Id. at 62:3–11.) In monthly meetings, Harpe used an intimidating tone of voice and
used words to let Sedgwick know "who is in charge" and to keep her in her place. (Id.
at 50:3–15.) 	Heavin witnessed numerous occasions when Harpe raised his voice at
Sedgwick to the point of yelling at her. 	(Heavin Decl. ¶¶ 2, 8, ECF No. 33-2.) 	No
male teachers or staff have complained to Heavin about abusive behavior by Harpe.
(Id. ¶ 6.)
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When asked about her relationship with Harpe outside the monthly meetings as
union building representative, Sedgwick said that any meeting or conversation with
him was "very strained." 	(Sedgwick Dep. 34:22–24, ECF No. 32-5.) 	When asked if
she thought that was related to her position as union representative, Sedgwick
answered, "It's hard to say. 	I really don't know." 	(Id. at 34:25–35:2.) 	Sedgwick
testified that Harpe never said anything to her that was based upon her sex and never
said anything derogatory about women. (Sedgwick Dep. 160:13–161:3, ECF No. 32-
5.) 	Any critical comments he made about other female teachers "were made in
reference to their effectiveness." (Id. at 161:17–162:23.)
In August 2023, Sedgwick believed there was a medical emergency when a student
in her classroom began convulsing and falling out of her chair. (Sedgwick Dep. 88:2–
14, ECF No. 33-1.) 	Sedgwick activated the Centegix emergency system by pressing
a button on an electronic badge, alerting the school administration and a school
resource 	officer 	of 	a 	medical 	emergency; 	the 	resource 	officer 	and 	school
administrators arrived at the classroom in response. (Id. at 83:23–84:14, 88:2–91:8.)
When the school social worker arrived, she said the situation was not an emergency
and told Sedgwick that she should not have pushed the button. (Id. at 92:9–93:14.)
Sedgwick asked for clarification on use of the Centegix system, which prompted a
late August/early September meeting with Harpe and two other teachers. 	(Id. at
89:4–7, 95:9–18, 141:2–20.) In the meeting, Harpe explained that the police felt they
were being dispatched unnecessarily and requested that the teachers use the
emergency button only for true emergencies. (Id. at 98:21–99:20.) He told Sedgwick
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that she should not have pushed the emergency button and that she should be
mindful of whether the situation is a true emergency. (Id. at 128:4–16, ECF No. 32-
5.) 	Nonetheless, Sedgwick thought there was a lack of clarity regarding use of the
Centegix system. (Id. at 141:24–142:4.)
After that meeting, Sedgwick reached out to the union's co-president, David
Lawson, to share her concerns about the Centegix protocol and the incident in her
classroom. (Id. at 101:24–103:2, 108:24–109:9, ECF No. 33-1.) She reported that ten
minutes passed before anyone from the school arrived in her classroom, (id. 104:1–
16); this was not accurate—video from the incident shows that the school responded
within two minutes, (id. at 104:22–25). 	Sedgwick later admitted she was mistaken
about the time, explaining that in the stress of the moment, it seemed like ten
minutes had elapsed. 	(Id. at 105:7–16; 105:20–23.) 	Sedgwick was unaware of the
actual amount of time until a November 2 meeting with Harpe. (Id. at 105:20–25.)
On September 7, Lawson emailed the Center Grove Superintendent and others
expressing staff concerns about Centegix and the August incident in Sedgwick's
classroom. (Id., Ex. 4, ECF No. 32-5 at 154–55.) Sedgwick, who had been blind copied
on the email, thanked Lawson for addressing the concern and wrote that teachers
were confused about when to use Centegix, "given the communication and feedback"
they recently received. 	(ECF No. 32-5 at 156.) 	She added that she would be more
"comfortable knowing that when [emergency] situations occur . . ., an administrator
will be arriving to assist within minutes." (Id.) The Superintendent replied, stating
that the incident was an isolated issue and that Harpe and the response team
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responded 	appropriately 	to 	the 	situation. 	(ECF 	No. 	32-5 	at 	152–53.) 	The
Superintendent expressed disappointment about the union "unnecessarily" copying
others on the email and asked that the union instruct its members to handle their
concerns with the building administrator. (Id.)
On November 2, Harpe called Sedgwick into his office for a meeting to discuss the
incident 	in 	Sedgwick's 	classroom 	and 	Lawson's 	email 	to 	the 	Superintendent.
(Sedgwick Dep., Ex. 4, ECF No. 32-5; Sedgwick Dep. 112:10–13.) Sedgwick describes
Harpe as "verbally aggressive" toward her. (Sedgwick Dep. 52:12–15, ECF No. 33-1.)
During the one-hour meeting Harpe was very upset and, raising his voice told
Sedgwick: "You went behind my back. This email went out to all of my superiors. . .
