Scott v. Tharp et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMAL D. SCOTT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KRISTOPHER 	THARP, 	STEPHEN
RIDINGS, and RACHELLE BRAUN,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:21-cv-01653-GCS
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
I NTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc.
63).1 Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Doc. 66). Based on the reason delineated below, the
Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.
On December 10, 2021, Plaintiff, Jamal Scott, an inmate in the Illinois Department
of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
deprivations of his constitutional rights at the Madison County, Illinois Jail. (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff alleges that he saw Nurse Rachell Braun for complaints of sleep apnea on
December 1, 2020. (Doc. 1). Nurse Braun told him that her husband had sleep apnea, and
1 	On June 18, 2025, the Court filed the required Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
notice informing Plaintiff of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion for
summary judgment and what is required of Plaintiff in responding to a motion for
summary judgment. (Doc. 65).
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she was sure Plaintiff did not have it. He was placed on allergy medicine and a nasal
spray.
Plaintiff submitted grievances on December 25 and 31, 2020, and January 1, 26, and
28, 2021, about his sleep apnea issues. He requested a sleep study and advised Nurse
Braun and Capt. Ridings that the medication he had been given was not helping his sleep
apnea.
Plaintiff saw a physician at Gateway Regional Medical Center on March 3, 2021,
who advised him that the allergy medicine and nasal spray would not help his condition;
he also needed a sleep study. Nurse Braun scheduled a sleep study for him on May 4,
2021. He had to sleep on a thin mat on the floor of a small attorney booth all night. Inmates
are not supposed to sleep on the floor if they are not in a boat with a mat. The Madison
County Jail has an infirmary that they only use for storage. He was charged $25 to sleep
on the floor for the sleep study. He was diagnosed with obstructive severe sleep apnea.
On June 10, 2021, Officer Miller told Plaintiff that in accordance with instructions
from Capt. Tharp, he would have to go to segregation or sleep on the floor to have a
CPAP machine. Officers Miller and Griffin (n/k/a Huber) told him he would have to
sign a refusal if he was not going to agree to sleep on the floor or go to segregation.
Plaintiff submitted a grievance on July 27, 2021, about chronic sleep apnea and the
denial of access to the CPAP machine. He requested an extension cord during the night
so he could use the CPAP machine. Capt. Ridings denied the grievance. Plaintiff
submitted another grievance on August 12, 2021, complaining about being required to
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sleep on the floor or having to go to segregation to use the CPAP machine. He again
requested an extension cord, but Capt. Tharp denied the grievance.
Plaintiff saw Nurse Braun on August 22, 2021, for complaints of waking up during
the night with tightness in his chest and feeling like he was having a heart attack. She
reiterated that he would have to sleep on the floor to use the CPAP machine and that she
was not surprised that it felt like he was having a heart attack.
On April 10, 2023, the Court conducted a threshold review of Plaintiff’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Doc. 20). Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with an Eighth
or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Braun and Ridings for exhibiting
deliberate indifference and/or acting objectively unreasonably and/or delaying medical
treatment for Plaintiff’s sleep apnea from December 2020 to March 2021 (Count 1) and an
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants Braun, Ridings and Tharp
for exhibiting deliberate indifference and/or acting objectively unreasonably in denying
Plaintiff access to a CPAP machine for treatment for his sleep apnea and/or for requiring
Plaintiff to endure unconstitutional conditions of confinement to use the CPAP machine
(Count 2). (Doc. 20).
U NDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are taken from the record and presented in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
his favor. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).
Plaintiff was booked into the Madison County, Illinois jail on September 7, 2018.
At the time of booking, Plaintiff had not been diagnosed with sleep apnea, and he did not
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have an inhaler prescribed to him. Plaintiff contends that as a young child he was
diagnosed with asthma and given an inhaler.
Between September 7, 2018, and December 1, 2020, Plaintiff did not submit any
Sick Call Slips related to breathing difficulties. However, Plaintiff maintains that he
verbally informed staff that he had asthma and sleep apnea.
