Peters v. Rauner et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SCOTT PETERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CLINT TANNER, MEGAN VANPELT,
VIRGINIA CHENG, TRAVIS JAMES,
MORGAN WALKER, SHELBY HUEY,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:20-cv-689-DWD
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Declaration, Claims, and Request for Good Faith
Certificate of Appealability (Doc. 224) and Petition for Leave to File and Proceed on
Appeal In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 226). As explained below, the former Request for a
Certificate of Appealability is DENIED as moot and the latter Petition is GRANTED.
Following a review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court found the
following claim could proceed against Defendants James, Cheng, Walker, Tanner, and
VanPelt under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference
toward Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Docs. 11; 15, pg. 3). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a
Second Amended Complaint against various Defendants. Ultimately, the Court added
Defendant Huey, among others, to the Eighth Amendment claim. (Doc. 103, pg. 2). That
claim persisted against Defendants James, Cheng, Walker, Tanner, VanPelt, and Huey.
Plaintiff, who was an inmate at Menard Correctional Center, allegedly suffers from
serious physical and psychological issues that resulted in a finding of one hundred
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percent disability by the Department of Veterans Affairs. (Docs. 11 & 96). He was
previously treated with benzodiazepines for his pain, arthritis, and psychological issues.
(Docs. 11 & 96). However, beginning in July 2018, and continuing through at least
November 2018, Defendants allegedly stopped providing his medication and failed to
follow a taper-down process to minimize or reduce his withdrawals. (Docs. 11 & 96).
More specifically, on approximately July 22, 2018, Defendant James allegedly
allowed the discontinuance of Plaintiff’s prescription for Klonopin without an acceptable
weening period. (Docs. 11 & 96). Defendant Cheng allegedly refused to restart that
prescription at a full dosage. (Docs. 11 & 96). On August 3, 2018, however, Defendant
Cheng renewed the prescription at half the original dosage, which was allegedly contrary
to medical practices. (Docs. 11 & 96). Defendants VanPelt and Huey, who are mental
health professionals, allegedly refused to treat his withdrawal symptoms. (Docs. 11 & 96).
On October 25, 2018, Plaintiff saw Defendant Walker who allegedly “immediately
began to deny him his effective medication anew.” (Doc. 11). Thereafter, on November
27, 2018, “Plaintiff would…see Dr. Tanner who continued the denial of his effective
medication, starting the process anew.” (Doc. 11). As a result of the denials of medication,
Plaintiff allegedly experienced general pain, chest pain, gastrointestinal distress, muscle
tightness 	and 	aches, 	difficulty 	breathing, 	profuse 	sweating, 	blurry 	vision, 	light
sensitivity, 	anxiety, 	panic 	attacks, 	excited 	delirium, 	increased 	aggression, 	stress,
hallucinations, shaking, sleep apnea, detachment, and agitation. (Docs. 11 & 96).
On January 8, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 187
& 188). Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel assigned by the Court, filed a Response
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in Opposition to that Motion for Summary Judgment on February 7, 2025. (Doc. 189). On
February 21, 2025, Defendants filed a Reply in Support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 190). The Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
September 8, 2025. (Doc. 197). Judgment was entered on September 9, 2025. (Doc. 198).
Plaintiff, while proceeding pro se, subsequently filed various post-judgment
filings, including: (1) a Motion Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 (Doc. 202);
(2) an Objection and Motion to Show Cause for Litigant’s Attorneys to Appear and
Explain the Failure to Comply with Common Law (Doc. 211); (3) a Statement of
Additional Facts in Support of the Motion under Rule 59 (Doc. 213); and (4) a Notice and
Motion of Objection by Interference and Request for Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. 214).
Ultimately, the Court denied and overruled these Motions and Objections. (Doc. 219).
Now, while proceeding pro se, Plaintiff has filed a Declaration, Claims, and
Request for Good Faith Certificate of Appealability (Doc. 224) and Petition for Leave to
File and Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 226). Initially, the Court notes it is not
necessary for Plaintiff to receive a certificate of appealability in this case, which was filed
under § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment. See Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23 (7th Cir.
1997) 	(“[A] 	certificate 	of 	appealability…is 	not 	required 	in § 1983 litigation.”);
accord Jordan v. Sukowaty, No. 23-cv-233, 2024 WL 3261916, *1 (E.D. Wisc. July 1, 2024). For
this reason, Plaintiff’s request for a certificate of appealability is DENIED as moot.
Next, a federal court may permit a party to proceed on appeal without the full
prepayment of fees if that party is indigent and the appeal is taken in good faith. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A); Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 630-31
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(7th Cir. 2009). The party must submit an affidavit that shows an inability to pay or give
security for fees and costs, claims an entitlement to redress, and states the issues to be
appealed. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). An appeal is in good faith if it seeks review of an issue
that is not clearly frivolous, meaning a reasonable person could suppose it has some
merit. Walker, 216 F.3d at 632 (citing Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Here, the Court FINDS Plaintiff may appeal without the full prepayment of fees
due to his documented indigence and the fact that the appeal appears to be taken in good
faith. In doing so, the Court notes Plaintiff tendered an Affidavit reflecting no income or
employment, assets, cash, or bank or other financial accounts. (Doc. 226, pgs. 2-6). He also
submitted a Trust Fund Statement that reflects $25.00 in total funds, $18.60 of which are
restricted. (Doc. 226, pgs. 7-9). In other words, since Plaintiff has $6.40 available, he is
unable to pay or give security for fees and costs. (Doc. 226, pg. 9). Further, Plaintiff has
claimed an entitlement to redress, stated the issues to be appealed, and satisfied the good
faith standard with the discussion in his Declaration. (Doc. 224, pgs. 2-9).
For these reasons, the Petition for Leave to File and Proceed on Appeal In Forma
Pauperis is GRANTED. However, under § 1915(b)(1), Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial
filing fee of $32.39. The agency having custody of Plaintiff is DIRECTED to forward that
initial partial filing fee from Plaintiff’s account to the Clerk of the Court upon receipt of
this Memorandum & Order. Plaintiff shall then make monthly payments of 20% of the
preceding month’s income credited to his prison trust fund account (including all
deposits to the inmate account from any source) until the $605.00 filing and docketing fee
is fully paid. The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall forward payments from his
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account to the Clerk of the Court each time the account exceeds $10 until the $605.00 filing
fee is paid. Payments shall be mailed to: Clerk of the Court, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois, 750 Missouri Avenue, East St. Louis, Illinois 62201.
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum & Order to the
Seventh Circuit, Plaintiff, and the Trust Fund Officer at Lawrence Correctional Center.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 18, 2026
_________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
s/ David W. Dugan
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