. 	You were attacking me[;] you were attacking my administration. 	I'm not happy
with this going out. It's full of lies." (Id. at 112:18–25.) Harpe asked Sedgwick, "Why
are you still here?" (Id. at 145:4–5.) Sedgwick said, "Excuse me?" and Harpe replied,
"Why are you still here? 	You hate this place. 	You’re miserable." 	(Id. at 52:10–20.)
Sedgwick said she was there because it was her job, and Harpe told her to consider
transferring to another school. 	(Id. at 52:21–24.) 	Harpe told Sedgwick that nobody
liked her and no one wanted to be around her. (Id. at 53:1–5.) He also said that she
breeds hostility and fosters negativity in the building. 	(Id. at 53:5–6.) 	When
Sedgwick responded that she did not have issues with anyone, Harpe told her to talk
to her peers and administrators because "everybody feels the same way about you."
(Id. at 53:7–12.)
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By this time, Sedgwick felt beat down and questioned her relationship with her
co-workers and her effectiveness as a teacher. 	(Id. at 168:3–22.) 	The next day,
Sedgwick saw her psychiatrist and was prescribed medication for work-related
anxiety. (Id. at 54:7–9, 54:21–55:12.)
Sedgwick took twelve weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
(Id. at 78:10–79:14.) 	While on leave, she filed a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Id. at 79:13–15.) When she returned
to work, Harpe avoided her. (Id. at 81:4–5.) When they crossed paths, Sedgwick said
hello, but Harpe often did not respond. (Id. at 81:5–8.) Sedgwick resigned from her
employment in October 2024 to care for her parents. (Id. at 80:3–25.)
As noted, Sedgwick alleges that Center Grove subjected her to a hostile work
environment based on her sex and age.
II. 	Legal Standard
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when "there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	"[W]hether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or
genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular
parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits." Paschall v. Tube
Processing Corp., No. 1:19-cv-04488, 2021 WL 1390350, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 13, 2021)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)).
At summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 	Khungar v. Access
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Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 2021). 	The Court cannot weigh
evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those
tasks are left to the factfinder. Jaranowski v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 72 F.4th
744, 750 (7th Cir. 2023).
III. 	Discussion
Before discussing the merits, the Court addresses the admissibility of certain
evidence and what evidence may properly be considered on summary judgment.
A. Consideration of Evidence
At summary judgment, the Court "may consider only admissible evidence."
Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A party may
not rely upon inadmissible hearsay to oppose a motion for summary judgment." Id.
"The evidence need not be admissible in form, but must be admissible in content, such
that, for instance, affidavits may be considered if the substitution of oral testimony
for the affidavit statements would make the evidence admissible at trial." Wheatley
v. Factory Card & Party Outlet, 826 F.3d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Center Grove argues Sedgwick relies on some inadmissible evidence. 	Sedgwick
cites Beth Heavin's declaration, (see, e.g., Pl.'s Resp. at 2, 7, 8, ECF No. 33), in which
Heavin attests to other female teachers' and staffs’ complaints to her that Harpe
treated them in a hostile and disrespectful manner, and male teachers' or staffs'
reports to Heavin that Harpe told them their job was "to manage the 6th grade
teachers," with Harpe stating that the sixth grade teachers were always "on red,"
(Heavin Decl. ¶¶ 4–7, ECF No. 33-2). Heavin attesting to what other teachers or staff
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told her is inadmissible hearsay because it is offered to prove the truth of the teachers'
or staffs’ assertions. Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802; see, e.g., Flanagan v. Off. of Chief Judge
of Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., Ill., 893 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the
plaintiff’s statements about what a colleague told her "were properly ignored because
they suffer from a double hearsay problem: they are statements of what . . . [the
colleague said others] had said"). 	Heavin's testimony about what other teachers or
staff told her must be made in-court, by the teachers or staff themselves, so they can
be subject to cross-examination. 	The Court does not consider the inadmissible
hearsay.
Paragraph nine of Heavin's Declaration is also inadmissible. 	There, Heavin
states: "In my opinion, Dr. Harpe treated Denise Sedgwick in a subhuman manner
throughout her employment and often minimized her importance." 	(Heavin Decl. ¶
9, ECF No. 33-2.) 	Heavin’s characterization of Harpe's treatment of Sedgwick is
inadmissible because it is a bare conclusion unsupported by any basis for her opinion.
See Tribble v. Evangelides, 670 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States
v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 2002)) ("Lay opinion most often takes the form of
a summary of firsthand sensory observations and may not provide specialized
explanations 	or 	interpretations 	that 	an 	untrained 	layman 	could 	not 	make 	if
perceiving the same acts or events.") (citation modified); United States v. Noel, 581
F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that under Rule 701(b) "a lay witness's
purpose is to inform the jury what is in the evidence, not to tell it what inferences to
draw from that evidence").