On December 1, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a Sick Call Slip, reporting that his asthma
was acting up and that he believed it was causing sleep apnea. That same day, Plaintiff
saw Defendant Braun, who noted that Plaintiff had never undergone a sleep study, that
he did not have an inhaler, and that his lungs were clear. At this time, the Nurse
Practitioner was notified, and no new medical orders were issued. Plaintiff contends that
also during this visit, Defendant Braun talked about how her husband thought he had
sleep apnea and did not, and she told Plaintiff that she was sure he did not have sleep
apnea either.
Thereafter, on December 25 and December 31, 2020, Plaintiff filed grievances
complaining about a nurse visit, worsening sleep apnea, and having difficulty breathing
at night. He requested copies of his sick call slips and grievances and asked again to be
seen by medical. On December 31, 2020, Defendant Braun responded, stating Plaintiff’s
complaints had been reviewed with the Nurse Practitioner, no new orders were given,
and Plaintiff would be scheduled to see the Nurse Practitioner. Defendant Braun
mentioned that Plaintiff was treated with Claritin 10 mg and nasal spray.
On January 1, 2021, Plaintiff submitted another grievance to Defendant Ridings
and Defendant Braun stating his doctor at Windsor Medical Building thought Plaintiff
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may have sleep apnea based on his reported symptoms. However, Plaintiff was unable
to complete a sleep study because he was booked in the Madison County jail before the
scheduled study.
On January 5, 2021, the Nurse Practitioner saw Plaintiff. During this visit, Plaintiff
was provided with allergy medication and nasal spray, and he underwent a chest X-ray.
On January 10, 2021, Defendant Braun responded to Plaintiff’s grievance dated January
1, 2021, stating that Plaintiff was seen by the Nurse Practitioner on January 5, 2021, and
Plaintiff’s medical records had been requested from Windsor Medical Group. On January
16, 2021, Plaintiff submitted another Sick Call Slip requesting a COVID-19 test and
complaining that the Claritin and nasal spray were not helping his sleep apnea in that he
was waking up choking. He also noted that he had stopped breathing in his sleep.
Subsequently, Plaintiff filed grievances on January 26, and 28, 2021, reporting
episodes of stopped breathing and ineffective treatment. Defendant Braun responded to
this grievance on February 11, 2021, advising Plaintiff to submit Sick Call Slips if he felt
unwell.
Madison County Jail received Plaintiff’s medical records from Windsor Medical
on February 26, 2021. On March 2, 2021, Madison County Jail referred Plaintiff to a
pulmonologist for a sleep apnea evaluation. Plaintiff was scheduled for an appointment
on April 15, 2021, with a pulmonologist at the Gateway Pulmonology Department
(“Gateway”) to evaluate Plaintiff for sleep apnea.
Gateway ordered a home sleep study and instructed the sleep lab to contact the
nurse at Madison County Jail to arrange testing. Plaintiff completed the sleep study on
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May 4, 2021, while sleeping on the floor of an attorney booth at the Madison County Jail.
Because of the seriousness of Plaintiff’s charges, Madison County Jail did not allow
Plaintiff to spend the night at the sleep clinic. Plaintiff contends that he should not have
had to sleep on the floor as Madison County Jail has an infirmary.
Gateway diagnosed Plaintiff with obstructive sleep apnea and recommended an
in-lab titration study. On May 19, and 25, 2021, Madison County Jail coordinated with
Gateway to arrange the titration study.
On June 4, 2021, pursuant to Gateway’s recommendation, Madison County Jail
ordered CPAP titration for Plaintiff. Madison County Jail received a CPAP machine for
Plaintiff. On June 10, 2021, Plaintiff refused the CPAP treatment. Because Plaintiff’s cell
lacked electrical outlets, Plaintiff was told he would need to sleep on the floor in the
dayroom or sleep in a segregation cell so that the CPAP machine could be plugged in
while he slept. Plaintiff refused these accommodations. Plaintiff maintains he was
coerced to sign the refusal form, and it was a violation of his rights to make him sleep on
the floor or go to segregation for the rest of his time at Madison County Jail.
