Braboy v. Annie

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAMIEN BRABOY, R57995, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. 26-cv-452-DWD
)
NURSE ANNIE, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Damien Braboy, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) currently detained at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at
Menard Correctional Center. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint concerns the alleged lack of
care he received after he fell in his cell. The original complaint was dismissed for failure
to state a claim (Doc. 7), and Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 9) is now before the
Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from
a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 	28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
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The Complaint
The factual allegations in the original and amended complaints are largely similar.
Plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint that on February 13, 2024, around 2:30am he
fell and hit his head on the floor while rising to collect medication from Defendant Nurse
Annie. (Doc. 9 at 5). He alleges that Annie witnessed the event and knew he injured his
forehead and low back. Plaintiff claims that he called out to Annie asking for help, but
she told him she did not have time to assist because she had to pass out medication.
Despite Annie’s alleged refusal to help on the spot, Plaintiff also states that she called a
code 3 for a medical emergency. (Id. at 5-6). He also alleges that around 3:15am Annie
wrote a medical incident report.
Regardless of Annie’s actions, Plaintiff alleges he laid on his cell floor in pain for
nearly five hours. In the following days, he alleges he experienced blackouts, dizziness,
and headaches, among other things. 	(Id. at 6). 	He alleges he sought medical attention
but was ignored, even when he had a visible lump on his head. Plaintiff faults Annie for
exhibiting deliberate indifference to his obvious injury, and he alleges that the delay in
care caused unbearable suffering and lasting symptoms.
The key distinction is that the original complaint alleged that Annie was
accompanied by an officer who left the scene to seek medical attention for Plaintiff (Doc.
1 at 3), whereas the amended complaint now omits all mention of anyone accompanying
Annie who took action (Doc. 9).
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Analysis
An Eighth Amendment claim arising from the denial of medical care consists of
an objective and a subjective component. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439–40 (7th Cir.
2010). A plaintiff must show that he suffered from a serious medical condition (i.e., an
objective standard) and also show that each defendant responded with deliberate
indifference (i.e., a subjective standard). 	Id. 	To satisfy the subjective component, a
prisoner must demonstrate that an official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
inmate health. 	Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). 	Neither medical
malpractice, nor mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment will amount to
deliberate indifference. 	Id. 	Additionally, an inmate is not entitled to demand specific
care, and a medical professional may choose from a range of acceptable courses of care.
Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019). If an inmate alleges
a delay in treatment, he must present verifying medical evidence that the delay, and not
the medical condition itself, caused some harm. Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th
Cir. 2013). He must also show it was the defendant’s actions or inaction that caused the
delay in treatment. Walker, 940 F.3d at 964.
As with the original complaint, Plaintiff faults Nurse Annie for a single interaction
on February 13, 2024, that occurred while she was performing medication rounds in the
cellhouse. 	Generally, a single interaction with a prison employee is not enough to
establish 	deliberate 	indifference 	absent 	extreme 	circumstances. See 	e.g., Owens 	v.
Duncan, 788 F. App'x 371, 374 (7th Cir. 2019) (a single interaction with staff at sick call did
not amount to deliberate indifference); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1374 (7th Cir.
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1997) (“isolated 	instances 	of 	neglect 	… 	cannot 	support 	a 	finding 	of 	deliberate
indifference”). The Court previously dismissed the claim against Annie in part because
the officer who accompanied her left to seek care. Plaintiff has omitted this information
from the amended complaint, perhaps in an attempt to make Annie’s actions look more
egregious, but the Court is still not persuaded that Plaintiff has a viable claim against
Annie. 	Notably, in the amended complaint Plaintiff now states that Annie initiated a
code 3 for a medical emergency and prepared an incident report when she finished
medication rounds. 	Both of these actions indicate that Annie attempted a proactive
response to get Plaintiff care. That the care was ultimately not provided might amount
to negligence, but it surely does not establish that Annie exhibited a total disregard for
Plaintiff’s well-being. As such, Plaintiff cannot proceed on the Eighth Amendment claim
against Annie.
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations twice with little meaningful variation
between the pleadings, the Court finds it unnecessary to invite further amendments. See
e.g. Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022) (amendment would be futile if
plaintiff already had multiple chances to cure deficiencies); Always Towing & Recovery,
Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4 th 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2021) (courts may deny leave to amend
if an amendment would be futile); McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011)
(leave to amend shall be granted where justice so requires, but leave to amend need not
be given if an amendment to the complaint would be futile). 	As such, this case is now
dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This dismissal shall count
as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 9) is
DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 	The Clerk of Court shall enter
judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
Judge
Dugan
Digitally signed
by Judge Dugan
Date:
2026.10.13
12:00:35 -05'00'
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