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However, parts of Heavin's declaration are admissible. 	Heavin states that no
male teachers or staff have ever approached her with complaints of abusive behavior.
(Heavin Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 33-2.) This statement is not hearsay. Rule 801 provides
that "hearsay" is an oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct that is intended
to be an assertion. The male teachers and staffs' failure to make complaints was not
intended to be an assertion. 	The Court considers that no male teachers or staff
complained to Heavin about abusive behavior by Harpe.
In paragraph eight, Heavin declares that she personally witnessed Harpe on
numerous occasions raising his voice to Sedgwick to the point of yelling at her. 	(Id.
¶ 8.) 	This is admissible because it is based on Heavin's personal observations. 	In
paragraph ten, Heavin declares that Harpe told her that Sedgwick was a "negative
force in the building." 	(Id. ¶ 10.) 	There is no hearsay problem because Heavin
personally heard Harpe's statements, which are statements by an opposing party's
agent or employee, and are not hearsay. 	Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). 	Therefore, the
Court considers paragraphs eight and ten of Heavin's declaration when assessing
Sedgwick's evidence.
Some of Sedgwick's cited deposition testimony is inadmissible hearsay. Sedgwick
says that in 2018–2020, Harpe warned three new male teachers that they would be
working with women who were always "on red" and that Harpe needed their "male
presence to come in and balance the situation." 	(Sedgwick Dep. 70:11–72:11, ECF
No. 33-1.) But Sedgwick did not hear Harpe make these comments; rather, one of the
male teachers reported them to Sedgwick. (Id.) While Harpe's comments to the male
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teachers are not hearsay, Sedgwick's assertion as to what the male teacher told her
is hearsay when offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, see Fed. R. Evid.
801, 802; see, e.g., Flanagan, 893 F.3d at 375, and will not be considered.
Similarly, Sedgwick recounts colleague Joe Shimp's apology to her for Harpe’s
treatment of her during a meeting, (Pl.'s Resp., ¶ 20, ECF No. 33 (citing Sedgwick
Dep. 62:24–63:3, ECF No. 33-1)); other colleagues' comments to Sedgwick expressing
disbelief as to how Harpe talked to her, (id. ¶ 21 (citing Sedgwick Dep. 63:13–21, ECF
No. 33-1)); and concerns expressed to her by two male teachers, (id. ¶ 22 (citing
Sedgwick Dep. 63:22–64:5, ECF No. 33-1)). 	These out-of-court statements by
Sedgwick's colleagues contain an assertion that Harpe treated Sedgwick poorly, and
the statements are being offered to prove that fact. 	Thus, they are inadmissible
hearsay and the Court does not consider them at summary judgment.
Sedgwick's testimony that Nicole Ryan was a secretary in the building who
"resigned for the way Harpe treated her," (id. ¶ 66 (citing Sedgwick Dep. 176:19–
177:13, ECF No. 33-1)), is inadmissible because Sedgwick failed to show her assertion
was based on personal knowledge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); James v. Hale, 959 F.3d
307, 315 (7th Cir. 2020) (affidavit or declaration submitted at summary judgment
must show that affiant has personal knowledge of the facts asserted).
B. Analysis of Claims
Title VII prohibits an employer from creating a hostile work environment based
on an employee's sex. Huri v. Off. of the Chief Judge of the Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 804
F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2015). "A work environment is hostile under Title VII '[w]hen
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the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 	victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment.'" 	Scaife v. U.S. Dep't of
Veterans Affs., 49 F.4th 1109, 1115 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)) (citation modified). To prove a hostile work environment
claim, a plaintiff must show: "(1) the work environment was both subjectively and
objectively offensive; (2) the harassment was based on membership in a protected
class; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer
liability." 	Id. at 1115–16. 	Hostile work environment claims under the ADEA are
analyzed the same way as Title VII hostile work environment claims. See, e.g., Brooks
v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 441–42 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Tyburski v. City of Chicago,
964 F.3d 590, 600 (7th Cir. 2020)) (assuming that hostile work environment claims
can be brought under the ADEA and applying the same framework used to analyze
such claims brought under Title VII).