On July 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance requesting an extension cord to use the
CPAP machine from his cell. The next day, Defendant Ridings responded to the grievance
informing Plaintiff that an extension cord cannot be run down the block to his cell, citing
safety and security risks.
On August 12, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance complaining about being
required to sleep on the floor or go to segregation to use the CPAP machine. On August
13, 2021, Defendant Tharp responded to Plaintiff’s grievance, stating in part, that several
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accommodations had been offered to Plaintiff to use the CPAP machine, but that Plaintiff
refused the accommodations. Plaintiff stated that he did not want CPAP therapy if it
required him to sleep on the floor in the dayroom or go to segregation. Plaintiff never
changed his position while he was detained at Madison County Jail.
During his deposition, Plaintiff admitted he had no criticism of either Defendant
Braun or Defendant Ridings. He also acknowledged that Defendant Braun did not deny
him the CPAP machine. Further, Plaintiff has not been diagnosed with depression.
However, he testified that he feared for his life if he sleeps.
SUMMARY J UDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and affidavits “show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. C IV. P ROC. 56(c); Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 997
(7th Cir. 2021) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). The movant
bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 8
F.4th 557, 567 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The
Court must consider the entire record, drawing reasonable inferences and resolving
factual disputes in favor of the non-movant. See Fletcher v. Doig, 145 F.4th 756, 764 (7th
Cir. 2025) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). See also Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association
International, 5 F.4th 684, 693 (7th Cir. 2021) (stating that “we are not required to draw
every conceivable inference from the record . . . but ‘only those inferences that are
reasonable.’”) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is also appropriate if a
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plaintiff cannot make a showing of an essential element of his claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322. While the Court may not “weigh evidence or engage in factfinding[,]” it must
determine if a genuine issue remains for trial. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 651
(7th Cir. 2007).
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not simply
rest on the allegations in his pleadings; rather, he must show through specific evidence
that an issue of fact remains on matters for which he bears the burden of proof at trial.
See Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004,
1012 (7th Cir. 2018). No issue remains for trial “unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party . . . if the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–250 (citations omitted). Accord Smith v. City of Janesville, 40 F.4th
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2022); Doxtator v. O'Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 860 (7th Cir. 2022). In other
words, “inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” DiPerna v.
Chicago School of Professional Psychology, 893 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal
citation omitted). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (finding that “[t]he mere existence of
a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]”).
Instead, the non-moving party must present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the
[summary judgment] motion.” Burton v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C., 934 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir.
2019) (internal citation omitted).
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DISCUSSION
A. 	Serious Medical Needs Claim
A pretrial detainee's unconstitutional medical care claim, brought under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is analyzed according to the objective
unreasonableness inquiry laid out in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). See
Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018). A defendant violates a pretrial
detainee's due process right to constitutionally acceptable medical care if:
(1) 	there 	was 	an 	objectively 	serious 	medical 	need; 	(2) 	the 	defendant
committed a volitional act concerning the [plaintiff's] medical need; (3) that
act was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances in terms of
responding 	to 	the 	[plaintiff's] 	medical 	need; 	and 	(4) 	the 	defendant
act[ed] "purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly" with respect
to the risk of harm.
Gonzalez v. McHenry County, Illinois, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Miranda, 900
F.3d at 353ï354). "This standard requires courts to focus on the totality of facts and
circumstances faced by the individual alleged to have provided inadequate medical care
and 	to 	gauge 	objectively— 	without 	regard 	to 	any 	subjective 	belief 	held 	by 	the
individual—whether the response was reasonable." Williams v. Ortiz, 937 F.3d 936, 942
(7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
First, the parties do not dispute that sleep apnea treatment is an objectively serious
medical need. Thus, the Court focuses on whether Defendants Braun and Ridings
provided inadequate care to Plaintiff. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not produced evidence that Defendants
Braun and Ridings failed to provide him with proper medical treatment. In fact, the
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record reveals that Plaintiff was provided appropriate medical treatment; the medical
treatment simply was not the treatment Plaintiff wanted or demanded at the time.
