Harris v. Monsanto Company et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DOUGLAS HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MONSANTO COMPANY et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 25-CV-2095-DWD
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
This case is before the Court for case management. The instant case was originally
filed in the Southern District of Illinois in July 2016, was transferred to the Roundup
Products Liability Litigation MDL in the Northern District of California, and was recently
remanded to this Court for trial following the MDL court’s Suggestion of Remand after
completion of pretrial proceedings. (Doc. 68). Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking an order
setting the case for trial as soon as possible. (Doc. 77). Monsanto does not oppose the
request to set a trial date but asks that trial be scheduled no earlier than January 2027,
citing the Supreme Court’s January 16, 2026 grant of certiorari in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell,
No. 24-1068, 2026 WL 120678, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2026), and the need to complete
additional discovery. (Doc. 78). Plaintiff has filed a reply. (Doc. 79).
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that setting this matter for trial
after the Supreme Court issues its decision in Durnell best serves the interests of judicial
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economy and fairness to the parties. Accordingly, the Court will, by separate order, set
this case for trial in 2027.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Roundup Products Liability Litigation MDL (In re Roundup Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 2741) was established in October 2016 in the Northern District of
California 	to 	centralize 	federal 	cases 	alleging 	that 	Monsanto’s 	glyphosate-based
herbicide, Roundup, causes non-Hodgkin lymphoma (“NHL”). (Doc. 68). The MDL was
prompted by the International Agency for Research on Cancer’s March 2015 classification
of glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans,” based on studies linking glyphosate
exposure to NHL. (Id.). Plaintiffs primarily assert failure-to-warn claims, alleging that
Monsanto knew or should have known of the cancer risk but failed to provide adequate
warnings, as well as 	related design-defect claims that Roundup is unreasonably
dangerous. (Id.). Thousands of cases have been filed and transferred to the MDL. Bayer,
which acquired Monsanto, began settling claims in 2020, while non-settled cases have
proceeded through coordinated pretrial proceedings in successive trial waves. (Id.).
This case was originally filed in the Southern District of Illinois on July 20, 2016
and was transferred to the MDL shortly thereafter as part of the seventh wave of cases
selected for trial preparation. (Doc. 68). Discovery was completed, Monsanto’s Daubert
motions were denied, and the case did not resolve through settlement. (Id.). It was
therefore remanded to this Court for trial. Plaintiff’s claims mirror those tried in the
MDL’s bellwether cases, particularly Hardeman v. Monsanto, which was tried in 2019 and
focused on general and specific causation of NHL, failure to warn, and product defect.
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(Id.). The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on causation and awarded compensatory
and substantial punitive damages following a bifurcated second phase. (Id.).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the liability and damages rulings in Hardeman.
Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 997 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2021). Monsanto sought certiorari,
arguing that the claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), but the Supreme Court denied review in June 2022.
Since that time, a circuit split has emerged on whether FIFRA preempts state-law
failure-to-warn claims based on labeling where the Environmental Protection Agency has
not required the warning at issue. The Ninth Circuit in Hardeman held that such claims
are not preempted, while the Third Circuit later reached the opposite conclusion in a
subsequent Roundup case. Schaffner v. Monsanto Corp., 113 F.4th 364 (3d Cir. 2024). In
light of this developing split, the MDL court observed in its Suggestion of Remand that,
if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari in a case presenting the preemption issue,
“it will be worth discussing with the parties whether the case should be stayed pending
a ruling on preemption.”(Doc. 68).
On January 16, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Monsanto Co. v.
Durnell, No. 24-1068, limited to the question: “Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act preempts a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not
required the warning.” Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068, 2026 WL 120678 (U.S. Jan.
16, 2026). A merits decision is expected by the end of the Court’s current term in June
2026. (Doc. 78).
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II. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the case has been fully worked up after nearly a decade of
litigation, that discovery is complete, and that no further discovery is necessary. He
contends that the narrow question accepted for review in Durnell will not affect this case,
particularly in light of existing Supreme Court precedent such as Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), and because at least three of his claims are not implicated by the
Durnell issue. Plaintiff maintains that the Court should apply the law as it currently
stands and set an immediate trial date to avoid further delay for a plaintiff who has
already waited nearly ten years. Monsanto asserts that the Supreme Court’s forthcoming
decision in Durnell will directly control the viability of Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims,
may require dismissal of those claims, and will significantly affect the scope of admissible
evidence at trial. Monsanto further notes that other courts have already stayed Roundup
trials pending the Durnell decision in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, and
it requests a 2027 trial setting to allow time to assess the ruling’s impact, update medical
records, complete any additional discovery, and refresh expert disclosures and pretrial
motions.
Although neither party formally seeks a stay, the Court’s authority to manage its
docket and set a trial date is guided by the same considerations that inform stay decisions.
See Texas Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 980 (7th Cir. 2005).
Courts evaluating whether to delay proceedings pending a potentially dispositive ruling
generally consider whether doing so will (1) unduly prejudice the nonmoving party, (2)
simplify the issues and streamline trial, and (3) reduce the burden of litigation on the
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parties and the court. Tel. Sci. Corp. v. Asset Recovery Sols., LLC, No. 15 C 5182, 2016 WL
47916, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2016).
Applying those considerations here, the Court finds that setting trial after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Durnell will simplify the issues and reduce the burden of
litigation on the parties and the Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
conflict among courts concerning the scope of FIFRA preemption. That conflict now
includes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 997 F.3d 941 (9th Cir.
2021), and the Third Circuit’s contrary decision in Schaffner v. Monsanto Corp., 113 F.4th
364, 398–99 (3d Cir. 2024).
Although Durnell arises from a Missouri state court decision, Durnell v. Monsanto
Co., 707 S.W.3d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 2023), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
this same conflict over the proper interpretation of FIFRA’s preemption clause. The
Court’s review is therefore directed to a question of nationwide significance that has
divided both federal and state courts. If, as Plaintiff contends, existing Supreme Court
precedent already dictated the outcome, such a conflict could not exist, and Supreme
Court review would not have been warranted.
The Court is also mindful that this action has now been remanded to the original
transferor court for trial. At this stage, federal questions are governed by the law of the
circuit in which the trial court sits, subject to the law-of-the-case doctrine for issues
previously decided by the MDL court. See McMasters v. United States, 260 F.3d 814, 819–
20 (7th Cir. 2001); Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993); Murphy
v. F.D.I.C., 208 F.3d 959, 965–966 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1,
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1983 (Korean Air Lines), 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987); § 3867 Law of the Case Doctrine
and the Effect of Transfer and Remand on Choice of Law, 15 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3867
(4th ed.).
The Court also notes that it cannot accommodate an immediate trial setting. Nor
has Plaintiff shown that a trial in 2027 will cause irreparable or substantial prejudice. By
contrast, proceeding now without the benefit of controlling guidance on a central
question of federal law risks inefficient proceedings and potentially unnecessary post-
trial motion practice or retrial.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that setting this matter for trial after the
Supreme Court issues its decision in Durnell best serves the interests of judicial economy
and fairness to the parties. The Court will, by separate order, set this case for trial in early
2027.
Once the trial date is set, the parties shall meet and confer and submit a proposed
case management and scheduling order within fourteen (14) days. The proposed order
shall identify any remaining discovery, expert updates, motion practice, or other pretrial
deadlines the parties agree are necessary in advance of the 2027 trial date, as well as any
areas of disagreement for the Court’s resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 10, 2026 	/s/ David W. Dugan
______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
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