In moving for summary judgment, Center Grove argues that there is no evidence
of any discriminatory animus and that Harpe and Sedgwick's conflict was nothing
more than a personality conflict. 	(Def.'s Mem. 15–17, ECF No. 32.) 	Center Grove
also argues that Sedgwick cannot establish severe or pervasive harassment. 	The
Court concludes that Sedgwick has not presented sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that the alleged harassment was based on her sex or that
the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive.1
1 Center Grove also argues there is no evidence that the alleged harassment was based
on Sedgwick's age. (Def's Mem. 16, ECF No. 32.) Sedgwick does not respond to this argument
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Although "the alleged conduct need not 'consist of pressure for sex, intimate
touching, 	or 	a 	barrage 	of 	deeply 	offensive 	sexual 	comments,' 	the 	'demeaning,
ostracizing, or even terrorizing' conduct must still be related to gender." 	Scaife, 49
F.4th at 1117 (citing EEOC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 626 (7th Cir.
2018)). Rather, "words or conduct demonstrating 'anti-female animus' can support a
sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment." Passananti v. Cook
Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC,
489 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2007)). 	A plaintiff can prevail "when the work
environment is hostile because it is 'sexist rather than sexual.'" Id.
Sedgwick's alleged harassment does not involve conduct of a sexual nature.
Instead, Sedgwick claims that Harpe was abusive, specifically that he frequently
raised his voice at and yelled at her, he used an intimidating and domineering tone
of voice, he minimized the concerns she raised, and he told Heavin that Sedgwick was
a "negative force in the building." 	And at the November 2 meeting, Harpe gave
Sedgwick an aggressive reprimand and demeaned her by saying that no one liked her
or wanted to be around her. 	He also said that she breeds hostility and fosters
negativity in the building. However, when asked if her "strained" relationship with
Harpe was related to her position as union building representative, Sedgwick
answered, "It's hard to say. 	I really don't know." 	(Sedgwick Dep. 34:22–35:2, ECF
No. 32-5.) Harpe never said anything to Sedgwick that was based upon her sex and
and she cites no evidence to suggest any challenged conduct was based on her age. 	(Pl.'s
Resp. 15, ECF No. 33.) Thus, summary judgment is granted to Center Grove on Sedgwick's
ADEA claim.
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never said anything derogatory about women. (Id. at 160:13–161:3.) And any critical
comments made by Harpe about other female teachers "were made in reference to
their effectiveness." (Id. at 161:17–162:23.) While Harpe was rude, unprofessional,
and mean, Sedgwick presents no evidence to raise a reasonable inference that his
conduct was related to her sex.
Instead, Sedgwick points to the facts that she is female; that all the sixth-grade
teachers were female when Harpe was hired as principal; that Harpe said he was
hired to "squelch" the sixth-grade teachers, which Sedgwick understood meant he felt
the teachers were always challenging him and he was going to get them "in line,"
(Sedgwick Dep. 73:9–19, ECF No. 33-1), and the absence of any complaints to Heavin
by male teachers or staff about abusive behavior by Harpe. 	This evidence is
insufficient to raise a reasonable inference that Harpe's conduct toward Sedgwick
was based on her sex.
In addition, Sedgwick has not produced evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find that the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive. 	To determine if
conduct is severe or pervasive, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, which
includes: "(1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) how offensive a
reasonable person would deem it to be; (3) whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating 	conduct 	as 	opposed 	to 	verbal 	abuse; 	(4) 	whether 	it 	unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance; and (5) whether it is directed at the
victim." 	Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1116. 	To be severe or pervasive, "the conduct must be
'extreme' considering all the circumstances." 	Rongere v. City of Rockford, 99 F.4th
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1095, 1105 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Howard v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 989 F.3d 587,
600 (7th Cir. 2021)).
Here, while Harpe’s treatment of Sedgwick was rude, unprofessional, and during
the November 2 meeting, even mean, under all the circumstances, Sedgwick's work
environment was not "extreme" or "permeated with intimidation, ridicule, and
insult." See id. Harpe frequently raised his voice at Sedgwick and yelled at her, and
he used an intimidating and domineering tone with her. 	While Sedgwick has
evidence that Harpe would "minimize" her concerns in front of her co-workers when
she raised issues in meetings, Sedgwick did not produce any evidence that the
minimization strayed beyond the professional and into personal criticism or was
otherwise humiliating. 	To be sure, Harpe attacked Sedgwick in the November 2
meeting—saying that no one liked her and that she should consider transferring to
another school. 	But that was an isolated incident. 	In sum, when considering the
totality of the circumstances, no reasonable jury could find that Sedgewick was
subjected to severe or pervasive conduct.
For these reasons, Sedgwick has presented insufficient evidence to prevail on her
hostile work environment claims, and summary judgment is granted in favor of
Center Grove.
Conclusion
Defendant's 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment, 	(ECF 	No. 	31), 	is 	granted.
Sedgwick's hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the ADEA are
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dismissed with prejudice. The Court will issue final judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58. The Clerk shall close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Date: ___________________
Distribution by CM/ECF to registered counsel of record
12/29/2025
Case 1:24-cv-00543-JRS-CSW Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:
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