Plaintiff’s grievances regarding his sleep apnea were promptly and appropriately
addressed. Specifically, the record reflects that Plaintiff filed Sick Call Slips and
grievances starting on December 1, 2020. That same day, Plaintiff was promptly seen by
Defendant Braun, and she noted that Plaintiff had never had a sleep study, did not have
an inhaler, and had clear lungs. Defendant Braun also spoke to the Madison County Jail
Nurse Practitioner about Plaintiff and no new orders were given at that time. Thereafter,
Plaintiff filed two more grievances at the end of December 2020, which Defendant Braun
responded to on December 31, 2020. In her response, Defendant Braun noted that the
complaints had been reviewed with the Nurse Practitioner, that no new orders were
given, and that Plaintiff would be scheduled to see the Nurse Practitioner. She also
mentioned that Plaintiff was treated with Claritin 10mg and nasal spray. Afterward,
Plaintiff submitted another grievance on January 1, 2021, stating that a previous doctor
thought he may have sleep apnea. In response to this grievance, Defendant Braun noted
Plaintiff saw the Nurse Practitioner on January 5, 2021, underwent a chest x-ray, and was
provided allergy medicine and nasal spray. Plaintiff’s medical records were also
requested from the previous doctor.
On January 16, 2021, Plaintiff submitted another Sick Call Slip regarding a COVID-
19 test and complained that the allergy medication and nasal spray were not working. He
also noted he was waking up choking and his breathing had stopped in his sleep.
Subsequently, Plaintiff filed two more grievances at the end of January 2021, reporting
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episodes 	of 	stopped 	breathing 	and 	ineffective 	treatment. 	On 	February 	11, 	2021,
Defendant Braun responded to the grievances. Madison County Jail received Plaintiff’s
outside medical records on February 26, 2021. On March 2, 2021, Madison County Jail
referred Plaintiff to a pulmonologist for a sleep apnea evaluation. Plaintiff was the
scheduled for an appointment on April 15, 2021.
Clearly, Defendants’ care of Plaintiff’s sleep apnea was timely, continuous, and
appropriate as it included a referral to a pulmonologist. Ultimately, Plaintiff underwent
a sleep study and was offered a CPAP machine for the treatment of his sleep apnea.
Despite Defendant Braun’s alleged dismissive comment about her husband’s sleep apnea
and that she did not think that Plaintiff had sleep apnea, the evidence shows that
Defendants properly monitored and treated Plaintiff’s condition. Simply put, there is no
evidence that Defendants were objectively unreasonable in their care of Plaintiff from
December 2020 to March 2021. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion for summary
judgment on Count 1.
B. 	Conditions of Confinement Claim
Conditions-of-confinement claims for pretrial detainees, which flow from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are also analyzed under an objective
standard. See Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821ï822 (7th Cir. 2019). Under this
standard, the plaintiff must show "that the conditions in [the jail] posed an objectively
serious threat to his health; that the [defendant's] response was objectively unreasonable
under the circumstances; and that [the defendant] acted purposely, knowingly, or
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recklessly with respect to the consequences of [his] actions." Mays v. Emanuele, No. 20-
2653, 853 Fed. Appx. 25, 27 (7th Cir. July 13, 2021) (citing Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 823,
827 and Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353ï354).
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds
that a reasonable jury could not infer that any of the Defendants’ responses/conduct
regarding Plaintiff’s use/access of the CPAP machine were objectively unreasonable. The
Madison County Jail obtained the CPAP machine in June 2021, and Defendants provided
Plaintiff with continual access to the CPAP machine. When the CPAP machine arrived,
Plaintiff was informed that he would have to sleep in the dayroom on the floor with his
mat or in segregation due to the lack of electrical outlets in his cell. Plaintiff immediately
refused treatment with the CPAP under these circumstances. Thereafter, Plaintiff
requested that an extension cord be run from the dayroom to his cell. Plaintiff’s request
was denied for security reasons as extension cords across blocks presented a safety and
security risk. Defendants’ actions were reasonable in that Plaintiff was provided with two
different locations/options to use the CPAP machine. Further, Plaintiff’s refusal to use
the CPAP machine in either of these locations undermines his claim that he was denied
access 	to 	the 	CPAP 	machine. 	Finally, 	Plaintiff 	was 	not 	required 	to 	endure
unconstitutional conditions to use the CPAP machine. Accordingly, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 63).
The Court FINDS in favor of Defendants Kristopher Tharp, Stephen Ridings and
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Rachelle Braun and against Plaintiff Jamal D. Scott. Further, the Court DIRECTS the
Clerk of the Court to enter judgment reflecting the same and close the case.
In an abundance of caution, and noting Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court informs
Plaintiff as follows. Plaintiff has two means of contesting this order: he may either request
this Court review this order, or he may appeal the order to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.
If Plaintiff chooses to request this Court to review the order, he should file a motion
to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Plaintiff must
file the motion within twenty-eight (28) days of the entry of judgment; the deadline cannot
be extended. See FED. R. C IV. P ROC. 59(e); 6(b)(2). The motion must also comply with Rule
7(b)(1) and state with sufficient particularity the reason(s) why the Court should
reconsider the judgment. See Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 707 (7th Cir. 2010); Talano v.
Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2001). See also Blue
v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that a party must
establish either manifest error of law or fact, or that newly discovered evidence precluded
entry of judgment to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
So long as the Rule 59(e) motion is in proper form and timely submitted, the 30-
day clock for filing a notice of appeal will be tolled. See FED. R. A PP. P ROC. 4(a)(4). The
clock will start anew once the undersigned rules on the Rule 59(e) motion. See FED. R. A PP.
P ROC. 4(a)(1)(A), (a)(4), (a)(4)(B)(ii). However, if the Rule 59(e) motion is filed outside the
28-day deadline or “completely devoid of substance,” the motion will not toll the time
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for filing a notice of appeal; it will expire 30 days from the entry of judgment. Carlson v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014); Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818, 819–
820 (7th Cir. 1977). Again, this deadline can be extended only on a written motion by
Plaintiff showing excusable neglect or good cause.
In contrast, if Plaintiff chooses to go straight to the Seventh Circuit, he must file a
notice of appeal from the entry of judgment or order appealed from within 30 days. See
FED. R. A PP . P ROC. 4(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The deadline can be extended for a short
time only if Plaintiff files a motion showing excusable neglect or good cause for missing
the deadline and asking for an extension of time. See F ED. R. A PP. P ROC. 4(a)(5)(A), (C).
See also Sherman v. Quinn, 668 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining the good cause and
excusable neglect standards); Abuelyaman v. Illinois State University, 667 F.3d 800, 807 (7th
Cir. 2011) (explaining the excusable neglect standard).
Plaintiff may appeal to the Seventh Circuit by filing a notice of appeal in this Court.
See FED. R. A PP. P ROC. 3(a). The current cost of filing an appeal with the Seventh Circuit
is $605.00. The filing fee is due at the time the notice of appeal is filed. See FED. R. A PP .
P ROC. 3(e). If Plaintiff cannot afford to pay the entire filing fee up front, he must file a
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP motion”). See FED . R. A PP. P ROC. 24(a)(1).
The IFP motion must set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See FED. R.
A PP. P ROC. 24(a)(1)(C).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 4, 2026.
_____________________________
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
Digitally signed
by Judge Sison
Date: 2026.02.04
14:33:41 -06'00'
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